I started a thread on A-26 and other conversions, as I was interested in those when I first started flying multi.
The real combat history of the P-39 Airacobra in the Pacific (2 Viewers)
- Thread starter Steamed_Banana
- Start date
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Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,263
- Sep 30, 2021
USAAF Delivery Logs early B-25C serials mentioning NEI, 41-12437 to 12445, 41-12447 to 12452, 41-12454 to 12456, 41-12458, 41-12460, 41-12462, 41-12464, 41-12466, 41-12468, 41-12470, 41-12472, 41-12474, 41-12476, 41-12478, 41-12480 to 12516, total 66 with lots of reassignments back and forth NEI/USA/USSR, easy to add or subtract several.
41-12438, 12439, 12442, 12444, 12455, 12464, 12466 "consigned to NEI 16 March", 41-12437, 12443 Montreal NEI 18 February, also on 18 February 41-12445 Phoenix, 12468 and 12470 March Field.
USAAF Aircraft Cards,
NEI 41-12437, 12439 to 12445, 12455, 12462, 41-12464, 41-12466, 41-12468, 41-12472, 41-12476, 41-12480 to 12484, 12494 to 12496, 12498, 12499, 12501, 12507, 12511, 12514
Australia 41-12447 to 12451, 12470, 12478, 12484 (NEI and Australia), 12485 to 12491, 12497, 12515.
ADO-468 says 5 B-25C accepted for NEI in February 1942, 3 delivered in February and 2 in March, 5 exported in March. Then 1 B-25C accepted in May and 10 in June 1942, delivered in July but not exported until January 1943, 7 B-25D accepted and delivered in July 1942, again not exported until January 1943. Clearly the export dates are incorrect, the Delivery Logs have all the 18 squadron reported August and September 1942 arrivals as delivered for USAAF. (41-12798, 12885, 12912, 12913, 12914, 12916, 12919, 12934, 12935, 12936, 12937, 29713, 29716, 29717, 29722, 29723, 29725, 29735, see below, the aircraft cards are marked NEI 1 October 1943, except for 12937 but 12933 does have the transfer date)
The web site found by Ewen says the first 6 B-25C in NEI service were 41-12437, 41-12439, 41-12464 41-12482, 41-12494, 41-12501
Two NEI aircraft listed as retained by RAF in India, N5-144, 145, reported as 41-12507 and 1509
18 squadron formed 1 April 1942, Australian Archives Series A9186 Control Symbol 40 readable online.
April 1942, N5-134
June 1942 (Also had A-20), N5-132, 134, 136, 151
On 17th had 5 B-25
16th A-20 45/40-077, 22/40-101, 15/40-82 flew out
18th one A-20 to RAAF (40-155)
23rd ten A-20 to RAAF
July 1942, N5-122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 134 (aircraft assigned new serials)
August 1942, N5-123, 124, 125, 126, 127
22nd 41-12935 arrived
23rd 41-12914, 12916, 12919, 12936, 29713 arrived
These are probably, in order, N5-128, 133, 129, 132, 131, 130
September
2nd N5-134/41-12885 arrived
3rd N5-123, 124, 125, 127 handed to USAAF
5th N5-135 to 138 arrived (41-12937 (probably 12933), 12912, 29735, 12934)
11th N5-140, 141 arrive (41-12913, 29725)
14th N5-142, 143 arrive (41-29716, 29722)
15th N5-139 arrived 41-29723
21st N5-144, 145 arrive (41-29717, 12798)
Strength 18 after the August/September 18 arrivals and 4 departures, now on strength N5-128 to 145
The Dutch order for 162 B-25 built as (the only) C-5 from October 1942 on, originally to be N5-122 to 283.
201 B-26 from February to October 1941, 139 B-26A from October 1941 to April 1942 with the final 2 in July, B-26B from April 1942 on, (307 B, 95 B-2, 28 B-3, 211 B-4), B-26B-10 from January 1943, B-26C from August 1942 on.
Far East Air Forces B-25 strength March to December 1942, 18, 31, 16, 17, 15, 45, 64, 75, 74, 68, same 9 months "Other" medium bomber strength, 18, 51, 63, 62, 77, 61, 59, 58, 54, 51
41-12438, 12439, 12442, 12444, 12455, 12464, 12466 "consigned to NEI 16 March", 41-12437, 12443 Montreal NEI 18 February, also on 18 February 41-12445 Phoenix, 12468 and 12470 March Field.
USAAF Aircraft Cards,
NEI 41-12437, 12439 to 12445, 12455, 12462, 41-12464, 41-12466, 41-12468, 41-12472, 41-12476, 41-12480 to 12484, 12494 to 12496, 12498, 12499, 12501, 12507, 12511, 12514
Australia 41-12447 to 12451, 12470, 12478, 12484 (NEI and Australia), 12485 to 12491, 12497, 12515.
ADO-468 says 5 B-25C accepted for NEI in February 1942, 3 delivered in February and 2 in March, 5 exported in March. Then 1 B-25C accepted in May and 10 in June 1942, delivered in July but not exported until January 1943, 7 B-25D accepted and delivered in July 1942, again not exported until January 1943. Clearly the export dates are incorrect, the Delivery Logs have all the 18 squadron reported August and September 1942 arrivals as delivered for USAAF. (41-12798, 12885, 12912, 12913, 12914, 12916, 12919, 12934, 12935, 12936, 12937, 29713, 29716, 29717, 29722, 29723, 29725, 29735, see below, the aircraft cards are marked NEI 1 October 1943, except for 12937 but 12933 does have the transfer date)
The web site found by Ewen says the first 6 B-25C in NEI service were 41-12437, 41-12439, 41-12464 41-12482, 41-12494, 41-12501
Two NEI aircraft listed as retained by RAF in India, N5-144, 145, reported as 41-12507 and 1509
18 squadron formed 1 April 1942, Australian Archives Series A9186 Control Symbol 40 readable online.
April 1942, N5-134
June 1942 (Also had A-20), N5-132, 134, 136, 151
On 17th had 5 B-25
16th A-20 45/40-077, 22/40-101, 15/40-82 flew out
18th one A-20 to RAAF (40-155)
23rd ten A-20 to RAAF
July 1942, N5-122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 134 (aircraft assigned new serials)
August 1942, N5-123, 124, 125, 126, 127
22nd 41-12935 arrived
23rd 41-12914, 12916, 12919, 12936, 29713 arrived
These are probably, in order, N5-128, 133, 129, 132, 131, 130
September
2nd N5-134/41-12885 arrived
3rd N5-123, 124, 125, 127 handed to USAAF
5th N5-135 to 138 arrived (41-12937 (probably 12933), 12912, 29735, 12934)
11th N5-140, 141 arrive (41-12913, 29725)
14th N5-142, 143 arrive (41-29716, 29722)
15th N5-139 arrived 41-29723
21st N5-144, 145 arrive (41-29717, 12798)
Strength 18 after the August/September 18 arrivals and 4 departures, now on strength N5-128 to 145
The Dutch order for 162 B-25 built as (the only) C-5 from October 1942 on, originally to be N5-122 to 283.
201 B-26 from February to October 1941, 139 B-26A from October 1941 to April 1942 with the final 2 in July, B-26B from April 1942 on, (307 B, 95 B-2, 28 B-3, 211 B-4), B-26B-10 from January 1943, B-26C from August 1942 on.
Far East Air Forces B-25 strength March to December 1942, 18, 31, 16, 17, 15, 45, 64, 75, 74, 68, same 9 months "Other" medium bomber strength, 18, 51, 63, 62, 77, 61, 59, 58, 54, 51
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Just pointing out that the specs commonly available (like WIKI) are for the latter models and don't reflect the early models well.
https://www.wwiiaircraftperformance...es/B-26_Operation_and_Flight_Instructions.pdf
has a lot of information on the early B-26 and some of it is a head scratcher.
Take off distance is listed as 2500ft to clear 50 ft at 26,734lbs but.............'normal' gross weight is 28,706lbs with four 500lb bombs and 465 gal of fuel.
Add another 400 gal of fuel (not quite full wing tanks) and gross weight is now 31,100lbs.
BTW that is with a 5 man crew.
The take off distance is also at 59 degrees F. In New Guinea ???
Greg Boeser
1st Lieutenant
The 26,734 weight is the original "normal" gross weight used in the Martin proposal. Once you add in guns armor extra crew things start adding up.
Typical load outs for 22nd BG were 2000 lbs of bombs and a 250 gallon auxiliary tank for missions to Rabaul, 3000 - 3500 lbs of bombs for shorter missions.
Also, though many crews were trained to drop torpedoes, with a school set up for that purpose in Australia, the only torpedoes dropped in anger were those at Midway.
Alaska based B-26s flew a few torpedo missions in defense of Dutch Harbor and then later against shipping at Kiska, but abandoned the practice, preferring masthead bombing. Which was more accurate and allowed a faster approach.
- Thread starter
- #125
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,074
- Sep 29, 2025
Ok not to derail the derail, but I'm going to veer back into the operational history here and y'all can keep up the parallel discussion about medium bomber production and deployment in parallel, as it is part of the same story. When I get a minute I'll go back and count up all of the accidents & mishaps and categorize them by subtype for the twin-engined bombers being used by the Allies in New Guinea - B-25, B-26, A-20 / DB-7, Beaufort, Hudson, and we can throw in the Beaufighter too for good measure even though they didn't usually carry bombs.
But in the meantime, I want to get into the fighter combat here because it gets very intense and really interesting for several reasons.
The Context
By 1943 the Allies have managed to put heavy pressure on the Japanese bases on the northern coast of Eastern New Guinea. The Battle of Buna-Gona came to an end by 22 January 1943, so right around the beginning of the period covered in South Pacific Air War Volume 6. The result was that the new Japanese bases at Buna, Sanananda and Gona were gradually captured by US and Australian troops and squeezed out of these enclaves. Their bases were overrun and captured. The fighting was bitter and the Allies had a lot of trouble achieving the victory, but air power was key to the whole campaign.
Due to the impossible conditions of dense jungle / hills / swamps on the coastline, overland supply routes were not viable so the Japanese bases had to be supplied by sea. Allied bombers and fighters flying out of Southern New Guinea constantly attacked the shipping heading to the three bases, and the bases themselves, especially the airfields at Buna, on a continuous basis. They were ably resisted by fighters operating out of Lae in northern New Guinea, and Rabaul on the nearby island of New Britain, and they also conducted their own operational bombing campaign against Port Morseby and other Allied bases on the southern coast of New Guinea.
As is very clear in the earlier episodes of this campaign through 1942, the Allies were having a lot of trouble attacking Japanese shipping, especially warships, with land based aircraft. The motley assortment of US Army Air Force and RAAF planes used in the Theater all for various reasons proved very inefficient at destroying enemy shipping. This is notably in contrast with the US Navy. The Navy came in as at Coral Sea, and both took and inflicted very heavy losses in shipping over a short period of time, and then left. The USAAF and RAAF attempted repeatedly to attack enemy shipping as the Japanese made their various attempts to launch amphibious operations around the eastern coast and to the southern shores of New Guinea (like at Milne Bay), and then later just to establish bases on the eastern part of the northern coast (i.e. Buna and Gona).
Early Allied air strikes had a very low success rate, a very high accident and mishap rate, and suffered at the hands of Japanese fighters on several occasions were 5 or 6 light or medium bombers were shot down. During the period when Airacobras were the main fighter component for the Allied forces in mid 1942, this was a particular problem partly due to the limited range of the P-39 / P-400 Airacobras, (which meant that Allied bombers often ended up under attack without fighter escort) and partly due to the difficulty they were having in combat, i.e. they were still usually being dominated by the Japanese fighter units like Tainan Ku. Level bombing at any kind of altitude proved to be relatively ineffective, while bombers themselves proved to be vulnerable. Douglas Dauntless dive bombers (as Army A-24s) had the accuracy needed to score hits, in theory, but their crews were poorly trained and they were far too vulnerable to Japanese fighters - to the point that they were quickly taken out of combat. B-17s could survive sorties but rarely hit anything in level bombing attacks. The B-25s and B-26s were somewhere in between - sometimes they got slaughtered, but often they could escape enemy fighters. Their hit rates were low in level bombing, but they could be used in other ways. The A-20As (and RAAF Boston IIIs) were surviving sorties due apparently to their speed, but didn't have enough range.
As we know General George Kenney took over the 5th Air Force effectively in September of 1942. This is when major changes started to take place. The US 49th FG was moved in to take over the bulk of the fighter duties, with P-40Es and Ks that had better range and somewhat better combat outcomes than the Airacobras. 49th FG, importantly, was also well lead, now somewhat experienced from their fighting at Darwin, and had a relatively high morale. P-38s were finally brought in though in small numbers initially - one squadron. Allied bomber crews had been experimenting with low-level attacks, even with B-17s, from the early days of the fighting here, but this was being done intermittently.
Realizing that higher altitude level bombing was of very limited practical benefit especially in this Theater with the constant rain, fogs, and clouds, Kenney leaned into the low-level attacks. With the help of Paul "Pappy" Gunn, they started modifying light and medium bombers (A-20s, B-25s, and B-26s) into strafers, they acquired bombs and necessary fighter-bomber kit for their P-40 fighters, they acquired external fuel tanks and figured out ways to increase the fuel capacity of existing bombers (putting fuel tanks in the bomb bays etc.). They acquired parafrag bombs (some of which proved defective and cost the lives of some aircrew early on, but ultimately these proved extremey useful in attacking airfields). They practiced mast-head bombing and skip-bombing in Australia and on a wrecked ship in the harbor of Port Morseby. They coordinated the use of fighters and strafers like the Beaufighters with bombers in attacks on shipping. They fixed radios and improved tactics so that bombers were better escorted. They also built more airfields and somewhat improved the horrible conditions of the existing bases which improved overall efficiency. The rate of accidents, though still bad, was clearly dropping from it's appalling highs of early to mid 1942. This in turn meant that the steady flow of new units and replacement aircraft was actually building up their forces instead of just holding on to a bare minimum force.
All of this was converging on improved outcomes and increasing success in targeting shipping, which ranged from formidable warships down to smaller waships and cargo ships and transports to tiny barges and motor launches scurrying around the coastlines. Enough of these were destroyed that the supply situation became critical at Buna and Gona - so much so that allegedly cannibalism took place among the starving troops. Without that, US and Australian ground forces may not have been able to capture the bases, it was an immense struggle to get it done as it was. By 1943, Lae itself was now under threat by the Allies. Pressure was increasing day by day as more Allied units were brought in and existing units strengthened, tactics was improving and critically- range was increasing, meaning that shipping was being targeted all the way up to Rabaul.
This is where the fighting really starts on January 5-9, 1943, as a major supply convoy is sent by the Japanese from Rabaul to the Japanese harbor and airbases at Lae, as Lae itself is starting to have problems. The Japanese have brought in the Army to augment the Navy air forces, but together they are now clearly struggling to contain the increasing efficiency and aggression of the Allied air forces. Before the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, there were many such convoys, which turned into hard fought struggles as the Allies honed their ship destroying methods, the Japanese attempted to protect their shipping, and the two clashed over the Bismarck and Solomon Seas to the north of eastern New Guinea and around New Britain.
Next post will get into the intense fighting, starting with January 5-9.
But in the meantime, I want to get into the fighter combat here because it gets very intense and really interesting for several reasons.
The Context
By 1943 the Allies have managed to put heavy pressure on the Japanese bases on the northern coast of Eastern New Guinea. The Battle of Buna-Gona came to an end by 22 January 1943, so right around the beginning of the period covered in South Pacific Air War Volume 6. The result was that the new Japanese bases at Buna, Sanananda and Gona were gradually captured by US and Australian troops and squeezed out of these enclaves. Their bases were overrun and captured. The fighting was bitter and the Allies had a lot of trouble achieving the victory, but air power was key to the whole campaign.
Due to the impossible conditions of dense jungle / hills / swamps on the coastline, overland supply routes were not viable so the Japanese bases had to be supplied by sea. Allied bombers and fighters flying out of Southern New Guinea constantly attacked the shipping heading to the three bases, and the bases themselves, especially the airfields at Buna, on a continuous basis. They were ably resisted by fighters operating out of Lae in northern New Guinea, and Rabaul on the nearby island of New Britain, and they also conducted their own operational bombing campaign against Port Morseby and other Allied bases on the southern coast of New Guinea.
As is very clear in the earlier episodes of this campaign through 1942, the Allies were having a lot of trouble attacking Japanese shipping, especially warships, with land based aircraft. The motley assortment of US Army Air Force and RAAF planes used in the Theater all for various reasons proved very inefficient at destroying enemy shipping. This is notably in contrast with the US Navy. The Navy came in as at Coral Sea, and both took and inflicted very heavy losses in shipping over a short period of time, and then left. The USAAF and RAAF attempted repeatedly to attack enemy shipping as the Japanese made their various attempts to launch amphibious operations around the eastern coast and to the southern shores of New Guinea (like at Milne Bay), and then later just to establish bases on the eastern part of the northern coast (i.e. Buna and Gona).
Early Allied air strikes had a very low success rate, a very high accident and mishap rate, and suffered at the hands of Japanese fighters on several occasions were 5 or 6 light or medium bombers were shot down. During the period when Airacobras were the main fighter component for the Allied forces in mid 1942, this was a particular problem partly due to the limited range of the P-39 / P-400 Airacobras, (which meant that Allied bombers often ended up under attack without fighter escort) and partly due to the difficulty they were having in combat, i.e. they were still usually being dominated by the Japanese fighter units like Tainan Ku. Level bombing at any kind of altitude proved to be relatively ineffective, while bombers themselves proved to be vulnerable. Douglas Dauntless dive bombers (as Army A-24s) had the accuracy needed to score hits, in theory, but their crews were poorly trained and they were far too vulnerable to Japanese fighters - to the point that they were quickly taken out of combat. B-17s could survive sorties but rarely hit anything in level bombing attacks. The B-25s and B-26s were somewhere in between - sometimes they got slaughtered, but often they could escape enemy fighters. Their hit rates were low in level bombing, but they could be used in other ways. The A-20As (and RAAF Boston IIIs) were surviving sorties due apparently to their speed, but didn't have enough range.
As we know General George Kenney took over the 5th Air Force effectively in September of 1942. This is when major changes started to take place. The US 49th FG was moved in to take over the bulk of the fighter duties, with P-40Es and Ks that had better range and somewhat better combat outcomes than the Airacobras. 49th FG, importantly, was also well lead, now somewhat experienced from their fighting at Darwin, and had a relatively high morale. P-38s were finally brought in though in small numbers initially - one squadron. Allied bomber crews had been experimenting with low-level attacks, even with B-17s, from the early days of the fighting here, but this was being done intermittently.
Realizing that higher altitude level bombing was of very limited practical benefit especially in this Theater with the constant rain, fogs, and clouds, Kenney leaned into the low-level attacks. With the help of Paul "Pappy" Gunn, they started modifying light and medium bombers (A-20s, B-25s, and B-26s) into strafers, they acquired bombs and necessary fighter-bomber kit for their P-40 fighters, they acquired external fuel tanks and figured out ways to increase the fuel capacity of existing bombers (putting fuel tanks in the bomb bays etc.). They acquired parafrag bombs (some of which proved defective and cost the lives of some aircrew early on, but ultimately these proved extremey useful in attacking airfields). They practiced mast-head bombing and skip-bombing in Australia and on a wrecked ship in the harbor of Port Morseby. They coordinated the use of fighters and strafers like the Beaufighters with bombers in attacks on shipping. They fixed radios and improved tactics so that bombers were better escorted. They also built more airfields and somewhat improved the horrible conditions of the existing bases which improved overall efficiency. The rate of accidents, though still bad, was clearly dropping from it's appalling highs of early to mid 1942. This in turn meant that the steady flow of new units and replacement aircraft was actually building up their forces instead of just holding on to a bare minimum force.
All of this was converging on improved outcomes and increasing success in targeting shipping, which ranged from formidable warships down to smaller waships and cargo ships and transports to tiny barges and motor launches scurrying around the coastlines. Enough of these were destroyed that the supply situation became critical at Buna and Gona - so much so that allegedly cannibalism took place among the starving troops. Without that, US and Australian ground forces may not have been able to capture the bases, it was an immense struggle to get it done as it was. By 1943, Lae itself was now under threat by the Allies. Pressure was increasing day by day as more Allied units were brought in and existing units strengthened, tactics was improving and critically- range was increasing, meaning that shipping was being targeted all the way up to Rabaul.
This is where the fighting really starts on January 5-9, 1943, as a major supply convoy is sent by the Japanese from Rabaul to the Japanese harbor and airbases at Lae, as Lae itself is starting to have problems. The Japanese have brought in the Army to augment the Navy air forces, but together they are now clearly struggling to contain the increasing efficiency and aggression of the Allied air forces. Before the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, there were many such convoys, which turned into hard fought struggles as the Allies honed their ship destroying methods, the Japanese attempted to protect their shipping, and the two clashed over the Bismarck and Solomon Seas to the north of eastern New Guinea and around New Britain.
Next post will get into the intense fighting, starting with January 5-9.
- Thread starter
- #126
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,074
- Sep 29, 2025
Fighter Forces
Correct me if I'm wrong on any of this I may have made errors:
Allied Fighters
Two Fighter Groups with five squadrons flying Airacobras, which were still a mix of P-39D, P-400, and some later variants:
8th FG - 35th, 36th and 80th FS flying from around Port Morseby
35th FG - 40th and 41st FS mainly flying from around Milne Bay
In addition, the 39th FS of the 35th FG was now flying P-38F and G models flying from the Port Morseby area. Richard Bong was one of the pilots.
The 49th Fighter Group flying three squadrons of P-40s, a mix of P-40K and E.
This was made up of the 7th, 8th and 9th FS flying from around Port Morseby and sometimes temporarily from forward bases further north in the middle of the Island like Dobodura.
Finally, one RAAF squadron, No 30 RAAF, flying Beaufighters out of the Port Morseby area.
Japanese Fighters
On the Japanese side, correct me if I'm wrong but I have two JAAF Flying Regiments (roughly equivalent to Fighter Groups):
1st Hiko Sentai with Ki-43-I flying out of Rabaul and other bases on New Britain, (would soon transfer into the Solomon Islands near the end of January)
11th Hiko Sentai with Ki-43-I flying mainly out of Rabaul and other bases on New Britain and later at Lae on New Guinea
In addition they had one Sentai flying Ki-45 out of Rabaul but flying more limited types of missions against shipping and long range recon aircraft.
(by April, just after the end of this period, two Sentai, the 68th and 78th, flying Ki-61s would arrive. I think this is what Claringboulds next book is about in part. But that is after our period here).
The IJNAF also had two Kokutai:
251st Kokutai (former Tainan Ku) with A6M2 and A6M3 fighters, (mostly the latter) flying out of Lae and other bases on New Guinea
582nd Kokutai (formerly 2nd Ku) with a mix of A6M3 fighters and D3A Val dive bombers flying out of bases on New Guinea
plus additional elements attached to 11th Air Fleet with A6M2 and A6M3, mainly flying out of Rabaul and other bases on New Britain.
In addition, the 802nd Kokutai (or elements thereof) was flying A6M2-N "Rufe" Seaplane fighters out of areas around New Britain, and 958, 851, and 14th Ku flew a mix of seaplanes which included some of the Mitsubishi F1M "Pete" Seaplane fighters (which were surprisingly capable especially against bombers and flying boats)
Correct me if I'm wrong on any of this I may have made errors:
Allied Fighters
Two Fighter Groups with five squadrons flying Airacobras, which were still a mix of P-39D, P-400, and some later variants:
8th FG - 35th, 36th and 80th FS flying from around Port Morseby
35th FG - 40th and 41st FS mainly flying from around Milne Bay
In addition, the 39th FS of the 35th FG was now flying P-38F and G models flying from the Port Morseby area. Richard Bong was one of the pilots.
The 49th Fighter Group flying three squadrons of P-40s, a mix of P-40K and E.
This was made up of the 7th, 8th and 9th FS flying from around Port Morseby and sometimes temporarily from forward bases further north in the middle of the Island like Dobodura.
Finally, one RAAF squadron, No 30 RAAF, flying Beaufighters out of the Port Morseby area.
Japanese Fighters
On the Japanese side, correct me if I'm wrong but I have two JAAF Flying Regiments (roughly equivalent to Fighter Groups):
1st Hiko Sentai with Ki-43-I flying out of Rabaul and other bases on New Britain, (would soon transfer into the Solomon Islands near the end of January)
11th Hiko Sentai with Ki-43-I flying mainly out of Rabaul and other bases on New Britain and later at Lae on New Guinea
In addition they had one Sentai flying Ki-45 out of Rabaul but flying more limited types of missions against shipping and long range recon aircraft.
(by April, just after the end of this period, two Sentai, the 68th and 78th, flying Ki-61s would arrive. I think this is what Claringboulds next book is about in part. But that is after our period here).
The IJNAF also had two Kokutai:
251st Kokutai (former Tainan Ku) with A6M2 and A6M3 fighters, (mostly the latter) flying out of Lae and other bases on New Guinea
582nd Kokutai (formerly 2nd Ku) with a mix of A6M3 fighters and D3A Val dive bombers flying out of bases on New Guinea
plus additional elements attached to 11th Air Fleet with A6M2 and A6M3, mainly flying out of Rabaul and other bases on New Britain.
In addition, the 802nd Kokutai (or elements thereof) was flying A6M2-N "Rufe" Seaplane fighters out of areas around New Britain, and 958, 851, and 14th Ku flew a mix of seaplanes which included some of the Mitsubishi F1M "Pete" Seaplane fighters (which were surprisingly capable especially against bombers and flying boats)
Last edited:
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Don't forget that Kenny's 63rd and 65th BS wreaked absolute havoc with their skip-bombing B-17s.
special ed
1st Lieutenant
- 7,036
- May 13, 2018
Late Father in law was a crew chief in the 19BG on those raids.
- Thread starter
- #129
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,074
- Sep 29, 2025
They did score some hits with them, and I did mention B-17s were used this way on occasion
special ed
1st Lieutenant
- 7,036
- May 13, 2018
I have mentioned on the forum that my Father in law told me the skip bombing B-17s had two horizontal white lines painted on the pilot's side windshield, and when approached at low altitude, and the speed they had learned from experience, the bomb was released when top line was even with the ship's deck and the bottom line was the waterline.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
One of the pilots had a star scratched into his windscreen.
- Thread starter
- #132
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,074
- Sep 29, 2025
Little anecdote about a B-26 from the book. Pretty impressive that the pilot was able to fly all the way back to base a substantial distance from where they were hit, and land with no elevator control.
I don't know if this says anything about the aircraft type itself, but it says something about the crew and the overall level of organization in the Theater - including the fact that a secondary airfield like at Dobodura has a designated 'crash strip' which is a very good idea (numerous fatal and catastrophic accidents earlier throughout 1942 were caused by damaged or distressed aircraft landing at busy runways).
I suspect that by this point in early 1943, the aircrews of all of these aircraft were experienced and good SOPs were being set up or had been set up that were alleviating whatever shortcomings the aircraft had
I don't know if this says anything about the aircraft type itself, but it says something about the crew and the overall level of organization in the Theater - including the fact that a secondary airfield like at Dobodura has a designated 'crash strip' which is a very good idea (numerous fatal and catastrophic accidents earlier throughout 1942 were caused by damaged or distressed aircraft landing at busy runways).
I suspect that by this point in early 1943, the aircrews of all of these aircraft were experienced and good SOPs were being set up or had been set up that were alleviating whatever shortcomings the aircraft had
Wildcat
Major
Talking about B-26 belly landings, have you guys seen this footage?
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bOvSYfBNOU
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bOvSYfBNOU
- Thread starter
- #134
Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,074
- Sep 29, 2025
Ok so getting back to the action.
Jan 5-9 1943 The First Lae Convoy
Between Jan 5-9 the Japanese ran what came to be called The First Lae Convoy. As I said in the context post upthread, the hitherto quite formidable Japanese base at Lae was now coming under considerable pressure from air attacks and Allied troops were looming at the nearby Australian base in the mountains at Wau. The possibility that Lae could be captured as Gona and Buna had just been was quite real. So the IJA organized a convoy of eight transport and supply ships, carrying troops, heavy equipment, and supplies including fuel and ammunition to the now beleaguered base at Lae. These were mostly quite old and clapped out steamers and being a convoy, they had to travel at the speed of the slowest vessel, which proved to be about 6 knots. These eight transport ships, escorted by two Japanese navy destroyers, inched down the coast of New Britain from Rabaul in the far eastern tip of the island westward in the direction of Lae.
Jan 5 - The Controversial Bomber Raid
To forestall this, the American brigadier general Kenneth Walker planned a raid on Rabaul harbor, where it was believed the convoy was being loaded, which defied the SOPs set out by General Kenney. Kenney preferred that unescorted bomber missions take place during the dawn or dusk, or at night, so as to minimize casualties and losses. But attacking in the half light of dawn often meant difficult aiming. Walker decided to defy his orders and organized a large bomber raid of B-17s and B-24s against Rabaul in the mid-day. I don't want to get into the whole story (you can read about it, it's quite well documented and discussed), but the gist of it is about half of his planned bomber force were prevented by bad weather from even reaching Rabaul, and the 15 or so bombers which did make it in three small groups, initially caught the Japanese defenders by surprise (since daytime attacks on Rabaul were unheard of) and hit a few ships in Rabaul harbor, but not any of the transports from this convoy because it was being loaded 15 miles away in another bay.
Even more daring was Walkers decision to fly with one of the bombers, something Kenney had specifically ordered him not to do, and he was in the B-17 San Antonio Rose with several other high ranking officers. For some unknown reason, possibly so he could take photos of the raid damage personally, San Antonio Rose stuck around after the other B-17s fled the scene, and a cloud of about a dozen Ki-43s and A6Ms from Rabaul converged on this aircraft and quickly mortally damaged it. This B-17 was lost in the raid and one other ditched due to battle damage. The loss and likely capture of General Walker caused immense consternation on the Allied side with multiple fruitless efforts being launched to try to find him, to no avail. Walker knew a lot of Allied plans, and it was believed that at least some of the officers aboard that plane were captured and of course interrogated before being later executed by the ruthless Japanese.
During the fighting the Japanese lost no less than 3 Ki-43-I to defensive gunners of the heavy bombers, plus one more which crash-landed. One thing that I am confused about here is why didn't they escort this strike with P-38s? They were later used to escort strikes to what seem to be more distant targets. Maybe Rabaul was just out of effective range. And even with escorts, there is no guarantee the mission would have gone much better, per St. Valentine's Day Massacre about a month later (which included both P-38s and Corsairs)
Allied Losses - 2 x B-17F destroyed, ~6 other bomber significantly damaged
Japanese Losses - 4 x Ki-43-I destroyed, several others damaged.
Jan 6 - Convoy underway, initial attacks
The Convoy started crawling ponderously down the coast amid repeated attacks by Allied fighters and bombers. The day started with an ambitious strike by the Japanese against Port Morseby to help forestall such harassment, consisting of 44 x G4M Betty bombers escorted by an impressive (for this Theater) 69 A6M Zero fighters. Fortunately for the Allies and not surprisingly, the entire mission had to be aborted to fierce storms encountered on the way, and all of these aircraft made their way back to Rabaul in small groups. Meanwhile convoy defense was being conducted by combat air patrols flown by both Army and Navy units, from Rabaul and then other bases down the coast including Gasmata on the southwest end of the island of New Britain, northeast of New Guinea.
US bomber-scouts sighted the convoy and radioed it's position at 10:35 in the morning. A series of US bomber raids from both light / medium and heavy bombers were launched through the rest of the day, some escorted by P-38s some unescorted. The bombers were attacked by Ki-43s (and later by A6Ms) and were unable to score any hits due to veering off to try to protect themselves, several being damaged and three lost. One experiment was then done with 8 x P-38s from 39th FS armed with bombs escorted by another 8 x P-38s as 'top cover'. The P-38s did not have proper bomb sights or other equipment and hadn't been trained at bombing, and hit no targets, but the top cover was intercepted by Ki-43s which led to a brisk dogfight. During the fight the P-38 pilots claimed 9 victories for no losses. Actual losses were 2 x Ki-43-I, but Claringbould makes the interesting comment that another 8 were badly damaged and after landing at base were not cleared for flight the next day.
It's not clear if these were writeoffs or were later repaired, but it's interesting for a couple of reasons - one, it shows that the P-38 claims were not necessarily so far off the mark, since they had heavily damaged ten Oscars, two, because it is one point among many I have noted through this series and also Christopher Shores "Bloody Shambles" series about Burma, that both the Ki-43 and the A6M were not nearly as easy to shred with a quick burst of machine gun fire as we thought. They often made it back to base, frequently in long flights, with heavy battle damage and still managed to land. We'll see more of this a little later in this campaign.
Though the transports survived their first day, their trouble was not over, as they were located and attacked by two RAAF PBY Catalinas during the night, one of which (which the pilot complained had a 'perfectionist bomb-aimer' who forced him to make several attack runs while being shot at by flak from the two Destroyers) hit the 5,447 ton IJA (!!) transport Nichiryu Maru which had 1,100 IJA troops plus medical supplies. This ship quickly sunk taking about 300 troops and all the supplies. The other troops were rescued by the IJN Destroyers and other ships.
Allied losses - 2 x B-24D and 1 x B-26 (one B-24 was shot down by A6Ms, the others by Ki-43s)
Japanese losses- 2 Ki-43-I shot down by P-38s
Jan 7 - The Big Fight
On Jan 7 the sinking of the Nichiryu Maru caused a mess which made it easier to locate the convoy a bit earlier. The Japanese Navy wanted to try another big strike at Port Morseby but weather over middle and southern New Guinea was still bad and the Army pressured them to contribute their fighters to the convoy defense, which was needed as the Army was now down to about 30 serviceable Ki-43s which were split between Lae and bases on New Britain. The day's fighting commenced as RAAF Boston IIIs launched a dawn raid on Lae, but didn't spot any of the well camouflaged fighters, hitting a G3M Nell that had brought in supplies the night before. One Boston was damaged by AA and then Ki-43s on the way out and crash-landed back at base, though crew survived.
A series of attacks against Lae and the Convoy took place through the day. Once again light, medium and heavy bombers made unescorted raids but were driven off by the K-43s and later A6Ms with some losses, and were unable to bomb accurately. In the late morning a strafing run by 30 Sqn RAAF Beaufighters, escorted by four P-38s from 39 FS came against lifeboats left by the sunk transport, but found only one occupied which they shredded. They were then attacked by K-43s which they got into a high-speed running fight at speeds of 245-265 knots down at sea level, the Beaufighters taking occasional shots at their pursuers as they fled. The Beaus held their own and took only minor damage (I would say that this is a case where the relatively low speed of the two bladed propeller, 950 hp Ki-43-I was somewhat telling). Another flight of Ki-43s engaged the P-38s, resulting in one Oscar shot down for no losses by the P-38s.
Another raid in the early afternoon consisted of 12 x B-25s from the 1st and 405 BS and 10 x B-26s from tghe 408th and 33rd BS, escorted by 15 x P-38s from 39th FS. These encountered Ki-43-Is from the 11th Hiko Sentai. The P-38s made 4 claims, it appears that the Japanese lost one Oscar piloted by the commander of the third Chutai, Lt Hirano Hiroatsu (called "Red Wing" for an earlier incident in the war when he shot down a B-24).
In another skirmish in the afternoon A6Ms from 582 Ku engaged P-38s near Rabaul, but there were no losses on either side.
Finally in the early evening a large-ish fighter bomber strike arrived from Port Morseby. This consisted of 20 x P-40E and K from 49th FG, of which 8 were equipped with 300 lb bombs for a fighter-bomber attack, the other 12 flying as fighter escort, and these were supposed to be joined by 8 x P-38s from the very busy 39th FS flying as top cover. This is interesting and may be controversial here because Claringbould says these eight fighter-bomber aircraft were carrying both 300 lb bombs and external fuel tanks. We had a big discussion on here a while back about when and what subtype of P-40 could carry bombs (of any significant size) on the wings. External fuel tanks only go on the center line, so if it's carrying both the bombs would be on the wings. It's possible Claringbould makes a mistake here, but interestingly, he notes that the commander of the 8 aircraft fighter bomber flight, Captain George Manning, had to reluctantly fly back to Port Morseby because his external fuel tank would not release. It is notable that the distance between Port Morseby and Gasmata (roughly where this action took place) is 305 miles, which is a lot for a round trip mission for a P-40 without a belly tank, especially if it's carrying a bomb or bombs, let alone then getting into a long running dogfight as we will see happened here.
The 49th FG P-40s spent some time (and burnt up fuel, as Claringbould notes) searching for the convy and trying to meet up with the P-38s which got separated, but did locate the ships and went on to attack them. The 49th FG did have some fighter-bomber experience and could use the auxiliary fixed sights on the P-40 to help aim, and they made a dive-bomber attack. One of the seven fighter-bombers hit the transport Myoko Maru causing significant damage and starting a fire, while others strafed Clyde Maru causing several wounds and deaths and starting another fire. At this point 18 x K-43s and A6Ms attacked the P-40s resulting in a protracted running fight over the Huon Gulf which Claringbould says lasted 45 minutes (!). During the fight the 49th FG P-40 pilots claimed 13 victories, which Claringbould (who is often very critical of the Americans) describes as 'hysterical'. Meanwhile, the P-38s had arrived not too far away and separately got into their own fight with both Zeros and Ki-43s, claiming 6 - two of these claims were by Richard Bong who was on loan to the 39th FS from the 9th FS, 49th FG for operational training on type with the P-38. The Japanese fighter pilots meanwhile claimed 3 victories. Claringbould notes here that actual losses were 6 Japanese fighters: 2 x A6Ms and 4 x Ki-43s shot down, plus several more heavily damaged (more on this in a sec), and 1 x P-40 shot down plus three heavily damaged, though all three made it back to base and landed normally - one without working brakes or flaps due to his hydraulics being shot out.
A major victory for the Allies here, though it's not entirely clear which unit and fighter type to credit the victories to. Going through the losses of the day in the appendix, the Japanese actually lost nine fighters - four A6M Zeros and five Ki-43s - to US fighters, plus one more A6M to gunners on a B-26. Two losses of Ki-43s earlier in the day were to the P-38s, and Claringbould credits at least one more in the evening fight to a P-38 pilot, and one to a P-40 pilot based on concurrance between Japanese and US descriptions of the loss / victory. This leaves five more to figure out, which is probably an impossible task. I suspect at least one of Bongs claims was real, as he tended to file accurate claims. Some of the others were likely the P-40s since they claimed a lot more and seemed to bear the brunt of the fighting (for far longer) but it's hard to say how many. It's noteworthy that this was one of the biggest Japanese fighter defeats in the whole three month period.
Allied Losses - 1 x B-17, 1 x Boston III, 1 x B-25, 1 x B-26, 1 x P-40
Japanese Losses - 5 x A6M, 5 x Ki-43
8 Jan - The convoy proceeded to Lae continuously persecuted by more Allied raids, some escorted by P-38s some unescorted. A major early morning raid on Lae of 36 x bombers and strafers including Beaufighters, A-20s, B-25s and B-26s attacking both the dock facilities and the Convoy, escorted by 16 x P-38s from 39th FS. One A-20 caught a Ki-43 taking off and shot it down. The medium bombers were then intercepted by 18 x Ki-43s from two Chutai. As the Oscars were attacking B-25s they were bounced by P-38s diving from 17,000 ft, and two were shot down including the commander of No. 2 chutai Capt. Tojo Michiaki. In a series of more raids through the day, B-25s hit the transport Myoku Maru again, which was then hit a third time by B-26s while trying to beach itself to save the cargo. A second fight took place later in the day between Oscars and P-38s, with 10 x P-38s bouncing 20 x Oscars at 14,000 ft from above, then the fight descending to sea level where the P-38s, losing advantage, managed to flee. No losses on either side in this fight in spite of multiple claims on both sides.
Finally the very busy 39th FS P-38s went out a third time on a final dusk bomber mission, this time escorting B-17s and B-24s. In this battle dove on a force of Oscars from 16,000 ft to their level at 14,000 ft, scattering them and then engaging in multiple dogfights which descended to sea level. Both sides made several claims, but the Oscars took no losses, while one P-38 piloted by Lt John Mangas was shot down. This was the first P-38 lost in the Pacific.
Allied Losses: 1 x B-25, 1 x B-26, 1 x B-17E, 1 x P-38F
Japanese Losses: 2 x Ki-43-I (one shot down by A-20, one by P-38), 1 x A6M ditched on flight back to Rabaul after combat at Lae.
That's all for now, I'll finish off with the Convoy and move on to the next fracas in the next post.
Jan 5-9 1943 The First Lae Convoy
Between Jan 5-9 the Japanese ran what came to be called The First Lae Convoy. As I said in the context post upthread, the hitherto quite formidable Japanese base at Lae was now coming under considerable pressure from air attacks and Allied troops were looming at the nearby Australian base in the mountains at Wau. The possibility that Lae could be captured as Gona and Buna had just been was quite real. So the IJA organized a convoy of eight transport and supply ships, carrying troops, heavy equipment, and supplies including fuel and ammunition to the now beleaguered base at Lae. These were mostly quite old and clapped out steamers and being a convoy, they had to travel at the speed of the slowest vessel, which proved to be about 6 knots. These eight transport ships, escorted by two Japanese navy destroyers, inched down the coast of New Britain from Rabaul in the far eastern tip of the island westward in the direction of Lae.
Jan 5 - The Controversial Bomber Raid
To forestall this, the American brigadier general Kenneth Walker planned a raid on Rabaul harbor, where it was believed the convoy was being loaded, which defied the SOPs set out by General Kenney. Kenney preferred that unescorted bomber missions take place during the dawn or dusk, or at night, so as to minimize casualties and losses. But attacking in the half light of dawn often meant difficult aiming. Walker decided to defy his orders and organized a large bomber raid of B-17s and B-24s against Rabaul in the mid-day. I don't want to get into the whole story (you can read about it, it's quite well documented and discussed), but the gist of it is about half of his planned bomber force were prevented by bad weather from even reaching Rabaul, and the 15 or so bombers which did make it in three small groups, initially caught the Japanese defenders by surprise (since daytime attacks on Rabaul were unheard of) and hit a few ships in Rabaul harbor, but not any of the transports from this convoy because it was being loaded 15 miles away in another bay.
Even more daring was Walkers decision to fly with one of the bombers, something Kenney had specifically ordered him not to do, and he was in the B-17 San Antonio Rose with several other high ranking officers. For some unknown reason, possibly so he could take photos of the raid damage personally, San Antonio Rose stuck around after the other B-17s fled the scene, and a cloud of about a dozen Ki-43s and A6Ms from Rabaul converged on this aircraft and quickly mortally damaged it. This B-17 was lost in the raid and one other ditched due to battle damage. The loss and likely capture of General Walker caused immense consternation on the Allied side with multiple fruitless efforts being launched to try to find him, to no avail. Walker knew a lot of Allied plans, and it was believed that at least some of the officers aboard that plane were captured and of course interrogated before being later executed by the ruthless Japanese.
During the fighting the Japanese lost no less than 3 Ki-43-I to defensive gunners of the heavy bombers, plus one more which crash-landed. One thing that I am confused about here is why didn't they escort this strike with P-38s? They were later used to escort strikes to what seem to be more distant targets. Maybe Rabaul was just out of effective range. And even with escorts, there is no guarantee the mission would have gone much better, per St. Valentine's Day Massacre about a month later (which included both P-38s and Corsairs)
Allied Losses - 2 x B-17F destroyed, ~6 other bomber significantly damaged
Japanese Losses - 4 x Ki-43-I destroyed, several others damaged.
Jan 6 - Convoy underway, initial attacks
The Convoy started crawling ponderously down the coast amid repeated attacks by Allied fighters and bombers. The day started with an ambitious strike by the Japanese against Port Morseby to help forestall such harassment, consisting of 44 x G4M Betty bombers escorted by an impressive (for this Theater) 69 A6M Zero fighters. Fortunately for the Allies and not surprisingly, the entire mission had to be aborted to fierce storms encountered on the way, and all of these aircraft made their way back to Rabaul in small groups. Meanwhile convoy defense was being conducted by combat air patrols flown by both Army and Navy units, from Rabaul and then other bases down the coast including Gasmata on the southwest end of the island of New Britain, northeast of New Guinea.
US bomber-scouts sighted the convoy and radioed it's position at 10:35 in the morning. A series of US bomber raids from both light / medium and heavy bombers were launched through the rest of the day, some escorted by P-38s some unescorted. The bombers were attacked by Ki-43s (and later by A6Ms) and were unable to score any hits due to veering off to try to protect themselves, several being damaged and three lost. One experiment was then done with 8 x P-38s from 39th FS armed with bombs escorted by another 8 x P-38s as 'top cover'. The P-38s did not have proper bomb sights or other equipment and hadn't been trained at bombing, and hit no targets, but the top cover was intercepted by Ki-43s which led to a brisk dogfight. During the fight the P-38 pilots claimed 9 victories for no losses. Actual losses were 2 x Ki-43-I, but Claringbould makes the interesting comment that another 8 were badly damaged and after landing at base were not cleared for flight the next day.
It's not clear if these were writeoffs or were later repaired, but it's interesting for a couple of reasons - one, it shows that the P-38 claims were not necessarily so far off the mark, since they had heavily damaged ten Oscars, two, because it is one point among many I have noted through this series and also Christopher Shores "Bloody Shambles" series about Burma, that both the Ki-43 and the A6M were not nearly as easy to shred with a quick burst of machine gun fire as we thought. They often made it back to base, frequently in long flights, with heavy battle damage and still managed to land. We'll see more of this a little later in this campaign.
Though the transports survived their first day, their trouble was not over, as they were located and attacked by two RAAF PBY Catalinas during the night, one of which (which the pilot complained had a 'perfectionist bomb-aimer' who forced him to make several attack runs while being shot at by flak from the two Destroyers) hit the 5,447 ton IJA (!!) transport Nichiryu Maru which had 1,100 IJA troops plus medical supplies. This ship quickly sunk taking about 300 troops and all the supplies. The other troops were rescued by the IJN Destroyers and other ships.
Allied losses - 2 x B-24D and 1 x B-26 (one B-24 was shot down by A6Ms, the others by Ki-43s)
Japanese losses- 2 Ki-43-I shot down by P-38s
Jan 7 - The Big Fight
On Jan 7 the sinking of the Nichiryu Maru caused a mess which made it easier to locate the convoy a bit earlier. The Japanese Navy wanted to try another big strike at Port Morseby but weather over middle and southern New Guinea was still bad and the Army pressured them to contribute their fighters to the convoy defense, which was needed as the Army was now down to about 30 serviceable Ki-43s which were split between Lae and bases on New Britain. The day's fighting commenced as RAAF Boston IIIs launched a dawn raid on Lae, but didn't spot any of the well camouflaged fighters, hitting a G3M Nell that had brought in supplies the night before. One Boston was damaged by AA and then Ki-43s on the way out and crash-landed back at base, though crew survived.
A series of attacks against Lae and the Convoy took place through the day. Once again light, medium and heavy bombers made unescorted raids but were driven off by the K-43s and later A6Ms with some losses, and were unable to bomb accurately. In the late morning a strafing run by 30 Sqn RAAF Beaufighters, escorted by four P-38s from 39 FS came against lifeboats left by the sunk transport, but found only one occupied which they shredded. They were then attacked by K-43s which they got into a high-speed running fight at speeds of 245-265 knots down at sea level, the Beaufighters taking occasional shots at their pursuers as they fled. The Beaus held their own and took only minor damage (I would say that this is a case where the relatively low speed of the two bladed propeller, 950 hp Ki-43-I was somewhat telling). Another flight of Ki-43s engaged the P-38s, resulting in one Oscar shot down for no losses by the P-38s.
Another raid in the early afternoon consisted of 12 x B-25s from the 1st and 405 BS and 10 x B-26s from tghe 408th and 33rd BS, escorted by 15 x P-38s from 39th FS. These encountered Ki-43-Is from the 11th Hiko Sentai. The P-38s made 4 claims, it appears that the Japanese lost one Oscar piloted by the commander of the third Chutai, Lt Hirano Hiroatsu (called "Red Wing" for an earlier incident in the war when he shot down a B-24).
In another skirmish in the afternoon A6Ms from 582 Ku engaged P-38s near Rabaul, but there were no losses on either side.
Finally in the early evening a large-ish fighter bomber strike arrived from Port Morseby. This consisted of 20 x P-40E and K from 49th FG, of which 8 were equipped with 300 lb bombs for a fighter-bomber attack, the other 12 flying as fighter escort, and these were supposed to be joined by 8 x P-38s from the very busy 39th FS flying as top cover. This is interesting and may be controversial here because Claringbould says these eight fighter-bomber aircraft were carrying both 300 lb bombs and external fuel tanks. We had a big discussion on here a while back about when and what subtype of P-40 could carry bombs (of any significant size) on the wings. External fuel tanks only go on the center line, so if it's carrying both the bombs would be on the wings. It's possible Claringbould makes a mistake here, but interestingly, he notes that the commander of the 8 aircraft fighter bomber flight, Captain George Manning, had to reluctantly fly back to Port Morseby because his external fuel tank would not release. It is notable that the distance between Port Morseby and Gasmata (roughly where this action took place) is 305 miles, which is a lot for a round trip mission for a P-40 without a belly tank, especially if it's carrying a bomb or bombs, let alone then getting into a long running dogfight as we will see happened here.
The 49th FG P-40s spent some time (and burnt up fuel, as Claringbould notes) searching for the convy and trying to meet up with the P-38s which got separated, but did locate the ships and went on to attack them. The 49th FG did have some fighter-bomber experience and could use the auxiliary fixed sights on the P-40 to help aim, and they made a dive-bomber attack. One of the seven fighter-bombers hit the transport Myoko Maru causing significant damage and starting a fire, while others strafed Clyde Maru causing several wounds and deaths and starting another fire. At this point 18 x K-43s and A6Ms attacked the P-40s resulting in a protracted running fight over the Huon Gulf which Claringbould says lasted 45 minutes (!). During the fight the 49th FG P-40 pilots claimed 13 victories, which Claringbould (who is often very critical of the Americans) describes as 'hysterical'. Meanwhile, the P-38s had arrived not too far away and separately got into their own fight with both Zeros and Ki-43s, claiming 6 - two of these claims were by Richard Bong who was on loan to the 39th FS from the 9th FS, 49th FG for operational training on type with the P-38. The Japanese fighter pilots meanwhile claimed 3 victories. Claringbould notes here that actual losses were 6 Japanese fighters: 2 x A6Ms and 4 x Ki-43s shot down, plus several more heavily damaged (more on this in a sec), and 1 x P-40 shot down plus three heavily damaged, though all three made it back to base and landed normally - one without working brakes or flaps due to his hydraulics being shot out.
A major victory for the Allies here, though it's not entirely clear which unit and fighter type to credit the victories to. Going through the losses of the day in the appendix, the Japanese actually lost nine fighters - four A6M Zeros and five Ki-43s - to US fighters, plus one more A6M to gunners on a B-26. Two losses of Ki-43s earlier in the day were to the P-38s, and Claringbould credits at least one more in the evening fight to a P-38 pilot, and one to a P-40 pilot based on concurrance between Japanese and US descriptions of the loss / victory. This leaves five more to figure out, which is probably an impossible task. I suspect at least one of Bongs claims was real, as he tended to file accurate claims. Some of the others were likely the P-40s since they claimed a lot more and seemed to bear the brunt of the fighting (for far longer) but it's hard to say how many. It's noteworthy that this was one of the biggest Japanese fighter defeats in the whole three month period.
Allied Losses - 1 x B-17, 1 x Boston III, 1 x B-25, 1 x B-26, 1 x P-40
Japanese Losses - 5 x A6M, 5 x Ki-43
8 Jan - The convoy proceeded to Lae continuously persecuted by more Allied raids, some escorted by P-38s some unescorted. A major early morning raid on Lae of 36 x bombers and strafers including Beaufighters, A-20s, B-25s and B-26s attacking both the dock facilities and the Convoy, escorted by 16 x P-38s from 39th FS. One A-20 caught a Ki-43 taking off and shot it down. The medium bombers were then intercepted by 18 x Ki-43s from two Chutai. As the Oscars were attacking B-25s they were bounced by P-38s diving from 17,000 ft, and two were shot down including the commander of No. 2 chutai Capt. Tojo Michiaki. In a series of more raids through the day, B-25s hit the transport Myoku Maru again, which was then hit a third time by B-26s while trying to beach itself to save the cargo. A second fight took place later in the day between Oscars and P-38s, with 10 x P-38s bouncing 20 x Oscars at 14,000 ft from above, then the fight descending to sea level where the P-38s, losing advantage, managed to flee. No losses on either side in this fight in spite of multiple claims on both sides.
Finally the very busy 39th FS P-38s went out a third time on a final dusk bomber mission, this time escorting B-17s and B-24s. In this battle dove on a force of Oscars from 16,000 ft to their level at 14,000 ft, scattering them and then engaging in multiple dogfights which descended to sea level. Both sides made several claims, but the Oscars took no losses, while one P-38 piloted by Lt John Mangas was shot down. This was the first P-38 lost in the Pacific.
Allied Losses: 1 x B-25, 1 x B-26, 1 x B-17E, 1 x P-38F
Japanese Losses: 2 x Ki-43-I (one shot down by A-20, one by P-38), 1 x A6M ditched on flight back to Rabaul after combat at Lae.
That's all for now, I'll finish off with the Convoy and move on to the next fracas in the next post.
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Shortround6
Lieutenant General
I appreciate the work you are doing here but I have a few notes/comments about some of the equipment (mainly bombs) being used.
B-26s in report of the B-26 making it back with the elevator controls damaged.
The other 5 planes dropped a total of 22 bombs of 300lbs each?
Not saying the account is wrong. A B-26 was supposed to hold sixteen 300lb bombs max (10 in the forward bay and 6 in the rear bay), but that load is 4727lbs.
Distance of the mission is short but having to clear the Owen Stanley's if the mission started on the south side of New Guinea may have restricted the bombload that could be carried.
Lack of bombs (poor supply) could be another reason for small bomb load (1200-1500lbs) per plane?
Other reasons?
P-40Es and Ks were supposed to be able to carry one 500lb bomb (fuselage) and two 100lb bombs under wing. Some sort of rack was there and the release mechanism and arming mechanism. 700lb (rounded off) load total.
A 52 gal tank was 352lbs for the tank and fuel.
about 950lbs total for the fuel tank and two 300lb bombs?
P-40Ks got to use 1325hp for take-off instead of the 1150hp for the P-40Es. However, the P-40Es and early P-40Ks had no boost control. It was up to the pilot to use whatever amount of boost he saw fit to use. Tropical conditions both hurt power and lift so perhaps the pilots were not using book numbers? In any case the P-40 needed a shorter runway than P-39s or twin engine bombers so perhaps runway length was not the limit?
P-40Ks were known to use a pair of 500lb bombs in service (unknown theater?) Without drop tank?
State of supply is interesting. US Army using 300lb and 600lb bombs instead of 250lb or 500lb bombs. US Army and Navy were in the process of standardizing in Dec 42/early 43?
And were the units in New Guinea at the end of the supply chain? North Africa getting the newer stuff?
Just throwing out possibilities.
B-26s in report of the B-26 making it back with the elevator controls damaged.
The other 5 planes dropped a total of 22 bombs of 300lbs each?
Not saying the account is wrong. A B-26 was supposed to hold sixteen 300lb bombs max (10 in the forward bay and 6 in the rear bay), but that load is 4727lbs.
Distance of the mission is short but having to clear the Owen Stanley's if the mission started on the south side of New Guinea may have restricted the bombload that could be carried.
Lack of bombs (poor supply) could be another reason for small bomb load (1200-1500lbs) per plane?
Other reasons?
Some squadrons did over-load the planes.
P-40Es and Ks were supposed to be able to carry one 500lb bomb (fuselage) and two 100lb bombs under wing. Some sort of rack was there and the release mechanism and arming mechanism. 700lb (rounded off) load total.
A 52 gal tank was 352lbs for the tank and fuel.
about 950lbs total for the fuel tank and two 300lb bombs?
P-40Ks got to use 1325hp for take-off instead of the 1150hp for the P-40Es. However, the P-40Es and early P-40Ks had no boost control. It was up to the pilot to use whatever amount of boost he saw fit to use. Tropical conditions both hurt power and lift so perhaps the pilots were not using book numbers? In any case the P-40 needed a shorter runway than P-39s or twin engine bombers so perhaps runway length was not the limit?
P-40Ks were known to use a pair of 500lb bombs in service (unknown theater?) Without drop tank?
State of supply is interesting. US Army using 300lb and 600lb bombs instead of 250lb or 500lb bombs. US Army and Navy were in the process of standardizing in Dec 42/early 43?
And were the units in New Guinea at the end of the supply chain? North Africa getting the newer stuff?
Just throwing out possibilities.
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Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
- 1,074
- Sep 29, 2025
I think Claringbould is just copying the squadron histories here.
I suspect for range, not only do they have to fly to the target which isn't that close (200-400 miles away depending) but they may have to divert a long way around sudden huge thunderstorms which spring up around the Owen Stanleys or just from the warm churning Pacific randomly pretty much 2 or 3 times per day, every day. Probably 2/3 of every mission was re-routed at least partially, either on the way to the target or on the way back to base (or to a secondary base) due to bad weather. So the need for extra fuel is significant, and a lighter load will probably (?) require less fuel. It could also mean the use of bomb-bay tanks which i know was common practice with the A-20s by this time but i'm not sure about the other types.
Yes i was wondering about the 300 lb bombs too, i was assuming Australian, British origin, or possibly even something weirder like Dutch? But they did also have 100, 250, 500 and 1,000 lb bombs all of which were being used routinely (including during the last 4 day period I just covered). They were clearly using whatever they could scrounge and it was also clearly a bit of a mess especially earlier in 1942. By 1943 they were starting to figure out exactly what worked and what was good for what purpose. At least one type of parafrag were defective and destroyed 2 or 3 A-20s / Boston IIIs in horrible accidents.
I agree about the P-40s, that is the most logical explanation and this may have been done with the P-40Ks in particular which maybe already had some strengthening of the wing bomb racks. The 100 lb bomb racks may have just turned out to be able to support 300 lb bombs. I am just being cautious because we had this big debate about P-40 bomb carrying and it was strongly asserted that only the P-40N could carry more than some 30 lb (or one 100 lb?) bombs on the wings.
As for boost control, later P-40Ks had it and I think they retrofitted it to earlier ones and also to some of the P-40Es which were re-engined with V-1710-73s. They were still using some P-40Es all the way into late 1943! By early 1943 they had also added radio direction finder loops to the backs of a lot of the P-40s and some of the P-39s, and I think the P-38s too.
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Steamed_Banana
Staff Sergeant
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Google / AI claims that the 300 lb bomb was a US made M31
but maybe some were made in the UK too?
www.awm.gov.au
but maybe some were made in the UK too?
300 pound M31 Aerial Bomb
Greg Boeser
1st Lieutenant
Light bomb loads were pretty common when the mission was a shipping sweep.
No need to waste a string of bombs on a small point target.
No need to waste a string of bombs on a small point target.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Could be coping and the original diaries had misprints. But while twenty two 100lb bombs per plane was certainly possible there is no way to say at this point.
But 2200lbs of bombs is still a small load for a B-26.
B-26, even the early ones, would/could hold 962 gal in the wing tanks. A-20 could hold 400 gallons in the wing tanks. A-20s were given one to three tanks in the upper bomb bay. One tank showed up fairly early but that tank held 125 gallons. All three tanks held 325 gallons. A-20 doesn't use as many gallons per mile but the B-26 doesn't need to resort to the bomb bay tank as soon. A-20 tanks were in the upper bomb bay and did not affect the normal bomb load of four 500lb bombs.
The accounts I have seen to not give details. The Details maybe out there. Some planes (Hawker Typhoon) needed a number of modifications to go from pair of 500lbs to a pair of 1000lbs bombs. Nobody mentions the bomb racks. They needed to change the wheels/tyres (?) they needed to change the brakes. Crashing while taxing out of the revetment to the runway was frowned upon. Typhoons also got larger horizontal stabilizers.
Stronger racks might be the easiest thing to change. British certainly used single 250lb bombs under the wings fairly soon on P-40s.
But for take-off from poor strips it would help if we knew the actual weight of the plane. Carrying less the full fuel and/or less than full ammo could allow for heavier bombload. Cutting the ammo load from 281 (?) rpg to 200rpg could save about 75lbs per wing (150lbs total). Adjust as you see fit. Total ammo for a P-40E or K was 423lbs.
As I said, the US Army and Navy did not standardize during the 1930s. I have no idea of the number of 300lb bombs built but the early B-17 units in England were using them over France and Germany in 1942 and early 1943.
See above. I am trying to go by pilot's manuals. Breaking planes by going against the manuals happened. for the combat units it was question of how often they broke something vs damage to the enemy.
Take-off and landing chart for the P-40D&E.
Adding 500-600lbs to the aircraft can add hundreds of feet to the take off run. Chart lists 3 types of runway surfaces.
Zeno's has a chart for a later P-39. It is easy to see why it was not popular.
The USAAF had two types of 300lb bomb in WW2Google / AI claims that the 300 lb bomb was a US made M31
View attachment 894666
but maybe some were made in the UK too?
300 pound M31 Aerial Bomb
300lb GP Mk.1 M2.
Bomb, 300 lb GP, Mk 1 M2
Description Streamlined and filled with 100% TNT. Prior to March 11, 1942, these bombs would have been yellow all over with black manufacturers markings; but since that date w
300lb Demolition M31
Bomb, 300 lb Demolition, M31
Description The 300 pound M31 Bomb has been replaced by the 250 pound bomb. It is identified by the rear closing cap and it has only two Army suspension lugs 14 inches apart. I
Britain didn't have any 300lb bombs in WW2.
