The use of 100 Octane Fuel in the RAF pt 2

[Hop]

A list of the Stations and airfields:
Seven in 11 Group:
Tangmere : Satellite airfields :Westhampnett, Ford
Kenley :Croydon
Biggin Hill :West Malling
Hornchurch : Hawkinge , Gravesend, Manston. Rochford
North Weald :Martlesham Heath , Stapleford Tawney
Debden :Martlesham Heath
Northolt : Hendon

Two in 10 Group:
Filton embry, Exeter, St Eval, Bibury, RNAS Roborough
Middle Wallop :Warmwell, Boscombe Down

Five in 12 Group:
Duxford :Fowlmere
Wittering : Coltishall
Digby :Ternhill
Kirton-in-Lindsey : no satellite
Church Fenton : Leconfield

Five in 13 Group:
Usworth :Catterick
Acklington : no satellite
Turnhouse : Grangemouth, Drem
Dyce :Grangemouth
Wick :Kirkwell, Sumburgh

The Sector stations and airfields with with a were definitely supplied with 100 octane fuel, according to Glider's list: NOTE: Elsewhere there is a photo of 610 Sqn Spitfires being refueled at Hawkinge - the fuel tanker is marked with a 100 octane label.

Looking at the combat reports on Mike Williams site, as well as the stations you've identified, 609 squadron used 100 octane fuel when based at Middle Wallop on 30 September, 602 used it when based at Westhampnett, 610 at Gravesend and 74 at Rochford.

 

[Kurfürst]

via http://www.raf.mod.uk/Bob1940/stations.html

11 Group

Group Headquarters

11 Group Headquarters was based at RAF Uxbridge, the administratve centre. Also within the physical area of 11 Group and close to Uxbridge is RAF Bentley Priory, the Headquarters of Fighter Command during the Battle.

Sector Airfields

RAF Biggin Hill.

RAF Biggin Hill was home to the Biggin Hill Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 32 Squadron from 4 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 5 June 1940
No 610 Squadron from 2 July 1940
No 79 Squadron from 27 August 1940
No 72 Squadron from 31 August 1940
No 92 Squadron from 8 September 1940
No 141 Squadron from 13 September to 18 September 1940
No 72 Squadron from 14 September 1940
No 74 Squadron from 15 October 1940

RAF Debden.

RAF Debden was home to the Debden Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 85 Squadron from 22 May 1940
No 17 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 15 August 1940
No 601 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 111 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 17 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 25 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Hornchurch.

RAF Hornchurch was home to the Hornchurch Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 65 Squadron from 5 June 1940
No 74 Squadron from 25 June 1940
No 54 Squadron from 24 July 1940
No 41 Squadron from 26 July 1940
No 54 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 266 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 600 Squadron from 22 August 1940
No 264 Squadron from 22 August 1940
No 603 Squadron from 27 August 1940
No 41 Squadron from 3 September 1940

RAF Kenley.

RAF Kenley was home to the Kenley Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 615 Squadron from 20 May 1940
No 616 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 253 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 66 Squadron from 3 September 1940
No 501 Squadron from 10 September 1940
No 253 Squadron from 16 September 1940

RAF Northolt.

RAF Northolt was home to the Northolt Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 609 Squadron from 19 May 1940
No 257 Squadron from 4 July 1940
No 303 Squadron from 22 July 1940
No 43 Squadron from 23 July 1940 to 1 August 1940
No 1 Squadron from 1 August 1940
No 401 Squadron RCAF from Mid-August 1940
No 615 Squadron from 10 October 1940
No 302 Squadron from 11 October 1940

RAF North Weald.

RAF North Weald was home to the North Weald Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 151 Squadron from 20 May 1940
No 56 Squadron from 4 June 1940
No 25 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 249 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 257 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Tangmere.

RAF Tangmere was home to the Tangmere Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 145 Squadron from 10 May 1940
No 43 Squadron from 31 May 1940
No 601 Squadron from 17 June 1940
No 1 Squadron from 23 June 1940
No 266 Squadron from 9 August 1940
No 17 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 607 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 601 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 213 Squadron from 7 September 1940
No 145 Squadron from 9 October 1940


Fighter Airfields

RAF Croydon.

RAF Croydon was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 111 Squadron from 4 June 1940
No 501 Squadron from 21 June 1940
No 401 Squadron RCAF from July 1940
No 85 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 72 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 111 Squadron from 3 September 1940
No 605 Squadron from 7 September 1940

RAF Detling.

Detling was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening.

RAF Eastchurch.

RAF Eastchurch was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 266 Squadron from 12 August 1940

RAF Ford.

RAF Ford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 23 Squadron from 12 September 1940

RAF Gosport.

Gosport was, along with Lee-on-Solent, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

RAF Gravesend.

RAF Gravesend was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 610 Squadron from 26 May 1940
No 604 Squadron from 3 July 1940
No 501 Squadron from 25 July 1940
No 66 Squadron from 11 September 1940

RAF Hawkinge.

RAF Hawkinge was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 79 Squadron from 2 July 1940

RAF Hendon.

RAF Hendon was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 257 Squadron from 17 May 1940
No 504 Squadron from 5 September 1940

RAF Lee on Solent.

Lee on Solent was, along with Gosport, one of the Royal Navy's airfields used in the defence of Southampton and Portsmouth. Royal Navy fighters were permanently based there, and occasionally RAF units were detached, using the airfield in the same way as a satellite or relief landing ground.

RAF Lympne.

Lympne was one of the 11 Group satellite airfields used by units on a day-to-day basis as required, often flights or squadrons would detach to such an airfield in the morning and return to their main operating and maintenance base in the evening. Due to the extreme forward position of this site it was under constant threat of attack and was not permanently manned during the Battle by any one Squadron.

RAF Manston.

RAF Manston was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 604 Squadron from 15 May 1940
No 600 Squadron from 20 June 1940

RAF Martlesham.

RAF Martlesham was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 25 Squadron from 19 June 1940
No 257 Squadron from 5 September 1940
No 17 Squadron from 8 October 1940

RAF Rochford.

RAF Rochford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 54 Squadron from 25 June 1940
No 264 Squadron from 27 August 1940
No 264 Squadron from 29 October 1940

RAF Stapleford.

RAF Stapleford was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 151 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 46 Squadron from 1 September 1940

RAF Thorney Island.

RAF Thorney Island was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 236 Squadron from 4 July 1940

RAF Westhampnett.

RAF Westhampnett was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 145 Squadron from 31 July 1940
No 602 Squadron from 13 August 1940

RAF West Malling.

RAF West Malling was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 141 Squadron from 12 July 1940
No 66 Squadron from 30 October 1940



10 Group

Group Headquarters

10 Group Headquarters was based at RAF Box, the administratve centre.

Sector Airfields

RAF Filton.

RAF Filton was home to the Filton Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 504 Squadron from 26 September 1940

RAF Middle Wallop.

RAF Middle Wallop was home to the Middle Wallop Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 236 Squadron from 14 June 1940
No 238 Squadron from 20 June 1940
No 401 Squadron RCAF from 21 June 1940
No 501 Squadron from 4 July 1940
No 609 Squadron from 5 July 1940
No 604 Squadron from 26 July 1940
No 222 Squadron from 13 August 1940
No 238 Squadron from 10 September 1940
No 23 Squadron from 12 September to 25 September 1940


Fighter Airfields

RAF Boscombe Down.

RAF Boscombe Down was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 249 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 56 Squadron from 1 September 1940

RAF Colerne.

RAF Colerne was used as a satellite and relief airfield for Middle Wallop during the Battle, units rotated in and out of the station on a daily basis.

RAF Exeter.

RAF Exeter was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 213 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 87 Squadron from 5 July 1940
No 601 Squadron from 7 September 1940

RAF Pembrey.

RAF Pembrey was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 92 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 8 September 1940

RAF Roborough.

RAF Roborough was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 247 Squadron from 1 August 1940

RAF St Eval.

RAF St Eval was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 222 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 236 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 238 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 222 Squadron from 11 September 1940

RAF Warmwell.

RAF Warmwell was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 152 Squadron from 12 July 1940

 

[Kurfürst]

12 Group

Group Headquarters

12 Group Headquarters was based at RAF Watnall, the administratve centre.

Sector Airfields

RAF Church Fenton.

RAF Church Fenton was home to the Church Fenton Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 87 Squadron from 26 May 1940
No 73 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 249 Squadron from 8 July 1940
No 85 Squadron from 5 September 1940

RAF Digby.

RAF Digby was home to the Digby Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 46 Squadron from 13 June 1940
No 29 Squadron from 27 June 1940
No 46 Squadron from 19 August 1940
No 151 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 611 Squadron from 10 October 1939

RAF Duxford.

RAF Duxford was home to the Duxford Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 264 Squadron from 10 May 1940
No 19 Squadron from 3 July 1940
No 310 Squadron from 10 July 1940
No 46 Squadron from 18 August 1940
No 312 Squadron from 29 August 1940
No 242 Squadron from 26 October 1940
No 19 Squadron from 30 October 1940

RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey.

RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey was home to the Kirton-in-Lindsey Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 222 Squadron from 4 June 1939
No 253 Squadron from 24 May 1940
No 264 Squadron from 23 July 1940
No 74 Squadron from 21 August 1940
No 264 Squadron from 28 August 1940
No 616 Squadron from 9 September 1940
No 85 Squadron from 23 October 1940

RAF Wittering.

RAF Wittering was home to the Wittering Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 266 Squadron from 14 May 1940
No 74 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 266 Squadron from 21 August 1940
No 1 Squadron from 9 September 1940


Fighter Airfields

RAF Coltishall.

RAF Coltishall was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 66 Squadron from 29 May 1940
No 242 Squadron from 18 June 1940
No 616 Squadron from 3 September 1940
No 74 Squadron from 9 September 1940
No 72 Squadron from 13 October 1940

RAF Leconfield.

RAF Leconfield was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 249 Squadron from 18 May 1940
No 616 Squadron from 6 June 1940
No 302 Squadron from 13 July 1940
No 303 Squadron from 11 October 1940

RAF Tern Hill.

Tern Hill was one of the 12 Group airfields used for resting units, and as a training airfield and maintneance depot. It was used as a relief landing ground and as a temporary base for night fighters operating against raids on Liverpool and cities in the north midlands.

13 Group

Group Headquarters

13 Group Headquarters was based at RAF Newcastle, the administratve centre.

Sector Airfields

RAF Acklington.

RAF Acklington was home to the Acklington Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 72 Squadron from 6 June 1940
No 79 Squadron from 13 July 1940
No 32 Squadron from 28 August 1940
No 610 Squadron from 31 August 1940

RAF Dyce.

RAF Dyce was home to the Dyce Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 248 Squadron from 22 May 1940
No 141 Squadron from 22 August 1940
No 145 Squadron from 31 August 1940
No 1 Squadron from 9 October 1940

RAF Turnhouse.

RAF Turnhouse was home to the Turnhouse Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 603 Squadron from 5 May 1940
No 141 Squadron from 28 June 1940
No 253 Squadron from 21 July 1940
No 65 Squadron from 28 August 1940
No 141 Squadron from 30 August 1940
No 1 Squadron from 14 September 1940
No 607 Squadron from 10 October 1940

RAF Usworth.

RAF Usworth was home to the Usworth Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 607 Squadron from 5 June 1940
No 43 Squadron from 8 September 1940

RAF Wick.

RAF Wick was home to the Wick Sector Operations Room and Staff, and the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 1 Squadron from 23 May 1940


Fighter Airfields

RAF Catterick.

RAF Catterick was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 219 Squadron from 4 October 1939
No 41 Squadron from 8 June 1940
No 54 Squadron from 28 July 1940
No 41 Squadron from 8 August 1940
No 504 Squadron from 1 September 1940
No 54 Squadron from 3 September 1940
No 600 Squadron from 12 October 1940

RAF Drem.

RAF Drem was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 145 Squadron from 14 August 1940
No 263 Squadron from 2 September 1940
No 111 Squadron from 8 September 1940
No 141 Squadron from 15 October 1940

RAF Grangemouth.

RAF Grangemouth was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 263 Squadron from 28 June 1940

RAF Kirkwall.

RAF Kirkwall was used as a satellite and relief airfield for fighter and coastal operations over the Scottish Islands and naval bases there.

RAF Sumburgh.

RAF Sumburgh was home to the following Squadrons during the Battle:

No 248 Squadron from 20 July 1940
No 248 Squadron from 31 July 1940

 

[Kurfürst]

Which of the above Stations and Fighter Airfields were supplied with 100 octane fuel?

 

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
a question
Quote:" By the automn, 1200 DB 601N engines were delivered"

Source, please? Because according to Mankau's Petrick's Bf 110/Me 210/Me 410 book at Generalluftzeugmeister's meeting on 31.5.40 they anticipated 1000 DB 601N engines by 1.1.41, of which appr. 350 are to be put in reserve. And in the meeting on 22.1.41 they heard that 500 DB 601N engines, if I counted right, were in planes serving in frontline units.

On C-3. Yes, Germans have counted much on it but there seems to be problems in production, because in the meeting on 22.1.41 the senior engineer had sent a message on C 3 fuel situation in which he proposed to reinstall DB 601 A engines (which ran wit 87 oct B 4 fuel) in Bf 110 again. And on 6.2.41 meeting "Aircraft manufacturers have begun converting Bf 110s from N to A engines"

And Bf 109 production switched from 601 N engined planes, which needed C 3, to 601 E and then 605A engined versions which run with B 4 fuel.

Juha

 

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
A counter question: Which of the above Stations and Fighter Airfields were supplied only with 87 octane fuel? As I have wrote many times, BoB literature states that FC had converted to 100 octane fuel before the beginning of the BoB, so if you think that those writers had got it wrong, produce your evidence.

Juha

 

[Kurfürst]

There were not 50+ Fighter stations during the Battle of Britain! This is something which needs to be cleared up: the vital airfields were the 19 Sector Stations. In addition there were 26 Satellite airfields, many of which only had basic facilities.

As others have demonstrated already, your list is incomplete. A complete list of RAF fighter stations and airfields has been added from the British Ministry of Defence website.

A list of the Stations and airfields:
Seven in 11 Group:
Tangmere : Satellite airfields :Westhampnett, Ford
Kenley :Croydon
Biggin Hill :West Malling
Hornchurch : Hawkinge , Gravesend, Manston. Rochford
North Weald :Martlesham Heath , Stapleford Tawney
Debden :Martlesham Heath
Northolt : Hendon

Two in 10 Group:
Filton embry, Exeter, St Eval, Bibury, RNAS Roborough
Middle Wallop :Warmwell, Boscombe Down

Five in 12 Group:
Duxford :Fowlmere
Wittering : Coltishall
Digby :Ternhill
Kirton-in-Lindsey : no satellite
Church Fenton : Leconfield

Five in 13 Group:
Usworth :Catterick
Acklington : no satellite
Turnhouse : Grangemouth, Drem
Dyce :Grangemouth
Wick :Kirkwell, Sumburgh

The Sector stations and airfields with with a were definitely supplied with 100 octane fuel, according to Glider's list:

Unfortunately no. What Glider and you calls a list that was shown in the earlier thread(s) of what stations were 'definietely supplied with 100 octane fuel' was in fact a mere letter from FC Admin to HQ on 7th December 1939.

The documents posted by Glider on the first page of this thread show that this was only a proposition, not a decision - a simple RAF administrator hardly had the authority to decide such matter - and decision was not yet taken on the matter nor in February on the 5th meeting, nor even in April 1940, and there isn't the slightest clue how many, if any of the listed 21 stations would be choosen for 100 octane fuel shipments, and wheter they were supplied or not.

See:

 

[Mike Williams]

These documents from December 1939 list the stations requiring 100 octane fuel since they have or were expected to have in the near future Merlin engined aircraft. Non operational stations in Fighter command were also required to hold certain quantities of 100 octane.

The Squadrons equipped with Hurricanes during December 1939 are as follows: 3, 17, 32, 43, 46, 56, 79, 111, 151, 213, 501, 504, 605.

During December 1939 these Hurricane Squadrons were stationed as follows.
3 – Croydon,
17 – Debden
32 – Biggin Hill
43 – Acklington
46 – Digby
56 – Martlesham Heath
79 – Manston
111 – Drem
151 – North Weald
213 – Wittering
501 – Tangmere
504 – Debden
605 – Tangmere

All these Stations were listed as requiring 100 octane fuel.

The Squadrons equipped with Spitfires in December 1939 are as follows: 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 152, 602, 603, 609, 610, 611, 616.

During December 1939 these Spitfire Squadrons were stationed as follows:
19 - Duxford
41 - Catterick
54 - Hornchurch
65 - Northholt
66 - Duxford
72 - Drem
74 - Rochford
152 - Acklington
602 - Grangemouth
603 - Turnhouse
609 - Drem
610 - Wittering
611 - Digby
616 – Leconfield

Rochford is the only base not listed, however, 74 Operations Record Book indicates that they had 100 octane at while at Rochford in March 1940.

Units converting to Hurricane or Spitfire after December 1939 and the station where they converted are as follows:

64 – Church Fenton
92 – Croyden
145 – Croyden
222 – Duxford
229 – Digby
232 – Sumburgh
234 – Leconfield
242 – Church Fenton
245 – Leconfield
253 – Manston
257 – Hendon
263 – Drem
266 – Sutton Bridge
302 – Leconfield
310 – Duxford
312 – Duxford
601 – Tangmere

Sumburgh is the only base not listed to receive 100 octane fuel. 232 formed there in July 1940.

Those units base in France during December 1939 were 1, 73, 85, 87 605 in Hurricane and 615 in Gladiator. We know from pilot accounts that 1, 73, 85, and 87 were using 100 octane by May 1940.

 

[NZTyphoon]

As others have demonstrated already, your list is incomplete. A complete list of RAF fighter stations and airfields has been added from the British Ministry of Defence website.


The documents posted by Glider on the first page of this thread show that this was only a proposition, not a decision - a simple RAF administrator hardly had the authority to decide such matter - and decision was not yet taken on the matter nor in February on the 5th meeting, nor even in April 1940, and there isn't the slightest clue how many, if any of the listed 21 stations would be choosen for 100 octane fuel shipments, and wheter they were supplied or not.

See:

Wow! I stand corrected on a few airfields.

I note that while Kurfürst is quite happy to use planning documents from 1938 and 1939 as evidence that he is right about the events of 1940, other people using similar documents are wrong. He wants to have things both ways while he provides no documentary evidence of his own. Glider did not state anywhere that his list of Sector Stations and airfields definitely supplied with 100 octane is based on that single document from 7 December 1939.

Meantime Kurfürst, where is the actual Beaverbrook memo you keep quoting, it is about time this was produced as a document.

Kurfürst

the analysis of fighter Squadron movement indicates that Squadron report show a pattern of reporting 100 octane fuel use in combat are clearly connected to being deployed at certain stations, 10 to 15 out of the fifty or so.

What evidence can you supply to support this statement?

Kurfürst, where are your documents from 1940 that show that fighter units were forced to use 87 octane fuel on operational sorties?

As it is Kurfürst has continually ignored requests to provide some evidence of his own that a mere 25% of RAF fighters used 100 octane fuel - instead he hides behind Bertrand Russells "Teapot Theory" while rejecting or criticising documentary evidence provided by others. This is the sort of no-win argument which will continue to go in silly little circles. I don't see that there is much point in trying to prove anything to Kurfürst because he has proved that he will not accept any evidence that his own pet theory is wrong. Why spend hours trying to convince someone who always thinks he is right?

 

[Kurfürst]

Hello Kurfürst
a question
Quote:" By the automn, 1200 DB 601N engines were delivered"

Source, please? Because according to Mankau's Petrick's Bf 110/Me 210/Me 410 book at Generalluftzeugmeister's meeting on 31.5.40 they anticipated 1000 DB 601N engines by 1.1.41, of which appr. 350 are to be put in reserve.

Juha, I wonder why are you quoted the projection on DB 601 N production by Mankau and Petrick from May 1940, when Mankau and Petrick make it clear how many were actually delivered (1100-1200 quoting the Generalluftzeugmeister's meeting on 26.10.40:

You have the same book... you see, you are saying they anticipated 1000 engines by January 1941, but the book later says that they actually delivered 1100-1200 by the end of October 1940 - ie. some 200 more engines three months earlier than anticipated.

You see, I have the book too. I like books!

And in the meeting on 22.1.41 they heard that 500 DB 601N engines, if I counted right, were in planes serving in frontline units.

Yes Juha, a couple of months earlier in the end of October they reported 4 Gruppen of 110s, 1 Gruppe of 109s with DB 601N. Even if I calculate with max establishment per Gruppe (about 35 aircraft), I get around 300-350 engines (not counting the other types like bombers of course.

So, in the end of October they had about 300 engines in use, by the end of December, about 500. Mankau and Petrick also makes it clear where to others went (reserved for circulation and 109F programmes).

On C-3. Yes, Germans have counted much on it but there seems to be problems in production, because in the meeting on 22.1.41 the senior engineer had sent a message on C 3 fuel situation in which he proposed to reinstall DB 601 A engines (which ran wit 87 oct B 4 fuel) in Bf 110 again.

Now again it is a problem that Mankau and Petrick does not say that.

You say that there was problem production of C-3. Mankau and Petrick summary the said meeting on 22.1.41 that by 1 April 1941 the following units were to be equipped with DB 601N:

6 Gruppen of 110s = 480 DB 601N engines
5 Gruppen of 109E-7N = 200 601N engines
12 Gruppen of 109 F = 480 601 N engines
Rowehl (I am not sure what this expression means) = 70 DB 601N engines

In total 1230 engines in service by 1 April 1940. Mankau and Petrick also notes (direct quote):

"This means that by 1 April 1941 apprx. 850 DB 601N engines shall be in active operation, for which the fuel will be available"

I really, really have to have think hard how could you come to the conclusion, that if in mid-January 1941 they had about 500 engines in active operation, and they wanted to increase that to 850-1200 engines within three months, that there was a some kind of shortage of C-3 fuel.

The decision to equip 110s with DB 601N was already made on 6 November 1940, and cause was to free up two months of DB 601N production to be installed in Bf 109Es (up to that date, 110s had priority). It should be noted that the Bf 109F production was also gearing up at the time, and engines had to be secured for that several weeks before; the 110 was also planned to be soon phased out in favour of the Me 210 anyway.

And on 6.2.41 meeting "Aircraft manufacturers have begun converting Bf 110s from N to A engines"

Yes, and perhaps this has to do with the fact that during a very short period of the first half of 194, Messerschmitt, Arado etc. factories produced some 1380 Bf 109F-2s, all with DB 601Ns;

And Bf 109 production switched from 601 N engined planes, which needed C 3, to 601 E and then 605A engined versions which run with B 4 fuel.

Bearing no relevance to the subject, given that the DB 601E was a more reliable and more powerful engine than the DB 601 N, not the mention that in the meantime the BMW 801 powered FW 190A appeared, which used C-3 fuel (even the earliest ones with the BMW 801C, even though the 801C was supposed to operate on B-4).

 

[Glider]

Unfortunately no. What Glider and you calls a list that was shown in the earlier thread(s) of what stations were 'definietely supplied with 100 octane fuel' was in fact a mere letter from FC Admin to HQ on 7th December 1939.

Be careful with your quotes Kurfurst. Nowhere will you find that I have said that these were definately supplied with 100 Octane. These were identified as the stations to be fuelled with 100 Octane in the first instance. It should be noted that for obvious reasons French stations were not on the list nor where supples that were sent to Norway which we know happened.

The documents posted by Glider on the first page of this thread show that this was only a proposition, not a decision - a simple RAF administrator hardly had the authority to decide such matter - and decision was not yet taken on the matter nor in February on the 5th meeting, nor even in April 1940, and there isn't the slightest clue how many, if any of the listed 21 stations would be choosen for 100 octane fuel shipments, and wheter they were supplied or not.

You are correct when you say that a Group Captain Administrator does not decide such matters, but a Group Captaiin is an implementer who makes things happen.

However the paper you posted is a different matter and has nothing to do with the choice of the stations. The paper you posted was in my post 2 and is the instruction from the Chief of the Air Staff that fighters and Blenhiem Bombers should start to use 100 Octane fuel.
When the Chief of the Air Staff requests something he is not asking for something. ACAS stands for Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and we can be sure that he wouldn't do this without his.

Please take care with your quotes and postings, mistakes like this can cause confusion.

By the way did you get anywhere with the hunt for the Australian Paper it would solve a lot of questions.

 

[Kurfürst]

Be careful with your quotes Kurfurst. Nowhere will you find that I have said that these were definately supplied with 100 Octane.

Glad to hear that. I was going by NZTyphoon's description of your list - relying on one guy's conclusion of another guy's conclusions of a paper can lead to such mistakes.

These were identified as the stations to be fuelled with 100 Octane in the first instance.

To me the correspondance is less clear in its terms, it seems that Mr. Air Vice Marshall is writing a letter to Mr.
Director of equipment saying we'd like to have 100 octane and this and that stations, and the other replies that he has no idea which station will receive it, when, but two thing is sure it will take some time, and that Bomber Command Station (all the four or so as seen from the later papers) are to have priority.

It should be noted that for obvious reasons French stations were not on the list nor where supples that were sent to Norway which we know happened.

Yes, indeed, though I do not think it is very important either, given that it would only shed light on the much neglected story behind 'the longest naval hit on 100 octane avgas' and 'how things that were poured into a Hurricane yesterday are poured into a Heinkel today'.

You are correct when you say that a Group Captain Administrator does not decide such matters, but a Group Captaiin is an implementer who makes things happen.

Yes but do we know eventually what decision was made with regards the requirements of these stations?

However the paper you posted is a different matter and has nothing to do with the choice of the stations. The paper you posted was in my post 2 and is the instruction from the Chief of the Air Staff that fighters and Blenhiem Bombers should start to use 100 Octane fuel.
When the Chief of the Air Staff requests something he is not asking for something. ACAS stands for Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and we can be sure that he wouldn't do this without his.

Please take care with your quotes and postings, mistakes like this can cause confusion.

I see, thanks for the clarification. It seem to me though the Oil Committee (with which you paper deals with) was a political body of civillian experts and decision makers, and they were making the decision over a proposition ACAS was making.

From your papers it seems to me there was considerable confusion in Fighter Command about possible difficulties that may erupt from converting aircraft to 100 octane fuel, possibly due to communication error (or the complete lack of it), even as late as spring 1940.

Which is quite a bit shocking, considering the same concerns were raised in 1938, see the documents I have posted from the Australian archives.

By the way did you get anywhere with the hunt for the Australian Paper it would solve a lot of questions.

I do not live in Australia to research personally (nor would I have the time around now with plenty of work to do after the summer lull), nor do I have any reason to doubt or to discredit the research done by Pips. Unfortunately the documentation you provided seem to have a gap from May 1940, a gap which Pips research fortunately covers.

Perhaps you should ask Pips. He is still active on some forums. It would also give him an opportunity to directly face and have to opportunity to certain... allegations regarding his research that were so far only spoken out behind his back.

 

[Milosh]

Posted by Oliver Lefebvre on his board:

Wastel are you sure about the E-7/N for 41 ? AFAIR my delivery data show a much lower amount of E-7 with the DB601N. While the E-7 was planned for use with the DB601N, the installation of this engien was quite troublesome on the Emil and few were actually fitted with it.
I'll try to come up with my numbers if the documents have not already been packed away...

Board Message

There is also a reference to 30 E-4/Ns built. Considering the above saying there was problems operating the DB601N engine, one has to ask how many E-4/Ns actually had the engine installed.

 

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
Thanks for the answer
I seem to have missed the info given at the GL meeting on 26.10.40.

Quote:" "This means that by 1 April 1941 apprx. 850 DB 601N engines shall be in active operation, for which the fuel will be available""

I cannot sat which is the correct expression but in my book, the English edition, the sentence is translated as " Meaning that on 1 April 1941 there are apprx. 850 DB 601N engines in active operation that WILL NEED fuel allocated." Emphasis mine.

Quote:" Bearing no relevance to the subject, given that the DB 601E was a more reliable and more powerful engine than the DB 601 N, not the mention that in the meantime the BMW 801 powered FW 190A appeared, which used C-3 fuel (even the earliest ones with the BMW 801C, even though the 801C was supposed to operate on B-4)."

Yes, I know but clearly Germans didn't produce enough C 3 to allow the whole Jagdwaffe to convert to use it, so vast majority of 109 units returned for time being to B 4 users and C 3 was allocated to 190 units.

IMHO it is not so difficult to began suspect that there was some kind of production delays in C 3 production, as I wrote in my earlier message
"because in the meeting on 22.1.41 the senior engineer had sent a message on C 3 fuel situation in which he proposed to reinstall DB 601 A engines in Bf 110 again"

Juha

PS Rowehl was the commander of the clandestine recon unit so the planes of his unit got those engines

 

[Glider]

To me the correspondance is less clear in its terms, it seems that Mr. Air Vice Marshall is writing a letter to Mr.
Director of equipment saying we'd like to have 100 octane and this and that stations, and the other replies that he has no idea which station will receive it, when, but two thing is sure it will take some time, and that Bomber Command Station (all the four or so as seen from the later papers) are to have priority.

Your mixing the two papers up. The list of stations was prepared in 1939 and on the 7th December the Admin people were looking into the nuts and bolts of how this was to be done. Its preparitory work the sort of thing done every day at work in many different fields. Part of that plan is to draw up who gets the first deliveries of the fuel. Post 110 has the letter.
The reference to a 'request' from the Chief of the Air Staff was at a meeting of the 24th February 1940 and the timeline is in those first two posts

I see, thanks for the clarification. It seem to me though the Oil Committee (with which you paper deals with) was a political body of civillian experts and decision makers, and they were making the decision over a proposition ACAS was making.

The attached shows the make up of the committee. Its a mixture of people.

 

[Glider]

From your papers it seems to me there was considerable confusion in Fighter Command about possible difficulties that may erupt from converting aircraft to 100 octane fuel, possibly due to communication error (or the complete lack of it), even as late as spring 1940.

Which is quite a bit shocking, considering the same concerns were raised in 1938, see the documents I have posted from the Australian archives.

As I said in my first postings it was the last thing I expected to find and the people on the Committee were also confused but it was sorted out.

I do not live in Australia to research personally (nor would I have the time around now with plenty of work to do after the summer lull), nor do I have any reason to doubt or to discredit the research done by Pips. Unfortunately the documentation you provided seem to have a gap from May 1940, a gap which Pips research fortunately covers.

Perhaps you should ask Pips. He is still active on some forums. It would also give him an opportunity to directly face and have to opportunity to certain... allegations regarding his research that were so far only spoken out behind his back.

I think that I and others have done sufficient research and posted a significant amount of original documentation. Plus, as this the one thing that you are relying on its up to you to supply this.
I should point out that I don't live in Australia and it didn't stop me trying to get a copy. Everyone I am sure would love this 'Pips' to explain how he put together his case so I suggest you ask him as you are live on forums where he is active. Clearly he isn't active on this one.

Even if the paper does exist and thats a big 'if', I am not that concerned, interested yes but not concerned, as the basic belief on which its apparently based, ie that the RAF during the Battle Of Britain were limited in the use of 100 Octane by a shortage of the fuel is totally wrong, unless of course you believe that a three year stockpile, is a shortage.

 

[NZTyphoon]

NZTyphoon,

As a new member, I kindly suggest you to read the post #82 by DerAdlerIstGelandet.

I am new to all this so if I have unintentionally caused offence my apologies. All I am asking is that you present some evidence for statements you have made - I do not believe that there is anything wrong with asking for evidence during what should be a civilised debate.

You have made this statement:

Let it be a court, or a historical question, the burden of evidence is upoon the one making the claim

and this

a very definietive claim like this should be backed up by very definietive sources speaking in no uncertain terms

Given that you want others to provide cast-iron definitive proof of their claims what is the harm in asking you to do likewise?

 

[Mike Williams]

These documents from December 1939 list the stations requiring 100 octane fuel since they have or were expected to have in the near future Merlin engined aircraft. Non operational stations in Fighter command were also required to hold certain quantities of 100 octane.

The Squadrons equipped with Hurricanes during December 1939 are as follows: 3, 17, 32, 43, 46, 56, 79, 111, 151, 213, 501, 504, 605.

During December 1939 these Hurricane Squadrons were stationed as follows.
3 – Croydon,
17 – Debden
32 – Biggin Hill
43 – Acklington
46 – Digby
56 – Martlesham Heath
79 – Manston
111 – Drem
151 – North Weald
213 – Wittering
501 – Tangmere
504 – Debden
605 – Tangmere

All these Stations were listed as requiring 100 octane fuel.

The Squadrons equipped with Spitfires in December 1939 are as follows: 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 152, 602, 603, 609, 610, 611, 616.

During December 1939 these Spitfire Squadrons were stationed as follows:
19 - Duxford
41 - Catterick
54 - Hornchurch
65 - Northholt
66 - Duxford
72 - Drem
74 - Rochford
152 - Acklington
602 - Grangemouth
603 - Turnhouse
609 - Drem
610 - Wittering
611 - Digby
616 – Leconfield

Rochford is the only base not listed, however, 74 Operations Record Book indicates that they had 100 octane at while at Rochford in March 1940.

Units converting to Hurricane or Spitfire after December 1939 and the station where they converted are as follows:

64 – Church Fenton
92 – Croyden
145 – Croyden
222 – Duxford
229 – Digby
232 – Sumburgh
234 – Leconfield
242 – Church Fenton
245 – Leconfield
253 – Manston
257 – Hendon
263 – Drem
266 – Sutton Bridge
302 – Leconfield
310 – Duxford
312 – Duxford
601 – Tangmere

Sumburgh is the only base not listed to receive 100 octane fuel. 232 formed there in July 1940.

Those units base in France during December 1939 were 1, 73, 85, 87 605 in Hurricane and 615 in Gladiator. We know from pilot accounts that 1, 73, 85, and 87 were using 100 octane by May 1940.

It should be noted that stocks of 100 octane stood at 202,000 tons as of December 1939.

I should also add that the documentation in hand of units converting to 100 octane shows the aircraft modified and 100 octane fuel being used by February 1940. 16 February 1940 is the earliest documented date so far known of use of 100 octane in operational fighter units after the December 1939 Fighter Command Instructions.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Given that you want others to provide cast-iron definitive proof of their claims what is the harm in asking you to do likewise?

Sounds reasonable to me...

 

[NZTyphoon]

While investigating this matter further I came across some interesting information which may help our understanding: I found this in "Oil" by D.J Peyton-Smith (Peyton Smith page xvii "Note on Weights and Measures"):


Imperial gallons per ton (2,240 lbs)
Aviation Spirit - 100-octane: 315 (Comment: 2,240 divided by 315 = 7.1 lbs)
-other grades: 300


1 ton of 100 octane = 315 imp gallons: take 1 Spitfire I, fuel load = 85 imp gallons = 315 divided by 85 = 3.7 Spitfire fuel loads; for every ton of 100 octane a Spitfire could fly 3.7 sorties.

On Page 2 http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/technical/use-100-octane-fuel-raf-during-bob-16305-2.html in the previous thread Mike Williams presented a paper entitled "Table II Consumption" detailing the monthly average consumption of 100 and 86 octane fuels

Jun-Aug = 10,000 tons = 37,000 Spitfire fuel loads
Sept = 14,000 tons = 51,800 Sfl
Oct = 17,000 tons = 62,900 Sfl

Total = 41,000 tons = 151,700 divided by 22 weeks = 6895 Sfl per week = 985 Sfl per day

Just a rough guide - there is no indication as to how much 100 octane fuel was consumed over France or Norway in June: this is just the fuel load of a Spitfire; the Hurricane took 90 gall, and I forget how much fuel a Defiant used. My question is how many fighter sorties were flown on a daily average during the B of B? How does this compare with Kurfurst's theory that 25% of RAF fighters used 100 octane (going by his statement that only 10-15 bases were supplied)?

Using this method there is no longer a need to worry about how many Fighter Command airfields were being stocked with 100 octane fuel. All we need know is how many combat sorties were flown on average during the 22 weeks.

Variables:
Not all aircraft landed with empty fuel tanks; a Spitfire landing with, say 30 gallons left need only be topped up with 55 gallons - standard Fighter Command policy was to fill all fuel tanks of all operational aircraft in readiness for the next day's operations; this prevented evaporation, condensation and potential vapour locks.

All aircraft shot down and destroyed = full fuel load.

Of course there were quiet periods when far fewer combat sorties were flown by Fighter Command; August 16 17 between two days of intensive combat August 15 18.

87 Octane: Mike William's table also shows that consumption of 87 octane was far higher than 100. This is easily accounted for because there were aircraft and second-line operations still using 87 octane fuel: heavy bombers, Coastal Command aircraft, Army Co-operation Command, aircraft deliveries, training etc.

There is still some refinement required...