The Falklands (1 Viewer)

[comiso90]

The U.S.A. Navy and Air force. Once again...the United States bailed 'merry old England' (again)out of a jam. Without U.S.A. Naval and air support, the Brits would have been blown away. Hmm.. WW1,WW2. And here.

You mean logistical and satellite support?

It's not like the USS New Jersey pounded Port Stanley and B-52's razed Buenos Aries.. What support are you referring too? In any case I'm sure American quasi-support helped the Brits but I wouldn't say it constitutes a Bail out...

As far as WW1 and WW2 goes, is that really necessary to mention? If it wasn't for France in the Revolutionary war, We would have lost for sure ...

so what!!! what is the point of your sarcasm?

 

[pbfoot]

The U.S.A. Navy and Air force. Once again...the United States bailed 'merry old England' (again)out of a jam. Without U.S.A. Naval and air support, the Brits would have been blown away. Hmm.. WW1,WW2. And here.

What air support in WW1

 

[comiso90]

What air support in WW1

Lafayette Escadrille - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


.

 

[pbfoot]

Sorry to sidetrack this thread

 

[rogthedodge]

CB - I'm sorry to go off-topic, this is a good thread and much of the discussion has been knowledgeable, sensible and very even-handed (with national pride, deep wounds, and many casualties on both sides) it's a credit to all - until very recently..................

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@ Woods - I really think you're going to struggle here, so far you've done nothing but post badly thought out personal opinions, based on little or no evidence, and when you're challenged you ignore it and go and post tosh on another thread (I've seen your 'contribution' to the WW2 leader thread ).

Some of your previous 'insights' on this thread:

'The Argentinians did a bang-up job' ??
The Argentinian air force did well, brave lads and paid a terrible price, The Argentinian navy really pushed for the Malvinas Op and then (pilots aside) did very little of note when the lead was flying.

The Argentinian Army were good when numbers were on their side but with months to prepare they just sat there, created poor positions, and waited for the victory parade. All through the advance to Stanley UKF kept expecting to run into Argentinian patrols but didn't as the Argentinian Army didn't bother putting the work in.

Poor sods but they paid the price for inept leadership tactics. They were described by the Brits as being short on small-unit tactics, over-reliant on equipment and tied to a doctrine that promised massive support that, in the end, wasn't there as the Paras Ghurkas attacked their positions.

A 'bang-up job' ? I'd hate to see your definition of failure!

US Navy Air support ??
Woods are we talking the same war here? What exactly were you doing in 1982??

US support was limited to satellite INT (and not that much of that), transhipping facilities at Ascension (which is a UK base leased under the 50 4-stacker WW2 deal and therefore use can be claimed by the UK in times of need) and the agreement to re-stock NATO stockpiles of the advanced Sidewinder (UK had paid for these but they were 'NATO war-only' stock and therefore strictly were off-limits for a non-NATO op) [this is in my previous post if you'd bother to read]

The last was crucial and much appreciated.

There were very early discussions about the US lending UK a proper aircraft carrier but all realised it was impractical.

This support was countered by Kirkpatrick's disgraceful and partisan showing in the UN which didn't go down well here (or do her any favours in the long-run).

'Bailed out' - hardly! Assisted?, yes but that's what allies do for each other. Menwith Hill, Fylingdales, Fairford, Iraq (twice) - do these names mean anything to you?

Woods, I really don't think you're doing enough research to make a positive contribution on any of the threads on this forum.

This is a sensible, informed and grown-up forum. You're coming across as ill-informed, prejudiced and possibly too immature to enter into sensible debate.

You may not be but it's up to you to show that you're not, rather than confirming the impression you've created so far.

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CB sorry to sidetrack, hopefully we can carry on with the sensible debate soon.
FWIW UK death toll in Iraq is certainly not 4,000 - more like 260 (and rising )

 

[trackend]

I work with the ex engineering PO from HMS Endurance and he has given me some interesting info on the original onset of the conflict and the SBS Royal Marine covert incursions.

 

[polebell]

Well the question must be asked... Will you share it?

 

[trackend]

He recalls the ship being sent to deal with the scrap dealers and how they had informed the UK of the situation requiring a much larger contingent than the limit resources available and that included the marine group they picked up to swell their onboard contingent. They had encountered the Argentinian transport that had already landed a sizable force but without orders nothing was done. He told me the feed back from the powers at be in the UK was very indecisive and despite numorous requests for immediate dispatch of reinforcments it seem to fall on deaf ears.
Being an artic survey vessel she could move amongst the ice so was involved in the insertion and support of the groups on South Georgia .
The warnings for a larger invasion force had been given to London with enough time to get troops deployed but the UK was very slow in reacting (his words not mine).

 

[polebell]

This is only my opinion of the conflict:

The Argentinian pilots performed far better than anyone imagined at the time (possibly excluding Argentinians). Whilst this sounds like an oxymoron I think the Argentinians won the battle yet lost the war!? The dead and wounded from the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were bad enough, without the learnings regarding magnesium alloy, ships and missiles.

Had the Poms sold their aircraft carriers slightly earlier the war probably would not have taken place (at least you would like to think so) I remember reading in a very old flight magazine how many old planes (Victors and Vulcans) it took to get a couple of Vulcans to Port Stanley, and whilst it was possibly successful it was also quite embarrassing (the Vulcan had already been retired(?) and superseded by the Tornado)?

Most importantly there is a great clip of Argentinian and Pommy planes in San Carlos sound in this site, all credits to the author (I tried to upload it but it doesn't appear to be happening) - it's entitled: 1982_758.wmv

"Played hard - done good" applies to both parties in this instance, I think?

Does anyone else have other video clips of the war?

 

[polebell]

Thanks Trackend, when you say "scrap" are you talking from the hulks that litter the area or land based scrap?

 

[trackend]

The whaling station,
This exert from History and Diplomacy
CSC 1987
explains the crux of what was know as The South Georgia incident

Located 800 miles southeast of Stanley, South Georgia is an
isolated island approximately 150 miles in length and
characterized by a harsh winter climate. In 1982, it was the
home of a number of scientific research bases manned by
approximately thirty members of the British Antarctic Survey Team
at Grytviken In September 1979 an Argentine scrap metal dealer named
Constantine Davidoff had contracted with a firm in Edinburgh to
remove 35,000 tons of scrap metal from abandoned whaling stations
at Leith on South Georgia. Trouble began when Davidoff
inspected the whaling stations in December 1981 and escalated to
crisis proportions when his workers returned there in March 1982
to begin dismantling operations.
To understand the confusion which surrounded the South
Georgia incident, it is necessary to review some background
relating to the 1971 Communications Agreement. The agreement had
established the so-called "white card," a document which provided
the holder freedom to travel between the Islands and Argentina.
At the time of the initiation of the United Nations program of
decolonization, described in chapter 3, Britain had listed the
Falkland Islands and Dependencies (which included South Georgia)
as one of its colonies. Thus, as far as Argentina was concerned,
the holder of a "white card" could legally travel to South
Georgia as well as the main Islands. But by December 1981, when
Davidoff first visited Leith, Britain insisted that the South
Georgia was a separate colony governed directly from Britain and
administered from the Islands only for the sake of convenience.
Accordingly, a British regulation was established which required
anyone disembarking on South Georgia to first obtain official
permission from the commandant of the Antarctic Survey Team at
Grytviken. Argentine officials were apparently never formally
notified of the new status of South Georgia or of the requirement
to check in at Grytviken.
Davidoff arrived at Leith aboard the Argentine icebreaker
Almirante Irizar on 20 December 1981, completed his inspection,
and returned to Argentina. Although he had been in touch with
British embassy officials in Buenos Aires on several occasions
during 1980 and 1981, it remains unclear whether or not he was
aware of the British regulation which required him to check-in
with officials at Grytviken before going to Leith.
On 31 December, Island Governor Rex Hunt informed the
British Foreign Office of Davidoff's unauthorized visit at Leith
in South Georgia. The governor insisted Davidoff was aware of the
requirement to obtain clearance at Grytviken and succeeded in
convincing the Foreign Office to lodge a strong protest with the
Argentine government. Argentine officials subsequently rejected
the protest, claiming no knowledge of Davidoff's trip.
Davidoff apologized for the incident in person at the
British embassy in Buenos Aires on 23 February 1982. He then
stated his intent to send workers to Leith, South Georgia to
begin scrap metal dismantling operations and requested detailed
instructions to preclude any further misunderstanding. The
British ambassador requested guidance from Governor Hunt. On 9
March, having not received the guidance, Davidoff formally
notified the British embassy that 41 of his salvage workers would
sail from Buenos Aires for South Georgia on 11 March aboard the
Argentine naval supply ship Bahia Buen Suceso and remain there
for four months. On 11 March, having still not received the
guidance, the salvage crew sailed for South Georgia.
Arriving at Leith on 19 March 1982 with their white cards,
the salvage workers raised the Argentine flag and sang their
national anthem. Four of the British Antarctic Survey scientists
observed the Argentines and, after informing the workers that
their activities were illegal, reported the incident by radio to
Governor Hunt. On Hunt's advice, the British Foreign Office
secretly dispatched 22 Royal Marines aboard HMS Endurance from
Stanley to South Georgia with the mission of expelling any scrap
metal workers who failed to leave on their own recognizance.
The British ambassador in Buenos Aires protested the landing
of Davidoff's men at Leith and all but a dozen of the workers
left South Georgia aboard Bahia Buen Suceso sometime between 21
and 23 March. Then, on 23 March, the British Foreign Office
informed Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Mendez that Endurance
had been dispatched to expel the remaining group of Argentine
workers. Costa Mendez expressed surprise that such action had
been taken prior to exhaustion of all diplomatic solutions and
warned of a possible strong reply. He said that Bahia Buen
Suceso might yet return to retrieve the remaining workers.
A rumor now circulated among British government officials
that Admiral Anaya had ordered the use of force to prevent a
British attempt to remove the workmen by force. This rumor was
confirmed on 24 March, when over one hundred Argentine troops,
under command of Captain Alfredo Astiz, disembarked from the
armed Argentine naval survey ship Bahia Paraiso under orders to
"protect" the remaining workmen. The Royal Marines aboard
Endurance arrived in time for their commander, Lieutenant Keith
Mills, to covertly observe Astiz's men unloading arms and
supplies from Bahia Paraiso in the vicinity of the scrap metal
salvage sight. Mills reported this sighting to officials in
London, who in turn ordered him not to take any action that might
provoke an armed response, presumably because London was
frantically trying to resolve the crisis by diplomacy.
Argentine and British diplomats failed to defuse the South
Georgia crisis during the next few days. On 26 March, an
announcement was made on British television, which later proved
to be premature, that two British nuclear submarines had deployed
from Gibralter to the South Atlantic. Bahia Paraiso sailed from
South Georgia on 27 March , leaving the Argentine troops and
remaining workmen behind. Then on 28 March the Argentine press
reported the cancelation of all navy leave and the departure of a
number of naval vessels for operations at sea. By then British
intelligence had predicted the invasion of the Islands would
occur on 2 April. Prime Minister Thatcher dispatched nuclear
submarines to the South Atlantic and warned Governor Hunt of the
imminent invasion.
The warning was warranted. Operation Rosario was well
underway.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

[quote="Woods]The U.S.A. Navy and Air force. Once again...the United States bailed 'merry old England' (again)out of a jam. Without U.S.A. Naval and air support, the Brits would have been blown away. Hmm.. WW1,WW2. And here.[/quote]


This is not the thread for this discussion of WW1 or WW2. Take it to another thread...

Also I suggest you learn you history a bit more....

....the US did not save England in WW1.

 

[CharlesBronson]

CB - I'm sorry to go off-topic, this is a good thread and much of the discussion has been knowledgeable, sensible and very even-handed (with national pride, deep wounds, and many casualties on both sides) it's a credit to all - until very recently..................

No problem from my side, in regard of your post I think the Argentine army paid a high price for rely heavily in the non profesional troops, but there was some regiments like the Army Infantry 25 (Regimiento Infanteria 25) and the special section of that wich deployed some sniper .

The RI 25 wa smostly bases in Staley/Pt Argentino so it only participate in the last battles.

The BIM 1 ( 1th regiment marines) wich was the best for cold weather combat since his Patagonian training remained in Tierra del Fuego protecting the Super Etendar bases and a possible attack by Chile. ( Chile, another question that worth for a future post )

Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin. Infantry Regiment 25.

With Rear admiral Busser and Colonel Castellanos.

And yet one more of Col Seineldin, this time as portrayed by Paul Hannon in the Osprey s Men-at-Arms 250th "Argentine Forces in the Falklands".

 

[polebell]

Thanks for the detailed account Trackend, it's appreciated. I wasn't aware of how complicated/confused/politically obtuse the issues were leading up to the war.

As an amusing aside and totally off the track ( I haven't thought about this for 20+yrs) but seeing your address I am reminded that I don't have much time for people from Canvey Island as it was a copper from there (or worked there) that slept with a girlfriend of mine back in.... 1982/3!!! Maybe you would like to come to Aus and I can reciprocate?!!! Only joking!!! history eh - sh*# happens.

Good on ya!

 

[trackend]

You could give it a whirl PB but my wifes a nurse and used to handling a bit of bovver you'd have a needle in your knackers quicker than you could say stuff Rolf Harris.
I speak from experience she assisted when I had my vasectomy done

Sorry Ive gone off track if you want to read the whole seminar on the Falklands it's been put on a web site.
The Argentine Seizure Of The Malvinas [Falkland] Islands: History and Diplomacy

 

[Aussie1001]

tut tut tut ....
Bloody Copper....

 

[rogthedodge]

CB for sure there were some good Argentinian troops, perhaps there was a realisation it wasn't going to end well and only the conscripts were left to face the Paras. I wouldn't wish it on anyone to defend against that lot. MILANS WP grenades, nasty stuff to face.

Ah the Chile thing - Pinochet and the build-up of troops on the border? That only came out here after he escaped extradition to Spain. Sounds like it was a major factor in the end-result.

 

[CharlesBronson]

Ah the Chile thing - Pinochet and the build-up of troops on the border? That only came out here after he escaped extradition to Spain. Sounds like it was a major factor in the end-result

I cannot say that was a major factor in the final outcome of the war, but it influenced, there is no doubt.

You can hear that from Mrs Tatcher herself in this video.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=milMu-0tpW8

 

[plan_D]

The real losing factor for Argentina was the simple fact that they didn't attack the right ships. The transports and carriers should have been their primary targets, but they concentrated their efforts on warships which were sent out to bait them anyway.

I know several people who served in several arms in the Falklands and they all say the same; "We had no doubt once our feet were on the ground, we'd win."

You also have to remember that the war was only fought with the first wave of the British counter; I know a lad who was on Ascension Island waiting to transport to the Falklands with armour. The British Command knew that armour would be able to operate on the Falklands after the Blues and Royals proved it. The Argentinians were about to see tanks rolling toward Stanley.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

This might of been mentioned, but didn't the Argentines have a problem with "dud" 500 pound bombs? I remember reading that a number of A-4s hit their targets just to have their bombs bounce off the deck of the ship..