I think your thought experiment is 2000 fighters meeting an air born threat anywhere in Germany. 2000 fighters alone could not protect Germany. From the UK the USAF could attack from the North Sea and across France from Italy and North Africa they could attack all of South Germany France and Eastern Europe. To protect Germany from all possible avenues of attack would require more than 10,000 aircraft. To take a break to build up such a force would mean Germany did not have any industry or cities in place. I base this on the difficulty the UK had in repelling the luftwaffe in 1940.
The P-38J and L in the European theater. (1 Viewer)
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
Thanks to their extensive radar (and radio listening) network, which stretched into France and Holland, they had hours of warning of USAAF raids from whatever direction. In 1940 Park had 30-40 mins warning and had to react to that, which he did masterfully. They didn't need 10,000 fighters, 2,000 with well trained pilots, with good tactics, would have made the 8th's job a heck of a lot harder.
drgondog
Major
In practice Old Skeptic is right - all te LW had to defend against was the long range escorts (P-38 and P-51). The number of US long range Groups went from three (December 1944) (20, 55 and 354FG's) to 10 by the end of May - which meant 3 long range escort groups per 11 Bomb Groups (30 mile string) in each of three divisions. 2000 LW fighters attacking where THEY chose to engage limits the numbers of long range escort groups to defend - one to two Maximum.
There are sometimes I find forums contradictory, some time ago I suggested that the Luftwaffe would have had more success if they engaged the escorts earlier forcing them to drop their tanks. I was told that post war both sides admitted that this would merely result in the LW being wiped out in a different place, I cant look back over my previous posts to find it though.. The P47 also had considerable range with its larger drop tank. 2000 aircraft may be able to defend a particular place in central Germany but not the whole of Germany. The combat radius of a SE is quite small, after climbing to 25,000ft and fighting for 20 mins it needs to find some where to refuel. With only 2000 aircraft you must surrender all the extremities like the northern ports the Ruhr and the southern industrial areas. To outnumber the escorts all over Germany by sufficient AC to enable heavy enough losses to be inflicted requires many more than 2000 aircraft. The bombers themselves were not unarmed and did inflict losses on the LW even on completely unescorted raids. Where would you place 2000 planes to repel raids on Hamburg Berlin Peenemunde and Stuttgart?
Park only had to deal with raids across the channel, after the LW tried a raid from Norway and got hammered all raids from there stopped, I say "only" but this was a considerable task. Park had more than 30-40 minutes warning that a raid was building up but knowing a raid was building didn't tell you where it was coming from. The 8th could attack across any German coast+ France and Holland. Other forces could attack across the Alps. All the Americans would have to do is modify their tactics. Instead of a deep penetration raid just raid the periphery of Germany with more escorts until Germany concedes the territory. The problem isn't solved until the escorts are massively outnumbered wherever they are and that cannot be done all over Germany with 2000 AC. This is of course hypothetical and ignores the fact that Germany had to defend the French coast, transport links to France the eastern oilfields as well as defending the eastern front with Russia
drgondog
Major
Exactly as placed for the Defense of the Rich as far as sectors go - just reinforce the fighter strength 4X.
Another factor. The US was producing crews, fighter pilots and the respective aircraft at peak production. Impossible to reinforce the 8th and 9th AF FC much because there really weren't enough airfields to expand beyond April, 1944 and shifting resources from MTO (When reinforcements are required to support 15th AF) isn't feasible. Ditto the PTO/CBI which was still suffering lack of front line fighter strength for its own projects.
In summary - the notion that the LW could actually stick 1500 more fighter pilots into LF Reich in spring 1944 is ludicrous - But since the question is What If, I agree OldSkeptic's POV.
I agree, and the Allies were well aware of it. To combat this, the British did employ electronic countermeasures as one way of temporarily blinding German coastal Freya radars in the form of Mandrel, before some US 8th AF raids, and also employed Moonshine and other countermeasures to further deceive the Germans as to where the forthcoming raid was approaching from.
Last edited:
The P47 was replaced by the P51 but could surely still be used with 150gal tank for penetration or withdrawal. I said 10000 to defend Germany, the scenario you are describing isn't defending Germany but a few places furthest from the UK. I disagree with your numbers a little, if you have 2000 fighters can 850 be available to defend Augsberg without leaving huge areas with no cover at all. If the LW did magic up 1500 extra fighters then the USA must keep them pinned down somehow or they will go to Normandy in which case what is politically acceptable changes.
drgondog
Major
By the time the bombers cross the coastline the relative options for the bomber course narrows down considerably, but the primary tactics of assembling the bomber stream in a somewhat contiguous series of bombers groups was followed with rare exception. When multiple targets were selected during the ramp up phase in February through May to replace P-47 groups with Mustangs, even separate target branches were delayed until well into Germany.
If I could give you a mission that represents a typical day in the life of the 8th, select 24 April. Three Task Forces with 1st BD leading as 1st TF, 2nd TF/2nd BD next and finally 3rd BD next as 3rd TF in trail.
All the bombers crossed the coastline NW of Paris, proceeded to Stuttgart then set a course for Munich, Gablingen and Freidrichshafen. At Stuttgart, the target escorts P-38s and P-51s arrive. The 4th FG (mustangs) are sweeping in front with intent of STAYING with the 1st TF as Penetration escort to Augsburg - but make contact north of Stuttgart with JG 11. The next relay for target support for 1st TF isn't due until Augsburg.
Looking at the map, the bombers stay 'connected' all the way through Stuttgart and part way to Ulm, then the 3rd TF, escorted by the shorter range P-38s (all three FG's) turn se toward Friedrichshafen.. then a little later the now tail end 2nd TF B-24s turn for Gablingen as the 1st TF continues toward Augsburg to Erding (Ne of Munich) thence south and then back to the west under Munich and begins bomb run on Landsberg and Oberphaffenhofen. The 352nd and 354th FG and 363rd FG cover Gablingen strike leaving the 1st TF completely uncovered (by plan) for 15 minutes between Ulm and Augsburg - and are attacked by the first elements of nearly 250 s/e day fighters. The 355th and 357th arrive on-time north of Augburg and immediately engage.
After all targets are bombed the reciprocal track for all bomb groups is northwest toward Frankfurt where as many of the Mustangs and Lightnings with fuel reserves continue escort until R/V with P-47s of the Withdrawal escorts.
My scenario is in place for a realistic appraisal of what would have been possible - as follows:
The 56th FG swept in front of 1st TF prior to R/V with 4th FG at Stuttgart. 56th Alone, with several P-47 groups in trail in close escort but running low on fuel as they approach Stuttgart. The 4th FG is inbound as is the 20th/55th and 364th P-38 FG's. The 352nd, 363rd, 354th also inbound but further away, and last are 355th and 357th. All the Target escort fighters are on a more direct course (not parallel to the bombers).
Assuming that 2000 day fighters implies 4X locally placed to augment the actual defense, then:
If LW controllers could draw on eight Gruppes instead of two and hit the 56th and 4th at Stuttgart there are perhaps 20 minutes in which they have the US fighter escort at a severe disadvantage. Don't even go after the bombers yet, just engage the US escorts with significant air superiority at the point of attack. The 1st TF is now completely stripped and subject to persistent attacks from those fighters emerging or not involved with the 4/56 FG engagement. 100 s/e fighters beginning attacks from Stuttgart past Ulm.
The second attack occurs against the 355th and 357th 100 miles northwest of Augsburg with perhaps two Gruppes. This fight would be more even but the outcome is certain. The ability of the two mustang groups to achieve R/V and perform escort is out the window because of low fuel. Additionally this attack could be sourced from Kassel to Mulhausen - presumably from another 4x reinforced defense sector, leaving the Munich sector able to put up 500+ fighters to attack from Ulm all the way to and around Munich... against bombers that were unescorted.
The real result against LW around Munich was shooting down or forcing to Sweden of 27 B-17s for the loss of 50 s/e and t/e day fighters of which 42 were awarded to the P-51s of the 355th and 357th for the loss of six over Munich plus two more strafing around Stuttgart.
IMO in this scenario the German fighter losses would be as great as the destruction of US fighters but more importantly it would be possible to shoot down 100 B-17s and B-24s on a given day... and the 8th AF could not survive that kind of repeated losses politically.
IMO this is a reasonable scenario that would be catastrophic to D-Day air superiority plans if a.) LF Reich could actually achieve 200o experienced pilots in January 1944 and b.) could replenish at least 70% of the attrition
In terms of the effect of the P-38 one thing that I think is worth noting is what the Luftwaffe hoped to use to destroy bombers; The "Zerstoerer" a word meaning "Destroyer" was meant to be used to destroy enemy bombers. (Me 110 and latter Me 210C/Me 410A). Zerstoerers were meant to be fighter bombers that strafed up and bombed enemy runways and ground born aircraft to supress enemy fighters, they were also to use their fire power (which got to 4 x 20mm and 2 x 30mm canon on the Me 110G) to dispatch enemy bombers. Furthermore the idea was to use outsize long range weapons such as 30mm, 37mm even 50mm canon and 20cm rockets to snipe of bombers with stereoscopic range finder equipped gyro sights at ranges the 0.50 inch Browning was considerably less effective. (German gyro sights seem to have started with this in mind). The Me 110 and Me 410 apart from greater fire power than the single engine fighters also possessed greater range but were only about 7.5% to 5% slower.
Whatever the P-38's limitations against the Luftwaffes single engined fighters it may have had a greater effect on its twin engine fighters.
Whatever the P-38's limitations against the Luftwaffes single engined fighters it may have had a greater effect on its twin engine fighters.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
Not being a pilot, or an engineer, I am rather an historian with a taste for the big picture but a weak spot for aviation during ww2. As such this site supplies me with a lot of usefull input, though it is sometimes difficult to decide who is right when 'specialists' get entrenched.
I always liked the twin fighters, their relative weakneses apart. If we assume that a bigger aircraft will (other things being equal) usually be less manouvarable than smaller (and yes, the P 47 approaches several contemporary twins), then the P 38 should encounter problems in ETO at day, and probably at night because of the limited space for rader and extra crew. As stated before in this thread, the relative success of P 38's against the japanese is largely explicable from the fact that it enjoyed a margin of speed that it didn't in ETO. This aggrevated by the light construction/lack of passive defense in most japanese fighters. To be fair, they often had to make do with far less power than their allied counterparts. Die Luftwaffe, with tougher mounts and higher speeds, could not be taken on as successfully with the same tactics. And of course japanese rader was even more inferior to the allied (at least UK and USA) than the German.
I take it that magicking 1500 more fighters into german airspace in 44 includes pilots and fuel. Actually they might have gotten close to supplying the extra airframes, but this underlines the axis basic problem, far inferior ressources than the allies. And even if more efficient use had been made of the awailable ressorses, parity could never have been met, exept through way of greater attrition for allied forces, which WERE approached in the early years of the war. But then again, untill 41, especially december, the balance was more even.
As it were, the remarkable fact is that die Luftwaffe did well at night at the same time they were decimated at day. The nightfighting strategy worked to an extent where they did win the 'battle of Berlin'. Bomber command lost so grieviously on the deep penetrations (not only at Berlin) that Harris had predicted would win the war for the allies. That points to the tactics and strategy used not being entirely misconcieved, at least on the German side.
One point I would like to comment on is the easily recognizable layout of the P 38. At the attitudes that the bombers and their escorts flew, contrails often gave away that SOMETHING was there. How easy it was to distinguish 1, 2 and 4 engined planes from each other in that way, I don't know.
This might not be so controversial, but here's one: reminicent of the debate on the lightning is the old story of the Bf 110. I just read a quite provokative article in a Norwegian periodical on warfare setting out to rahabilitate that mashine as an air superiority fighter. I believe it hasn'y been translated into english. Apart from entirely glossing over the many well known occasions where single engined fighters gave them a sound beating, it seem to have something going for it when it examines the 110's record as an escorting fighter, or the Zerstörer role outlined by Koopernic. That is, when it was not tied to the bombers in close escort, the kill to loss ratios during the battle of britain seem to compare favourably with the Bf 190E. In other words, when somewhat counterintuitively NOT used for protecting single bombers on single missions, but seeking to bounce hunting fighters where they are likely to be found - near freindly bombers - the bigger twins might have been effective.
That just might make sense if we remember that, during BoB, the hurricane by far outnumbered the spitfire, and the 110 indeed in 1940 enjoyed a margin of speed over pretty much every operational fighter except the spitfire. I must admit that I'm somewhat in doubt here. But who knows, even considering that the 110 might have had more going for it in fighter versus fighter than is usually conceded, might bring the whole forum heavily down on my head. Then again, it really isn't given much cred...
Anyway, not to highjack the thread, a twin engined fighter (P 38's late models) probably need to be faster (also in climb and dive) than its single engined opponents, besides the obvious fact that it should be employed in the right way under the right surcumstances, assuming those circumstances are present.
I always liked the twin fighters, their relative weakneses apart. If we assume that a bigger aircraft will (other things being equal) usually be less manouvarable than smaller (and yes, the P 47 approaches several contemporary twins), then the P 38 should encounter problems in ETO at day, and probably at night because of the limited space for rader and extra crew. As stated before in this thread, the relative success of P 38's against the japanese is largely explicable from the fact that it enjoyed a margin of speed that it didn't in ETO. This aggrevated by the light construction/lack of passive defense in most japanese fighters. To be fair, they often had to make do with far less power than their allied counterparts. Die Luftwaffe, with tougher mounts and higher speeds, could not be taken on as successfully with the same tactics. And of course japanese rader was even more inferior to the allied (at least UK and USA) than the German.
I take it that magicking 1500 more fighters into german airspace in 44 includes pilots and fuel. Actually they might have gotten close to supplying the extra airframes, but this underlines the axis basic problem, far inferior ressources than the allies. And even if more efficient use had been made of the awailable ressorses, parity could never have been met, exept through way of greater attrition for allied forces, which WERE approached in the early years of the war. But then again, untill 41, especially december, the balance was more even.
As it were, the remarkable fact is that die Luftwaffe did well at night at the same time they were decimated at day. The nightfighting strategy worked to an extent where they did win the 'battle of Berlin'. Bomber command lost so grieviously on the deep penetrations (not only at Berlin) that Harris had predicted would win the war for the allies. That points to the tactics and strategy used not being entirely misconcieved, at least on the German side.
One point I would like to comment on is the easily recognizable layout of the P 38. At the attitudes that the bombers and their escorts flew, contrails often gave away that SOMETHING was there. How easy it was to distinguish 1, 2 and 4 engined planes from each other in that way, I don't know.
This might not be so controversial, but here's one: reminicent of the debate on the lightning is the old story of the Bf 110. I just read a quite provokative article in a Norwegian periodical on warfare setting out to rahabilitate that mashine as an air superiority fighter. I believe it hasn'y been translated into english. Apart from entirely glossing over the many well known occasions where single engined fighters gave them a sound beating, it seem to have something going for it when it examines the 110's record as an escorting fighter, or the Zerstörer role outlined by Koopernic. That is, when it was not tied to the bombers in close escort, the kill to loss ratios during the battle of britain seem to compare favourably with the Bf 190E. In other words, when somewhat counterintuitively NOT used for protecting single bombers on single missions, but seeking to bounce hunting fighters where they are likely to be found - near freindly bombers - the bigger twins might have been effective.
That just might make sense if we remember that, during BoB, the hurricane by far outnumbered the spitfire, and the 110 indeed in 1940 enjoyed a margin of speed over pretty much every operational fighter except the spitfire. I must admit that I'm somewhat in doubt here. But who knows, even considering that the 110 might have had more going for it in fighter versus fighter than is usually conceded, might bring the whole forum heavily down on my head. Then again, it really isn't given much cred...
Anyway, not to highjack the thread, a twin engined fighter (P 38's late models) probably need to be faster (also in climb and dive) than its single engined opponents, besides the obvious fact that it should be employed in the right way under the right surcumstances, assuming those circumstances are present.
drgondog
Major
Thoughtful essay Schmidt.
Imbedded in your piece is that the twin for all combatants was a common thread of "easy to see First". At night, we can strip this fault away and deal solely with the effectiveness of the night fighter to a.) find its prey quickly, b.) have enough speed advantage to close on its prey and c.)enough firepower to take it down. The Me 110 and Ju 88 fulfilled these requirements as well as the He 219.
For daylight the given of being 'spottable' yields the initiative to the 'spotter' if performance equality was also given. While relative maneuverability was important the tactical advantage always fall to the one that sees the other first - which is why you, and I, and others have associated with less success for the P-38 against the Bf 109 and 190 than against the Zero, for example.
The second most contributory factor altering the P-38 success was the well known and lingering issue of dive performance in which a split ess to chase, or evade, led to a forced high speed and uncontrollable dive for many thousands of feet due to compressibility limit - not suffered by its ETO adversaries.
The introduction of the dive flap resolved the issue from Uncontrollable dive but did not alter the limit dive speed issue - which remained well below the Bf 109, FW 190, P-47 and P-51. This limit meant that the P-38 maneuverability equality was solely in positive vertical and forward speed until the boosted flaps some delayed parity in turn and roll (greater than 109, less than 190).
Historically, the all altitude performance of the Mustang and steadily increasing range capability of the P-47 drove the tactical planners of the Air Force to allocate more and more Close Air Support roles to the P-38 in Europe at the point in time of its development that it was reaching its air to air potential - but history passed it by in the ETO as the Mustang was not only cheaper to buy, train in, operate and maintain but available in quantities to perform all of the long range mission requirement.
Imbedded in your piece is that the twin for all combatants was a common thread of "easy to see First". At night, we can strip this fault away and deal solely with the effectiveness of the night fighter to a.) find its prey quickly, b.) have enough speed advantage to close on its prey and c.)enough firepower to take it down. The Me 110 and Ju 88 fulfilled these requirements as well as the He 219.
For daylight the given of being 'spottable' yields the initiative to the 'spotter' if performance equality was also given. While relative maneuverability was important the tactical advantage always fall to the one that sees the other first - which is why you, and I, and others have associated with less success for the P-38 against the Bf 109 and 190 than against the Zero, for example.
The second most contributory factor altering the P-38 success was the well known and lingering issue of dive performance in which a split ess to chase, or evade, led to a forced high speed and uncontrollable dive for many thousands of feet due to compressibility limit - not suffered by its ETO adversaries.
The introduction of the dive flap resolved the issue from Uncontrollable dive but did not alter the limit dive speed issue - which remained well below the Bf 109, FW 190, P-47 and P-51. This limit meant that the P-38 maneuverability equality was solely in positive vertical and forward speed until the boosted flaps some delayed parity in turn and roll (greater than 109, less than 190).
Historically, the all altitude performance of the Mustang and steadily increasing range capability of the P-47 drove the tactical planners of the Air Force to allocate more and more Close Air Support roles to the P-38 in Europe at the point in time of its development that it was reaching its air to air potential - but history passed it by in the ETO as the Mustang was not only cheaper to buy, train in, operate and maintain but available in quantities to perform all of the long range mission requirement.
drgondog
Major
I agree. Must point out that the Bf 110 and Ju 88 and Me 410 were easy to spot by the P-38 before, or at the same time, and the German T/E was inferior in performance to either seek a tactical advantage (safely) or evade, once engaged by P-38. Having said that, all the German twins were even more vulnerable to the higher performance single engine fighters and the range of the P-51 made it necessary for the LW to pull all the twin engine day fighter bases back to the 'Berlin Line' as the LW reduced the sorties against US bomber forces during the spring and finally altogether in July/August 1944 when they transitioned to FW 190A8's
The daylight success of the LW twin engine day fighter ceased when it was continuously molested by US day fighters at long, then longer, range. The P-47D forced the daytime ZG units into western Germany, then central Germany as the 150 gallon belly tanks were added, and finally out of operations altogether by the P-51
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
I agree entirely (good scenario) and there is an additional factor. The great successes the Luftwaffe achieved in late '43 was also because they could use their heavily armed twins. As the US escorts got more range they were obliterated, putting more pressure on the SE fighters.
In your scenario (I call it the 'Park/drgondog' scenario), provided they can strip away the escorts earlier this still leaves the Luftwaffe their twins to cause havoc.
Analogous to Park using the Spits against the 109s thus creating the space for the Hurricanes to get through to the bombers, we have the SE Luftwaffe fighters stripping away the US escorts to let the big twins get through to the bombers.
Airfighting is three dimensional, time after time we see a well placed squadron (or less) causing huge destruction of a much larger group of fighters. Park's tactics were not about getting Spits into dogfights with the 109s (anything but, he didn't want them to do that it was hit and run he wanted), it was about disrupting them with good bounces. Causing them to lose formation, move away from the bombers, lose altitude, burn fuel, etc (and if they had drop tanks then...drop them) and fighter pilots being fighter pilots to get into pointless chases after being bounced. That was what he meant by 'stripping the escorts away'.
So it wasn't, if done well, necessary for the Luftwaffe to use huge numbers of their SE fighters against the US escorts to strip them away. It was the tactics that mattered more.
Remember what Park faced. Little warning time, towards the end of the BoB ridiculous escort/bomber ratios (3:1, even 5:1 at times), yet he, with good tactics, still managed to inflict crippling losses on the bombers all the time.
Numbers, of course, are important, but good tactics can multiply the effectiveness of what you have got. The Luftwaffe had the technical capability (and greater fighter numbers would have been very useful, natch) but not the tactical capability to use what they had as effectively as they could have done.
This is a mission profile to ensure defeat. The original proposition is that the LW could defend Germany with 2000 fighters. This shifted to the LW defending against only the 8th AF on deep penetration raids. Now we have the 8th committing suicide repeating serious mistakes over and over until they are told to stop.
If the LW has 2000 s/e fighters then the allies must use all their strength and use it wisely. All aircraft useful to the allies from all groups must be used. First raids to attack their outlying airfields using P47 (the range of a P47 is greater than the range that they can escort) mosquitos. First raids targetted only on airfields with a small number of bombers and large escorts on a fixed flight plan no splitting of the bomb group.Flying through the LW lines in large numbers is doing bwhat the LW wants, constantly pounding at its limits is what it doesnt. The USAF and British had a large number of trained pilots, it is relatively easy to convert from a typhoon to a P47 and from a Spitfire to a Mustang. Once into early summer planes can be doubled up flying 2 missions a day (Mosquitos bombed Berlin 2 times a night after all. Spitfires can be used for withdrawal over France (they were at times). Multiplying the LW by a factor of 4 would put serious issues in front of the allies but unless they had a massively increased capacity to replace pilots they would eventually lose even if they could find the planes and the fuel to fly them.
Alternatively the allies could sit on the ground and within a month 1500 of these fighters would be sent to the eastern front or make the tactical decision to drive the LW away from Normandy in the build up to D day.
Last edited:
Brilliant as Dowding and Park were they nearly lost when the LW concentrated on raids against Radar and Airfields. PArk was able to strip away the escorts when the objective, London, was clear. The Me109 had fuel to fight over London for, 5 minutes Park only had to make the escorts use burn 5 minutes of fuel and he would eventualy have the bombers alone regardless of the ratio. During the BoB Germany came no where near replacing their material losses while the RAF was replacing losses of aircraft although pilots were another matter. In 1944 Germany was struggling to provide pilots planes and fuel, even starting with 2000 planes and pilots they would lose because the allies had more and could more easily replace them.
OldSkeptic
Senior Airman
- 509
- May 17, 2010
I think Bungey (His book "Most Dangerous Enemy") pretty much has debunked that common mythology. Only one airfield (Manston) was ever put out of operation. Virtually no planes were caught on the ground. The radars were hard to take out, only a Stuka might do it and they were easy prey, and the RAF had redundancy and mobile radars and quick repairs. The Luftwaffe tried that for weeks and got nowhere, except large losses.
The Germans attacking London was a last resort because nothing else had worked, the RAF just kept inflicting unacceptable losses. The Germans had worse problems getting new pilots and they didn't have the production of the British to replace machine losses.
Only if they had hit Sector stations and took out the controllers could they have done it...and they didn't know they existed, their importance or where they were.
They needed a quick victory (to enable an invasion), so they depended on the RAF being stupid. That is put up all their fighters in the air so that the Luftwaffe experten could shoot them down at a 5:1 ratio (as if) or get their planes caught on the ground. Neither of these things happened, Park tactically managed his forces beautifully.
Oh yes the RAF was under pressure all right, but so was the Luftwaffe. Neither side really knew how the other one was suffering. The Luftwaffe fell prey to over confidence, the RAF, correctly, remained very conservative. Even at the worst point, when Dowding broke up squadrons (allocated as A, B C categories) Fighter Command actually had more pilots than at the beginning of the Battle (don't forget the huge losses they suffered in France which had to made good). They were under establishment (ie theoretical) strength, but they still had plenty...plus reserves, which the Luftwaffe didn't.
And the Luftwaffe newbies were just as bad as the RAF ones, ie cannon fodder.
So the BoB would still have turned out the way it did, even if the Luftwaffe had kept on at the airfields (etc) and never touched London.
The Luftwaffe were not stupid they also tried very hard to take out aircraft production...and like Bomber Command and the USAAF did later, failed, despite the fact that (at that time) the Supermarine and Hawker production were well within 109 escort range (closer than London).
So we are back to inaccurate bombing again, which had little effect, so the bombers were just the reason to get the RAF up so they could be shot down. Trouble was, FC (after France) had a hard core of experienced pilots ..and, which they could never understand (and didn't understand later in '43 and '44) the concept of a 'General' maintaining effective tactical control over his forces.
You have to remember the Heer (Army part of the Wehrmacht) training, leadership, doctrine, etc (such as Mission Command) was all worked out before the Nazis took over. It was a master of 3rd Generation warfare. Hence why it was so good.. and took the combined forces of the USSR, UK and US to beat them.
The Luftwaffe was created by the Nazis. Hence it's doctrine and ethos were very different. Full of the 'warrior hero' nonsense. Technology, logistics, tactics, were secondary to 'will power' and all that piffle. Hence things like Galland not wanting radios in fighters in the BoB, pilots never getting breaks (while their soldier brothers were far better looked after). Marseille feted, who slaughtered huge numbers of Hurricanes and P-40s...and shot down only 4 bombers in his entire career (leaving his soldier brothers to get hammered by the DAF while he got the headlines...dickhead).
Galland, even at the end, still couldn't except tight effective tactical ground control. To him the pilots in the air were the 'kings'...and then repeated the mistakes of Leigh Mallory in France in '41...the same which mistakes he benefited from in getting his 'score' (and medals).
So it was a weird and very disfunctional organisation, the most effective leader of it all was Kesselring, a very (prior and later) good ground general..who got thumped twice by Park.
Park was like Monty, a really good General who knew his stuff inside out. He knew what he wanted to achieve, he learned, he taught, he changed things. He out thought the enemy at all points...he denied them of what they wanted. He never risked too much at any point in time, hence his opposition to (along with many other reasons) the 'big wing stuff. He understood that air warfare was 3 dimensional and that timing, position and surprise were more important than just raw numbers. 4 planes at the right time and place with the advantage of position and surprise can create more damage than 200 at a tactical disadvantage.
And he cared about his pilots. When the Luftwaffe was hitting the RAF's airfields (many not Fighter Command) his jumped up and down, not because the airfield's were out of operation ..they weren't (Spits and Hurris all took of in grass) but because the pilots didn't have a bed and food and so on. Unlike Leigh Mallory, Park got in his Hurricane and went all round his airfields and talked to his people regularly.
A true leader.
The Luftwaffe, unlike the Heer who produced many of them, was incapable of producing and using people like Park...hence they lost.
Though the RAF (overall) wasn't much better in may ways since it fired Park and Dowding real fast after the BoB.....took until the DAF to get it back being useful again.... 70% losses in Bomber Command (50% killed)? Which was the same the Luftwaffe overall suffered, as did the U-Boats.... Ideology (idiotology?) achieves nothing just gets people killed for nothing.
I wrote my post with this book in mind, please read the sections on the early raids, they did take down a radar but didnt realise it and they did wreak havoc with low level raids using Me110 as a fighter bomber but only had one squadron.
The original discussion was that the LW could defend Germany with 2000 aircraft, this was changed to 2000 AC against the 8th AF, later to 2000 against the 8th AF where mission profiles lead to the bombers being left unescorted. However since you say this The Luftwaffe, unlike the Heer who produced many of them, was incapable of producing and using people like Park...hence they lost. I now think the LW would struggle to defend Magdeburg alone with 10,000 AC.
The LW night fighters showed that the LW could use the best technology to produce a formidable defence, the question was always numbers. Multiplying the LW by 4 to defend Germany would create problems for the allies but eventually they would prevail. They may not have eliminated the LW before D Day was planned and the Russian Army may have been at the edges of Berlin but they would have won eventually in my opinion.
I think you are contradicting and moving the goal posts for your amusement and so will duck out for a while.......cheers
- Thread starter
- #139
DSR T-888
Airman
Thanks
drgondog
Major
Quote Originally Posted by Mike Williams View Post
You might consider checking out the operations of the 9th Air Force P-38 groups, i.e. 367th, 370th and 474th Fighter Groups. The 367th and 370th operated the P-38 into early 1945 and the 474th stayed with the P-38 through to war's end. These units did see action against German fighters.
The total VC's for the three P-38 Groups (including P-47 (367FG) and P-51(370FG) after transition for 367 and 370FGs) was 89-9-43 for 367FG, 42-13-39 for 370FG and 96-54-24 for the 474th FG. By contrast the all Mustang op 339th FG which was operational for same period May 1 forward, destroyed 237 in the air and 431 on the ground.
I'm too lazy to parse out the P-47 scores for 367 and 370 but there weren't many
You might consider checking out the operations of the 9th Air Force P-38 groups, i.e. 367th, 370th and 474th Fighter Groups. The 367th and 370th operated the P-38 into early 1945 and the 474th stayed with the P-38 through to war's end. These units did see action against German fighters.
The total VC's for the three P-38 Groups (including P-47 (367FG) and P-51(370FG) after transition for 367 and 370FGs) was 89-9-43 for 367FG, 42-13-39 for 370FG and 96-54-24 for the 474th FG. By contrast the all Mustang op 339th FG which was operational for same period May 1 forward, destroyed 237 in the air and 431 on the ground.
I'm too lazy to parse out the P-47 scores for 367 and 370 but there weren't many
Last edited:
Users who are viewing this thread
Similar threads
