Likewise, the PT-17 didn't.
The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war. (3 Viewers)
- Thread starter michael rauls
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Glider
Captain
I think we all recognise that no one plane (or anything else) changed the course of the war as that would imply that the benefit stayed for a long time. It didn't as countermeasures almost invariably came to reverse the situation.
In no particular order these are my thoughts, and I expect there are people who will have their own comments, but here goes.
Hellcat.
The Wildcat held the onslaught of the IJN Zero, but it was the Hellcat that turned the corner and defeated the Zero. No Japanese naval aircraft surpassed the Hellcat, at sea.
Me109E (in France)
The 109D was a very average fighter which suffered serious losses to the French airforce and would have found the Hurricane in France hard going. Even the Poles considered the Me110 to be more dangerous than the Me109D. It was the 109E that dominated the war in France. The countermeasure was of course the Spitfire, which first matched and then surpassed the 109E and later versions, with periods where the advantage switched between the two aircraft.
Fw190
Had a clear advantage over the Spit V which cause serious losses to the RAF, was matched by the arrival of the Spit IX, but it wasn't until the Spit 12 that the Fw190 was surpassed. It severely limited the RAF incursions over France in 1941/2
P38 (in the pacific)
First American fighter to dominate the IJAF with its speed, range and reliability. Germany never considered the P38 to be dominant fighter
Zero
Gave the IJN a fighter that was at least as good as the best of its adversaries plus the significant tactical advantage of its range.
P51
Similar to the Zero in that its was a fighter at least as good as its opponents but had the significant tactical advantage of an unmatched range.
Beaufighter
Was the first true nightfighter with range, performance, firepower and radar. Turned Luftwaffe night raids from being a milkrun, to a very dangerous occupation. Clearly surpassed by the Mossie, but it was the Beaufighter that turned the night battle in favour of the RAF.
B24
For the closing of the Atlantic gap.
In no particular order these are my thoughts, and I expect there are people who will have their own comments, but here goes.
Hellcat.
The Wildcat held the onslaught of the IJN Zero, but it was the Hellcat that turned the corner and defeated the Zero. No Japanese naval aircraft surpassed the Hellcat, at sea.
Me109E (in France)
The 109D was a very average fighter which suffered serious losses to the French airforce and would have found the Hurricane in France hard going. Even the Poles considered the Me110 to be more dangerous than the Me109D. It was the 109E that dominated the war in France. The countermeasure was of course the Spitfire, which first matched and then surpassed the 109E and later versions, with periods where the advantage switched between the two aircraft.
Fw190
Had a clear advantage over the Spit V which cause serious losses to the RAF, was matched by the arrival of the Spit IX, but it wasn't until the Spit 12 that the Fw190 was surpassed. It severely limited the RAF incursions over France in 1941/2
P38 (in the pacific)
First American fighter to dominate the IJAF with its speed, range and reliability. Germany never considered the P38 to be dominant fighter
Zero
Gave the IJN a fighter that was at least as good as the best of its adversaries plus the significant tactical advantage of its range.
P51
Similar to the Zero in that its was a fighter at least as good as its opponents but had the significant tactical advantage of an unmatched range.
Beaufighter
Was the first true nightfighter with range, performance, firepower and radar. Turned Luftwaffe night raids from being a milkrun, to a very dangerous occupation. Clearly surpassed by the Mossie, but it was the Beaufighter that turned the night battle in favour of the RAF.
B24
For the closing of the Atlantic gap.
pinehilljoe
Senior Airman
- 673
- May 1, 2016
I think of the Fall of 1942 as the high water mark of the Axis in all Theaters. After Guadalcanal, El Alamein, Torch, and Stalingrad the Axis never had the Strategic Initiative through the end of the War. Herman Wouk called the Fall of 1942 the "Global Waterloo". IMHO that means Allied aircraft in 1942 helped turn the Tide. The Wildcat, Dauntless, Spitfire, Hurricane, Swordfish, PBY, P-40, A-20 all contributed to turning the tide.
Shortround6
Major General
As you know I am against this one.
The few B-24s (and crews) did excellent/exceptional work and showed the utter stupidity (criminal?) of Harris denying resources to Coastal Command.
However the numbers don't add up well.
May 1943 was the peak of the U-boat war losses (?) with over twice of the number of boats lost in any previous month of the war and only few later months coming close or exceeding (?) it.
The B-24s only sank 4 boats during that month. Which is 4 more than Harris managed to destroy in all the months of bombing German bases and construction yards up until that time.
The B-24s may have hindered German operations to larger degree to than just the loses would indicate. They knew that from WW I, despite arguments by the strategic bombing school.
But there were other things going on. The Allies don't sink over twice the number of U-boats over the next deadliest month of the war from Sept 1939 to April 1943 just by luck. It was probably a combination of number of things. Some of which (code breaking?/Huff-duff?) were held secret for a number of years after the war.
Better weapons only accounted for a one/two sinkings each, better sensors got ships/aircraft into killing positions, Huff-duff and code breaking may have accounted for a few more. The Escort carrier got one or two which was certainly not a deal breaker by itself. Maybe better weather in May allowed for a better results from a few contacts? It was the total that was the deal breaker.
The B-24 may have been the most visible.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
Agreed. The Battle of the Atlantic was won primarily by the destroyers and corvettes of the RN and RCN. You can escort convoys with surface vessels alone but not with aircraft alone. Aircraft are a force multiplier but they are not the force. The pivotal convoy battles of May 1943 were fought at night without the participation of aircraft.
Anyway the weapons that won the war are the Lee Enfield and Garand rifles.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Let's not forget the Short Sunderland's contribution in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Shortround6
Major General
Here again is the British making different priorities, that are certainly dumb in retrospect.
Short Seaford, first flown in Aug 1944, production in 1945/post war.
A Sunderland with Hercules engines, a taller tail and a little fuselage stretch (?).
But Bomber command needed ALL of the Hercules engines that were not going into Beaufighters (Harris may have been gnashing his teeth at those).
Or just give 2-3 squadrons of Lancs or Halifax's to CC (losses from one bad night of BC operations) and the "gap" is closed 1-2 years early.
I would side with the SBD Dauntless partly out of sentiment, my uncle flew in them off the Sarratoga in ww2, and parly out of history. Midway was such a shock to Japan that when I was in Tokyo in 1988 the English edition of the newspaper described the Yen hitting 240 as comparable to Midway - 46 years later!
Glider
Captain
First of all I totally agree with your comments about Harris and I would add the cowardice of those above him (including Churchill) in not standing up to him. Churchill famously said that the only thing that ever really worried him, were the German U Boats. He was probably the only man who could have insisted on the transfer of Lancaster's to CC but didn't.
I can see where you are coming from but I have a slightly different opinion. The value of the B24 in the Atlantic Gap wasn't so much the losses they caused, it was their presence. The escort could capture a estimate of where the U Boat might be from Radar, Huff Duff, whatever and direct the B24 to investigate. This did a few things: -
a) the contact could be investigated further away from the convoy.
b) It would be done in a fraction of the time needed for an escort to check
c) The escort cover for the convoy would remain intact
d) Improved the morale of everyone in the convoy
D is often overlooked. My Grandfather was in the Merchant Navy and once said to me that once they knew they had aircover all the way, they knew that they were a lot safer and were likely to get home.
He was an amazingly lucky man being sunk once in the First World War and twice in the Second, surviving all three despite being an engineering officer.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
Aircraft should be thought of as weapons systems. The B-24s effectiveness improved dramatically with the addition of centimetric radar. Also operational research had a lot to do with improved performance. Setting depth charges to lower settings, much better navigation aids, vastly improved tactics , training, training, training. The B-24 of 1943 was a much better sub killer compared to the B-24 of 1942.
Probably the biggest factor in the success in May was the appearance of special support groups which reinforced convoys under attack. Three groups were formed ad hoc by borrowing 13 modern destroyers from the home fleet. A fourth was composed of a sloop and 5 of the new frigates. Interestingly the famous 2nd group of Walker was too late to join in and didn't see its first success until June.
These support groups were instrumental in winning the great convoy battles of May.
MiTasol
2nd Lieutenant
Post war the Seaford was civilianised as the Solent. It is a much bigger aircraft all round than the Sunderland. MoTaT in Auckland NZ have one of each side by side and the difference in size is very noticeable.
Shortround6
Major General
These are things that are hard to measure.
What they knew in WW I was the vanishingly low rate of losses to convoys that air escort. They also knew that flying random patrols over pretty much empty areas of ocean did very little. They might have been able to figure out the moral thing even in WW I.
Problem in WW I was that they could not figure out what did NOT get sunk by air patrols (merchant ships getting through). Convoy getting through with low or no losses didn't get the headlines that massive bomber raids got.
The B-24s had an effect, quite possible a large one in the Atlantic, in early 1943 they were still using some of the Liberator MK Is.
These may be MK IIs or later (?) of the famous No 120 Squadron. Note the engine cowls. One reason that CC even got some of these early B-24s was that they did not have turbo charged engines and lacked performance at altitude. Also only one turret, the really early ones didn't have tail turrets (?).
Just about any 4 engine plane would have done about as well, (maybe not the Stirling). CC got the planes that BC didn't want and some of the early ones were ex transports.
Now to be somewhat fair, the mid-Atlantic gap didn't exist in in 1939 or 1940 (or even 1941?) as the Germans could get pretty easy pickings close the British Isles without have to travel to the mid-Atlantic. It was only once the naval and air patrols increased in numbers and effectiveness' that the Germans moved to areas of the ocean where pickings (opposition) was easier. Of course in the early years CC thought they were getting hot stuff when they got Whitleys.
The entire submarine warfare of WW II in the first 3-4 years was under funded or not given priorities. It was hard fought by the the sailors both Naval and Merchant and too many paid for poor decisions by the men in charge.
Liberators
The first Coastal Command Liberators were 11 (10 with 20mm gun pack) LB-30B (ex B-24A) delivered in 1941 as Liberator GR.1. These were followed by 10 LB-30 conversions during 1942 as Liberator GR.II. None of these conversions had turbosupercharged engines.
There was then a batch of 11 B-24D delivered from US stocks as an emergency delivery in March/April 1942 as Liberator IIIA (delivery dates for these and subsequent deliveries are when received at Dorval in Canada. They still had to find their way to Britain to be fitted out to CC requirements)
Deliveries from RAF orders then began in April 1942 with 57 GR.III delivered until Oct 1942. These and the following GR.V were based on the B-24D airframe. It is these that feature in the photo in post #1372 above (taken at Aldergrove in March 1943, the nearest pair belong to 120 squadron & the third, with the "Dumbo" nose to 86 squadron). The GR.V was the first version fitted with centimetric radars (other than for trials and there were several different radars and radomes involved, the earliest having the "Dumbo" undernose radome) and only 4 were delivered between Aug & Dec 1942. In all 220 GR.V were delivered through until Nov 1943. So it was spring 1943 before the GR.V began to reach front line units. But the equipment fits, especially fuel tank arrangements, radar & armament, varied across the GR.III/V fleet with the result that by the end of May 1943 CC broke them down into Class A, B (with sub classes i, ii, iii) and C. And individual aircraft often had their equipment changed, so changing classification.
The CC Order of Battle for 10 May 1943 shows the following Liberator squadrons and their strengths and available numbers:-
Aldergrove:-
86 - 15/8
59 - 14/1 (This unit had converted from the Fortress IIA in Mar/Apr 1943 and was in the process of relocating to Aldergrove)
Beaulieu:-
224 - GR.V 19/5
53 - GR.III/V 2/0 (In process of converting from Whitley VII to Liberators from 11 May)
Reykjavik
120 - GRI/III 19/8
311 squadron converted to the Liberator GR.V from July & 547 from Oct 1943 to augment the Liberator force in CC.
At this time CC also had 2 squadrons of Fortress IIA on Benbecula (30 aircraft with 10 available) and 2 squadrons of Halifax at Holmsley South / ST Eval (converted from Whitley VII Dec 1942- Feb 1943. 34 aircraft with 11 available). There were also 2 operational USAAF B-24D anti-submarine squadrons (plus another 2 still to come on line). The remaining aircraft were Sunderland & Catalina flying boats and some Hudsons.
Available numbers were affected by the sortie length that these aircraft flew and the maintenance they required in between. So the number of land based LR/VLR aircraft available to CC around this time was not huge by any means.
Support Groups
While it is true that a number of destroyers were transferred from the Home Fleet to Western Approaches Command from March 1943, their usefulness was limited by NOT being equipped with centimetric radars (Type 271/272) OR HF/DF (ships allocated long term to Western Approaches had the priority for these equipments over Home Fleet destroyers), although some ships got these during their stint in WAC. And most of them received very little specialist AS training before embarking on their new tasking. There were other limitations. Lack of escort oilers meaning that these relatively thirsty short ranged destroyers had to be sent to ports periodically to refuel. And that also meant that the composition in the groups kept changing so practice as a team was limited.
Escort carriers
The were only beginning to appear in the North Atlantic with only Biter & Archer operating regularly during the March - June period. (other RN escort carriers joined convoys as protection in this period during their delivery voyages to Britain, where they then had to go into refit to bring them up to RN standards - see loss of Avenger & Dasher for the reasons why amongst others).
USN
Somewhere I have some information on USN CVE operations in theis period and their changing tactics if anyone is interested. But no time tonight.
The first Coastal Command Liberators were 11 (10 with 20mm gun pack) LB-30B (ex B-24A) delivered in 1941 as Liberator GR.1. These were followed by 10 LB-30 conversions during 1942 as Liberator GR.II. None of these conversions had turbosupercharged engines.
There was then a batch of 11 B-24D delivered from US stocks as an emergency delivery in March/April 1942 as Liberator IIIA (delivery dates for these and subsequent deliveries are when received at Dorval in Canada. They still had to find their way to Britain to be fitted out to CC requirements)
Deliveries from RAF orders then began in April 1942 with 57 GR.III delivered until Oct 1942. These and the following GR.V were based on the B-24D airframe. It is these that feature in the photo in post #1372 above (taken at Aldergrove in March 1943, the nearest pair belong to 120 squadron & the third, with the "Dumbo" nose to 86 squadron). The GR.V was the first version fitted with centimetric radars (other than for trials and there were several different radars and radomes involved, the earliest having the "Dumbo" undernose radome) and only 4 were delivered between Aug & Dec 1942. In all 220 GR.V were delivered through until Nov 1943. So it was spring 1943 before the GR.V began to reach front line units. But the equipment fits, especially fuel tank arrangements, radar & armament, varied across the GR.III/V fleet with the result that by the end of May 1943 CC broke them down into Class A, B (with sub classes i, ii, iii) and C. And individual aircraft often had their equipment changed, so changing classification.
The CC Order of Battle for 10 May 1943 shows the following Liberator squadrons and their strengths and available numbers:-
Aldergrove:-
86 - 15/8
59 - 14/1 (This unit had converted from the Fortress IIA in Mar/Apr 1943 and was in the process of relocating to Aldergrove)
Beaulieu:-
224 - GR.V 19/5
53 - GR.III/V 2/0 (In process of converting from Whitley VII to Liberators from 11 May)
Reykjavik
120 - GRI/III 19/8
311 squadron converted to the Liberator GR.V from July & 547 from Oct 1943 to augment the Liberator force in CC.
At this time CC also had 2 squadrons of Fortress IIA on Benbecula (30 aircraft with 10 available) and 2 squadrons of Halifax at Holmsley South / ST Eval (converted from Whitley VII Dec 1942- Feb 1943. 34 aircraft with 11 available). There were also 2 operational USAAF B-24D anti-submarine squadrons (plus another 2 still to come on line). The remaining aircraft were Sunderland & Catalina flying boats and some Hudsons.
Available numbers were affected by the sortie length that these aircraft flew and the maintenance they required in between. So the number of land based LR/VLR aircraft available to CC around this time was not huge by any means.
Support Groups
While it is true that a number of destroyers were transferred from the Home Fleet to Western Approaches Command from March 1943, their usefulness was limited by NOT being equipped with centimetric radars (Type 271/272) OR HF/DF (ships allocated long term to Western Approaches had the priority for these equipments over Home Fleet destroyers), although some ships got these during their stint in WAC. And most of them received very little specialist AS training before embarking on their new tasking. There were other limitations. Lack of escort oilers meaning that these relatively thirsty short ranged destroyers had to be sent to ports periodically to refuel. And that also meant that the composition in the groups kept changing so practice as a team was limited.
Escort carriers
The were only beginning to appear in the North Atlantic with only Biter & Archer operating regularly during the March - June period. (other RN escort carriers joined convoys as protection in this period during their delivery voyages to Britain, where they then had to go into refit to bring them up to RN standards - see loss of Avenger & Dasher for the reasons why amongst others).
USN
Somewhere I have some information on USN CVE operations in theis period and their changing tactics if anyone is interested. But no time tonight.
Not all round. The wingspan of the Sunderland and Seaford/Solent were exactly the same. 112ft 9.5in. The fuselage and tailplane of the Seaford were redesigned. The fuselage of the Seaford was extended by about 3ft forward of the wings. The planing bottom of the hull was completely redesigned. And the tailplane was also taller and faired into the fuselage.
Shortround6
Major General
It also took until 1944 to even trial P&W R-1830s in Sunderlands. For Australia but the British were already using the same engines in Dakota's and Catalinas (for years), didn't reach operations until Feb 1945? Main difference was that with the R-1830s the Sunderland could stay in the air with 2 engines out on one side, With 2 Pegasus engines out on one side the plane steadily lost altitude. Constant speed does not always mean fully feathering.
Basic point is that the Sunderland stayed in production from Dec 1941 to just about the end of the war with no improvement in powerplant.
The Seaford got Hercules XIX engines that were almost 70% more powerful than the Pegasus engines. But it took over 4 years.
The Lerwick got 1300hp engines (wasted them) or a bit more.
Plenty of 1375hp Hercules engines were built in in 1941-42-43 (running on 87 octane) that could have changed a bunch of things for CC and the sub war.
Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
Oribi and Offa proved to be extraordinarily useful in the pivotal battle of ONS 5.
Excerpt from:
Hell’s Highway: The Battle for Convoy ONS-5 and the Defeat of Germany’s U-boats
On 22 March 1943, the battered ships of eastbound Convoys SC122 and HX229 reached the entrance of the North Channel, and their sailors breathed a collective sigh of relief. In a running battle across the North Atlantic sea lanes, 44 of Germany’s U-boats, under the leadership of Grossadmiral Karl...
Excerpt from
From Crisis to Victory in the North Atlantic
The spring of 1943 witnessed a dramatic escalation in U-boat attacks on Allied shipping—but the tide soon turned on the wolf packs.
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Reluctant Poster
Staff Sergeant
- 1,382
- Dec 6, 2006
I posted the record of escort carriers here:
Rn vs IJN
I did some further research on Escort Carriers in the North Atlantic. The title Escort Carrier is a bit of a misnomer, as the majority of them actually served in the role of assault carrier in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific. For example 22 CVEs were used in the invasion of Okinawa...
ww2aircraft.net
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 782
- Sep 30, 2021
Except Harris was never in a position to deny resources to Coastal Command, he did effectively advocate for more resources for Bomber Command, mostly from February 1942 onwards, the more senior RAF people and the Government allocated resources.
As allied anti submarine range increased the U-boats moved further offshore, a withdrawal of target approach that hindered U-boat efficiency which goes part way to explaining the number of U-boats sunk by aircraft early in the war, but in late 1941 switched to coastal waters off the Americas until towards the end of 1942, then were diverted to North Africa before returning to the Atlantic in strength. A well there were the U-boats operating in the Arctic etc., all reducing the available Atlantic boats.
U-boat losses January to June 1942 total 11, by month July 1942 to June 1943, 12, 11, 12, 16, 14, 3, 6, 22, 17, 17, 40, 19. From Germany and the Second World War volume V2. The 40 lost in May was not matched until 41 in August 1944, then the final 2 months of the war. May came as part of a series of increased losses but without as many merchant ship sinkings. According to Lloyds the top 4 months of the war for allied and neutral losses to submarines were Nov-42, 120 ships 763,509 GRT, Jun-42, 144 ships 694,953 GRT, May-42, 130 ships 617,819 GRT, Mar-43, 104 ships 601,650. Apr-43 was 55 ships 309,875 GRT, May-43, 49 ships 260,115 GRT
Harris would point out such low returns by Coastal Command would justify using the aircraft as bombers. In 1942 Bomber Command dropped under 1,000 short tons on U-Boat yards, mostly in July, plus 260 short tons on Hamburg as city and U-Boat yards. The failure to bomb the U-boat pens while they were being constructed in France was a major error, in the end Bomber Command was ordered to area bomb them. Not sure how many U-boats were sunk by Bomber Command laid mines in 1942.
Using Peter Kemp, U-Boats Destroyed, 40 losses in May 1943, 1 Atlantic 10 degrees North, 1 Biscay, 1 Caribbean, 3 Mediterranean, 32 North Atlantic, 1 Atlantic off Spain, 1 South Atlantic. Cause 2 Collision, 1 Submarine, 14 Surface forces, 20 Air attack, 1 unknown type (USN), 1 Avenger, 2 Canso, 1 Catalina, 2 Halifax, 1 Halifax/Sunderland, 4 Hudson, 4 Liberator, 4 Sunderland, 1 Swordfish, finally 1 Catalina/Surface, 1 Halifax/Surface and 1 Sunderland/Surface. 2 Fido used successfully, some U-boats scuttled after air attack upon seeing approaching surface forces. It seems clear the presence of surface and air units enhanced the effectiveness of both. Poor visibility during one of the convoy battles worked in favour of those with radar.
On average 1941 to 1945 Britain built 999.4 Hercules each month, what Harris was mostly after in 1942 was Merlins for 970 Halifax and 711 Lancaster built to end 1942. There were 630 Stirlings built by end 1942.
The Lancaster had the best performance range wise but did not have a lot of internal room to enable extra crew to be carried and to move around over the course of a long patrol. Economic cruise range is given as 2,530 miles with 2,154 gallons with 7,000 pounds of bombs, deducting 150 gallons for a reserve and somehow exchanging 5,000 pounds of bombs for extra fuel and associated tanks would add around 600 miles to the range.
The Stirling had more room than the Lancaster and apparently a (partially) water tight wing. The Sunderland I could do 2,530 miles at 141 mph at 5,000 feet using 2,034 gallons, carrying 2,000 pounds of bombs. The Stirling I could do 2,500 miles at 165 mph at 15,000 feet using 2,425 gallons, carrying 3,500 pounds of bombs. Both with a 50 minute allowance. 200 gallons is about 1,500 pounds, if carried would push the Stirling to 2,700 miles. The Sunderland III upped internal fuel to 2,552 gallons but increased drag via the mid upper turret and later radar, ignoring that drag adds an extra 690 miles, but it looks like the actual gain was under half that. If the Lancaster could close the mid Atlantic gap so could the Sunderland.
Coastal Command September 1939 strength 16 squadrons, 183 aircraft, 1 January 1943 strength 45 squadrons, 683 aircraft, the first of year strength report has 27 types of aircraft not counting what was in the FAA, PR, Met and ASR units which are ignored below,
September 1939, Anson, Hudson, London, Stranraer, Sunderland, Vildebeeste,
January 1940 Anson, Beaufort, Blenheim, Hudson, London, Stranraer, Sunderland, Vildebeeste, Whitley from Bomber Command.
January 1941 Anson, Beaufighter, Beaufort, Blenheim, Hudson, Lerwick, London, Stranraer, Sunderland, Wellington, Whitley.
January 1942 Beaufighter, Beaufort, Blenheim, Catalina, Hudson, Liberator, Northrop, Sunderland, Wellington, Whitley.
January 1943 Beaufighter, Catalina, USN Catalina, Fortress, Halifax, Halifax from Bomber Command, Hampden, Hudson, Liberator, Liberator, USN/USAAF Liberator, Northrop, Sunderland, Wellington, Whitley, Whitley from Bomber Command. The US B-24 were on Bay of Biscay patrols. The 3 RAF Liberator squadrons had 52 aircraft, 33 serviceable.
For war totals
| Sorties | hours | Average Sortie length, hours | Lost | Type |
5725 | 82065 | 14.33 | 46 | Catalina |
2069 | 16782 | 8.11 | 3 | US Catalina |
11411 | 131551 | 11.53 | 87 | Liberator |
6991 | 65740 | 9.40 | 29 | US Liberator |
14182 | 150478 | 10.61 | 95 | Sunderland |
116 | 986 | 8.50 | 5 | Lancaster |
365 | 3103 | 8.50 | 5 | BC Halifax |
3202 | 28707 | 8.97 | 39 | Halifax |
15847 | 128651 | 8.12 | 144 | Wellington |
| I | II | III | V | Total | Where |
7 | 8 | 25 | 4 | 44 | CC |
4 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 13 | BOAC |
2 | 9 | 25 | 14 | 50 | UK Repair/reserve etc. |
0 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 11 | En route from US |
1 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 13 | Middle East/Aden/Malta |
0 | 16 | 5 | 0 | 21 | India |
0 | 4 | 2 | 15 | 21 | Canada |
14 | 56 | 67 | 36 | 173 | Strength |
11 | 16 | 13 | 0 | 40 | Lost UK |
0 | 19 | 3 | 1 | 23 | Lost Overseas |
25 | 91 | 83 | 37 | 236 | Total Delivered |
As of end February 1943 the USN had received 81 PB4Y-1 direct from production, another 45 B-24D were transferred from the USAAF, not sure when. In 1942 the mid Atlantic gap was not a priority, containing the Germans as well as stopping the Japanese and forcing the U-boats out of American waters and then the Caribbean were, the latter requiring mostly medium range air power plus an overhaul of US anti submarine doctrine. By the looks of things the USAAF officially formed its first B-24 group in January 1941, the next group formed in January 1942, all up some 16 groups were formed in 1942. Though individual aircraft and squadrons were in service in the Pacific in early 1942 and the Middle East in mid 1942 the first B-24 group did not officially leave the US until July 1942. The USAAF considered it normally took 12 months to properly train a bomb group. End February 1943 the USAAF had 992 B-24 on strength.
How is giving Bomber Command resources cowardice? Harris threatened people? Bomber Command units made 116 Lancaster sorties (6 attacks) July and August 1942, 365 Halifax sorties (7 attacks) October 1942 to February 1943, and 1,848 Whitley sorties (54 attacks) August 1942 to July 1943, mostly anti submarine in the Bay of Biscay.
An unmodified Lancaster could not close the Atlantic gap, it had less range than the Sunderland, obviously more Coastal Command patrols should up U-boat losses.
Changing the Sunderland engines from the Pegasus engine was considered for a long time with various mostly British engines being proposed, as a result the Twin Wasp idea was postponed while the other alternatives were worked through. The known engineering changes for the Twin Wasp Beaufort would be a consideration. There were 21 Lerwicks built.
The official Sunderland mark V prototype ML765 was taken on charge by the RAF 31 March 44, counted as a mark III, though it has been reported it flew as a mark V in March.
Sunderland mark V unofficial prototype ML839 Mk.III Taken on RAF Charge 29 October 43, allocated to 10 Sqn RAAF on 8 December 43, coded RB-A, for conversion to mark V (R-1830 Twin Wasp replacing Pegasus XVIII engines) but not officially on strength, mentioned on 2 March 44 with work underway when a delegation of Ministry of Aircraft Production, Coastal Command, Short Brothers and Pratt & Whitney representatives visit the squadron to discuss the project.
16 March 44 Four engines and one propeller installed. The propellers are from Albemarles with 9 inches clipped off the blades and are fully feathering. Conversion now has priority over operational commitments. 5552 Fitter 2E Sgt G F Beattie is in charge of the installation.
04 May 44 First test flight of mark V, pilot Group Captain J Alexander OBE RAAF (Commanding Officer RAF Mount Batten)
01 July 44 Loaned to 10 Sqn for local and training flights.
12 September 44 First operational sortie, captained by F/Lt S T Chilcott
12 October 44 Sank at moorings during gale.
Four Sunderland production lines, Short 74 mark I May 1938 to March 1941, 23 mark II May to November 1941, 186 mark III November 1941 to September 1944, 47 mark V September 1944 to December 1946, Short & Harland 15 mark II April to December 1942, 70 mark III January 1943 to September 1944, 48 mark V October 1944 to May 1946, Short Windemere 35 mark III September 1942 to July 1944, Blackburn Dumbarton 20 mark II October 1941 to July 1942, 170 mark III July 1942 to October 1944, 60 mark V October 1944 to November 1945. 58 mark II, 461 mark III, 155 mark V, total production 748. The highest monthly output of any production line was 9. Average production May 1938 to May 1946 of 8.8 per month. B-24 production exceeded 748 per month January to July 1944 and August 1944.
Other Sunderland changes DD852 on 3 August 1943 Attacked by 7 Ju88s for about one hour, Nose gunner F/Sgt H Allan Bird killed, on the first patrol of a 10 Squadron RAAF Sunderland with four fixed forward firing Browning 0.303 inch machine guns.
January 1944, DD865 trial modification of two 0.5 inch waist guns. Also all aircraft getting twin gun front turret.
February 1944 DD865, JM684, JM721 have 0.5" waist guns.
Then there is the bigger picture. Planning for the Sunderland's successor had begun in 1939 with a series of Specs issued in 1939/40 and a further revision in March 1943. Shorts and Saro agreed to work jointly on the project. The product was the Centaurus powered Short S.35 Shetland, the prototype of which finally flew on 14 Dec 1944.
And in the 1941/42 timeframe I'm not sure where you would get the necessary volume of R-1830 engines for a Sunderland re-engining programme. With the exception of a single PBY-4 delivered in June 1939, it was Feb 1941 before production examples of the Catalina showed up for the RAF began in Britain. Only about 99 were delivered by Jan 1942, with delivery of the next batch not starting until July that year.
The Dakotas took even longer to arrive in numbers. DC-2 & DC-3 were requisitioned from various sources in the early war period, but C-47 Dakotas took a considerable time to become available in large numbers (1943?)
With the heavy demand from the US aviation industry for the type, would / could they have been made available in the numbers required under Lend Lease?
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51 and 77 Squadrons were loaned to Coastal Command and flew anti-submarine patrols (in the Whitley V) from June through October 1942 before being returned to Bomber Command.
B-24s were used in bombing operations in the Mediterranean, flying with 178 Squadron and 10/227/462/614 Squadron.
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