I liked this. It primarily concentrates on the command decisions for Allied drive to the German border up to Jan 1945. I learned a good deal.
1) Monty was not as bad a General as his detractors make him out to be. Tactically and strategeically brilliant. But his personality was terrible.
2) Ike erred in not making Antwerp and the Scheldt the main focus of allied operations after the breakout.
3) General Gavin of the 82nd Airborne blundered terribly in not seizing the bridges at Nijmegen the moment they landed and had surprise. Probably caused the failure of market garden.
4) Ike's broad front strategy was doomed to failure. Not enough supplies to keep all of the armies supplied. It would have been better to pour resources into one or two of the armies and use brute strength in numbers and fire power to punch holes in the Nazi defenses.
Perhaps. XXX Corps was slowed enough that those bridges being in enemy hands didn't change much. They didn't have the impetus to punch through very deep no matter where they went.
The smart money was on securing logistics by clearing the Scheldt before weather set in. Eisenhower should have nixed the entire plan, and that decision is indeed his fault. But Monty putting it forward in the first place kinda shows his lack of understanding too -- especially curious considering his overweening concern for logistics in the chase after Rommel in 1942, when you think about it.
You'd think he would have come to value stuff like gas and ammo being brought in from Antwerp rather than over roadways.
What i do not understand is why i do not hear anything about Ultra in connection with market garden.
And for montys brilliant desert campaign, I too would look brilliant as commander when i can read the others sides mail.