starling
Airman 1st Class
i agree with haztoys,those pilots did their jobs well.starling.
The Most Cost-Effective Plane of WW2
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Messy1
Master Sergeant
Midway was a combination of cracking Japan's secret code, knowing about the attack ahead of time, setting a trap for the IJN, and being in the right place at the right time to take advantage of the IJN mistake of switching their plane's armament 2 or 3 times thus losing them precious time they could not afford to lose. It was also very lucky for the USN and it's dive bombers that the IJN fighter cover was too busy going after the low flying torpedo planes that came in first, to be in a position too attack the high flying dive bombers. Luck does play into the equation, as it did in the USN carriers being out of port during Dec 7th, and as it tends to in war. But I hardly think the overall success of Midway has anything to do with one single radio. The trap was set days before!
And it most definitely was also due to the brave US pilots who took part in the attack, both those that survived, and those that gave their lives in the attack! I wanted to add this part. Too important to forget and worth mentioning lest we forget!
And it most definitely was also due to the brave US pilots who took part in the attack, both those that survived, and those that gave their lives in the attack! I wanted to add this part. Too important to forget and worth mentioning lest we forget!
Haztoys
Senior Airman
And that too...
Messy1
Master Sergeant
And I agree with you Haztoys. Good points.
Just had to re-word my post a little.
Just had to re-word my post a little.
That the USN pilots as well as the IJN pilots and sailors did a heroic job is not questioned by me - the respective cause for making it a great US victory was questioned by me - in regard to the SBD's being the reason and as such putting them forward on this thread.
Regards
Kruska
Messy1
Master Sergeant
According to this info, sounds like Nagumo and his fleet were in big trouble no matter what.
From Wikipedia
Battle of Midway - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"Admiral Nagumo, in accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time, had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive-bombers and torpedo bombers, the torpedo bombers armed with torpedoes, should any American warships be located. The dive bombers were, as yet, unarmed.[39] As a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation regarding the need for a second strike, Nagumo at 07:15 ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with general purpose contact bombs for use on land targets. This had been underway for about 30 minutes, when at 07:40 a scout plane from the cruiser Tone signaled the discovery of a sizable American naval force to the east. Nagumo quickly reversed his order and demanded the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally detected and radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force, TF 16 (the other carrier was not detected).[40]
Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand. Nagumo's seeming opportunity to hit the American ships,[41] however, was curtailed by the fact his Midway strike force would be returning shortly. They would be low on fuel and carrying wounded crewmen, would need to land promptly or ditch, losing precious aircraft and crews; there was slim chance a strike could be mounted in time. Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes.[42] Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, he would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament, as well as without fighter escort; they had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers were shot down by their own fighters [43]. Japanese carrier doctrine preferred fully constituted strikes, and in the absence of a confirmation (until 08:20) of whether the American force contained carriers, Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire.[44] In addition, the impending arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo chose to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve force, which would have by then been properly armed and ready.[45] In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher had launched beginning at 07:00, so the aircraft which would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. There was nothing Nagumo could do about it. This was the fatal flaw of Yamamoto's dispositions: it followed strictly traditional battleship doctrine.[46]"
According to this article, the American attack was launched 40 minutes before the USN fleet was discovered, and then it took another 30-40 minutes until the carrier was confirmed. With Nagumo waiting for his first wave to return, and the bumbling about with fully loaded planes and ammunition on deck, he had no chance. Based on the time frame, I do not think the radio would have played that big a part as the Japanese were all ready reloading planes on the deck, and with the first strike returning, and the 40 minute head start the American pilots had, there was no way this was going to end good for the Japanese.
From Wikipedia
Battle of Midway - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"Admiral Nagumo, in accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time, had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive-bombers and torpedo bombers, the torpedo bombers armed with torpedoes, should any American warships be located. The dive bombers were, as yet, unarmed.[39] As a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation regarding the need for a second strike, Nagumo at 07:15 ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with general purpose contact bombs for use on land targets. This had been underway for about 30 minutes, when at 07:40 a scout plane from the cruiser Tone signaled the discovery of a sizable American naval force to the east. Nagumo quickly reversed his order and demanded the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally detected and radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force, TF 16 (the other carrier was not detected).[40]
Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand. Nagumo's seeming opportunity to hit the American ships,[41] however, was curtailed by the fact his Midway strike force would be returning shortly. They would be low on fuel and carrying wounded crewmen, would need to land promptly or ditch, losing precious aircraft and crews; there was slim chance a strike could be mounted in time. Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes.[42] Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, he would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament, as well as without fighter escort; they had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers were shot down by their own fighters [43]. Japanese carrier doctrine preferred fully constituted strikes, and in the absence of a confirmation (until 08:20) of whether the American force contained carriers, Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire.[44] In addition, the impending arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo chose to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve force, which would have by then been properly armed and ready.[45] In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher had launched beginning at 07:00, so the aircraft which would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. There was nothing Nagumo could do about it. This was the fatal flaw of Yamamoto's dispositions: it followed strictly traditional battleship doctrine.[46]"
According to this article, the American attack was launched 40 minutes before the USN fleet was discovered, and then it took another 30-40 minutes until the carrier was confirmed. With Nagumo waiting for his first wave to return, and the bumbling about with fully loaded planes and ammunition on deck, he had no chance. Based on the time frame, I do not think the radio would have played that big a part as the Japanese were all ready reloading planes on the deck, and with the first strike returning, and the 40 minute head start the American pilots had, there was no way this was going to end good for the Japanese.
Oh yes, Nagumo was in trouble from the day he set sails to Midway. What I acctually do not know, is if the Japanese did actually expect USN resistance at all - not to mention by 3 carriers - at the most I think they only expected one US carrier if at all to be in the vicinity of Midway.
IIRC it was supposed to be an amphibious assault including the occupation of Midway as such. Chances would have been very high for the Japanese to succeed if not for the cracking of their code. But despite this major disadvantage, if the recon of the IJN would have been as effective as that by the USN, who knows what might have happened.
In numbers and experience they clearly outmatched the USN, which in turn makes this USN feat an outstanding victory.
Regards
Kruska
Messy1
Master Sergeant
There is a ton of info in that article on Wikipedia. Here is a little more.
"Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle also fell into disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers proceed to their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected.[25] A second attempt to use four-engine reconnaissance flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle (and thereby detect the absence or presence of the American carriers), known as "Operation K", was also thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point — a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals — was occupied by American warships (because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March).[26] Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle. Japanese radio intercepts also noticed an increase in both American submarine activity and U.S. message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. However, Japanese plans were not changed in reaction to this; Yamamoto, at sea in Yamato, did not dare inform Nagumo without exposing his position, and presumed (incorrectly) Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo.[27]"
Some more!
"Admiral Nimitz had one priceless asset: American and British cryptanalysts had broken the JN-25 code.[28] Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and his team at HYPO were able to confirm Midway as the target of the impending Japanese strike, to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle.[29] Japan's efforts to introduce a new codebook had been delayed, giving HYPO several crucial days; while it was blacked out shortly before the attack began, the important breaks had already been made.[30]
As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz was aware, for example, the vast numerical superiority of the Japanese fleet had been divided into no less than four task forces, and the escort for the main Carrier Striking Force was limited to just a few fast ships. For this reason, they knew the anti-aircraft guns protecting the carriers would be limited. Knowing the strength he faced, Nimitz calculated his three carrier decks, plus Midway island, to Yamamoto's four, gave the U.S. rough parity. (It is also true American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones.) The Japanese, by contrast, remained almost totally in the dark about their opponents even after the battle began.[31]"
"Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle also fell into disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers proceed to their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected.[25] A second attempt to use four-engine reconnaissance flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle (and thereby detect the absence or presence of the American carriers), known as "Operation K", was also thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point — a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals — was occupied by American warships (because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March).[26] Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle. Japanese radio intercepts also noticed an increase in both American submarine activity and U.S. message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. However, Japanese plans were not changed in reaction to this; Yamamoto, at sea in Yamato, did not dare inform Nagumo without exposing his position, and presumed (incorrectly) Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo.[27]"
Some more!
"Admiral Nimitz had one priceless asset: American and British cryptanalysts had broken the JN-25 code.[28] Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and his team at HYPO were able to confirm Midway as the target of the impending Japanese strike, to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle.[29] Japan's efforts to introduce a new codebook had been delayed, giving HYPO several crucial days; while it was blacked out shortly before the attack began, the important breaks had already been made.[30]
As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz was aware, for example, the vast numerical superiority of the Japanese fleet had been divided into no less than four task forces, and the escort for the main Carrier Striking Force was limited to just a few fast ships. For this reason, they knew the anti-aircraft guns protecting the carriers would be limited. Knowing the strength he faced, Nimitz calculated his three carrier decks, plus Midway island, to Yamamoto's four, gave the U.S. rough parity. (It is also true American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones.) The Japanese, by contrast, remained almost totally in the dark about their opponents even after the battle began.[31]"
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
I would not put too much faith in wikipedia.
Messy1
Master Sergeant
I have wondered about that myself Renrich.
I know this is off topic of thread. sorry. It's a interesting topic for me.
I know this is off topic of thread. sorry. It's a interesting topic for me.
MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
Most cost effective airplane of WWII?
That's easy. The Enola Gay.
That's easy. The Enola Gay.
Kevin J
Banned
Okay, so looking to the future the best bet for the USAF would be to get rid of the Thunderbolt II and replace it with the B-1B as its more cost effective. I think John MaCain would have something to say about that.
michael rauls
Tech Sergeant
- 1,679
- Jul 15, 2016
I would think if most cost-effective if defined as most amount of positive outcome for the country using for the amount of currancy invested it would have to be the p51. Half the cost of competitive designs and look at the payoff. Even if payoff so to speak were equal(which it's not) the cost to result ratio would still be only 50%. Tough to beat that. I'm also thinking the Bf 109 might be a close second here. Thats my take on it anyway
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Too much testosterone here folks, everyone is thinking about combat aircraft. The most cost-effective AIRPLANE (all encompassing) of World War II is also arguably the best airplane ever built, that being the DC-3 C-47 series.
michael rauls
Tech Sergeant
- 1,679
- Jul 15, 2016
Good point my immediate instinct was to start thinking about most damage to opposing forces for the least amount of dollars spent.
YF12A
Airman
The DC-3 was the game changer in Commercial Aviation. The first real profitable aircraft the Airlines could actually make money from, then just its' tremendous strengths in doing everything and more it was asked to do like being turned into the C-47, along with fantastic reliability and ruggedness. Which then led to the DC-4, 6 and 7 series, which alongside the Connie's, became the Swan song of the propeller Airliners. Glad to have caught the tail end of that era, thanks Dad.
Funny DC-3 story. My Mother worked at A/A from 1940 until 1960. She was on a lightly loaded DC-3 flight with Orson Welles after he had put on some weight. Mom told me he paced the aisle front to back almost the entire flight. As she was the last one off the plane and the crew knew her, they told her what an absolute pain the flight had been as they spent half the flight flying the plane and the other half constantly re-trimming it because of Welles pacing.
Funny DC-3 story. My Mother worked at A/A from 1940 until 1960. She was on a lightly loaded DC-3 flight with Orson Welles after he had put on some weight. Mom told me he paced the aisle front to back almost the entire flight. As she was the last one off the plane and the crew knew her, they told her what an absolute pain the flight had been as they spent half the flight flying the plane and the other half constantly re-trimming it because of Welles pacing.
michael rauls
Tech Sergeant
- 1,679
- Jul 15, 2016
I love that story. My grandfather worked at Douglas and was involved with the Dc3/ C47 in a small way. Always eager to hear stories involving them.
CORSNING
Tech Sergeant
I'm agreeing with FLYBOYJ. Every single C-47 that took
off with supplies or personnel was worth its weight in gold.
And definitely worth twice its weight in gold to the people
that it was delivering to. I may be very opinionated on this
subject. But if I was at point A and had to advance to point
B in order to reach victory, I can't imagine anything more
beautiful than an armada of C-47s with escorts bringing
us supplies.
AND THAT IS HOW I SEE THAT! Jeff
off with supplies or personnel was worth its weight in gold.
And definitely worth twice its weight in gold to the people
that it was delivering to. I may be very opinionated on this
subject. But if I was at point A and had to advance to point
B in order to reach victory, I can't imagine anything more
beautiful than an armada of C-47s with escorts bringing
us supplies.
AND THAT IS HOW I SEE THAT! Jeff
Last edited:
Kevin J
Banned
Everyone one has forgotten the Li-2, a re-engineered DC 2 suitable for the USSR.I'm agreeing with FLYBOYJ. Every single C-47 that took
off with supplies or personnel was worth its weight in gold.
And definitely worth twice its weight in gold to the people
that it was delivering to. I may be very opinionated on this
subject. But if I was at point A and had to advance to point
B in order to reach victory, I can't imagine anything more
beautiful than an armada of C-47s with escorts bringing
us supplies.
AND THAT IS HOW I SEE THAT! Jeff
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