The use of 100 Octane Fuel in the RAF pt 2

[Kurfürst]

Some more evidence:


This is from a researcher (Pips over Allaboutwarafe discussion boards, who posted this some time ago), researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.


The second description is from Gavin Bailey's work, "The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain", originally published online on April 15, 2008:

Significantly, at the same time as the British were preparing to take these preliminary steps required to utilise 100-octane fuel, a committee was formed consisting of representatives from the leading oil companies, Imperial Chemical Industries and Air Ministry officers. Chaired by Sir Harold Hartley, the chairman of the Fuel Research Board, the objective of the committee was to recommend measures to ensure that adequate supplies of 100-octane fuel could be supplied in wartime. The immediate impetus behind this development was the possibility that the main existing source of supply""hydrogenation plants run by Standard Oil and Shell within the United States""might become inaccessible owing to the embargo requirements of the US Neutrality Acts on the outbreak of war. A further consideration was the fact that 100-octane supplies were purchased in dollars in the case of Shell and Standard Oil production in the United States and in Dutch guilders for Shell production from Curacao in the Netherlands West Indies and later on from the Netherlands East Indies. This presented a potential problem for British balance of payments and foreign currency exchange which was only resolved in the short- and medium-term future by the adoption of supply under the terms of lend–lease in 1941.

The Hartley Committee eventually determined in December 1938 that three new hydrogenation plants should be funded partially at government expense in Trinidad and in Britain to expand British-controlled annual 100-octane fuel production capacity to 720,000 tons above the level already in prospect from existing supplies. At this point Shell and ICI had co-operated to build the first hydrogenation plant in Britain at Billingham on Teeside and further plants were being planned at Stanlow in Cheshire by Shell and Heysham and Thornton in Lancashire by the Air Ministry. In January 1939, when the Hartley Committee report was adopted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Treasury was able to cancel one of the planned plants in Trinidad on the grounds of cost, in return for an expansion of the authorised war reserve from 410,000 tons to 800,000 tons, 700,000 tons of which were to consist of 100-octane. This represented an entire years worth of estimated consumption on the basis of the major expansion and production schemes then in force and required an enormous investment in building the required protected underground storage infrastructure.

RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939.34

By the time war broke out, the available stocks of aviation fuel had risen to 153,000 tons of 100-octane and 323,000 tons of other grades (mostly 87-octane).35 The actual authorisation to change over to 100-octane came at the end of February 1940 and was made on the basis of the existing reserve and the estimated continuing rate of importation in the rest of the year The available stock of 100-octane fuel at this point was about 220,000 tons. Actual use of the fuel began after 18 May 1940, when the fighter stations selected for the changeover had completed their deliveries of 100-octane and had consumed their existing stocks of 87-octane. While this was immediately before the intensive air combat associated with the Dunkirk evacuation, where Fighter Command units first directly engaged the Luftwaffe, this can only be regarded as a fortunate coincidence which was contingent upon much earlier decisions to establish, store and distribute sufficient supplies of 100-octane fuel.

 

[Glider]

The reason why it is included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.

This the paper that the AWM cannot find and have not heard of but for now I will go what we have in front of us.
Point A Where have McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and Churchill quoted from this paper? If you cannot supply the paper then the quotes would be of interest.

"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

This statement is inaccurate as permission had been given to use 100 Octane Fuel in February Post 2 has the details and copy of the original paper. This is supported by operation books reporting the change over in some squadrons as early as February post 48 has examples of original documents.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use.

This is a false claim with no evidence to support it. Any evidence would be welcomed and appreciated. In my opinion its unlikely as all the squadrons in France were using 100 Octane in May so why we wouldn't use 100 octane for defending the UK is something that would need evidence to support.

The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

This is totally wrong. The consumption of 100 Octane fuel in July and August on average was 10,000 tons a month.
On 31st May the Stockpile was 294,000 tons a two and a half year stockpile
On 31st August it was 404,000 tons a three and a half year stockpile
Post 1 has the details
This was supported by the use of Billingham refinery to produce 33,000 tons of 100 octane in the four months up to November 1940. If there had been a shortage this production would have continued.
Post 26 has the details of the preparitory paper. I didn't take a copy of the completion paper but assure you that it did take place.

.
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place.[/B] Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.
The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.

This is without doubt wrong. I say this as I went through the entire records minutes, actions and reports contained in the Oil Co ordination Committee and nowhere was there any mention of a shorage of 100 octane, of a slowdown or stoppage of the distribution of fuel. Neither was there any mention of the recommencement of the distribution at any time let alone September. This is supported by the decision on 7th August to allow 100 Octane fuel to be released to all operation commands namely Coastal and the rest of Bomber Command. Post 1 has the details.
I should add that the Oil Coordination Committee was responsible for the purchasing, import, storage and distribution of all fuel for the United Kingdon at home and overseas. It would have been impossible for such actions to have been implemented without their knowledge or involvement.
Also the minutes of the War Cabinet are available on line and anyone can check these. You will see that the War Cabinet didn't make any decisions on 100 octane in May 1940, In fact they never mentioned 100 octane at all.

The second description is from Gavin Bailey's work, "The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain", originally published online on April 15, 2008:]

[/QUOTE]

Gavin Bailey formally objected to the use of his material to support the idea that the RAF was limited in the use of 100 Octane Fuel. If people wish to go into this then the following link will suffice.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-during-bob-16305-5.html

 

[Glider]

Problem is nobody made such an arguement. Glider etc. state that each and every RAF Figther Station was was supplied with 100 octane fuel, and each and every RAF fighter Squadron was running on 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain.

I think one thing has to be made clear. Can I give a 100% Cast Iron, Gold Plated guarantee that every station in fighter command had 100 Octane fuel. No I cannot, as that would involve checking vast amounts of data and I have a life to lead, so in short there could be one station in the back end of nowhere which didn't get the fuel. As Kurfurst rightly pointed out I used the phrase , "sources links that exist and support the view that Fighter Command was effectively fully converted to 100 Octane by May 1940. Note the word effectively.
That said I do believe and there is no evidence in my mind to contridict the view that all stations did have the 100 Octane Fuel.

As others have noted, there is no conclusive evidence for this (yet) in the documentation so far found. As opposed to this, reasearch and some of the documentation (including research in the Australian archieves, papers the 18 May Meeting, and fuel consumption data) points to that 100 octane fuel was issued to some stations, while others relied on 87 octane fuel. It is yet to be determined what was the ratio between these stations. Whether the RAF used 100 octane fuel or whether the engines were capable of using it was never a question, and nobody questioned this here AFAIK.

The Australian Archives again. There are two questions here
a) Does the paper exist
b) If it does is it accurate
Responses are
a) The Australian Archives that couldn't find the paper when I asked for it, couldn't find it when the editors at Wikipedia asked for it. Kurfurst was going to look for it but don't know how far he got with the request. I haven't seen it and am assuming he failed but could be wrong on that.
b) Without (a) we cannot know (b) but the omens are not good I will go into that later.

18th May Meeting
I don't know what Kurfurst is referring to as this is totally covered in my postings 3, 4, 5 and 6 and has nothing to do with shortages, named squadrons or named stations.

Fuel Consumption figures
These support my contention that the increase in September was due to the fuel being released to Bomber and Coastal Command in August. The details are in Posting 1.
Kurfursts comments are vague but I am happy to debate them if he can be specific.

Glider's post and documents he posted cover the period up to May 1940, and it makes clear that some specific bomber Stations were issued with this fuel, as well as Mike's collection of Pilot combat reports show that several RAF Squadrons were using the fuel in France and later over Britain in the summer of 1940. The question is of course complicated by the fact that the Squadrons were rotated amongst fifty-odd stations during the Battle. I will address this later.

I admit this confused me in two areas.
a) Posting 1 goes well beyond May and goes to August 1940.
b) The total number of squadrons in Mikes combat reports and postings is 34 squadrons Posts 57 and 68 have the details. Considering the contention from Kurfurst is that we had only 18 squadrons its difficult to understand the argument.
I have no doubt that if we were to look into the other squadron records we would find similar postings.

 

[NZTyphoon]

I'm sorry, but Kurfürst has not answered my main points; none of the documents he has presented relate directly to 1940. The document from 1937 shows that the RAF was already using 100 octane. The documents from 1938 show that the Air Ministry and the RAF were fully aware that supplies of 100 octane fuel were vital and plans were underway to overcome any potential shortfall in the event that the US would stop supplying the fuel. The document from late 1941 or 1942 merely discusses Beaverbrook's projections about how much 100 octane fuel would be used in 1942 cf 1941. Where is Kurfürst's evidence from 1940 which will show that some RAF fighter squadrons were forced to use 87 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain while others continued to use 100?

Generally using higher octane fuel in an engine originally for lower octane fuel, say 87 which was the standard in the 1930s, was no particular problem as it would appear. For example, the Germans were using their own 96/115 octane fuel 'C-3' during the Battle of Britain even with Ju 88 bomber units, even those the Jumo 211 engines of these bombers were probably not gaining any extra output with it.

What on earth does this mean? In fighter v fighter combat, especially between aircraft as evenly matched as the Spitfire I and Bf 109E, small advantages could mean the difference between being killed or killing the opponent.
The combat reports make it clear that several RAF pilots evaded 109s by using the "overboost", similarly 109s were shot down after being caught by pilots using +12 lbs. How does Kurfürst know that Ju 88s using the German equivalent fuel, which was supplied in very small quantities BTW, didn't evade Hurricanes or Spitfires because thay were able to call on some extra boost?

 

[Milosh]

By the time war broke out, the available stocks of aviation fuel had risen to 153,000 tons of 100-octane

To give people an idea how much fuel that is, it is enough for ~910,000-920,000 Spitfire sorties.

1 ton = 14.5 barrels
1 barrel = 35 Imp gal.

 

[Glider]

I'm sorry, but Kurfürst has not answered my main points; none of the documents he has presented relate directly to 1940. The document from 1937 shows that the RAF was already using 100 octane. The documents from 1938 show that the Air Ministry and the RAF were fully aware that supplies of 100 octane fuel were vital and plans were underway to overcome any potential shortfall in the event that the US would stop supplying the fuel. The document from late 1941 or 1942 merely discusses Beaverbrook's projections about how much 100 octane fuel would be used in 1942 cf 1941. Where is Kurfürst's evidence from 1940 which will show that some RAF fighter squadrons were forced to use 87 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain while others continued to use 100?



What on earth does this mean? In fighter v fighter combat, especially between aircraft as evenly matched as the Spitfire I and Bf 109E, small advantages could mean the difference between being killed or killing the opponent.
The combat reports make it clear that several RAF pilots evaded 109s by using the "overboost", similarly 109s were shot down after being caught by pilots using +12 lbs. How does Kurfürst know that Ju 88s using the German equivalent fuel, which was supplied in very small quantities BTW, didn't evade Hurricanes or Spitfires because thay were able to call on some extra boost?

You will find this quote from a previous thread of interest. It shows that the British investigated the fuel carried in 29 crashed German aircraft, of the 29 only one had 100 octane fuel and that was from captured british stocks.

I direct you to Document file number 043697, in the BP Archive at Warwick University, and specifically to 'Petroleum Board Enemy Oils Fuels Committee. A Survey of the Results Obtained to Date in the Examination of Enemy Fuel Samples', by D. A. Howes, dated 4 November 1940. This used fuel samples taken from 29 crashed Luftwaffe aircraft between November 1939 and September 1940, and, exclusive of one sample of captured British 100-octane, revealed octane ratings which varied between 87.5 and 92.2 octane. The results were summarised by H. E. Snow to Sir William Fraser on 13 November 1940 as follows (and I quote from the original document):

'No general indication [of] iso-octane or other synthetics. The only 100 octane fuel identified was definitely captured British.'

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-during-bob-16305-5.html

 

[NZTyphoon]

It would seem that a brief summary of this discussion would read something like:

We have Glider and others providing documantary evidence, running through from 1938 to late 1940, which gives a clear picture of how extensive the use of 100 octane fuel in RAF fighter squadrons was during the battles of France and Britain. Glider admits that he does not know some things, but this does not weaken the evidence he has presented. I read over 20 primary source documents in these threads alone which provide strong evidence that there were sufficient supplies of 100 octane fuel to sustain the needs of RAF fighter units during the critical months of 1940. Not only that but there was enough to allow some bomber units to use the fuel as well.

The only objection comes from Kurfürst, who has not presented any 1940 vintage documentary evidence that RAF fighter units were having to use 87 octane fuel (the only alternative) during operational sorties, because of supply shortages. The only basis for his argument (from the first thread) that only "25% of fighter squadrons" were using 100 octane fuel is based on a 1938 planning document, which was written with the contingency that supplies of the fuel would be withheld by the USA in the event of a war. He has also presented a written transcript which purports to come from Beaverbrook, but the source document, it seems, cannot be found. So far no evidencehas been produced that shows that any fighter squadrons were "relegated" to using 87 octane fuel during operational sorties. Until Kurfurst (or someone else) can provide documentation that this did happen, all he is working with is conjecture and assumption based on some provisional planning data from 1938 and/or 1941-42, and what seems to be a mystery memo from Beaverbrook to the Australians.

The matter about whether ALL RAF fighter stations were supplied with 100 octane is a red herring. What would have mattered in 1940 is whether the stations in 11, 10 and 12 Groups were able to supply the fighter squadrons with the fuel, particularly during the B of B. I have no problem with Glider admitting that he has no idea whether all stations were supplied, because none of the participants in this discussion know for sure. The weight of evidence is that there was no supply problem... unless some sensational NEW documentary evidence is produced which counters this...

 

[Kurfürst]

More to ponder on, 100 octane fuel development and operational use via

Spitfire: The History by Eric B. Morgan , Edward Shacklady
Spitfire: The History: Amazon.co.uk: Eric B. Morgan, Edward Shacklady: Books

 

[Kurfürst]

It would seem that a brief summary of this discussion would read something like:

Thank you for your summary. Others have already summerized the contents of the thread, please read below if you missed it.

Hi Glider,

good research but I'm not convinced of the "ALL SQUADRONS" either. Maybe there were more documents which are more convincing - though I found every one you scanned interesting - but from what I've read I wouldn't come to a definite conclusion. It may be likely, yes, but as a historian I have to say "likely" is no proof, no offence meant. Again, kudos for your research, and believe me, since I'm working in an archive I know what I'm talking about.Krabat

Personally, I find myself in agreement with Krabat 42. Let it be a court, or a historical question, the burden of evidence is upoon the one making the claim. It is Glider, and Mike, making the claim that each and every RAF fighter squadrons were supplied with, and was using, 100 octane fuel during the Battle of Britain. As others, including Krabat42, Vincenco and myself have noted, the evidence for this claim is so far absent from this thread, and is directly contradicted by some of the other evidence posted. At present, the evidence is sufficient to prove that 100 octane fuel was used a number of Squadrons during the Battle, the the exact percentage and amount is impossible to determine. Until such evidence is posted, I am afraid most of us who are sceptical on this claim will have trouble accepting this claim based on how 'likely' it should be.

Of course all of us can look it at different the evidence posted at angles, but a very definietive claim like this should be backed up by very definietive sources speaking in no uncertain terms. Certainly if 100 octane fuel was used in such an uniform manner as some posters claim, there should be evidence easily found for this.

The only objection comes from Kurfürst, who has not presented any 1940 vintage documentary evidence that RAF fighter units were having to use 87 octane fuel (the only alternative) during operational sorties, because of supply shortages. The only basis for his argument (from the first thread) that only "25% of fighter squadrons" were using 100 octane fuel is based on a 1938 planning document, which was written with the contingency that supplies of the fuel would be withheld by the USA in the event of a war.

As opposed to:

This is from a researcher (Pips over Allaboutwarafe discussion boards, who posted this some time ago), researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives, from a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.

 

[Kurfürst]

You will find this quote from a previous thread of interest. It shows that the British investigated the fuel carried in 29 crashed German aircraft, of the 29 only one had 100 octane fuel and that was from captured british stocks.

I direct you to Document file number 043697, in the BP Archive at Warwick University, and specifically to 'Petroleum Board Enemy Oils Fuels Committee. A Survey of the Results Obtained to Date in the Examination of Enemy Fuel Samples', by D. A. Howes, dated 4 November 1940. This used fuel samples taken from 29 crashed Luftwaffe aircraft between November 1939 and September 1940, and, exclusive of one sample of captured British 100-octane, revealed octane ratings which varied between 87.5 and 92.2 octane. The results were summarised by H. E. Snow to Sir William Fraser on 13 November 1940 as follows (and I quote from the original document):

'No general indication [of] iso-octane or other synthetics. The only 100 octane fuel identified was definitely captured British.'

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-during-bob-16305-5.html

This opinion was posted already in the other discussion, but unfortunately it was not possible due to refute it because the premature closing of that thread due to the behaviour of the poster.

However, the notion and implication that the only 100 octane fuel used by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain originates to British stocks of 100 octane fuel, captured from British airfields in France after the premature leave by the British Army in June 1940 is a dangerous myth, which needs to be promptly refuted, before any credence is attributed to it. Even if I did not want to engage in continuing that discussion here, given that the title discusses the RAF use of such fuel in 1940, the above repetence of it warrants a proper refutation of the claim by poster 'gbailey'.

Some of the documents already posted from the Australian archieves already show that already in 1938 the British were concerned of German 100 octane fuel developments and the capacity to produce this fuel on an industrial scale. Please refer back to these before proceeding further.

Please also refer to the German datasheet of the DB 601N. This type of engine was developed for German 100 octane 'C-3' fuel use, and went into mass production in late 1939 (October 1939 via Manfred Griehl to be exact)

It extremely puzzling, to say the least, why would the Germans decide to mass produce an engine, specifically made for 100 octane fuel use, without having any own stock of 100 octane fuel. And then equip whole wings of fighters, bombers, and zestoerers with the said engine.

As the statements by 'gbailey' are said to be based on 'Document file number 043697, in the BP Archive at Warwick University, and specifically to 'Petroleum Board Enemy Oils Fuels Committee. A Survey of the Results Obtained to Date in the Examination of Enemy Fuel Samples', please find below the original scans of the document below to these claims made.

The full document, of 76 pages, is not reproduced here due to size restriction, but it is available in its full at my website at Kurfurst - Your resource on Messerschmitt Bf 109 performance.

It should be noted, however, that during the war, there were different octane ratings used for aviation gasoline. Allied states generally preferred to give octane rating at its rich mixture, while the Germans preferred the CFR method, which gave the octane rating at weak mixture.

The bottomline of the story, the green 'C-3' type fuel that the Germans were calling 96 octane fuel by the CFR method, was the equaivalent of 96/110 octane fuel as the Allies would call it. In other words, actually a bit better at rich mixture and for knock resistance than ordinary 100 octane fuel.

Also it is evident from these documents that the British were aware of the existance and use of German 100 octane - for simplicity's sake lets ignore for a moment it superior qualities and call it the same since the summer of 1940.

Examples of such fuel were found and analysed in crashed Ju 88 and Me 110 aircraft. The use in the former type is especially interesting as the types capable of taking advantage of higher octane fuel were DB 601N-powered Bf 109Es and Bf 110Cs. These latter were already in service by July 1940. By the automn, 1200 DB 601N engines were delivered, divided amongst Bf 110, Bf 109 units, Bf 109F production and reserve engines. Priority was given to Bf 110 units until the automn for these engines. The use of 100 octane C-3 thus may appear to be superflous in German bomber aircraft, nevertheless is was an existing practice.

The British report do not seem to mention 100 octane fuel found in Bf 109s, but this may be due to the limited scope of the report. See the image of Bf 109E-4/N, W.Nr. 1190, 'White 4', is being unloaded by Curtiss workers. The Emil belonged to 4. Staffel Staffel of JG 4, and was flown by Uffz. Horst Perez on, when it was shot down on the 30th September 1940 over East Dean during the Battle of Britain. Note the fuel triangle with the '100' label, pointo to 100 octane fuel and the DB 601N.

Given the contradiction between gbailey's statements - ' exclusive of one sample of captured British 100-octane, revealed octane ratings which varied between 87.5 and 92.2 octane' - and the original scan of the document below, it would be very much desirable that gbailey would comment on how he arrived at the opposite conclusions in comparisons what these vintange British reports of the same series say.

 

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
as I have wrote earlier, the burden of delivering proof is on your side, because current BoB literature says that FC had converted to 100 oct before the beginning of BoB. Numerous books claiming this have been mentioned in the treads where we have discussed on this subject. Mike and other have showed evidence that over 30 sqns definitely used 100 oct, you still have not shown any evidence, that even one sqn of those serving under 10, 11 or 12 Group, those were the groups that really mattered, used 87 oct during the BoB. So try to find some positive proof to back up your stand. As I have wrote, history doesn't progress if we argue on "established" facts again and again without positive proof that "established" facts were wrong but it progresses if we can proof that "established" facts are wrong or even partly wrong and so success to generate new understanding of our past.

Juha

 

[Kurfürst]

Dear Juha,

I am afraid this whole thread is all about what the so-called 'established' historical facts are.

As I see, your stance is, briefly, that it is I who have to disprove your claims, and unless I do so, they are to be accepted as true.

This is hardly how it works, please refer to Russell's teapot - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia for a better understanding of the pitfalls of 'burden of proof'.

To quote Russel:

'If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is an intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.'

Regarding the number of RAF FC Squadrons, using 100 octane fuel during the Battle, I think the deployment and constant changing of Stations by the Squadrons during the Battle has to be taken into account. It was Stations, and not squadrons, which were supplied with this fuel. As noted by Vincenzo in an earlier thread, there were about 50+ Stations used as a base during the BoB, and the analysis of fighter Squadron movement indicates that Squadron report show a pattern of reporting 100 octane fuel use in combat are clearly connected to being deployed at certain stations, 10 to 15 out of the fifty or so. To give a simple example, Squadron X may report use of 100 octane when deployed at Y Station, then when redeployed to another Station, there no such reports. However, Squadron Z deployed to Y Station in its place starts to report using 100 octane fuel afterwards. The mechanism in this is not difficult to be realized.

As I noted earlier, I will share my analysis of this later. For today, I feel the subject has been sufficiently discussed.

 

[Juha]

Dear Kurfürst
have you notice that huge majority of aircombat happened in the areas of 10 and 11 Group. It is not surprising that for ex sqns stationed at Castletown, Isle of Man didn't produce combat reports.

On established facts, name a book on Bob which support your stand. As I wrote, numerous books are named that claims that FC had gone over to 100 oct before the BoB began.

Juha

 

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
Quote:" As I see, your stance is, briefly, that it is I who have to disprove your claims, and unless I do so, they are to be accepted as true."

Now IIRC my only claim have been, that in the literature on BoB many famous experts claim that FC changed to 100 oct before the BoB began and when you asked in what books I gave titles of some and others produced scans on relevant pages from some of the books which proved my point. So I have backed up my claim but I'm still waiting some positive proof from you to back up your claim. All I have seen is that Glider et al have demolished your original claim that only 16+2 sqns used 100 oct during the BoB but now you seem to have changed you a position a bit and demanded new proofs that your claim is wrong instead of producing positive backing to your claim.

Juha

 

[pbfoot]

I think Kurfurst is missing something of note when he talks about Squadrons moving or being posted to "non 100 octane" stations I believe it was standard practice that the aircraft remained on station and the the personel transferred without their aircraft , leaving their aircraft for the incoming personel or squadron

 

[NZTyphoon]

I note Kurfürst has left out a great deal of my statement

It would seem that a brief summary of this discussion would read something like:
The only objection comes from Kurfürst, who has not presented any 1940 vintage documentary evidence that RAF fighter units were having to use 87 octane fuel (the only alternative) during operational sorties, because of supply shortages. The only basis for his argument (from the first thread) that only "25% of fighter squadrons" were using 100 octane fuel is based on a 1938 planning document, which was written with the contingency that supplies of the fuel would be withheld by the USA in the event of a war. He has also presented a written transcript which purports to come from Beaverbrook, but the source document, it seems, cannot be found. So far no evidence has been produced that shows that any fighter squadrons were "relegated" to using 87 octane fuel during operational sorties. Until Kurfurst (or someone else) can provide documentation that this did happen, all he is working with is conjecture and assumption based on some provisional planning data from 1938 and/or 1941-42, and what seems to be a mystery memo from Beaverbrook to the Australians.

As opposed to what? A transcribed, third hand account of a memo which nobody, apart from Pip, has seen?
Why did Kurfürst omit my mentioning this? He has yet to explain why he continues to use such documents as a basis for his argument when others are doing all the hard work and supplying documents from 1940.

More to ponder on, 100 octane fuel development and operational use via

Spitfire: The History by Eric B. Morgan , Edward Shacklady
Spitfire: The History: Amazon.co.uk: Eric B. Morgan, Edward Shacklady: Books

I'm familiar with the book but I don't have a copy. However, in this excerpt Morgan and Shacklady used a document from November 1937 which only describes fuel supplies from British sources. Nothing about the USA and hardly convincing evidence about the events of 1940. Then comes a document from March 1939 to prove that 100 octane fuel was to be used in sixteen fighter squadrons and two bomber by September 1939. So what? As I have explained before. the RAF's pre-war planning was based on an assumption that in the event of war being declared the USA would withold supplies of 100 octane.

Only later do thay say that supplies were shipped from the USA and then go on to say that large numbers of tankers were sunk. Strangely enough 1940 documents, none of which are mentioned by M S, show that stocks of 100 octane fuel were increasing throughout 1940, in spite of the use of the fuel by the RAF. Where was it coming from if the tanker losses were so bad?

I think the deployment and constant changing of Stations by the Squadrons during the Battle has to be taken into account. It was Stations, and not squadrons, which were supplied with this fuel. As noted by Vincenzo in an earlier thread, there were about 50+ Stations used as a base during the BoB, and the analysis of fighter Squadron movement indicates that Squadron report show a pattern of reporting 100 octane fuel use in combat are clearly connected to being deployed at certain stations, 10 to 15 out of the fifty or so.

First of all what does this mean?

the analysis of fighter Squadron movement indicates that Squadron report show a pattern of reporting 100 octane fuel use in combat are clearly connected to being deployed at certain stations, 10 to 15 out of the fifty or so.

What pattern? Can Kurfürst present some evidence that there is such a detectable " pattern" ? If by this he means that combat reports show the airfield at which the pilot was based then he is mistaken. Take a look at the combat reports presented by Mike Williams - none of them show where the pilot or unit was based.

There were not 50+ Fighter stations during the Battle of Britain! This is something which needs to be cleared up: the vital airfields were the 19 Sector Stations. In addition there were 26 Satellite airfields, many of which only had basic facilities. A list of the Stations and airfields:
Seven in 11 Group:
Tangmere : Satellite airfields :Westhampnett, Ford
Kenley :Croydon
Biggin Hill :West Malling
Hornchurch : Hawkinge , Gravesend, Manston. Rochford
North Weald :Martlesham Heath , Stapleford Tawney
Debden :Martlesham Heath
Northolt : Hendon

Two in 10 Group:
Filton embry, Exeter, St Eval, Bibury, RNAS Roborough
Middle Wallop :Warmwell, Boscombe Down

Five in 12 Group:
Duxford :Fowlmere
Wittering : Coltishall
Digby :Ternhill
Kirton-in-Lindsey : no satellite
Church Fenton : Leconfield

Five in 13 Group:
Usworth :Catterick
Acklington : no satellite
Turnhouse : Grangemouth, Drem
Dyce :Grangemouth
Wick :Kirkwell, Sumburgh

The Sector stations and airfields with with a were definitely supplied with 100 octane fuel, according to Glider's list: NOTE: Elsewhere there is a photo of 610 Sqn Spitfires being refueled at Hawkinge - the fuel tanker is marked with a 100 octane label.

We do have a list of the first 21 stations that were to be issued with the fuel. These were

ACKLINGTON 13 Group
BIGGIN HILL 11 Group
CATTERICK 13 Group
DEBDEN 11 Group
DIGBY 12 Group
DREM 13 Group
DUXFORD 12 Group
HORNCHURCH 11 Group
LECONFIELD 12 Group
MANSTON 11 Group
MARTLESHAM HEATH 11 Group
NORTHHOLT 11 Group
NORTH WEALD 11 Group
TANGMERE 11 Group
TURNHOUSE 13 Group
CROYDON 11 Group
ST. ATHAN
WITTERING 12 Group
CHRUCH FENTON [sic] 12 Group
GRANGEMOUTH 13 Group
FILTON 10 Group

Eleven out of 14 Sector Stations in 11, 10 and 12 Groups had been supplied with 100 octane fuel (Kenley's satellite Croydon was also supplied with the fuel). These are the most important Groups and the most important Sector Stations NOTE:Sector stations were the focal points for supplying fuel to their satellites.

In total thirteen out of 19 Sector Stations plus several airfields were supplied with 100 octane fuel. This is going by Glider's list. Considering each Sector Station was responsible for operating two or more fighter squadrons, and was responsible for supplying its satellite airfields, the situation is quite different from the bare statistics of 10-15 out of 50+.

 

[Vincenzo]

my old topic on that
Tab for only spit and hurry squadrons (54):
Stations/Squadrons When used Days (max 114)
RAF Acklington. Ever 114
RAF Dyce. 31/8-11/10 42
RAF Turnhouse. Ever but 27/8 and 20/7 112
RAF Usworth. Ever but 1/9-7/9 107
RAF Wick. Until 1/9 53
RAF Catterick. Ever but 26 and 27/7 112
RAF Drem. Ever 114
RAF Grangemouth. Until 1/9 54
RAF Sumburgh. 17/7-17/9 63
RAF Church Fenton. Until 22/10 105
RAF Digby. Ever 114
RAF Duxford. Ever 114
RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey. Ever 114
RAF Wittering. Ever 114
RAF Coltishall. Ever 114
RAF Leconfield. Ever 114
RAF Filton. From 26/9 36
RAF Middle Wallop. Ever 114
RAF Boscombe Down. From 14/8 79
RAF Exeter. Ever 114
RAF Pembrey. Ever 114
RAF St Eval. Ever but 13/8 and 10/9 112
RAF Warmwell. From 12/7 112
RAF Biggin Hill. Ever 114
RAF Debden. Until 7/10 90
RAF Hornchurch. Ever 114
RAF Kenley. Ever 114
RAF Northolt. Ever 114
RAF North Weald. Ever 114
RAF Tangmere. Ever 114
RAF Croydon. Ever but 19/8-31/8 101
RAF Eastchurch Never but 12 and 13/8 2
RAF Gravesend. 25/7- 29/10 but 10/9 96
RAF Hawkinge Never but 10/7 1
RAF Hendon. 5/9-25/9 21
RAF Martlesham. From 5/9 57
RAF Rochford. Until 23/7 14
RAF Stapleford. From 29/8 64
RAF Westhampnett. From 31/7 93
RAF West Malling. From 30/10 2
Castletown Ever but 1/9 and 14-17/9 109
Fowlmere 24/7-29/10 98
Matlask From 30/10 2
Castle Camps From 3/9 59
Sealand Never but 11 and 12/7 2
Prestwick From 23/8 but 10/10 68
Skitten 13/10-23/10 11
Chibolton From 30/9 32
Aldergrove From 20/7 104
Speke From 26/9 36

total 50 fields, 36 with almost a squadron for almost 57 days

 

[Milosh]

One must take what comes out of Australia with a grain of salt. The Australians were always whining, and in some cases with good cause, but they were at the end of a very long supply line. In the case of 100 octane fuel for Australia, why was it needed at that time? The Japanese menace was well over a year away and the fuel was most certainly required at home with the Germans on the British doorstep. The British most certainly would be making all kinds of excuses why they could not supply 100 octane fuel to Australia.

Also, why could not Australia produce it own 100 octane fuel? Were there no refineries in Australia?

 

[Juha]

Hello pbfoot
I'm not BoB specialist but the few sqns I know took their plane south with them when they moved to 11 Group and the sqns they were relieving took their remaining planes with them up to north. And those could not have been the only cases because IIRC there was a standing order, given after an unfortunate incidence when one sqn was surprised with empty guns during a transfer flight (they had put their personal belongings into ammo trays) that during transfer flight at least half of the guns must be loaded (so half of the ammo trays could still be used as baggage storage).

Spitfire: The History by Eric B. Morgan and Edward Shacklady shows the movements of the a/c from one unit to another, so if one is very interested in this that might be a place from where to begin to study this.

Juha

 

[Juha]

Hello
I made a short check using Bowyer's Aircraft for the Few, checking 2nd and 12th Hurricane and Spit sqns listed (3 Sqn, 87 Sqn, 41 and 234Sqn). None seemed to change their whole a/c establishment in one go but in 41 Sqn 4 planes were dropped out from their books on 20.9.40 and 7 on 24.10.40 without any explanation by Bowyer.But there were no corresponding influx for 24.10. but sqn got 4 planes on 19.9., on 28.9. sqn got 2 planes and 3 on 29.9. but it got planes on many other days also. In No. 3 Sqn 4 planes were dropped from their books without explanation by Bowyer on 21.7.40 and it got 8 planes on 23.7.40. In the other 2 sqns there were not any noticeable clusters of outgoing planes. I also noticed that Bowyer has noted on 56 Sqn that "considerable interchange of aircraft with 249 Sqn in Sept 40" on the other hand he has noted on 249 Sqn "some jointly used with 56 Squadron in 9.40"

That's all in this time

Juha