The real combat history of the Ki-43 (1 Viewer)

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Shores states:

"The Avengers and Fireflies were escorted by 16 Hellcats and 16 Corsairs, which engaged Ki 43s of the 71st Chutai, claiming seven of these shot down. The Firefly pilots added two more. Two of the Chutai's pilots were killed, 1/Lt Terabumi Murakani (reportedly whilst undertaking a ramming attack) and Wt Off Kamao Hirate. Details of losses where pilots may have baled out or crash-landed are not known, but during these engagements no FAA fighters were missing. One Avenger was damaged by a Japanese fighter and one force-landed in the sea due to engine failure, the crew being rescued successfully."

So we know that the IJ units lost aircraft because of pilot fatalities but the actual losses are likely understated. This is true for Meridian 1 and II also. The TBM loss may not have been due to battle damage.

We can only go by the losses listed in the data available, but I don't see any reason to assume that JAAF losses were higher than stated. I never said why the Avenger was lost, as it was not clear from the narrative in Shores. In the later battles at least two, probably more Avengers were actually lost to the barrage balloons, which probably should have been shot down before the raid went in.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The constant claims of RAF and now FAA being outnumbered against the Japanese is something I'd like to specifically address, based on data from Shores and the other sources.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'd also like to note that the JAAF seems to have acquitted itself pretty well here, compared to IJN during the same period.

 

[buffnut453]

Your zeal is amusing, as is your palpable outrage. Lighten up Francis.

I was referring mainly to the claim that the Ki-43 was armed with 7.7mm light machine guns, which they definitely were not, and in the highly exaggerated portrayal of the Ki-44 as much more modern than the Ki-43 - in the 'Armouredcarriers' summary. Not necessarily in the wartime briefing. "Can be expected to give a good account of themselves"

Underestimating the Ki-43 became a common trope post-war. During the war I think in Theaters where they actually encountered Ki-43s, the local Allied units were quickly disabused of these fantasies.

Your other claims are also I think, unfounded. I was not able to find numbers for the JAAF units, except for some partial numbers, from Shores, but it appears that none of the JAAF fighter units were at full strength. One of the Oscar units in Meridian I was noted to launch 6 aircraft. Then there is an additional issue of how many aircraft on both sides actually got into contact and were engaged. I was careful not to make any claims on either side of this fence.

However, being outnumbered, which was a routine occurrence on both sides during the fighting in the CBI and South Pacific, did not necessarily lead to bad outcomes. Many other factors, including pilot training and the traits of the aircraft used, played a role in the outcomes. It was routine in fact for Allied units to engage Japanese units in the CBI when outnumbered and still come out ahead. This includes RAF units flying Spit VIIIs. Of course, we know that these pilots were flying pretty strictly according to the 'best practices' doctrines, i.e. "Boom and Zoom". It's unclear if the FAA was using this or how strictly they were implementing it if they were. Certainly there seems to have been some discipline issues at play.

I have no "palpable outrage." I'm simply calling out your oversimplification of basic tenets of air combat and your overzealous application of the retrospectroscope. It's called a discussion where we offer different insights. You clearly want to ridicule. my contributions since you persist in knowing my state of mind. I can't help wondering if you just don't like it when people disagree with your broad statements.

Yes, the later Ki-43s had better armament than the 7.7mm MGs stated. However, if the FAA didn't KNOW that, then it can't be an underestimate, can it? You also completely ignore my other point that the FAA crews were expecting to face a mix of Ki-43s and Ki-44s and, in the heat of combat, the pilots were unlikely to take the time to worry about which was which...thus any "understimate" of the Ki-43's armament is irrelevant.

An IJAAF Sentai could comprise up to 50 aircraft. The units involved in these engagements were almost certainly understrength but even if we discount the minimal contribution of the 64th Sentai, you're still looking at 4 sentai's worth plus a couple of independent squadrons...so 150 may not be a bad estimate. Even if it's 100, that's still a 2-to-1 advantage. I would also point out that I never made a "claim" that 150 IJAAF aircraft were involved: it was an estimate, nothing more nothing less.

The success or otherwise of any particular engagement is down to the details specifics of that engagement. The FAA did come out ahead on 4 and 24 Jan and, even though they suffered on 29 Jan, they still achieved mission success. You're ignoring these details to support your position.

 

[buffnut453]

The constant claims of RAF and now FAA being outnumbered against the Japanese is something I'd like to specifically address, based on data from Shores and the other sources.

I won't speak for others but I never said that the RAF or FAA were constantly outnumbered. I did observe that the mission on 29 Jan 1945 was likely a situation where the FAA force was significantly outnumbered. I made no such statements about the missions on 4 or 24 Jan...so I'm hardly making a "constant claim."

The bigger issue here is that you want to make generalized comparisons while I'm trying to point out that things aren't that simple. You previously stated that the P-40s and Hurricanes were engaged in the same mission profiles and therefore we could directly compare their performance. I'd like to take the bomber escort mission as an example.

Let's say the Hurricanes are escorting Blenheims while the P-40s are escorting B-25s (both are realistic force compositions for this theatre in 1944). The B-25 cruise speed is over 30mph faster than the Blenheim, while it's maximum speed was obtained at a higher altitude. Those factors will change how the escorting fighters function in order to perform their mission. The ability to fly higher and faster is, clearly, an advantage for the escorting fighters.

This is just one example. Just because aircraft were performing similar missions in the same theatre does not mean they can be directly compared because there are just too many other variables, including adversary numbers, the starting point of the engagement etc etc.

 

[EwenS]

I was just paraphrasing Shores and a handful of other sources that I read. Shores gives this summary on page 322 (which I assume you have read already?)

"The cost to Force 63 had been quite substantial however. During the two late January raids 16 aircraft had been lost in combat, 11 had ditched near the fleet and 14 had been written off in deck landings - 41 aircraft in 378 sorties. Thirty aircrew were lost including 19 Avenger personnel, one Hellcat pilot, eight Corsair pilots and the crew of a Firefly. Three pilots had been seen to bale out apparently safely, whilst four of those who had returned to the carriers had been wounded. Victorious and Illustrious had suffered most and sailed into the Pacific deficient in both aircraft and aircrew until replacements could arrive. However, the three January raids were probably the British Pacific Fleet's greatest contribution to victory despite the scale of their subsequent activities in the Pacific."

Yes I read it which was why I queried your statement. Paraphrasing in the way you did portrays a misleading picture which you would have realised, if you had stopped to think about it. The alternative explanation is that you are seeking to portray a biased view of BPF operations, something that quite a number of your fellow countrymen that I have encountered on the net are prone to doing. So let us get the record straight.

Yes the carriers had suffered losses during Meridian. But given that they sailed direct from carrying out those operations to Australia without returning to Ceylon and without being able to pick up replacement aircraft, of course they "sailed into the Pacific deficient in both aircraft and aircrew" (my emphasis). Replacements were not obtainable until they arrived at Sydney. And last time I looked Sydney was on Australia's Pacific coast! By the time they sailed from Sydney a couple of weeks later those losses had been made good.

As usual, I appreciate the data but I am 'curious' as to your accusing tone here, just like last time when you got so animated about the idea that there was resistance by RAF officers to replace the Hurricane in Burma and India, which their clearly was, and were implying that I had made this up, which I obviously didn't.

See above

I'll also quote a couple of passages from the long writeups you linked on armouredcarriers.com:

(@RCAFson should also find this interesting

"The performance of the US-built FAA aircraft was generally reported to be excellent."

"The serviceability problems experienced by the FAA's Avengers was attributed to the hot, damp tropical conditions. But the strain placed on the armoured carriers' small maintenance teams in the sweltering hangars was also a factor. Captain Denny reported HMS Victorious was carrying one Avenger and four Corsairs more than her listed capacity. This meant more aircraft on deck exposed for longer to the elements, and fewer mechanics per aircraft for maintenance."

"Admiral Vian expressed disappointment about the conduct of his Seafires. He went so far as to declare them unsuitable for Pacific operations. Low endurance prevented their use in RAMRODS or as close escort. Even in their role as CAP fighters, their hourly turn-over rate forced the fleet to constantly manoeuvre. While excellent in combat, their weak landing gear had produced an unacceptably high deck-landing attrition rate."

That sounds pretty familiar.

Yes. But don't forget that was the same Vian that had commanded Force V at Salerno. So he brought a certain bias with him before he started. The Seafire squadrons recognised their limitations and come July had come up with solutions which meant that they could become more useful. And Seafire attrition rates in the BPF came no where near those at Salerno, for all the reasons discussed on various previous threads.

If the USN had been willing to provide more Hellcats (and other aircraft) during 1943/44, instead of seemingly tearing up agreements on aircraft allocations between the two nations, then perhaps Indefatigable and Implacable (which arrived at Sydney on 8 May 1945) could have taken them to the Pacific instead of Seafires.

As an assessment of losses:

"But Meridian was a costly exercise for the British.

Captain Lambe noted that the Meridian operation had cost HMS Illustrious 10 per cent of his fighter pilots, 8 per cent of his Avenger crews, 24 per cent of his Avenger aircraft and 24 per cent of his fighters."

"Neither the loss in FAA aircraft or air crew could be made up until the fleet arrived in Sydney. HMAS Unicorn, sailing separately was carrying all available spares and replacements."

As I noted above and should have been clear to you from what you read elsewhere.

Finally, from your own review up above here, it seems like the this fleet did not get into action until March.

Yes . And I have set out the reasons why. Why do you seem to have a problem with that?

Based on all this, I have to again question whether the Royal Navy and FAA was ready to face the IJN on their own, even this late in the game, as we have discussed previously in this thread.

But the intention never was for the BPF to face the IJN on its own. It was always intended that it should operate alongside the USN.

But I have no doubt that whatever I say you will persist in your negative views of the BPF.

 

[buffnut453]

I won't speak for others but I never said that the RAF or FAA were constantly outnumbered. I did observe that the mission on 29 Jan 1945 was likely a situation where the FAA force was significantly outnumbered. I made no such statements about the missions on 4 or 24 Jan...so I'm hardly making a "constant claim."

The bigger issue here is that you want to make generalized comparisons while I'm trying to point out that things aren't that simple. You previously stated that the P-40s and Hurricanes were engaged in the same mission profiles and therefore we could directly compare their performance. I'd like to take the bomber escort mission as an example.

Let's say the Hurricanes are escorting Blenheims while the P-40s are escorting B-25s (both are realistic force compositions for this theatre in 1944). The B-25 cruise speed is over 30mph faster than the Blenheim, while it's maximum speed was obtained at a higher altitude. Those factors will change how the escorting fighters function in order to perform their mission. The ability to fly higher and faster is, clearly, an advantage for the escorting fighters.

This is just one example. Just because aircraft were performing similar missions in the same theatre does not mean they can be directly compared because there are just too many other variables, including adversary numbers, the starting point of the engagement etc etc.

Wild_Bill_Kelso you think this post is funny, too. Yet BiffF15 liked it...and I respect his "likes" because of his operational background and experience.

Maybe you could engage in the conversation with something meaningful? Or are you simply dismissing everything I post because it doesn't fit with the theory you're propounding?

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I have no "palpable outrage." I'm simply calling out your oversimplification of basic tenets of air combat and your overzealous application of the retrospectroscope. It's called a discussion where we offer different insights. You clearly want to ridicule. my contributions since you persist in knowing my state of mind. I can't help wondering if you just don't like it when people disagree with your broad statements.

Some people seem to add a little vinegar to the disagreement every single time anything of a certain national association is portrayed as anything less than ideal or perfect. Exploring the realities of the war is not a contest in which each nation scores points against the other. I am routinely just as critical of one force as any other.

Yes, the later Ki-43s had better armament than the 7.7mm MGs stated. However, if the FAA didn't KNOW that, then it can't be an underestimate, can it? You also completely ignore my other point that the FAA crews were expecting to face a mix of Ki-43s and Ki-44s and, in the heat of combat, the pilots were unlikely to take the time to worry about which was which...thus any "understimate" of the Ki-43's armament is irrelevant.

No mate, you completely missed my point that the underestimate was largely a post-war phenomenon. The summary of the briefing given "expect a good fight" was correct. The summary of the Ki-43 on the modern armoured carriers site is where it goes awry.

My theory as to war-time units in general, both in the US and Commonwealth forces, is that the higher-ups had an incorrect under-estimate of the capabilities of the Ki-43, just as they had with the A6M prior to the outbreak of war, but (to repeat myself again) the units in the field did not suffer from this illusion. However, it is by far the narrative which survived postwar, and one which this thread seeks to correct.

An IJAAF Sentai could comprise up to 50 aircraft. The units involved in these engagements were almost certainly understrength but even if we discount the minimal contribution of the 64th Sentai, you're still looking at 4 sentai's worth plus a couple of independent squadrons...so 150 may not be a bad estimate. Even if it's 100, that's still a 2-to-1 advantage. I would also point out that I never made a "claim" that 150 IJAAF aircraft were involved: it was an estimate, nothing more nothing less.

Ok, I think it's a very high estimate. The only JAAF numbers I saw in Shores were:

1) during the first Jan 4 raid, only 71st I F Chutai seemed to be involved, which was a squadron sized unit.
2) during the second, Jan 24 raid, "about 20 Ki 44s and Ki 43s" attacked the top cover, "followed by more" and
"five or six Ki 43s from the 26th Sentai had also gotten off the ground, as had at least ten Ki 45kais of the 21st Sentai" (and that the leader of 26 Sentai claimed 5 victories)

I don't see any numeric estimates for the JAAF forces in Shores for the third raid on the 29th. But none of this gives me the impression of anything even close to 100+ aircraft, let alone 150, nor does Shores suggest anywhere I have noticed that the FAA units were outnumbered. The truth is though I don't see any numbers for these units yet, so until I find them or someone else posts them to the thread, it's kind of pointless to speculate. It's certainly dubious to suggest that any trouble suffered by the FAA unit was due to being heavily outnumbered, not only because we don't really have evidence that they really were, but also because being outnumbered did not necessary equate to high losses in many other encounters with these same Japanese units and aircraft types.

The success or otherwise of any particular engagement is down to the details specifics of that engagement. The FAA did come out ahead on 4 and 24 Jan and, even though they suffered on 29 Jan, they still achieved mission success. You're ignoring these details to support your position.

I'm not ignoring a damn thing, as you know very well. You just don't like what I have to say. All of my conclusions are provisional pending further data.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I won't speak for others but I never said that the RAF or FAA were constantly outnumbered. I did observe that the mission on 29 Jan 1945 was likely a situation where the FAA force was significantly outnumbered. I made no such statements about the missions on 4 or 24 Jan...so I'm hardly making a "constant claim."

And I never said that you were the only one making this claim, to the contrary, it's all over the thread, among other places. You'd have to have some pretty strict tunnel vision not to notice that.

The bigger issue here is that you want to make generalized comparisons while I'm trying to point out that things aren't that simple. You previously stated that the P-40s and Hurricanes were engaged in the same mission profiles and therefore we could directly compare their performance. I'd like to take the bomber escort mission as an example.

Let's say the Hurricanes are escorting Blenheims while the P-40s are escorting B-25s (both are realistic force compositions for this theatre in 1944).

Actually, nope. According to Shores Bloody Shambles page 388-390, by Dec 1943 there are no, as in zero Blenheims still left in any operational squadrons in the RAF TO&E. They seemed to have mostly been replaced by Vultee Vengeance (45, 110, 84, 82, and 8 IAF Sqns) and by Beaufighters (177 and 27 Sqns)

The B-25 cruise speed is over 30mph faster than the Blenheim, while it's maximum speed was obtained at a higher altitude. Those factors will change how the escorting fighters function in order to perform their mission. The ability to fly higher and faster is, clearly, an advantage for the escorting fighters.

And I think that is very much a reach, considering that both air forces escorted a variety of bombers with varying cruise speeds, ranging from slow (C-47, Hudson, B-24, Blenheim, Wellington) to faster (A-36, Vengeance, Beaufighter) and in-between (B-25, Beaufort), and escorted their own same types (P-40s or Hurricanes) flying as fighter bombers of course.

More importantly, both types (in fact all Allied fighter types) also performed fighter sweeps, strafing and fighter bomber attacks, armed reconnaissance and so on.

I believe the idea that you can't draw any conclusions from the operational outcomes, claims vs losses (or with postwar data, actual enemy losses vs friendly losses) is childish. They were flying against the same units, often on the same days, in the same exact kinds of conditions, and we can now see, most of the time with basically the same tactics.

This is just one example. Just because aircraft were performing similar missions in the same theatre does not mean they can be directly compared because there are just too many other variables, including adversary numbers, the starting point of the engagement etc etc.

Well, I don't think I can convince you that you are wrong, but I doubt many would agree with you. Of course they can be compared, and clearly were compared during the war.

 

[buffnut453]

Some people seem to add a little vinegar to the disagreement every single time anything of a certain national association is portrayed as anything less than ideal or perfect. Exploring the realities of the war is not a contest in which each nation scores points against the other. I am routinely just as critical of one force as any other.

That's not a reasonable excuse for simply marking my posts as funny, I'm afraid. You've consistently said I'm displaying a national bias when all I'm trying to do is provide some different contextual understanding to the direct comparisons you're trying to make.

No mate, you completely missed my point that the underestimate was largely a post-war phenomenon. The summary of the briefing given "expect a good fight" was correct. The summary of the Ki-43 on the modern armoured carriers site is where it goes awry.

Then I truly don't know what you're trying to achieve. I, for one, never underestimated the Ki-43. It was an outstanding fighter. By 1944 it was definitely past its best but it was still a dangerous adversary. I've never held a different position than that.

My theory as to war-time units in general, both in the US and Commonwealth forces, is that the higher-ups had an incorrect under-estimate of the capabilities of the Ki-43, just as they had with the A6M prior to the outbreak of war, but (to repeat myself again) the units in the field did not suffer from this illusion. However, it is by far the narrative which survived postwar, and one which this thread seeks to correct.

Well, the briefings to the FAA pilots were provided by "higher ups" or, at least, with their sanction. So which side of the argument is it? Early in the war in the Far East, it was often the squadron-level personnel who ignored accurate intelligence on the capabilities of the A6M. Unit commanders arriving in the Far East did, on occasion, ignore the advice of the "old hands" who'd been in-theatre a while...to their cost. Once the capabilities were understood, I find it incredibly hard to believe that anyone, at any echelon, would believe that either the Ki-43 or the A6M were anything other than dangerous adversaries.

Am I correct in my understanding that your theory, at least from the Commonwealth perspective, is based on Richey's account and, hence, you blame Peirse for not getting better aircraft into theatre?

I'm not ignoring a damn thing, as you know very well. You just don't like what I have to say. All of my conclusions are provisional pending further data.

Well, here I have to disagree. My likes are irrelevant. I'm just frustrated that you ARE ignoring posts and information provided.

I pointed out several times that Japan was bottom of the priority pile from the UK's perspective, and that it was London that assigned forces to specific theatres. You have completely ignored that point and just went back to blaming Peirse for failing to adequately equip his command, and hence he was an idiot. When I pushed back on that, you then asserted that "From your point of view, it's almost impossible for the senior RAF leadership in Burma to have made terrible decisions vis a vis the Hurricane, because they were wise and intelligent men doing their best."

The bottom line is that London set the priorities. Peirse could be screaming for better fighters but if London didn't send them, then he had to make do with what he had. Whether Peirse was capable or incapable of bad decisions is irrelevant. It wasn't within Peirse's gift to conjure up additional resources for his theatre. That was London's job...and they priorities any theatre where Germany was operating above the Far East.

FWIW, the same general approach to force allocation is followed today. For example, the US Geographic Combatant Commands do not generate their own forces. They request forces from the Secretary of Defense and it's through the Global Force Management and Allocation Process (GFMAP) that forces are assigned to theaters based on priority of need.

Then again, you'll probably just add another "funny" emoji to this post, too.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yes I read it which was why I queried your statement. Paraphrasing in the way you did portrays a misleading picture which you would have realised, if you had stopped to think about it.

I was not portraying anything even remotely misleading.

The alternative explanation is that you are seeking to portray a biased view of BPF operations, something that quite a number of your fellow countrymen that I have encountered on the net are prone to doing. So let us get the record straight.

You seem to be expressing a chip on your shoulder against Americans. I'd say, let it go.

Yes the carriers had suffered losses during Meridian. But given that they sailed direct from carrying out those operations to Australia without returning to Ceylon and without being able to pick up replacement aircraft, of course they "sailed into the Pacific deficient in both aircraft and aircrew" (my emphasis). Replacements were not obtainable until they arrived at Sydney. And last time I looked Sydney was on Australia's Pacific coast! By the time they sailed from Sydney a couple of weeks later those losses had been made good.

See above

I am really not sure what your point is here, but I didn't contradict any of that. I was pointing out that they had taken substantial losses which needed to be made up prior to going into action.

Yes. But don't forget that was the same Vian that had commanded Force V at Salerno. So he brought a certain bias with him before he started. The Seafire squadrons recognised their limitations and come July had come up with solutions which meant that they could become more useful. And Seafire attrition rates in the BPF came no where near those at Salerno, for all the reasons discussed on various previous threads.

If the USN had been willing to provide more Hellcats (and other aircraft) during 1943/44, instead of seemingly tearing up agreements on aircraft allocations between the two nations, then perhaps Indefatigable and Implacable (which arrived at Sydney on 8 May 1945) could have taken them to the Pacific instead of Seafires.

I notice, routinely, when I point out that FAA officers had something negative to say about British aircraft, or for example when British officers pointed out that other officers refused to replace obsolete aircraft, it seems to be routinely alleged that they had a bias.

Frankly, I would not give the Seafire quite as much grief as all this though, and it did seem that by the time they got to Okinawa they had worked out a lot of the issues and they had a valuable role in intercepting Kamikazes. I really emphasized this guys commentary because it highlights the issue of range and flight endurance which certain other posters on these threads insisted into near eternity was not a real issue for the Seafire or the Sea Hurricane, when in fact it's clear that high ranked FAA officers believed that it was.

But I think the Seafire did have some advantages in a very high threat environment.

As I noted above and should have been clear to you from what you read elsewhere.

Yes . And I have set out the reasons why. Why do you seem to have a problem with that?

I don't know why you would construe it as my "having a problem with" it?

But the intention never was for the BPF to face the IJN on its own. It was always intended that it should operate alongside the USN.

But I have no doubt that whatever I say you will persist in your negative views of the BPF.

I don't necessarily have negative views of the BPF or the Royal Navy or the FAA.

I believe the IJN has been somewhat denigrated in postwar analysis and in some of the discussions on this forum. When I made the theoretical "IJN vs RN" thread, it was to make that point, not to belittle the Royal Navy. I do think that of the two, the IJN clearly had a much more formidable carrier force, at least until it was destroyed by the USN, and which side had a stronger surface force was an interesting debate (I lean toward IJN but admit that it was not definitively proven either way). Clearly the RN had better submarine and ASW forces, and some advantages in technology such as radar.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

That's not a reasonable excuse for simply marking my posts as funny, I'm afraid. You've consistently said I'm displaying a national bias when all I'm trying to do is provide some different contextual understanding to the direct comparisons you're trying to make.

I find some of your posts funny, which is all the reason I need. I don't need an 'excuse'. I do believe you are displaying a national bias, but I don't need to prove that.

Then I truly don't know what you're trying to achieve. I, for one, never underestimated the Ki-43. It was an outstanding fighter. By 1944 it was definitely past its best but it was still a dangerous adversary. I've never held a different position than that.

We agree on that, but you are not the only person I've been discussing this with (and debating it with) in this forum.

Well, the briefings to the FAA pilots were provided by "higher ups" or, at least, with their sanction. So which side of the argument is it? Early in the war in the Far East, it was often the squadron-level personnel who ignored accurate intelligence on the capabilities of the A6M. Unit commanders arriving in the Far East did, on occasion, ignore the advice of the "old hands" who'd been in-theatre a while...to their cost. Once the capabilities were understood, I find it incredibly hard to believe that anyone, at any echelon, would believe that either the Ki-43 or the A6M were anything other than dangerous adversaries.

I don't think anyone who flew against them believed that, at least not for long... it does seem that some higher-ups did believe it though, and for example resisted the idea of using "Hit and Run" tactics. But overall, I think the problem with the reputation of the Ki-43 is mostly a postware myth.

Am I correct in my understanding that your theory, at least from the Commonwealth perspective, is based on Richey's account and, hence, you blame Peirse for not getting better aircraft into theatre?

I am not placing the blame soely on any individual. I just think it's clear that some higher ranking officers in Theater wanted to stick with the Hurricanes and didn't move fast enough to get the Spitfires in. Even the Spitfire Vs were a major improvement.

Well, here I have to disagree. My likes are irrelevant. I'm just frustrated that you ARE ignoring posts and information provided.

I don't feel that I am.

I pointed out several times that Japan was bottom of the priority pile from the UK's perspective, and that it was London that assigned forces to specific theatres. You have completely ignored that point and just went back to blaming Peirse for failing to adequately equip his command, and hence he was an idiot. When I pushed back on that, you then asserted that "From your point of view, it's almost impossible for the senior RAF leadership in Burma to have made terrible decisions vis a vis the Hurricane, because they were wise and intelligent men doing their best."

That seemed to be the argument you were making, to me.

CBI was a tertiary Theater, there is no doubt about that. It was for the Americans too. But they fairly quickly figured out what was working and what wasn't, and got better kit into the Theater. I also know that some Spitfire Mk Vs at least were available, and I do not believe it would be a huge change in terms of logistics etc. to replace Hurricane IIs with Spit Vs, seeing as the engines were very similar and so on. I also think it would not have been impossible to get some more Kittyhawks from the Americans or even from the Australians.

The bottom line is that London set the priorities. Peirse could be screaming for better fighters but if London didn't send them, then he had to make do with what he had. Whether Peirse was capable or incapable of bad decisions is irrelevant. It wasn't within Peirse's gift to conjure up additional resources for his theatre. That was London's job...and they priorities any theatre where Germany was operating above the Far East.

Chennault and other US leaders were facing the same kinds of problems, but managed to get more suitible assets sooner.

FWIW, the same general approach to force allocation is followed today. For example, the US Geographic Combatant Commands do not generate their own forces. They request forces from the Secretary of Defense and it's through the Global Force Management and Allocation Process (GFMAP) that forces are assigned to theaters based on priority of need.

Then again, you'll probably just add another "funny" emoji to this post, too.

See above.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The entire conversation is beyond annoying.

It reminds of the children's arguments when we were kids "I'm rubber, you're glue! Whatever you say bounces off me and sticks to you."

 

[eagledad]

Gentlemen

What the US Army Air Force thought of the Ki-43 can be found here

Air Force Magazine 1945-06: Vol 28 Iss 6 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Air Force Magazine 1945-06: Volume 28, Issue 6.Digitized from IA1533407-07.Previous issue: sim_air-force-magazine_1945-05_28_5.Next issue:...

archive.org

Eagledad

 

[tyrodtom]

Gentlemen

What the US Army Air Torce thought of the Ki-43 can be found here

Air Force Magazine 1945-06: Vol 28 Iss 6 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Air Force Magazine 1945-06: Volume 28, Issue 6.Digitized from IA1533407-07.Previous issue: sim_air-force-magazine_1945-05_28_5.Next issue:...

archive.org

Eagledad

 

[tyrodtom]

It seems to give a honest assessment of the Oscar II until you read the last sentence.
Perhaps outweighing these technical advantages is the fact that American pilots can think better and quicker than the Japanese.
I edited the last word.

My dad and two of my uncles fought the Japanese soldier in the Pacific, some hated them to their dying day, but they all respected them.
,

 

[Shortround6]

It seems to give a honest assessment of the Oscar II until you read the last sentence.
Perhaps outweighing these technical advantages is the fact that American pilots can think better and quicker than the Japanese.
I edited the last word.

My dad and two of my uncles fought the Japanese soldier in the Pacific, some hated them to their dying day, but they all respected them.
,

It also brings into focus what the Allies knew and when they knew it.

Post war they found that there were 4 somewhat different Ki-43 IIs.
The Ki-43 IIs started replacing the Ki-43 Is in the end of 1942/beginning of 1943.
Some of the Ki-41 Is had the two 12.7mm armament (and some were upgrade in the field) although by the time an allied pilot knew his opponent had 12.7mm guns instead of 7.7s he was in trouble ( being able to judge the size of the bullet holes in your own aircraft is not good).

A little researched/under reported aspect of the Ki-43 story in the Ki-43 III. This seems to have had 2 different versions (3-4 ?)
. The Ki-43 III Ko, of which 10 prototypes were built by Nakajima between May 1944 and some time in 1945 (?) according to some accounts. Nakajima production of all KI-43s was supposed to have stopped in Sept 1944, perhaps a few prototypes lingered on?
Tachikawa is supposed to have built all of the production Ki-43 III Ko aircraft but when or how many is never stated. Or not stated in older accounts.
There is also the Ki-43 III KAI with the Ha-115-II engine, dates and production numbers not given in old western accounts. Top speed was 358mph at 21,920ft which is quite good but they were still using the pair of 12.7mm guns.
The Ki-43 III Otsu got the Mitsubishi Ha-112 engine and two 20mm guns but, according to some accounts they only built 2 and they were both under test at the end of the war.

Sometimes there is confusion as to the Ki-43 IIIs and the Ki-43 III Otsu is given credit for earlier introduction?

Ki-43 post war accounts also get into details about what kind of exhaust manifolds some the different versions had. Some of these changes were worth 10-15mph (?) but in many cases if you can identify the type of aircraft by their exhaust pipes you are too damn close.

The Main problem with the Ki-43 was they devoted too much production capacity to an obsolete aircraft for much of the war. Depending on source they built about 5900 of them total. The Problem is that 3500 of them were built in 1944 and 1945. Doesn't matter how good they were in 1942-43. In 1944 the Japanese needed something else.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Well, that may be true, but the Germans needed something else than the Bf 109 by 1944 too, I'd say. And yet the two stories are told very differently.

There is an interesting dynamic with some of these long-lived types, that even while they may have become obsolescent, they remained far from useless (and never a 'safe bet' for Allied pilots). The Ki-43s was not feeble, it turns out, but had quite a sting. It was not flimsy, but was a tough bird that often brought it's pilots home in spite of heavy damage. It was not a one-trick pony, but a very flexible and versatile aircraft. You can see, in the operational history, why so many Japanese pilots continued to prefer it over all the newer types.

And the Hayabusa, in spite of all the aggravation and insults, was worth a closer look. It is a lesson in WW2 aviation, because it shows pretty well that top speed and heavy firepower really aren't everything. We kind of oversimplified this in the postwar narrative, and have done similar crude simplifications again and again in subsequent aviation eras since WW2.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Well, that may be true, but the Germans needed something else than the Bf 109 by 1944 too, I'd say. And yet the two stories are told very differently.

The Bf 109 had the capacity to be upgraded to a point that it remained competitive with the very best of Allied types, within an increasingly narrow envelope. A G-10 or K-4 was still a formidable adversary in 1945, even when flown against a P-51D or Spitfire Mk.XIV.
The Ki-43 was still dangerous in 1945, but it was no longer competitive with the best. The 109 was living on borrowed time by 1945, and should have been replaced, arguably after the F-4 variant, but it still had a 100mph speed advantage over the Ki-43.