The real combat history of the Ki-43 (2 Viewers)

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Bloody shambles III just arrived. In very good condition too. I guess Shores doesn't cover China though really eh? This just seems to be exclusively Burma, India, and Indian Ocean. I have already noticed a couple of interesting things though.

Is there any book which covers loss records on both sides for China during WW2?

 

[Just Schmidt]

Oops, I did go too high on the hp. The Ki-43-III had 1230 hp, but a few experimental ones had 1300hp.
There's a picture of the Ki-43-III with the 2x40mm cannons on this forum , within the last 2 weeks, miscellaneous pictures.

In the Pedestal thread Thomas P mentioned the Ki-43-III, and I think it popped up other places in recent discussions. I was under the impression that it was not mass produced, and that at most a handfull could have become operational. However, my information could be seriously outdated?

 

[EwenS]

In the Pedestal thread Thomas P mentioned the Ki-43-III, and I think it popped up other places in recent discussions. I was under the impression that it was not mass produced, and that at most a handfull could have become operational. However, my information could be seriously outdated?

AIUI Nakajima built 10 Ki-43-IIIa prototypes from May 1944 but production was undertaken by Tachikawa.

Tachikawa built 2,629 Ki-43-II and Ki-43-IIIa aircraft between May 1943 & Aug 1945. Unfortunately I don't have a split between the two models.

 

[MiTasol]

Francillion did not break it down either

 

[ThomasP]

In my notes I have Tachikawa Kikoki K.K. manufacturing ~1000x Ki-43-IIIa (-III Ko) airframes from Jul'44 to end of war. This note is from a long time ago (1990s) and I did not note the source.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Osprey book gives some data on Ki-43-III with specific units, I'll look it up.

 

[tyrodtom]

The Osprey book gives some data on Ki-43-III with specific units, I'll look it up.

On the last page of text in the book, page 88, it states the 24th Sentai on 13 nov. 44 was replaced by the 13th Sentai with 27 brand new Ki-43-IIIs.
It's sometimes hard to read the book, unless you read it from front to back, but everything is dated, by month only, to get the year you usually have to read several pages to get the year, or know your history of the Asia WW2 intimately.
On back in the book there's several other times it mentions units supplied with Ki-43-IIIs, I haven't had the time to total them, but they seem to trend in excess of total, by a great amount,. to the totals presented here so far

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

yes, thanks, haven't had a chance to grab the book yet, I've been out for a St. Patrick's day parade. It seemed to me like a lot of units got the Ki-43-IIIs in late 44 and early 45s, but by that time the Allies were fielding a lot of Spit VIII and P-51B/C/D etc., and the attrition on the 64 Sentai etc. was finally starting to tell, so it was kind of too late. I think the Ki-43 units got relegated to ground attack not too long after that.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I've been sporadically going through Shores Bloody Shambles III, prior to a more systematic analysis of losses on both sides, and I ran into a really interesting battle between the JAAF and the British navy in January1945. The Royal Navy, with three aircraft carriers (HMS Indomitable, Indefatigable, and Victorious) with a substantial escort of 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers, made a raid against the oil refineries in Sumatra. This consisted of two raids, the first called Operation Lentil on 4 Jan, 1945, an the second called Operation Meridian on 24-29 January.

The British had a large force consisting mainly of four squadrons of Avengers, escorted by no less than 88 fighters (consisting of Corsairs, Hellcats, and Fireflies), with Seafires and more Corsairs forming fleet defense / CAP. These were met in a fierce air battle by a mixed force of Ki-43 and Ki-44 fighters, and in the second raid a small force of 6 x Ki-21 bombers were sent on what appears to have been a kamikaze raid, which was fortunately defeated.

The first raid went fairly smoothly though there were some discipline problems with fighter escorts veering away from their bombers to engage the JAAF fighters.

The second raid, broken up into two parts, was a bit of a shit show with quite a few losses, both to enemy fighters and barrage balloons. But they did manage to badly damage the refineries, putting them out of commission for two months, and destroyed many JAAF planes on the ground. Overall though it looks like the JAAF fighters got the better of the FAA in this engagement.

Operation Lentil (Sumatra) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Operation Meridian - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I'll go through shores and try to count up the losses on both sides and make note of any other interesting details. This is certainly an interesting matchup of fighter types.

 

[EwenS]

This will help you

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

A series of 'working-up' missions in the Indian Ocean would expose the RN's armoured flight deck aircraft carriers' lack of experience in strike operations.

www.armouredcarriers.com

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

The freshly formed British Pacific Fleet had to prove the worthiness of its armoured flight deck fleet aircraft carriers. Japan's remaining oil refineries were an ideal test.

www.armouredcarriers.com

And the reports from the Air Co-ordinator, Major Ronnie Hay, about Operations Meridian I & II

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

Original Document: Operation Meridian: REPORT OF AIR COORDINATOR ON FIRST STRIKE Major R. C. HAY, Royal Marines, HMS Victorious

www.armouredcarriers.com

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Here is what Shores has on this.

The first strike on 4 Jan, 1945 consisted of a strike group flying from HMS Indefatigable, Indomitable and Victorious, consisting of ~50 Avengers (carrying bombs) and 10 Fireflies (carrying rockets), escorted by 16 Hellcats and 16 Corsairs. * more Hellcats and Corsairs undertook fighter sweeps against nearby airfields.

They were mainly opposed by about ten fighters from 71st I F Chutai, formerly a reconnaissance unit that was converted to Ki-43s in April 1944.

The JAAF were caught off guard, the strike was a success and the FAA fighter pilots claimed 9 Ki-43s (7 by Corsair pilots and 2 by Firefly pilots), as well as a Ki-21 and Ki-46 which were flying recon.

Actual JAAF losses were apparently 2 Ki-43s and the Ki-21 and Ki-46, so four aircraft in total. The FAA only lost one Avenger which ditched in the sea on the way back. The refinery was significantly damaged and several Japanese planes were destroyed on the ground. The only shadow cast over the raid was that the Avenger pilots complained that the pilots had been drawn off from the close escort by the Japanese fighters.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The next strike on 24 Jan, 1945 was much larger. But it seems like it actually went ok. The original mission consisted of:

47 x Avengers from 857, 849, 854 and 820 sqns.
Top cover of 16 x Corsairs from 1834 and 1836 sqns
Middle cover of 8 x Corsairs + 16 x Hellcats from 1830, 1839 and 1844 sqns.
"Strike and bow cover" of 12 x Fireflies from 1770 Sqn (also carrying eight 60 lbs rps each)
"Stern close escort" of 8 Corsairs from 1833 Sqn

48 fighters all told if you count the Fireflies, otherwise 36.

Several of these planes had engine trouble etc., and the actual strike consisted of 40 Avengers and about 40 fighters.

A second strike against Mana consisted of 5 x Avengers from 857 sqn and 4 x Hellcats from 1844 sqn,

And two fighter sweeps consisting of another 24 Corsairs from 1830, 1833, 1834, and 1836 sqns.

These were opposed by a larger JAAF force consisting of:
87th Sentai flying Ki-44s (converted from Ki-43 in May-June 1944)
26th Sentai flying Ki-43s
33rd Sentai flying Ki-43s
Part of 64 Sentai flying Ki-43s (this was just a few planes)
21st Sentai flying K-45kai twin-engined fighters

The Ki-43s here were probably a mix of Ki-43-II and III. The Osprey Ki-43 aces book notes that 64th Sentai converted to Ki-43-III in August on 1944. The author notes that the model III could fly at full power for 40 minutes, something unheard of compared to the -II.

On this day the JAAF was better prepared, and some of their fighters were already airborne when the FAA raids came in, with 20 fighters (a mix of Ki-44 and Ki-43) already waiting at high altitude. They also had some barrage balloons up. The JAAF fighters attacked the escorts and a fight sharp ensued.

Shores says FAA losses included:
6 x Corsairs and 1 x Hellcat , of which one to AAA and the rest to fighters. Most of the Corsairs lost seemed to have been from the high cover and stern cover.
2 x additional Corsair were lost, one ditched on the return trip, one more to a mid-air collision with a Ki-45.
2 x Avengers were lost, both possibly to AAA

JAAF losses included:
8 x Ki-44 shot down or force-landed from 87th Sentai,
2 x Ki-45 from 21st Sentai (including one which collided with a Corsair)
1 x Ki-43 from 64th Sentai (possibly killed on the ground from strafing)
3 x Ki-43 from 26th Sentai

Damage to the refineries was considered significant though still not decisive, and many JAAF planes were destroyed on the ground.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The last strike was on 29 Jan 1945

This was another large group of 48 Avengers, escorted by the following fighters:

Top cover consisting of 12 Corsairs from 1830 and 1833 sqns
"Middle cover" of 16 Hellcats from 1839 and 1844 sqns
Close escort of 12 Corsairs from 1836 sqn and 10 Fireflies of 1770 sqn

For a total of 50 fighters

In addition, once again there were two "Ramrod" missions consisting of 12 Corsairs each, 24 total, from 1830 and 1834 sqns.

and 2 more Fireflies from 1770 sqn on an armed recon mission over Mana.

Against all this was basically the same array of Japanese fighters as on the 24th:
87th Sentai flying Ki-44s (converted from Ki-43 in May-June 1944)
26th Sentai flying Ki-43s
33rd Sentai flying Ki-43s
Part of 64 Sentai flying Ki-43s (this was just a few planes)
21st Sentai flying K-45kai twin-engined fighters

This time though the Japanese were fully prepared and it looks like most of their fighters were in the air by the time the FAA strike arrived.

Once again the escorting fighters seem to have gotten separated from the Avengers during the raid, and the Avengers were forced to engage with Japanese Ki-44 and Ki-43s. Two Avengers were quickly shot down, while another Avenger pilot claimed a Ki-44 destroyed when it blundered in front of him. Another Avenger pilot claimed a second Ki-44 which he believed he shot off the tail of one of his squadron mates. The Avengers from 820, 849 and 854 sqns were badly shot up, and six more Avengers ditched on the way back to the carriers.

The FAA escorts claimed 8 JAAF fighters (5 Ki-44 and 3 Ki-43s). Two were claimed by Fireflies of 1770 sqn, one right before he was in turn shot down, both crew being lost.

The "Ramrod" missions had less lucky, and only claimed ground targets destroyed.

87 Sentai claimed 14 British planes, for the loss of 4 x Ki-44s.
33rd Sentai lost 2 x Ki-43s. (6 Japanese fighters total)
Seafires in the CAP encountered a Ki-21 and claimed it as shot down, but one Seafire was shot down by defensive gunners. A Ki-46 was then claimed by Corsairs from 887 Sqn.

Then seven more Ki-21s were seen to approach the fleet at low altitude, which they originally thought meant they were torpedo bombers. Luckily these were all shot down by AAA and CAP consisting of Seafires and Hellcats. There were some injuries on the ships due to friendly fire, King George V accidentally hit a hellcat, and the Cruiser Euryalus hit Illustrious's flight deck and island killing 12 men and wounding 21.


Shores says that in the two raids of Jan 24 and 29, FAA Task Force 63 lost the following aircraft:

16 shot down in combat
11 ditched near the fleet
14 written off in deck landings

Altogether 41 aircraft with 30 aircrew, including 19 Avenger crew, 1 Hellcat pilot, 8 Corsair pilots, and one Firefly crew were lost.

9 of the missing aircrew were captured by the Japanese and later were murdered during Japanese captivity.... after the Japanese surrender. The soldiers who confessed to decapitating them later committed ritual suicide.

The losses were so serious that task force 63 was delayed getting into action until they could built up their air contingents. But the refineries in Sumatra were estimated at 35% capacity after the raid, and did not rise above 50% capacity after that.

 

[EwenS]

The losses were so serious that task force 63 was delayed getting into action until they could built up their air contingents.

I'm curious about just what you are referring to with this statement. Before Meridian I or after Meridain II? The implication due to the reference to losses seems to be the latter.

The RN strength in the Indian Ocean had begun to build up after the surrender of Italy in Sept 1943, and spurred by a panic in spring 1944 when the Japanese fleet moved to the Singapore area, continued throughout 1944 and 1945 as ships no longer needed in Europe were refitted and sailed east.

Britain split the Eastern Fleet effective 22 Nov 1944, with the fleet carriers and the more modern ships allocated to the British Pacific Fleet which was to transfer to Australia around the end of the year. Due to the failure of B-29 attacks in Aug 1944 and at the request of Nimitz, the BPF was asked to strike at various refineries in the DEI before transferring to Australia. So there was then:-
Operation Robson - 20 Dec 1944 intended for Pangkalan Brandan refinery (but switched to the port of Belawan Deli by the strike leader due to bad weather) by air groups of Illustrious & Indomitable (under designation TF67)
Operation Lentil - 4 Jan 1945 restrike on Pankalan Brandan by air groups of Indomitable, Victorious & Indefatigable (designated TF65)

After that the fleet returned to Trincomalee, made good its losses, and sailed again as TF63 on 13 Jan 1945. This was the first time that the 4 carriers (Indomitable, Illustrious, Victorious & Indefatigable. The latter had only arrived at Colombo from Britain on 10 Dec 1944) had worked together as a single group and they exercised en route to Sumatra. Then:-

Operation Meridian I - 24 Jan 1945 (delayed by several days due to weather)
Operation Meridian II - 29 Jan 1945

On completion of Meridian II TF63 sailed for Australia, arriving Fremantle on 4 Feb & Sydney on 10/11 Feb. It then sailed for its forward base at Manus on 27/28 Feb as TF113 arriving 7 March, where it restored and exercised in preparation for receiving its next orders about where it would serve alongside US forces in the Pacific. These exercises were necessary as the BPF was adopting USN tactical fleet formations and manoeuvres and signals and this was the first opportunity to practise.

Meanwhile, the movement of replacement aircraft from India / Ceylon to Australia had begun in early Dec 1944 when the Maintenance Carrier Unicorn and 4 escort carriers made the journey east.

During this period there was an ongoing debate between London & Washington and Bruce Fraser (CinC BPF) and Macarthur about exactly how and where the BPF should be used in the Pacific theatre now that it was no longer a hypothetical entity (other than under Nimitz it could have been under Macarthur supporting operations in Borneo). However, it was not until the night of 14 March that the future use of the BPF carriers was finally settled. Admiral King, who strongly resisted British involvement in the Pacific, relented and signalled the BPF that it was to operate under Nimitz. At that point the BPF could plan its fleet train movements and finalise its schedules for moving north. A tanker force was despatched from Manus on 17th heading for the refuelling area south of Okinawa. On 18th March the BPF sailed from Manus in 2 groups after the carriers had completed loading the last of their replacement aircraft (always a few losses in carrier operations even during exercises). It arrived at Ulithi on 20th March, fuelled and left again on the early morning of 23 March, after senior staff meeting between RN & USN officers on 22nd, for the operational area off Okinawa. After a final refuelling from the tanker group despatched earlier (and receiving 4 new aircraft from the replenishment carrier Striker) on 25th, TF57 as the BPF carrier force was now designated flew its first operations against the Sakishima Gunto island airfields on the 26th March.

To put this in context, the USN carriers of TF58 left Ulithi on 14 March to strike southern Japan in preparation for the Okinawa invasion (on 19th March the Franklin was bombed and put out of the war), the minesweeping groups left Ulithi for Okinawa on the 19th, beginning operations on the 23rd, the fire support ships left on 21st arriving on 25th. The Kerama Retto island group was invaded on the 26th and Okinawa itself on 1 April 1945.

Given the above, I'm not seeing any evidence that it was the aircraft losses incurred during the 2 Meridian operations that prevented the BPF carriers seeing their next action sooner.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This will help you

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

A series of 'working-up' missions in the Indian Ocean would expose the RN's armoured flight deck aircraft carriers' lack of experience in strike operations.

www.armouredcarriers.com

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

The freshly formed British Pacific Fleet had to prove the worthiness of its armoured flight deck fleet aircraft carriers. Japan's remaining oil refineries were an ideal test.

www.armouredcarriers.com

And the reports from the Air Co-ordinator, Major Ronnie Hay, about Operations Meridian I & II

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

Original Document: Operation Meridian: REPORT OF AIR COORDINATOR ON FIRST STRIKE Major R. C. HAY, Royal Marines, HMS Victorious

www.armouredcarriers.com

Those are good, and very nicely detailed, though I notice one major mistake in there, chiefly in their assessment of the fighters:

"It was also known some 250 front-line fighters and bombers were based nearby in Singapore and Java. Once again, early warning could see these rapidly reinforce Palembang's defences.

The quality of the aircraft facing the FAA was mixed.

During briefings, pilots were warned the Japanese 'should be able to give a good account of themselves but much will depend on how much warning they get and how good their individual pilots are'.

The older Ki43 Oscars were mostly in 'active training' squadrons operating in relative safety far from the front lines. By 1945 these were well and truly obsolescent, their nimble airframes in no way making up for its slow speed and light armament of two 7.7mm machineguns.

Active units were equipped with the newer Ki44 Shoki (Tojo). This had greater speed and climb, as well as a heavier armament of four 12.77mg or two 12.77mg and two 20mm cannon."

This is the persistent, standard, and during the war very dangerous underestimate of the "Oscar" yet again.

The Ki-43 was not much older than the Ki-44, in fact Ki-44s were in action before (Sept 1941) the Ki-43. It's highly debatable whether the Ki-44 was actually a better fighter. It was faster but much less maneuverable, and not necessarily superior in general. They also underestimate the armament of the Ki-43 (which actually had two 12.7mm in the -II and -III variants which were present in Sumatra) and overestimate the armament of the Ki-44 (which most likely had four 12.7mm).

They give the JAAF TO&E (I think directly from Shores) as:

9th Air Division, Sumatra

• 21st Hiko Sentai (Palembang**): Ki45kai Toryu (Nick)
• 26th Hiko Sentai (Betung**): Ki43-II & III Hayabusa (Oscar)
• 33rd Hiko Sentai (Bersun / Betung**): Ki43-III Hayabusa (Oscar)
• 64th Sentai detachment (Betung**): Ki-43-II & III Hayabusa (Oscar)
• 87th Sentai (Lembak / Gelumbang**): Ki44 Shoki (Tojo)
• 58th Hiko Sentai: Ki21-II (Sally/Gwen)
• 1st Field Reserve Regiment: Ki21 (Sally/Gwen)
• 24th Independent Air Squadron*
• 71st Independent Air Squadron*

I think this battle and others in other Theaters show that the Ki-43 was not in fact, an opponent to be taken lightly, and it could shoot down the most modern Allied fighter types if their pilots were not very careful and disciplined. But I'll come back to that later.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'm curious about just what you are referring to with this statement. Before Meridian I or after Meridain II? The implication due to the reference to losses seems to be the latter.

I was just paraphrasing Shores and a handful of other sources that I read. Shores gives this summary on page 322 (which I assume you have read already?)

"The cost to Force 63 had been quite substantial however. During the two late January raids 16 aircraft had been lost in combat, 11 had ditched near the fleet and 14 had been written off in deck landings - 41 aircraft in 378 sorties. Thirty aircrew were lost including 19 Avenger personnel, one Hellcat pilot, eight Corsair pilots and the crew of a Firefly. Three pilots had been seen to bale out apparently safely, whilst four of those who had returned to the carriers had been wounded. Victorious and Illustrious had suffered most and sailed into the Pacific deficient in both aircraft and aircrew until replacements could arrive. However, the three January raids were probably the British Pacific Fleet's greatest contribution to victory despite the scale of their subsequent activities in the Pacific."

The RN strength in the Indian Ocean had begun to build up after the surrender of Italy in Sept 1943, and spurred by a panic in spring 1944 when the Japanese fleet moved to the Singapore area, continued throughout 1944 and 1945 as ships no longer needed in Europe were refitted and sailed east.

Britain split the Eastern Fleet effective 22 Nov 1944, with the fleet carriers and the more modern ships allocated to the British Pacific Fleet which was to transfer to Australia around the end of the year. Due to the failure of B-29 attacks in Aug 1944 and at the request of Nimitz, the BPF was asked to strike at various refineries in the DEI before transferring to Australia. So there was then:-
Operation Robson - 20 Dec 1944 intended for Pangkalan Brandan refinery (but switched to the port of Belawan Deli by the strike leader due to bad weather) by air groups of Illustrious & Indomitable (under designation TF67)
Operation Lentil - 4 Jan 1945 restrike on Pankalan Brandan by air groups of Indomitable, Victorious & Indefatigable (designated TF65)

After that the fleet returned to Trincomalee, made good its losses, and sailed again as TF63 on 13 Jan 1945. This was the first time that the 4 carriers (Indomitable, Illustrious, Victorious & Indefatigable. The latter had only arrived at Colombo from Britain on 10 Dec 1944) had worked together as a single group and they exercised en route to Sumatra. Then:-

Operation Meridian I - 24 Jan 1945 (delayed by several days due to weather)
Operation Meridian II - 29 Jan 1945

On completion of Meridian II TF63 sailed for Australia, arriving Fremantle on 4 Feb & Sydney on 10/11 Feb. It then sailed for its forward base at Manus on 27/28 Feb as TF113 arriving 7 March, where it restored and exercised in preparation for receiving its next orders about where it would serve alongside US forces in the Pacific. These exercises were necessary as the BPF was adopting USN tactical fleet formations and manoeuvres and signals and this was the first opportunity to practise.

Meanwhile, the movement of replacement aircraft from India / Ceylon to Australia had begun in early Dec 1944 when the Maintenance Carrier Unicorn and 4 escort carriers made the journey east.

During this period there was an ongoing debate between London & Washington and Bruce Fraser (CinC BPF) and Macarthur about exactly how and where the BPF should be used in the Pacific theatre now that it was no longer a hypothetical entity (other than under Nimitz it could have been under Macarthur supporting operations in Borneo). However, it was not until the night of 14 March that the future use of the BPF carriers was finally settled. Admiral King, who strongly resisted British involvement in the Pacific, relented and signalled the BPF that it was to operate under Nimitz. At that point the BPF could plan its fleet train movements and finalise its schedules for moving north. A tanker force was despatched from Manus on 17th heading for the refuelling area south of Okinawa. On 18th March the BPF sailed from Manus in 2 groups after the carriers had completed loading the last of their replacement aircraft (always a few losses in carrier operations even during exercises). It arrived at Ulithi on 20th March, fuelled and left again on the early morning of 23 March, after senior staff meeting between RN & USN officers on 22nd, for the operational area off Okinawa. After a final refuelling from the tanker group despatched earlier (and receiving 4 new aircraft from the replenishment carrier Striker) on 25th, TF57 as the BPF carrier force was now designated flew its first operations against the Sakishima Gunto island airfields on the 26th March.

To put this in context, the USN carriers of TF58 left Ulithi on 14 March to strike southern Japan in preparation for the Okinawa invasion (on 19th March the Franklin was bombed and put out of the war), the minesweeping groups left Ulithi for Okinawa on the 19th, beginning operations on the 23rd, the fire support ships left on 21st arriving on 25th. The Kerama Retto island group was invaded on the 26th and Okinawa itself on 1 April 1945.

Given the above, I'm not seeing any evidence that it was the aircraft losses incurred during the 2 Meridian operations that prevented the BPF carriers seeing their next action sooner.

As usual, I appreciate the data but I am 'curious' as to your accusing tone here, just like last time when you got so animated about the idea that there was resistance by RAF officers to replace the Hurricane in Burma and India, which their clearly was, and were implying that I had made this up, which I obviously didn't.

I'll also quote a couple of passages from the long writeups you linked on armouredcarriers.com:

( R RCAFson should also find this interesting

"The performance of the US-built FAA aircraft was generally reported to be excellent."

"The serviceability problems experienced by the FAA's Avengers was attributed to the hot, damp tropical conditions. But the strain placed on the armoured carriers' small maintenance teams in the sweltering hangars was also a factor. Captain Denny reported HMS Victorious was carrying one Avenger and four Corsairs more than her listed capacity. This meant more aircraft on deck exposed for longer to the elements, and fewer mechanics per aircraft for maintenance."

"Admiral Vian expressed disappointment about the conduct of his Seafires. He went so far as to declare them unsuitable for Pacific operations. Low endurance prevented their use in RAMRODS or as close escort. Even in their role as CAP fighters, their hourly turn-over rate forced the fleet to constantly manoeuvre. While excellent in combat, their weak landing gear had produced an unacceptably high deck-landing attrition rate."

That sounds pretty familiar.

As an assessment of losses:

"But Meridian was a costly exercise for the British.

Captain Lambe noted that the Meridian operation had cost HMS Illustrious 10 per cent of his fighter pilots, 8 per cent of his Avenger crews, 24 per cent of his Avenger aircraft and 24 per cent of his fighters."

"Neither the loss in FAA aircraft or air crew could be made up until the fleet arrived in Sydney. HMAS Unicorn, sailing separately was carrying all available spares and replacements."

Finally, from your own review up above here, it seems like the this fleet did not get into action until March.

Based on all this, I have to again question whether the Royal Navy and FAA was ready to face the IJN on their own, even this late in the game, as we have discussed previously in this thread.

 

[RCAFson]

Here is what Shores has on this.

The first strike on 4 Jan, 1945 consisted of a strike group flying from HMS Indefatigable, Indomitable and Victorious, consisting of ~50 Avengers (carrying bombs) and 10 Fireflies (carrying rockets), escorted by 16 Hellcats and 16 Corsairs. * more Hellcats and Corsairs undertook fighter sweeps against nearby airfields.

They were mainly opposed by about ten fighters from 71st I F Chutai, formerly a reconnaissance unit that was converted to Ki-43s in April 1944.

The JAAF were caught off guard, the strike was a success and the FAA fighter pilots claimed 9 Ki-43s (7 by Corsair pilots and 2 by Firefly pilots), as well as a Ki-21 and Ki-46 which were flying recon.

Actual JAAF losses were apparently 2 Ki-43s and the Ki-21 and Ki-46, so four aircraft in total. The FAA only lost one Avenger which ditched in the sea on the way back. The refinery was significantly damaged and several Japanese planes were destroyed on the ground. The only shadow cast over the raid was that the Avenger pilots complained that the pilots had been drawn off from the close escort by the Japanese fighters.

Shores states:

"The Avengers and Fireflies were escorted by 16 Hellcats and 16 Corsairs, which engaged Ki 43s of the 71st Chutai, claiming seven of these shot down. The Firefly pilots added two more. Two of the Chutai's pilots were killed, 1/Lt Terabumi Murakani (reportedly whilst undertaking a ramming attack) and Wt Off Kamao Hirate. Details of losses where pilots may have baled out or crash-landed are not known, but during these engagements no FAA fighters were missing. One Avenger was damaged by a Japanese fighter and one force-landed in the sea due to engine failure, the crew being rescued successfully."

So we know that the IJ units lost aircraft because of pilot fatalities but the actual losses are likely understated. This is true for Meridian 1 and II also. The TBM loss may not have been due to battle damage.

 

[buffnut453]

This is the persistent, standard, and during the war very dangerous underestimate of the "Oscar" yet again.

No it's not. Look at the entirety of the statements made.

There is nothing factually incorrect about the statement "During briefings, pilots were warned the Japanese 'should be able to give a good account of themselves but much will depend on how much warning they get and how good their individual pilots are." Clearly, the FAA pilots were warned NOT to take the IJAAF for granted, per the section I bolded. It's worth noting that this evaluation was borne out by the examples you cited on 4, 24 and 29 Jan 1945. Better warning and defensive organization on 29 Jan led to better results for the IJAAF.

The same with this statement "The older Ki43 Oscars were mostly in 'active training' squadrons operating in relative safety far from the front lines. By 1945 these were well and truly obsolescent, their nimble airframes in no way making up for its slow speed and light armament of two 7.7mm machineguns." By 1945, the Ki-43 WAS obsolescent compared to the best Allied fighters, and certainly compared to the Corsairs and Hellcats used by the FAA. The Ki-43 was slower and was less well armed. That's not to say the Ki-43s couldn't score victories and even "give a good account of themselves"...to restate the preceding quote. Obsolescent does not mean the Ki-43 was an easy adversary, nor do the statements suggest such an interpretation.

You criticize the "underestimate" of the Ki-43 armament and yet this was presumably derived from the available intelligence. That's not underestimating; it's citing the best available information. It's also worth noting that they overestimated the armament of the Ki-44. Given the quality of aircraft recognition at combat ranges, how many pilots could accurately differentiate between a Ki-43 and a Ki-44? Bottom line is that the FAA pilots expected a mix of both types and so the underestimate of armament for the Ki-43 is an irrelevance.

Yet again, you are entirely ignoring the IJAAF numbers involved. For the 29 Jan event, it seems like almost all their fighters were in the air. That's potentially 150+ airframes giving the defenders perhaps as much as a 3-to-1 numerical advantage. Unsurprisingly, the IJAAF came off better than the numerically inferior FAA gorilla.

You persist with your perception that the Ki-43 was underestimated but there's NOTHING in the cited section to suggest that was the case. Indeed, the assessment seems to have been bang on the money. Just because the FAA suffered losses does not mean they underestimated the enemy, nor does it mean that they were less capable than (pick your country/ air arm). It just means that, for the engagement on 29 Jan 1945, they were outnumbered and suffered losses. At the end of the day, the FAA's mission objectives were achieved. They greatly disrupted Japanese oil supplies which equals mission success.

 

[buffnut453]

Wild_Bill_Kelso , I'm glad I amuse you. Care to enlighten me as to what, exactly, is funny in my post?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Your zeal is amusing, as is your palpable outrage. Lighten up Francis.

I was referring mainly to the claim that the Ki-43 was armed with 7.7mm light machine guns, which they definitely were not, and in the highly exaggerated portrayal of the Ki-44 as much more modern than the Ki-43 - in the 'Armouredcarriers' summary. Not necessarily in the wartime briefing. "Can be expected to give a good account of themselves"

Underestimating the Ki-43 became a common trope post-war. During the war I think in Theaters where they actually encountered Ki-43s, the local Allied units were quickly disabused of these fantasies.

Your other claims are also I think, unfounded. I was not able to find numbers for the JAAF units, except for some partial numbers, from Shores, but it appears that none of the JAAF fighter units were at full strength. One of the Oscar units in Meridian I was noted to launch 6 aircraft. Then there is an additional issue of how many aircraft on both sides actually got into contact and were engaged. I was careful not to make any claims on either side of this fence.

However, being outnumbered, which was a routine occurrence on both sides during the fighting in the CBI and South Pacific, did not necessarily lead to bad outcomes. Many other factors, including pilot training and the traits of the aircraft used, played a role in the outcomes. It was routine in fact for Allied units to engage Japanese units in the CBI when outnumbered and still come out ahead. This includes RAF units flying Spit VIIIs. Of course, we know that these pilots were flying pretty strictly according to the 'best practices' doctrines, i.e. "Boom and Zoom". It's unclear if the FAA was using this or how strictly they were implementing it if they were. Certainly there seems to have been some discipline issues at play.