The Operations Room - The Bombing of Dresden
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Just watched it.
Good one!
A book review I wrote -
The Destruction of Dresden
David Irving 1963 This printing, March 1968
287 pages with appendixes and index Ballantine Books NY
"The single biggest massacre in European history," according to this author, took place as a result of the triple-blow air raids over the night of February 13-14, 1945 when successive waves of British and American bombers bombed the Eastern German city of Dresden. In this book, the author covers so many aspects of the raid that I took four pages of notes.
Dresden was acknowledged as a cultural center for arts, music, and architectural beauty. There were wartime rumors that the city had not been bombed because of a secret deal with England – Germany would not bomb Oxford and the British would not bomb Dresden. Many Germans believed the city was safe from air attack since it had no factories making any particular war materials, though it did have small shops and an optical facility. Some RAF personnel questioned whether it was really the target, or had there been a mistake? The war was still raging, though the end was inevitable in February 1945. The Red Army was 90 miles from the city center. Evacuees fleeing the advancing Red Army had flooded the city; its hospitals were full while schools were being converted to handle more patients. Allied prisoner of war camps were in the suburbs. Prison camps in the East that were being moved were passing through the city as well.
The city had no massive air raid shelter, and in fact, searchlights and anti-aircraft guns had been moved to other parts of Germany in October the year before. It was undefended.
(The book cover's artwork is incorrect – the AA guns had been pulled out to use as anti-tank guns elsewhere.)
The residents had seen 171 false air raid alarms before that night when the RAF dropped 650,000 incendiary bombs, plus many 4,000 and 8,000 pound blockbuster bombs, on the old historic residential part of the city (not the suburbs with the rail yards and small factories).
And that was just the first wave that struck at 10:10 PM. At 1:30 AM the second wave struck – timed to interrupt the firefighting attempts and cause a fire-storm.
The American B-17s dropped their bombs just after 12 noon on the 14th (Ash Wednesday) but because 9/10ths cloud cover, their bombs (aimed at the railway yards) fell wide into residential sections. P-51 Mustangs swooped down and strafed columns and masses of people fleeing and rescue people heading in. Again, there was no anti-aircraft fire. No German night fighters met the bombers either.
One whole U.S. Bomb group bombed the wrong city. (They mistakenly bombed Prague, Czechoslovakia)
The result, according to this book, was the death of 135,000 people in one day. The results caused a furor in London and Washington, D.C. "Were terror raids being conducted or strategic bombing of industrial facilities?"
The book covers the grisly recovery and attempts to identify bodies. The well-organized Germans did their best under the circumstances. However, four buckets of gold wedding bands tagged from bodies for identification (the wearers initials and sometimes wedding dates were engraved) disappeared when the Red Army took them. As can be imagined, there was much finger pointing among the Allies. That too is covered in the book.
One thing to take away from reading this was my wondering how modern emergency preparedness measures would do under such circumstances.
The Destruction of Dresden
David Irving 1963 This printing, March 1968
287 pages with appendixes and index Ballantine Books NY
"The single biggest massacre in European history," according to this author, took place as a result of the triple-blow air raids over the night of February 13-14, 1945 when successive waves of British and American bombers bombed the Eastern German city of Dresden. In this book, the author covers so many aspects of the raid that I took four pages of notes.
Dresden was acknowledged as a cultural center for arts, music, and architectural beauty. There were wartime rumors that the city had not been bombed because of a secret deal with England – Germany would not bomb Oxford and the British would not bomb Dresden. Many Germans believed the city was safe from air attack since it had no factories making any particular war materials, though it did have small shops and an optical facility. Some RAF personnel questioned whether it was really the target, or had there been a mistake? The war was still raging, though the end was inevitable in February 1945. The Red Army was 90 miles from the city center. Evacuees fleeing the advancing Red Army had flooded the city; its hospitals were full while schools were being converted to handle more patients. Allied prisoner of war camps were in the suburbs. Prison camps in the East that were being moved were passing through the city as well.
The city had no massive air raid shelter, and in fact, searchlights and anti-aircraft guns had been moved to other parts of Germany in October the year before. It was undefended.
(The book cover's artwork is incorrect – the AA guns had been pulled out to use as anti-tank guns elsewhere.)
The residents had seen 171 false air raid alarms before that night when the RAF dropped 650,000 incendiary bombs, plus many 4,000 and 8,000 pound blockbuster bombs, on the old historic residential part of the city (not the suburbs with the rail yards and small factories).
And that was just the first wave that struck at 10:10 PM. At 1:30 AM the second wave struck – timed to interrupt the firefighting attempts and cause a fire-storm.
The American B-17s dropped their bombs just after 12 noon on the 14th (Ash Wednesday) but because 9/10ths cloud cover, their bombs (aimed at the railway yards) fell wide into residential sections. P-51 Mustangs swooped down and strafed columns and masses of people fleeing and rescue people heading in. Again, there was no anti-aircraft fire. No German night fighters met the bombers either.
One whole U.S. Bomb group bombed the wrong city. (They mistakenly bombed Prague, Czechoslovakia)
The result, according to this book, was the death of 135,000 people in one day. The results caused a furor in London and Washington, D.C. "Were terror raids being conducted or strategic bombing of industrial facilities?"
The book covers the grisly recovery and attempts to identify bodies. The well-organized Germans did their best under the circumstances. However, four buckets of gold wedding bands tagged from bodies for identification (the wearers initials and sometimes wedding dates were engraved) disappeared when the Red Army took them. As can be imagined, there was much finger pointing among the Allies. That too is covered in the book.
One thing to take away from reading this was my wondering how modern emergency preparedness measures would do under such circumstances.
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buffnut453
Captain
I treat with caution anything written by David Irving because he's a well-known holocaust denier.
While he was one of the first historians to use German records, it seems his familiarity with those records and with Germany itself means he often paints the Nazi perspective in the most positive light, even quoting Mazi propaganda as fact. His casualty figures in Dresden have been widely discredited.
The idea that the Allies were supposed to avoid buildings with blue lights on them is patently laughable. Any lights would simply aid the Allies' night navigation, and that's assuming they were clearly visible. Such a warning system would also require Berlin to tell the Allies not to bomb blue lights…and, of course, Berlin could then put blue lights in every town and city in an attempt to deter Allied attacks.
I also question his claims about POWs passing through the city. I have a relative who was a POW at Zagan in Poland and was forced-marched from 8 Feb 1945 to Frankfurt. The prisoners were put in large groups and stayed away from large towns. They slept in barns, disused buildings or just in the open. There would be no suitable accommodation in a city like Dresden. The lack of recorded POW casualties associated with the raid suggests there were few, if any, POWs in Dresden at the time of the attack.
The clue to Dresden's military importance is indicated by the USAAF target selection: the railway facilities. Dresden was, and still is, a major rail hub for travel to the east. As such, it would have handled a lot of war materiel to support German forces resisting the Soviet advance.
While he was one of the first historians to use German records, it seems his familiarity with those records and with Germany itself means he often paints the Nazi perspective in the most positive light, even quoting Mazi propaganda as fact. His casualty figures in Dresden have been widely discredited.
The idea that the Allies were supposed to avoid buildings with blue lights on them is patently laughable. Any lights would simply aid the Allies' night navigation, and that's assuming they were clearly visible. Such a warning system would also require Berlin to tell the Allies not to bomb blue lights…and, of course, Berlin could then put blue lights in every town and city in an attempt to deter Allied attacks.
I also question his claims about POWs passing through the city. I have a relative who was a POW at Zagan in Poland and was forced-marched from 8 Feb 1945 to Frankfurt. The prisoners were put in large groups and stayed away from large towns. They slept in barns, disused buildings or just in the open. There would be no suitable accommodation in a city like Dresden. The lack of recorded POW casualties associated with the raid suggests there were few, if any, POWs in Dresden at the time of the attack.
The clue to Dresden's military importance is indicated by the USAAF target selection: the railway facilities. Dresden was, and still is, a major rail hub for travel to the east. As such, it would have handled a lot of war materiel to support German forces resisting the Soviet advance.
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Could you please cite any other sources that mention these "Blue Lights"? I suspect that this is simply a fabrication. Taking into account Irving's scandalous reputation, he cannot be considered as a reliable source.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,094
- Sep 30, 2021
For,
Evans was one of the defence historians when Irving sued for libel and lost, Evans examined the various books Irving has published. See David Irving v Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt judgment, plenty of online copies. See also the recent book Dresden: Tuesday, February 13 by Frederick Taylor.
Irving has a quote about trying to kill the refugees, the source was, "The wording is from the diary kept by one of the bomb-aimers who was present at one of the No. 3 Group briefings. Irving's notes show this wording of the briefing coming from "Messrs Hoffmann, Abel, Lindsley and Jones, all former Bomber Command aircrew personnel." Telling Lies For Hitler shows the difference between what people said in interviews with Irving and what was published.
The 8th Air Force bombed the Dresden Friedrichstrasse area on 7 October 1944, 30 bombers with 72.5 short tons of HE bombs dropped visually, as a target of opportunity.
The 8th Air Force bombed the Dresden Marshalling yards on 16 January 1945, 133 bombers with 321.4 short tons of bombs (41.6 tons of incendiaries) dropped using visual sighting. This was a secondary target for the raid. 2 aircraft lost, 1 reported to flak.
Apparently these raids and the obvious systematic bombings of German rail marshalling yards were not warnings to the Nazis to do something about the defences.
Bomber Command dropped 1x8000 pound bomb, 579x4000 pound, 153x2000 pound, 234x500 pound, 4,481x500 pound and 599x250 pound, and 675,538x4 pound, the latter incendiary, on the night of 13/14 February 1945. (There were 2 RAF targets, Dresden and Bohlen, plus the Usual Mosquito reads). Around 50 of the 4,000 pound bombs and the majority of the other HE bombs were dropped on non Dresden targets, Dresden received almost all the incendiaries, 796 Lancasters and 9 Mosquitoes in two waves, 1,478 long tons of HE and 1,182 long tons of incendiaries, (Richard Davis gives the figures as 772 bombers credited with attacking, 1,655 short tons of HE and 1,323.4 short tons of incendiaries, total 2,978.4 short tons of bombs). Some 6 Lancasters lost plus 3 crashes in allied territory. Its official target was the city and railway facilities and was the only Bomber Command attack on Dresden for the entire war, Mosquitoes included, and appears to be the first time allied bombers were sent out with Dresden as the primary target. The Luftwaffe night fighter force possibly claimed 2 Lancasters. Some 5 Lancasters were classified lost to enemy action plus a sixth to an engine fire that may or may not have been enemy action. The crews reported slight flak and some fighter activity. The two wave tactics had been in use for months, the gap between the waves based on Luftwaffe Night fighter range and endurances, trying to minimise night fighter encounters.
The RAF effectively did three raids that night, the first against Dresden was rated as a moderate success thanks to the cloud, three hours later the cloud had cleared and the attack was made in clear conditions with devastating results, meantime in Bohlen, around 60 miles away, the RAF attack on the oil refinery there was badly affected by 10/10 cloud and icing at 15,000 feet. The Bohlen raid was rated as a failure. There was not a great deal you need to change for Dresden to escape that night. In his post war Despatch on War Operations, Arthur Harris claimed 1,681 out of 2,844 acres or 59% of the Dresden built up area had been destroyed. That is a lot more than the centre of town.
The RAF had managed to create 2 firestorms in 1943, Hamburg and Kassel, some 3 months apart. After that no firestorms until February 1945. The reality of the heavy bomber raids, just about everything had to work in order to create firestorms. As a result they were unpredictable and unlikely.
On the 15th 8th Air Force first division despatched 224 B-17s of which 211 dropped 465.6 short tons of HE bombs on Dresden, using H2X sighting, no bombers lost but 4 write offs. Also apparently one 3rd Division bomber sent to Cottbus attacked Dresden instead with 2.5 short tons of bombs.
The target for the 15th February raid is given as "1AD, Report of Operations, BOHLEN, 15 February, dated 23 February 1945, p.1. Reel B 5018, frame 988. This report states the secondary target for the mission was "Military Installations" in Dresden and were to be bombed either visually or by H2X. This is a unique target classification the 8AF applied it to no other target in Germany -- ever."
The 8th Air Force dropped another 1,080.8 short tons of bombs (140.5 short tons of incendiaries) on Dresden Marshalling yards on 2 March, using H2X sighting. Then another 1,718,9 short tons of bombs (164.5 short tons of incendiaries) mainly on rail targets in Dresden on 17 April 1945. Some 540.2 tons by H2X sighting, the rest by visual bombing.
And no, there were no blue lights used to mark protected targets, at the very least to anyone who could read a map it would help pinpoint key targets.
The German reports,
DRESDEN, 28X - 10 - LW. Ops. Staff, 13/14 FEBRUARY. Two heavy attacks were made on the entire city area between 2209 and 2235 hours and 0122 and 0154 hours. Bombing was concentrated on the residential and commercial districts in the city centre.
Bombs dropped: 6,000 H.E., 400,000 incendiary bombs, 2,000 oil bombs, 4,500 jet incendiary bombs and a large number of leaflets and ration cards.
Houses: Exact figures cannot be given but houses in the city area were extensively damaged. The Old Town and adjoining districts and the southern suburban area were almost completely destroyed. Very heavy damage resulted in the districts of Johannstadt, Friedrichstadt, Strissen, Blasewitz, Strehlen, Gruna, Plausen and in the New Town.
Fires: There were a large number of fires and fire storms developed in the central district.
Casualties: Casualties were believed to be very heavy, the majority of them arising in the second attack when large numbers of people were leaving the city. A very large number were trapped by rubble. About 500,000 were rendered homeless.
A large number of public buildings were hit and nearly all of them destroyed. Railway buildings and installations were seriously affected, including the regional offices. The Central Station was gutted and severe damage done to tracks, resulting in services being temporarily suspended. At the Neustadt passenger station the reception building was destroyed, heavy damage caused to tracks and services suspended. At the Neustadt goods station sheds were badly damaged by fire. At the Altstadt station passenger coaches and goods trucks were also badly damaged by fire. The Infantry Barracks and several reserve hospitals were badly damaged and gas, water and electricity services were put out of action.
The following industrial concerns were destroyed: Clemens Mueller (special instruments); Glaesser Coachbuilders; Laube Machine Works; Zeiss-Ikon; Ika (optical and special signals equipment); Ernemann (fuses and optical instruments); "Universell" Dresden (weapon parts and torpedoes) and a number of others.
DRESDEN, 28X - 10 - LW. Ops. Staff, 14 FEBRUARY, (USAAF). About 1100 bombers penetrated to attack various towns. Some of these carried out a raid on Dresden from 1215 to 1225 hours and Loebau, Friedrichstadt, Cotta and Leipziger-Vorstadt were the districts mostly affected.
Bombs dropped: 1.000 H.E., 30.000 incendiary bombs, 300 oil bombs.
Details of damage to houses and the number of casualties are not available. The Friedrichstadt Goods Station and the Wettiner Station were hit.
DRESDEN, 28X - 11 - LW. Ops. Staff, 2 MARCH, (USAAF). Part of the force of 1100 bombers with fighter protection which paid a visit to Dresden, Magdeburg and Chemnitz attacked Dresden at about 1025 hours.
Numerous H.E. and incendiary bombs were dropped which caused severe damage to the Neustadt, Altstadt and Niedersebnitz districts. Also hit in the Leipzig suburb, the industrial area in the north and the districts of Striesen, Radebeul, Coswig, Dobritz and Gruna. Severe damage was also caused to the Waldschloesschen district. Damage to transport installations included severe damage to the permanent way at the Neustadt passenger station and to railway installations on the banks of the Elbe in the Alstadt near the Marien bridge.
At the date of the report (2nd March) information concerning industrial damage and casualties was not available. Medium damage resulted at the Neustadt Goods Station and the stations at Wettinerstrasse and Koenig-Albert-Hafen. Four lines were temporarily closed.
DRESDEN, 28X - 11 - LW. Ops. Staff, 17 APRIL, (USAAF). Some 1,200 bombers and 350 fighters
penetrated as far as Nuremberg where one division remained, the rest flying on to Pilsen and Dresden which latter town was attacked from 1350 to 1500 hours by one division.
Bombs dropped: 3,000 H.E., 10,000 incendiary bombs.
In the Old Town and New Town, in Strehlen and further suburbs damage was caused to houses, public buildings and public supply installations. Numerous fires were started. Compared with the scale of attack the damage was slight. Most of the bombs fell on former bombed-out sites. Railway installations at 6 stations, damage to tracks and buildings was extensive and an ammunition train was blown up. Rail traffic was stopped for several days.
There is a quite good discussion on the Dresden casualties in Lying about Hitler (or Telling lies for Hitler) by Richard Evans. It appears the East German official toll was 35,000, and someone added a 1 to the front. Dresden itself reported 18,375 confirmed dead by 10th March 1945, 20,204 dead by 22nd March with an expected death toll of around 25,000 (this report became known as TB47, a forgery was issued adding a zero to the numbers). Some 1,858 bodies were recovered between 8 May 1945 and 1966. Note the fire raid at Hamburg killed around 3.3% of the population, 25,000 represents around 3 to 4% of the estimated Dresden population, 567,000 down from 630,000 pre war plus refugees, around 100,000 official refugees plus any unofficial ones. There were some 31,102 death cards issued and 21,271 burials registered. Evans suggests the 25,000 deaths figure should be the one used.
Evans was one of the defence historians when Irving sued for libel and lost, Evans examined the various books Irving has published. See David Irving v Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt judgment, plenty of online copies. See also the recent book Dresden: Tuesday, February 13 by Frederick Taylor.
Irving has a quote about trying to kill the refugees, the source was, "The wording is from the diary kept by one of the bomb-aimers who was present at one of the No. 3 Group briefings. Irving's notes show this wording of the briefing coming from "Messrs Hoffmann, Abel, Lindsley and Jones, all former Bomber Command aircrew personnel." Telling Lies For Hitler shows the difference between what people said in interviews with Irving and what was published.
The idea here is the Germans are so inefficient that near 1% of the country's pre war population was allowed to go through WWII without contributing much to the war effort. Pre war the city was known for glass and Scientific instruments for example. See the raid reports
So it had many small shelters? Hitting the enemy where they ain't is usually considered a good thing when the good guys do it and bad when the bad guys do it. Since a duty of the government is protection of its citizens why no blame on the Nazis? It seems all defences moved is an overstatement
The 8th Air Force bombed the Dresden Friedrichstrasse area on 7 October 1944, 30 bombers with 72.5 short tons of HE bombs dropped visually, as a target of opportunity.
The 8th Air Force bombed the Dresden Marshalling yards on 16 January 1945, 133 bombers with 321.4 short tons of bombs (41.6 tons of incendiaries) dropped using visual sighting. This was a secondary target for the raid. 2 aircraft lost, 1 reported to flak.
Apparently these raids and the obvious systematic bombings of German rail marshalling yards were not warnings to the Nazis to do something about the defences.
Along with a couple of all too real raids, by the way how come there is supposed to be no Dresden Central Station servicing that area plus the through lines?
Bomber Command dropped 1x8000 pound bomb, 579x4000 pound, 153x2000 pound, 234x500 pound, 4,481x500 pound and 599x250 pound, and 675,538x4 pound, the latter incendiary, on the night of 13/14 February 1945. (There were 2 RAF targets, Dresden and Bohlen, plus the Usual Mosquito reads). Around 50 of the 4,000 pound bombs and the majority of the other HE bombs were dropped on non Dresden targets, Dresden received almost all the incendiaries, 796 Lancasters and 9 Mosquitoes in two waves, 1,478 long tons of HE and 1,182 long tons of incendiaries, (Richard Davis gives the figures as 772 bombers credited with attacking, 1,655 short tons of HE and 1,323.4 short tons of incendiaries, total 2,978.4 short tons of bombs). Some 6 Lancasters lost plus 3 crashes in allied territory. Its official target was the city and railway facilities and was the only Bomber Command attack on Dresden for the entire war, Mosquitoes included, and appears to be the first time allied bombers were sent out with Dresden as the primary target. The Luftwaffe night fighter force possibly claimed 2 Lancasters. Some 5 Lancasters were classified lost to enemy action plus a sixth to an engine fire that may or may not have been enemy action. The crews reported slight flak and some fighter activity. The two wave tactics had been in use for months, the gap between the waves based on Luftwaffe Night fighter range and endurances, trying to minimise night fighter encounters.
The RAF effectively did three raids that night, the first against Dresden was rated as a moderate success thanks to the cloud, three hours later the cloud had cleared and the attack was made in clear conditions with devastating results, meantime in Bohlen, around 60 miles away, the RAF attack on the oil refinery there was badly affected by 10/10 cloud and icing at 15,000 feet. The Bohlen raid was rated as a failure. There was not a great deal you need to change for Dresden to escape that night. In his post war Despatch on War Operations, Arthur Harris claimed 1,681 out of 2,844 acres or 59% of the Dresden built up area had been destroyed. That is a lot more than the centre of town.
The RAF had managed to create 2 firestorms in 1943, Hamburg and Kassel, some 3 months apart. After that no firestorms until February 1945. The reality of the heavy bomber raids, just about everything had to work in order to create firestorms. As a result they were unpredictable and unlikely.
On the 14th 8th Air Force first division despatched 461 B-17s with the target the Dresden Marshalling yards, of these bombers 68 dropped 120.5 short tons of HE and 49.5 tons of incendiaries visually and another 248 dropped 367.2 short tons of HE and 244.8 short tons of incendiaries using H2X, so a total of 487.7 short tons of HE and 294.3 short tons of incendiaries, total 782 short tons of bombs. The remainder of the bomber force attacked a variety of targets, 62 dropped 152.5 tons on Prague, 25 attacked Brux, 12 Pilsen and 25 targets of opportunity, 5 bombers lost (by cause as 1 to fighters, 4 to flak), plus 3 write offs. The strafing claims have been debunked, there were low level fighter versus fighter engagements.
On the 15th 8th Air Force first division despatched 224 B-17s of which 211 dropped 465.6 short tons of HE bombs on Dresden, using H2X sighting, no bombers lost but 4 write offs. Also apparently one 3rd Division bomber sent to Cottbus attacked Dresden instead with 2.5 short tons of bombs.
The target for the 15th February raid is given as "1AD, Report of Operations, BOHLEN, 15 February, dated 23 February 1945, p.1. Reel B 5018, frame 988. This report states the secondary target for the mission was "Military Installations" in Dresden and were to be bombed either visually or by H2X. This is a unique target classification the 8AF applied it to no other target in Germany -- ever."
The 8th Air Force dropped another 1,080.8 short tons of bombs (140.5 short tons of incendiaries) on Dresden Marshalling yards on 2 March, using H2X sighting. Then another 1,718,9 short tons of bombs (164.5 short tons of incendiaries) mainly on rail targets in Dresden on 17 April 1945. Some 540.2 tons by H2X sighting, the rest by visual bombing.
Not surprising in daylight.
That is pure David Irving, how good the Germans were. The finger pointing was kicked off by Churchill weeks later.
And no, there were no blue lights used to mark protected targets, at the very least to anyone who could read a map it would help pinpoint key targets.
The German reports,
DRESDEN, 28X - 10 - LW. Ops. Staff, 13/14 FEBRUARY. Two heavy attacks were made on the entire city area between 2209 and 2235 hours and 0122 and 0154 hours. Bombing was concentrated on the residential and commercial districts in the city centre.
Bombs dropped: 6,000 H.E., 400,000 incendiary bombs, 2,000 oil bombs, 4,500 jet incendiary bombs and a large number of leaflets and ration cards.
Houses: Exact figures cannot be given but houses in the city area were extensively damaged. The Old Town and adjoining districts and the southern suburban area were almost completely destroyed. Very heavy damage resulted in the districts of Johannstadt, Friedrichstadt, Strissen, Blasewitz, Strehlen, Gruna, Plausen and in the New Town.
Fires: There were a large number of fires and fire storms developed in the central district.
Casualties: Casualties were believed to be very heavy, the majority of them arising in the second attack when large numbers of people were leaving the city. A very large number were trapped by rubble. About 500,000 were rendered homeless.
A large number of public buildings were hit and nearly all of them destroyed. Railway buildings and installations were seriously affected, including the regional offices. The Central Station was gutted and severe damage done to tracks, resulting in services being temporarily suspended. At the Neustadt passenger station the reception building was destroyed, heavy damage caused to tracks and services suspended. At the Neustadt goods station sheds were badly damaged by fire. At the Altstadt station passenger coaches and goods trucks were also badly damaged by fire. The Infantry Barracks and several reserve hospitals were badly damaged and gas, water and electricity services were put out of action.
The following industrial concerns were destroyed: Clemens Mueller (special instruments); Glaesser Coachbuilders; Laube Machine Works; Zeiss-Ikon; Ika (optical and special signals equipment); Ernemann (fuses and optical instruments); "Universell" Dresden (weapon parts and torpedoes) and a number of others.
DRESDEN, 28X - 10 - LW. Ops. Staff, 14 FEBRUARY, (USAAF). About 1100 bombers penetrated to attack various towns. Some of these carried out a raid on Dresden from 1215 to 1225 hours and Loebau, Friedrichstadt, Cotta and Leipziger-Vorstadt were the districts mostly affected.
Bombs dropped: 1.000 H.E., 30.000 incendiary bombs, 300 oil bombs.
Details of damage to houses and the number of casualties are not available. The Friedrichstadt Goods Station and the Wettiner Station were hit.
DRESDEN, 28X - 11 - LW. Ops. Staff, 2 MARCH, (USAAF). Part of the force of 1100 bombers with fighter protection which paid a visit to Dresden, Magdeburg and Chemnitz attacked Dresden at about 1025 hours.
Numerous H.E. and incendiary bombs were dropped which caused severe damage to the Neustadt, Altstadt and Niedersebnitz districts. Also hit in the Leipzig suburb, the industrial area in the north and the districts of Striesen, Radebeul, Coswig, Dobritz and Gruna. Severe damage was also caused to the Waldschloesschen district. Damage to transport installations included severe damage to the permanent way at the Neustadt passenger station and to railway installations on the banks of the Elbe in the Alstadt near the Marien bridge.
At the date of the report (2nd March) information concerning industrial damage and casualties was not available. Medium damage resulted at the Neustadt Goods Station and the stations at Wettinerstrasse and Koenig-Albert-Hafen. Four lines were temporarily closed.
DRESDEN, 28X - 11 - LW. Ops. Staff, 17 APRIL, (USAAF). Some 1,200 bombers and 350 fighters
penetrated as far as Nuremberg where one division remained, the rest flying on to Pilsen and Dresden which latter town was attacked from 1350 to 1500 hours by one division.
Bombs dropped: 3,000 H.E., 10,000 incendiary bombs.
In the Old Town and New Town, in Strehlen and further suburbs damage was caused to houses, public buildings and public supply installations. Numerous fires were started. Compared with the scale of attack the damage was slight. Most of the bombs fell on former bombed-out sites. Railway installations at 6 stations, damage to tracks and buildings was extensive and an ammunition train was blown up. Rail traffic was stopped for several days.
The above text contains many typos and uses different names for the same objects, which can complicate understanding. In addition, there are more recent studies that take into account all possible sources. Unfortunately, the most serious of these is only available to me in German: Abschlussbericht der Dresdner Historikerkommission (Final report of the Dresden Historical Commission)
I just copied and pasted a book review I wrote a few years ago and I know that in 1963 not many people (if any) had access to mission reports and details. England had/has a law about secrets being declassified after a certain amount of years. (50 or 30?) so in 1963 an author could be frustrated in research.
Irving did go into great detail about workings of the RAF night bombing campaign.
As for the blue lights, I never heard of them before of since. On the other hand in all the research on the American Civil War, I only found one reference that a field HQ of a commander or general would have green lanterns so messengers could find them in the dark. (Later Police Headquarters were called "the Green Light Hotel" since Police HQ adopted the practice.) My point is that sometimes veterans did not write down such (to them) minor details.
I also only read one reference to Japanese civilians putting out white sheets in the last days to get Americans from strafing.
Irving did go into great detail about workings of the RAF night bombing campaign.
As for the blue lights, I never heard of them before of since. On the other hand in all the research on the American Civil War, I only found one reference that a field HQ of a commander or general would have green lanterns so messengers could find them in the dark. (Later Police Headquarters were called "the Green Light Hotel" since Police HQ adopted the practice.) My point is that sometimes veterans did not write down such (to them) minor details.
I also only read one reference to Japanese civilians putting out white sheets in the last days to get Americans from strafing.
Maxrobot1: David Irvin's book is completely unreliable and completely misleading. Fredrick Taylor's Dresden is a recent and definitive source. That together with a collection of essays published in "FIRESTORM The bombing of Dresden 1945" and edited by Paul Addision and Jeremy Crang is also superb and includes views on both sides of the debate. Within the second book is Sebastien Cox's excellent essay on The Dresden Raids Why and How. The other documents, on which I rely heavily are the Navigator logs and chart from my father's navigator. When compared with the logs and charts from dad's two other deep penetration raids (Chemnitz 5/6-March-1945 and Dessau 7/8-March-1945), the situation that night was marked by few events of note. The navigation was straightforward and uneventful. The logs and chart neat and tidy.
What I discovered as I examined the primary historical material was the operation to Dresden was unexceptional—not altogether different than any other raid, except perhaps that it was a boring operation. In his audio memoirs dad recalled "It was pretty "sissy" actually, we went along and nothing seemed to bother us... And to my knowledge there was very little flak and we didn't see…a fighter the whole time we were on that trip." Dad recorded in his logbook that "all engines gave trouble" In his audio memoirs, he recalled that they flew to Dresden and back on three engines, continually feathering, unfeathering and restarting the engines all along the route there and back. There were certainly other operations that were far more frightening and dangerous to crews. As there was so little opposition, crews were able to do their jobs without interference. The Nachtjagd was hobbled and few of them took off to intercept the Dresden raids. This, together with the weather conditions and poor preparation of the city by the political elements and civil services, sealed the fate of Dresden.
Jim
Aircraft of World War II - WW2Aircraft.net Forums Taylor, Fredrick. 2004. Dresden, Tuesday, February 13, 1945. Harper Collins. New York. 519 p.
What I discovered as I examined the primary historical material was the operation to Dresden was unexceptional—not altogether different than any other raid, except perhaps that it was a boring operation. In his audio memoirs dad recalled "It was pretty "sissy" actually, we went along and nothing seemed to bother us... And to my knowledge there was very little flak and we didn't see…a fighter the whole time we were on that trip." Dad recorded in his logbook that "all engines gave trouble" In his audio memoirs, he recalled that they flew to Dresden and back on three engines, continually feathering, unfeathering and restarting the engines all along the route there and back. There were certainly other operations that were far more frightening and dangerous to crews. As there was so little opposition, crews were able to do their jobs without interference. The Nachtjagd was hobbled and few of them took off to intercept the Dresden raids. This, together with the weather conditions and poor preparation of the city by the political elements and civil services, sealed the fate of Dresden.
Jim
Aircraft of World War II - WW2Aircraft.net Forums Taylor, Fredrick. 2004. Dresden, Tuesday, February 13, 1945. Harper Collins. New York. 519 p.
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