Unfortunately that story, while correct in some parts, perpetuates some of the anti-P-38 myths.
The pilots might have still froze but if the planes were flown at lower rpm and higher boost there may have been less trouble with turbochargers and the oil and the coolant and the fuel puddling in the intake manifolds. (the lead never came out, other compounds did, they were anti-knock compounds but they were not lead)
If, for example, you use more boost from the turbo, the intake temperature will be higher. If you raise the intake temperature 100 degrees the peak temperature in the cylinders goes up 100 degrees and the exhaust goes up 100 degrees. Now the higher boost used at cruise may not result in a full 100 degrees but you get the idea.
The article gives a couple of gas mileage figures but doesn't say at what speed or altitude. A P-38L could get around 3.3 mpg at 210mph indicated (over 300mph true) at 25,000ft while burning about 98 gallons an hour. 210mph indicated at 25,000ft was the standard speed the USAAF used for figuring combat radius. A MUstang was good for over 5 miles to gallon in such conditions.
Unfortunately the USSAF was operating it's P-38s against the wishes of both Allison and Lockheed and using high rpm and low boost. This burned more fuel than needed and helped keep the intake tract cold (there were other reasons). The Article mentions Lindberg in the Pacific but ignores Tony Levier going to Europe and telling the pilots there pretty much the same thing at about the same time (May/June?) of 1944. which helped but was a bit late.
However the article fails to mention that the P-38Gs, Hs and early Js only had 300 gallons of internal fuel in the fall 43/winter44 and it took a while for the Js and Ls with 410 gallons internal to show up. That 110 gallons was worth 200-300 miles of radius depending on exit speed.
The photo recon planes had a lot less trouble with engines, in part because they cruised faster (engines hotter) but the pilots may still have froze.
Actually the F-5 suffered the same problems as the P-38
Dr Alfred Price from "Spitfire in Combat"
"Initially the 7th Photo Group flew the F-5, the reconnaissance version of the P-38 Lightning fighter. This aircraft was vulnerable to interception during deep penetrations into enemy territory, however, and it has serviceability problems. One squadron in the group was therefore equipped with Spitfire PR XIs, and operated the type for the rest of the conflict."
Roger Freeman from "The Mighty Eighth War Manual"
"Even before the first 8th Air force F-5As became operational, some disquiet was expressed in USAAF circles as to their suitability for the task."
"Short comings of the F-5A and F-5B were principally insufficient ceiling and range for the type of operations conducted. Further, it could not accommodate cameras of 36-inch focal length which were desirable to obtain more detailed images."
"On 14 December 1943 General Eaker informed the RAF that the current model P-38 used for photographic reconnaissance by 7th group was not to the standard required. As improved models would not be available for a few months, he inquired if it would be possible to obtain the use of 12 Spitfire XI's to tide them over."
"The Spitfires were used almost exclusively for the deepest penetrations of enemy airspace or to areas where the risk of interception was the greatest. Pilots with F-5 experience found the Spitfire cockpit cramped and noisy by comparison, plus a degree of vibration not evident with the smoother running Allisons. Performance was another matter for the Spitfire provided speed, range and altitude that could not be achieved with the Lightning models on hand in the winter of 1943-44. Few technical problems arose with the Spitfire in 7th Group service, although there was some trouble with the fuel system vapour lock during July/August 1944 caused by hot weather at ground level. The Group's Spitfires had only a 5 per cent mechanical failure rate over their operational period. It was estimated that the Spitfire took but one third of the maintenance time required for the F-5 and had a 70 per cent availability, which 7th Group stated would have been even higher if the supply of spare parts had been simplified."
"The F-5A suffered the same operating problems as contemporary P-38s operating at high altitudes, cutting out and pre-detonation, which sometimes prevented operation above 22,000 feet – although the minimum safe altitude for photo reconnaissance was advised as 24,000 feet. Little could be done about this problem."
"Both versions (talking about the F-5B & C(my note)) were prone to the same engine troubles experienced with the fighter P-38Js. In March 1944 the position was critical with aircraft grounded through engine failures."
Tom Ivie in "Aerial Reconnaissance – the 10th Photo Recon Group in World War II"
"The F-5s normally ranged 100-150miles from their bases, but at times they were as deep as 250-275 miles."
Patricia Fussell Keen in "Eyes of the Eighth – A Story of the 7th Photographic Reconnaissance Group"
"About the time the 14th pilots arrived at Mount Farm the USAAF confirmed disturbing evidence of major flaws in its primary photo reconnaissance plane. The Eighth Air Force knew that its primary camera platform could not perform satisfactorily at high altitudes"
"By the middle of July 1943 it became apparent to headquarters that the limitations of the P-38G (F-5A) had probably cost lives. As well as altitude problems, the unarmed F-5A, which used speed to evade pursuit, had problems escaping enemy aircraft when carrying drop tanks on long flights. The high loss of pilots under these conditions prompted the USAAF to issue an order on 15 July 1943 restricting aircraft of Station 231 to a 300 mile radius on operational missions. As a result of this order, the newly formed 7th Group had to turn the jobs over to the RAF."
"Spitfires allowed the 14th Squadron to fly longer missions and deeper missions into Germany. One major target remained primary in everyone's mind, Berlin. When the big raid came, Headquarters would want damage assessment photos. Group Operations considered only 14th Squadron Spitfires capable of the range needed." ((Captain Walter Weitner photographed the first USAAF raid on Berlin on March 6, 1944. Lt Charles Parker photographed the second raid on March 8. Both in Spitfire XIs) my note)
"In December, the Group began received 10 F-5Bs, a photographic version of the P-38J-5. Unfortunately this aircraft and the F-5C, a converted and modified version of the same P-38J, suffered the same engine problems endemic in the early aircraft."
Professor John F. Guilmartin, Jr. in his 2001 lecture to the United States Air Force Academy "The Aircraft that Decided World War II: Aeronautical Engineering and Grand Strategy, 1933-1945, the American Dimension."
"In addition, specially modified Spitfires were the most important Allied strategic photo-reconnaissance aircraft at the outbreak of hostilities in 1939—and the
only ones capable of deep penetrations of Axis territory—and so remained until the debut of reconnaissance versions of the Mosquito in the autumn of 1941."
"The Griffon-powered Spitfire PR XIX (PR for photo-reconnaissance), which entered service in the spring of 1944, provides a final commentary on the Spitfire's importance. The Griffon's superior high altitude performance and a pressurized cockpit combined with the Spitfire's refined aerodynamics to give the PR XIX a service ceiling of no less than 48,000 feet—the highest of any operational piston-engined aircraft—rendering it effectively immune from interception. At that point photo-reconnaissance versions of the P-38 were horribly vulnerable to interception by later versions of the Bf 109 and the PR XIX, though produced only in small numbers, satisfied a vital strategic requirement at a critical time. The aerial edge in battle early shifted between allied air forces and the
Luftwaffe as the Spitfire underwent growth in engine power, aeronautical performance and increased firepower."
Here is the link to the complete paper:
http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/dfh/docs/Harmon44.doc