The importance of availabilty.

[Admiral Beez]

You can take this same logic further, and say that Japan would have been better off without the A6M Zero. Without a fighter to achieve air superiority of the vast Pacific, would Japan have even taken on the Western Allies?

Yes, Japan would have. It has to go to war or capitulate to the US' demands, which it could not do. Would Japan have done any worse or better with whatever replaces the A5M instead of the Zero? Probably not. Give Japan's 1941 navy a 1,500 hp fighter with armour, self sealing tanks and a radio.... they still lose.

But in Malaya, fielding a few squadrons of an ineffective fighter gave confidence to the politicos and Brass back in London that sending Force Z and the British, Australian and Indian was a good idea. I suggest without any pretence of fighter cover, Force Z would have stopped at Ceylon, or stayed in the Atlantic. On the flipside, make available 500 modern fighters (for example, send Canada's production of Hurricanes), even Buffaloes, plus more bombers, and you significantly impact Japan's streatefy in SEA.

 

[pinehilljoe]

In his book Blackett's War, Stephen Budiansky cover the issue of serviceablity for Coastal Command Aircraft. Flying hours of Coastal Command presented a different problem, than a squadron of fighters needing to have a planned number of aircraft available at a moments notice, but it is an Interesting read:

 

[mikewint]

Nothing for air defence in Malaya May have saved thousands of British and Imperial lives.

I certainly agree that older obsolete aircraft are at a major disadvantage when up against more modern aircraft, the Stuka comes immediately to mind, these older obsolete planes can play a significant role. Consider the Stuka as a tank killer in Russia
Consider the Battle of Midway where 41 old Douglas TBD Devastators were sent against the Japanese carriers. The torpedoes were faulty as well thus not one single hit was made and 35 of the TBDs were shot down, BUT the TBDs kept the carriers busy at low level while the dive bombers nailed them almost unseen from above.
So yes indeed a lot of American pilots died flying those old TBDs but their sacrifice made the Midway victory possible

 

[Dimlee]

Yes, good point Dimlee, the environment Stalin's Soviet Union worked in was not wholly conducive to honest problem solving.

I'll just add that not just Stalin's but the Soviet Union in all periods since 1922 to the end. In different grades, of course.

 

[Glider]

Tanks... At the same time, T-34s, especially early series with 76 mm, were of abysmal quality and numbers produced dropped down quickly without any combat losses and even before reaching a battlefield. So final availability was undermined by (lack of) reliability.
Actually, it was typical for the Soviet war machine in general. Thousands of tanks abandoned in 1941 without a single shot fired, thousands of aircraft scattered around airfields and factories without spare parts, a huge fleet of submarines (the largest in the world before WWII) without adequate repair facilities, etc.
So, above mentioned PRAM-D was completely out of balance. P was given the ultimate priority while R and D were often neglected and M was limited by lack of training and infrastructure. As a result, Availability suffered. Due to wrong feedback or incompetence, most attention was given to P on account of other elements and it went on and on... Luckily the scale of the economy allowed that. And then Lend-Lease provided equipment which was better balanced in terms of PRAMD.

I certainly go with some but not all of this. The T34 had little wrong with the design and therefore the research without which it would never have been a contender. Production was given an absolute priority which resulted in a lack of quality control, which I certainly agree with which in turn often made them unreliable. Once the quality control issues were mastered, the T34 was a very reliable tank which served in many nations, in many battlefields, over many years, with considerable success.
The experience in 1941 / early 1942 was totally different from the second part of the war. The vast majority of the tanks lost abandoned in this early period were down to a failure of logistics and leadership. The latter we all know being massively handicapped by the great purges of the 1930's which saw trained officers decimated and those left in total fear of being seen to disagree, or even comment on, any order given by a higher authority. Hard to blame the T34 for those failings.

Despite all this the T34 quickly became a successful iconic weapon for the USSR because it became available in numbers, and was effective in combat.

To believe that the delivery of the Sherman to the Soviet Union was a game changer is overstating the position. My understanding is that the Sherman didn't reach the Soviet Union in numbers until the last quarter on 1943/early 1944 and these were the M4a2 which had the 75mm gun which had similar characteristics to the Russian 76 in the T34. The Sherman 76mm arriving in mid/late 1944, However by this time the T34 was reliable and by late 1944 the T34/85 was entering service with a similar performance.
I have little doubt that the Sherman was better made and equipped but both were available in numbers and reliable, serving their respective countries well.

Look at it another way. If you had to go to war in mid 1942 what would you rather use, Matilda, Valentine, Lee/Grant, T34 or KV1 what would your choice be?

 

[pinehilljoe]

I certainly go with some but not all of this. The T34 had little wrong with the design and therefore the research without which it would never have been a contender. Production was given an absolute priority which resulted in a lack of quality control, which I certainly agree with which in turn often made them unreliable. Once the quality control issues were mastered, the T34 was a very reliable tank which served in many nations, in many battlefields, over many years, with considerable success.
The experience in 1941 / early 1942 was totally different from the second part of the war. The vast majority of the tanks lost abandoned in this early period were down to a failure of logistics and leadership. The latter we all know being massively handicapped by the great purges of the 1930's which saw trained officers decimated and those left in total fear of being seen to disagree, or even comment on, any order given by a higher authority. Hard to blame the T34 for those failings.

Despite all this the T34 quickly became a successful iconic weapon for the USSR because it became available in numbers, and was effective in combat.

To believe that the delivery of the Sherman to the Soviet Union was a game changer is overstating the position. My understanding is that the Sherman didn't reach the Soviet Union in numbers until the last quarter on 1943/early 1944 and these were the M4a2 which had the 75mm gun which had similar characteristics to the Russian 76 in the T34. The Sherman 76mm arriving in mid/late 1944, However by this time the T34 was reliable and by late 1944 the T34/85 was entering service with a similar performance.
I have little doubt that the Sherman was better made and equipped but both were available in numbers and reliable, serving their respective countries well.

Look at it another way. If you had to go to war in mid 1942 what would you rather use, Matilda, Valentine, Lee/Grant, T34 or KV1 what would your choice be?

I think the Lend Lease tanks were a game changer. T-34 Production is advertised to be about 50,000 vehicles by the end of the War. Lend Lease tank deliveries from the UK and USA totaled about 12,000, about 1 to 4 ratio. An increase of 20% in tanks to your Order of Battle would be significant. Since the Soviet Union was a closed society, its rare to find photos or movies of Lend Lease equipment, but about 1 in 4 or 1 in 5 tanks in the field were Lend Lease. I am also skeptical about the Soviet production claims for the T-34.

 

[Glider]

I think the Lend Lease tanks were a game changer. T-34 Production is advertised to be about 50,000 vehicles by the end of the War. Lend Lease tank deliveries from the UK and USA totalled about 12,000, about 1 to 4 ratio. An increase of 20% in tanks to your Order of Battle would be significant. Since the Soviet Union was a closed society, its rare to find photos or movies of Lend Lease equipment, but about 1 in 4 or 1 in 5 tanks in the field were Lend Lease. I am also skeptical about the Soviet production claims for the T-34.

I don't know the numbers but the UK tanks were nearly all Matilda's and Valentines, hardly front line tanks from 1942 onwards and the majority of the 1942 tanks from the USA were Lee Grants which again were barely front line tanks from 42 onwards. Also don't forget that Russia produced huge numbers of light tanks and thousands of SPG and Heavy tanks, KV1 and IS2 in particular, plus a handful of other types.
Re doubts of soviet production I have never heard of any serious doubts of the numbers, but am open to evidence saying otherwise.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't know the numbers but the UK tanks were nearly all Matilda's and Valentines, hardly front line tanks from 1942 onwards and the majority of the 1942 tanks from the USA were Lee Grants which again were barely front line tanks from 42 onwards. Also don't forget that Russia produced huge numbers of light tanks and thousands of SPG and Heavy tanks, KV1 and IS2 in particular, plus a handful of other types.

this is both true and not true. By 1943 the Russians were cutting way back on light tank production (and starting SP gun production) and also stopping KV tank production and starting IS 2 production.
Russian light tanks also weren't very good and many Matildas and Valentines served as "light" tanks. The Russian light tanks sometimes had to be towed by T-34s in poor conditions so their usefulness as recon equipment was rather weather dependant. Many Russian light tanks were used for infantry support where their light armor, poor guns (T-70 aside) and lack of radios made them somewhat less than ideal. The T-60 and T-70 were two man tanks the 45mm gun in the T-70 did not make up for the low rate of fire and poor vision/situational awareness of the commander/gunner/loader.
The British tanks with their 3 man turrets were more effective in combat than a simple look suggests.

 

[yulzari]

There is an argument that, whilst the sheer volume of lend lease to the Soviet Union logistically made it possible for the war in the east to be won within the timescale of OTL, the critical item that allowed the Soviet Union to maintain the war to use all of this was the British supply of armour just as the Soviets were moving their factories and had a hiatus in supply just as they had suffered enormous losses. Whatever the weaknesses of British armour supplied at the time and it's suitability for the conditions it was there and was used and bulked out the Soviet armour actually available for action at the front.

 

[Dimlee]

The experience in 1941 / early 1942 was totally different from the second part of the war. The vast majority of the tanks lost abandoned in this early period were down to a failure of logistics and leadership. The latter we all know being massively handicapped by the great purges of the 1930's which saw trained officers decimated and those left in total fear of being seen to disagree, or even comment on, any order given by a higher authority. Hard to blame the T34 for those failings.

If we speak about summer 1941, it's difficult to separate mechanical problems from the leadership (and skills overall) issues. Tanks were abandoned after they were broken (or run out of fuel) and that happened because of the wrong decisions on many levels, etc. Combination of several negative factors culminating in one of the worst military catastrophes. It was not just about T-34, of course. Similar issues were in aviation and infantry, everywhere.
Regarding the purges. Yes, they demotivated officer corps in general and degraded the status of the officer in the eyes of the soldier and increased the influence of politruks (political officer). Yet purges were just several episodes of an internal terror campaign. RKKA in 1941 was still a peasant army and the peasantry was oppressed in the late 1920s-1930s and robbed, humiliated and de-facto turned into the 2nd-grade citizens.

 

[WARSPITER]

If we speak about summer 1941, it's difficult to separate mechanical problems from the leadership (and skills overall) issues. Tanks were abandoned after they were broken (or run out of fuel) and that happened because of the wrong decisions on many levels, etc. Combination of several negative factors culminating in one of the worst military catastrophes. It was not just about T-34, of course. Similar issues were in aviation and infantry, everywhere.
Regarding the purges. Yes, they demotivated officer corps in general and degraded the status of the officer in the eyes of the soldier and increased the influence of politruks (political officer). Yet purges were just several episodes of an internal terror campaign. RKKA in 1941 was still a peasant army and the peasantry was oppressed in the late 1920s-1930s and robbed, humiliated and de-facto turned into the 2nd-grade citizens.

It is interesting how the same thing happened in Germany as the war situation deteriorated from 1942 on and the Nazi system devolved. Self preservation encouraged the
sycophants to backstab others and pretend that things were still going well. Voices of reason tend to be ignored when this manifests itself.

The end effect on availability of everything needed to prosecute a war suffers to a catastrophic level overall. The German army started off badly as far as logistics went anyway
(best way I've seen it put was "all teeth and no arse").

As has been already posted it is better to have things that can do the job (T34, Sherman) as opposed to things that simply aren't available when needed (Panther).

 

[wlewisiii]

I'll just add that not just Stalin's but the Soviet Union in all periods since 1922 to the end. In different grades, of course.

The classic joke that was told in the Gorbachev era: "They pretend to pay us; we pretend to work."

 

[Dimlee]

The classic joke that was told in the Gorbachev era: "They pretend to pay us; we pretend to work."

Yes, a good one which summarizes many faults of the system in several words. I heard it first in the early 1980s when Mr.Brezhnev was still around...

 

[glennasher]

My vote is on availability. Something is better than nothing. What good is the most advanced "does everything" aircraft if you don't have any or they're not ready to fly? One of my concerns with our latest (US) high tech fighter/bomber/stealth aircraft. There is so much high tech equipment to maintain and millions of lines of complex code....what becomes of them when you don't have the leisure and/or parts to keep them maintained to the high standards required? Aircraft so expensive that they can't be risked if someone could shoot one down?

That is a prime concern of mine, too. We have huge monies tied up in high-tech stuff. Is it too expensive to risk using it?

 

[Kevin J]

That is a prime concern of mine, too. We have huge monies tied up in high-tech stuff. Is it too expensive to risk using it?

They're like modern day battleships of the skies.

 

[Zipper730]

You can take this same logic further, and say that Japan would have been better off without the A6M Zero. Without a fighter to achieve air superiority of the vast Pacific, would Japan have even taken on the Western Allies?

I think almost anything can be taken to the extreme...

 

[pbehn]

The classic joke that was told in the Gorbachev era: "They pretend to pay us; we pretend to work."

That was also a maxim of all employees of the British Steel Corporation, along with "all for one and do f^^k all"

 

[pbehn]

I think the Lend Lease tanks were a game changer. T-34 Production is advertised to be about 50,000 vehicles by the end of the War. Lend Lease tank deliveries from the UK and USA totaled about 12,000, about 1 to 4 ratio. An increase of 20% in tanks to your Order of Battle would be significant. Since the Soviet Union was a closed society, its rare to find photos or movies of Lend Lease equipment, but about 1 in 4 or 1 in 5 tanks in the field were Lend Lease. I am also skeptical about the Soviet production claims for the T-34.

My boss in Russia was a keen model maker and expert on British tanks, well the ones supplied under lend lease, so at least it is known about today.

 

[Koopernic]

I certainly go with some but not all of this. The T34 had little wrong with the design and therefore the research without which it would never have been a contender. Production was given an absolute priority which resulted in a lack of quality control, which I certainly agree with which in turn often made them unreliable. Once the quality control issues were mastered, the T34 was a very reliable tank which served in many nations, in many battlefields, over many years, with considerable success.
The experience in 1941 / early 1942 was totally different from the second part of the war. The vast majority of the tanks lost abandoned in this early period were down to a failure of logistics and leadership. The latter we all know being massively handicapped by the great purges of the 1930's which saw trained officers decimated and those left in total fear of being seen to disagree, or even comment on, any order given by a higher authority. Hard to blame the T34 for those failings.

Despite all this the T34 quickly became a successful iconic weapon for the USSR because it became available in numbers, and was effective in combat.

To believe that the delivery of the Sherman to the Soviet Union was a game changer is overstating the position. My understanding is that the Sherman didn't reach the Soviet Union in numbers until the last quarter on 1943/early 1944 and these were the M4a2 which had the 75mm gun which had similar characteristics to the Russian 76 in the T34. The Sherman 76mm arriving in mid/late 1944, However by this time the T34 was reliable and by late 1944 the T34/85 was entering service with a similar performance.
I have little doubt that the Sherman was better made and equipped but both were available in numbers and reliable, serving their respective countries well.

Look at it another way. If you had to go to war in mid 1942 what would you rather use, Matilda, Valentine, Lee/Grant, T34 or KV1 what would your choice be?

The early T34/76 had a lot of problems as a fighting design even when the reliability issues were solved. I'd watch "the chieftans" review:

Also Bismarck's review