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Dr Norman Ramsey was the man tasked with designing the atomic bomb casings and in finding a suitable aircraft for testing and actual delivery. It is very clear from the historical record that Ramsey favoured the Lancaster, and that his research led him to conclude that only two Allied bombers were suitable to carry the proposed weapons, the B-29 and the Lancaster. Ramsey conferred with Roy Chadwick, the designer of the Lancaster and showed him drawings of the proposed bomb casings including FAT MAN, the implosion bomb, and was assured by Chadwick that the Lancaster could accommodate either bomb design:
"The person at Los Alamos with who, Wilson primarily worked was Norman F. Ramsey.
Ramsey, son of an army officer, received a Ph.D. in physics from Columbia in 1939, and
was drafted to work at the MTT Radiation Lab the following year."" After some time in
Cambridge he came to Washington to work in Stimson's office on Army Alr Forces
projects for Edward Lindley Bowles, a consultant to the secretary. Ramsey's combination of
expertise in physics and aerodynamics made him a prime candidate for Los Alamos. After
an effective recruitment appeal by Oppenheimer in March 1943, Ramsey agreed to foin the
project. Oppenheimer left t to Groves o get Stimson to agree to release Ramsey. This took
several months, because Bowles refused to let him go. Bowles and Groves were both used to
getting their way, and who would get Ramsey turned into a matter of prestige and power.
To men in powerful positions losing a bureaucratic battle, even a small one, could mean
Losing others in the future, and that must not be allowed to happen. Rather than push it to
the hilt, Bowles found a way out by asking Ramsey what he wanted to do. Ramsey said he
thought he should go to Los Alamos. To allow Bowles to save face Ramsey continued as a
consultant from the secretary of war's offce and was not an employee of the University of
California, Los Alamos's contractor.
Ramsey was assigned to head the Delivery Group of the Ordnance Division and later
served as deputy to Pasion." His immediate tasks were to design the bomb casings that
would carry the gun-assembly bomb and implosion bomb. By the end of 1943 it had
already been established that the gun-type bomb-Thin Man-would weigh on the order
of five tons. Ramsey assumed that the implosion bomb would weigh approximately the
same. Given their size and weight, there were only two possible choices for an aircraft to
deliver the weapons, the British Lancaster or the American B-29, which had begun
production in September.
Ramsey favored the Lancaster and traveled to Canada in early October 1943 to meet Roy
Chadwick, the plane's chief designer, Chadwick was in Canada to observe the initial
Lancasters coming off the production line at the Victory Aircraft Works, Milton Airdrome,
in Toronto. Ramsey showed Chadwick preliminary sketches of the large-thin-shaped and
stubby shaped-bombs and later wrote with more details.(12) Chadwick assured Ramsey that
the Lencaster could accommodate them.
When Ramsey returned, he wrote to Parsons suggesting that the Lancaster be seriously
considered and planned a memo to General Groves recommending that a modified
Lancaster be used.(13)The bomb bay was thirty-three feet long and sixty-one inches wide.
The depth was only thirty-eight inches, but this could be modified. The Lancaster's ceiling
was 27,000 feet, its speed 285 miles per hour, and takeoff required only 3,750 feet of runway
-a critical matter wherever it would be based.
Groves had not been Informed about Ramsey's preference and was at a loss for words
when he found out. It was beyond comprehension that Ramsey could consider using a
British plane to deliver an American atomic bomb. Needless to say, Groves found an ally in
General Arnold when he discussed. this matter with him. The new Boeing B29
Superfortress would carry the atomic bomb.
The first production B-29s were produced at the Boeing-Wichita plant beginning in
September 1943. One was chosen to be modified; by December 1 it was at Wright Feld for
two months of modifications. The modifications were originally called Silver Plated. but
this was soon shortened to Siverplate. On the same day General Arnold's office informed
the commanding general, Material Command, that Siverplate modifications should be
given "the greatest possible priority." The two bomb bays were made into one, and the four
twelve-foot bomb bay doors were replaced by two. twenty-seven-foot pneumatically
operated doors. At this point the length of the Thin Man bomb was expected to be at least
seventeen feet. Racks, bracing, and hoists were installed, long with the release mechanism
and mounts for a motion picture camera to record training drops.
On February 20, 1944, the first hand-modified Silverplate B-29 flew from Wright Fld to
Muros Army Air Base (now Edwards AFB) in the Mojave Desert of California. Drop tests
of the Thin Man and Fat Man dummy bombs began on March ."" Many problems were
encountered and corrected, The ballistics for the Thin Man had been partially worked out
at Dahlgren, where scale-model tests were conducted. The bulbous Fat Man shape was
another matter it proved more difficult over the next year to find the correct tall structure
design to prevent it from wobbling. As the analysts sought their solution, they made
another discovery The standard tailfins used on air force aerial bombs seemed to have a
flaw, which caused some of the fins to collapse as the bomb reached terminal velocity. This
had an obvious effect on accuracy and would have been of great interest to the Ordnance
Department. But when this information was passed on to Groves he suppressed it, not
wanting to compromise security It took another year for the Ordnance Department to find
out.
As the tests continued, further modifications and refinements were made to the aircraft
to arrive at a final standard. These mainly had to do with the bomb bay and the various
frames, hoists, braces, and release assemblies that could handle the four-and five-ton
bombs. One major change was to adopt a single lug to suspend the heavy bomb rather than
twin release lugs, which had caused problems. Once premature release of a seventy-three
hundred-pound Thin Man caused severe damage to the bomb bay doors of the single B-29
in March. After repairs were made, testing resumed in mid-June.
By the summer of 1944 the design was fairly firm, and on August 23 the Glenn L. Martin
-Nebraska Company received the contract to modify the first three B-29s of a total of
twenty-four-and selected its Fort Crook Modification Center in Omaha as the program
site. The delivery schedule was three planes by the end of September, the next eleven by
the end of the year, and the final en in January 1945, The initial fourteen were slated for
test and training, with the other ten assigned as the combat unit. As with most parts of the
Manhattan Project, schedules were accelerated and quantities increased. In February the
number of Silverplate B-29s was increased to forty-eight, and on April 18 to fifty-three-
fifty-four counting the hand-modified Muroc plane. As Los Alamos continued to change
and refine its design for the bombs, new instructions were repeatedly sent to modify the
bombers. By the end of the war forty-six planes had been completed.
(12). Norman F, Ramsey Jr. to Roy Chadwick, October 23, 1943, Folder Dr. Norman Ramsey, Box 6,
Tolman Files, RG 227/81, NARA.
(13). Memo, N. F, Ramsey to Capt. W. . Parsons, October 14, 1943, Lancaster Aircraft, Folder Dr Norman Ramsey... NARA
" (Norris, pages 316-317 Racing for the Bomb)
Lordy :rollseyes: thought I'd continue this here since it is more appropriate.
Yes, I have read these sources and have even referenced these highlighted sections in brief in my article, but it in no way changes my statement that the Americans never seriously considered the Lancaster for carrying the Little Boy or Fat Man bombs operationally. Within the passages is the following:
"Groves had not been Informed about Ramsey's preference and was at a loss for words
when he found out. It was beyond comprehension that Ramsey could consider using a
British plane to deliver an American atomic bomb. Needless to say, Groves found an ally in
General Arnold when he discussed this matter with him. The new Boeing B29
Superfortress would carry the atomic bomb."
This is after this:
"When Ramsey returned, he wrote to Parsons suggesting that the Lancaster be seriously
considered and planned a memo to General Groves recommending that a modified
Lancaster be used.(13)"
So, we know that Ramsey wanted the Lancaster to be seriously considered, because it was not being so at the time, otherwise, why would he suggest something that was already happening?
Next, Groves, in charge of the Manhattan Project states that he was at a loss for words when he found out about Ramsey's suggestion, which means that this is the first he is hearing of it. If the Lancaster was being seriously considered, why would he react that way?
The final nail in the coffin is the last two sentences, which state that Groves found an ally in Arnold, which means he was obviously opposed to the idea and that the B-29 was to be the atom bomber. The term beyond comprehension reflects his attitude toward the suggestion.
This ties in neatly with Ramsey's own subsequent official report on the situation and he apparently agreed, emphasising that the Lancaster was to be used for trials only, while the B-29 would be the operational platform. Taken from a report that Ramsey wrote on 27 September 1945 to Brig Gen T.F. Farrell, within which is a history of Project A:
"In view of the critical shortage of B-29's it was at first proposed that a British Lancaster be used for the test work even though a B-29 would almost certainly be used as the combat ship."
Finally, we see that even Ramsey had changed his mind about the use of the Lancaster, indicating that the decision not to use it for testing was the right one, as follows:
"The Air Forces, however, wisely recommended that a B-29 be used for the test work as well, both to avoid non-standard maintenance and to accumulate experience in B-29 operations with such a bomb."
All this does is reinforce what I have maintained all along, that the Lancaster was only ever suggested in letters and conversation, with Ramsey as its biggest supporter and the origin of the suggestion, and even then he later demonstrably changed his stance on the matter in official sources. The theory that it was "seriously considered" just doesn't hold water, not when the head of the Manhattan Project and the Chief of the USAAF both rejected it outright.
Yes, just watched this. I'd never heard of this 'Black Lancaster Squadron' before and Felton's claim that no official documents exist that mentions them would make it very difficult to find out information, which would be very welcome. Felton does get a few things wrong in this. He does not mention Thin Man, the first aerial atom bomb project, which is why Ramsay suggested the Lancaster as the only bomber that could carry the bomb internally without modification. Then Felton then goes on to incorrectly state that the B-29 could not carry Little Boy and Fat Man internally without modification to its bomb bays. Thin Man was of course 17 feet long, which required a single B-29 to be modified to carry it internally, which Felton references, but Little Boy and Fat Man could fit within the B-29's bomb bay without altering it.
He also mentions that the Lancaster could carry Fat Man, but it was too wide and would require removal of its bomb doors, to say nothing of the drag factor of having it hanging under the aircraft. Little Boy would have been a cinch to carry internally by the Lancaster as we have discussed however, but by the time Thin Man was abandoned and Little Boy was being developed the Americans had ruled out the use of the Lancaster, which Felton acknowledges in his video.
His estimation of the Lancaster's range is also something of a stretch taking into consideration its warload, fuel load and performance figures. To achieve a range of over 2,000 miles as Felton states, the Lanc would have had to reduce its warload and quite probably its performance. As we've discussed here before, if you alter one factor, like increasing range, something has to give, like payload. A bigger payload means less range etc.
Would love to know more about this Black Lancaster Squadron. Sadly, Felton's video provides little more than the base and a number of aircraft...
I don't think that the Lancaster was ever considered to carry Little Boy or Fat Man. Rather it was Thin Man, the first bomb developed, which brought the Lancaster into consideration. Thin Man was very long which meant that it could not fit in a standard B-29 bomb bay.
But a B-29 was modified so that it could carry that bomb, so the Lancaster was no longer considered.
Fat Man and Little Boy could fit inside a modified standard size B-29 bomb bay, so no need to use a Lancaster for them.
Should the B-29, which had gone
into production in September 1943,
prove not feasible, Groves suggested
the British Lancaster would have to
be considered. - This displeased
Arnold, who stated emphatically that
an American-made airplane should
carry the bombs, and he promised to
make a special effort to have a B-29
available for that purpose. (3)
(3) Groves Diary, 21 Mar 44, LRG; H. H. Arnold.
Manhattan - The Army and the Atomic Bomb.
I imagine if both B-29 and the B-32 failed the Lancaster would have been considered. The Superfortress and the Dominator were both going through development issues IIRC initially. The Lancaster was a known asset.
Undeniably, as we can see by what's being posted here, it was certainly discussed by Ramsey and Groves. How the deficiencies in performance were going to be catered for remains an open question for the fantasists since it never got that far and it was never seriously investigated. It remains a tantalising what-if, but with so many caveats.
The B-32 was the backup plan. I imagine if both B-29 and the B-32 failed the Lancaster would have been considered. The Superfortress and the Dominator were both going through development issues IIRC initially. The Lancaster was a known asset.
So, this is actually contradictory to your previous post then, which clearly states that Groves disapproved of the Lancaster, now you've dug up something else, which says it may have to be considered, but let's note what is actually said, again.
"Should the B-29, which had gone into production in September 1943, prove not feasible, Groves suggested the British Lancaster would have to
be considered."
Groves believes that the Lancaster would need to be considered, not that it is being considered and only if the B-29 doesn't prove feasible, which simply supports my view that it wasn't considered. Also, there is nothing in that sentence that states that Groves actually supports the use of the Lancaster, but that it might need to be considered - not that it actually is being considered - but again, Arnold says no.
Again, letters and discussions, nothing more.
Keep them coming; soon you are going to run out of sources that continually prove my point instead of your own.
"Again, letters and discussions, nothing more." Which is the process that occurs when decisions are being made. The Lancaster was chosen by Ramsey. This is indisputable.
Groves was an engineer tasked with developing a viable nuclear weapon with a reliable delivery system. What Groves as a US Army officer personally wanted and what he, as an engineer and project manager, would recommend were two different things. Groves told Arnold that the Lancaster was on the table and would remain there unless the USAAF could make the B-29 reliable.
In a total break from convention, I ask without being snarky...
1. What would Ramsey have to do with the delivery aircraft? Wouldn't that choice be made by the U.S.A.A.F.?
2. When/where did Groves tell Arnold that the "Lancaster was on the table..."?
(1)Dr Ramsey's job at Los Alamos was to design the bomb casings and to select suitable aircraft for training and delivery - this has been explained and documented in prior posts: German Aircraft that could deliver The Bomb
(2)
Should the B-29, which had gone
into production in September 1943,
prove not feasible, Groves suggested
the British Lancaster would have to
be considered. - This displeased
Arnold, who stated emphatically that
an American-made airplane should
carry the bombs, and he promised to
make a special effort to have a B-29
available for that purpose. (3)
(3) Groves Diary, 21 Mar 44, LRG; H. H. Arnold.
Manhattan - The Army and the Atomic Bomb.
Groves was outranked by Arnold, and it appears that he was following military protocol by framing his statement as a "suggestion".
Mmm... I don't know, I see that as Groves suggesting that the Lancaster would have to be considered, meaning to me, they were not considering it and may not have any intent to do so unless the B-29 issues reached critical mass. I can see how it might be interpreted that the Lancaster was in the running, but I don't feel anything concrete was really done about it, just my way of looking at it at present, I'm always ready to reevaluate with the proper evidence though.
Thanks for the response.
The first production B-32 wasn't produced until 19 September 1944 and only a handful were produced by the end of 1944. The B-32 was never in the running.
The Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks occurred on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively, so there is 11 months for the production B-32 to be made reliable. The CW R-3350 was the biggest risk to the B-29 and B-32 program however the Allison V-3420 seems to have been a satisfactory backup that could have powered either aircraft type reliably.
The fact is that the historical record shows that the Lancaster was chosen in 1943 as more suitable for A-bomb delivery by the A-bomb's bomb casing designer.
The Lancaster was chosen by Ramsey. This is indisputable.