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I have to agree with Geoffrey Sinclair on this. The bombing of the oil plants required precise navigation. Wasn't it the Butt-report that showed how poor BC navigation worked? Even in good weather conditions. In the last year and a half of the war the results of many attacks were poor even with Oboe and other navigational means from occupied France.
What navigational problems had been solved by May 1944 that would have prevented the bombing of Leuna in 1943? As I understand it, the 8th Air Force didn't want to fly deep into the Reich without a fighter escort, but what prevented the RAF from doing it at night with H2S? We're talking about an object on the order of several square kilometers - that's about as big as a town, and not the smallest one. Also, it is difficult to camouflage - there will be torches to burn some by-product gases, etc. In addition, the main bomber losses in the raids on the area of Leuna suffered from the AAA fire, not fighters, and the losses can be characterized as very moderate.I have to agree with Geoffrey Sinclair on this. The bombing of the oil plants required precise navigation. Wasn't it the Butt-report that showed how poor BC navigation worked? Even in good weather conditions. In the last year and a half of the war the results of many attacks were poor even with Oboe and other navigational means from occupied France.
Any bombs were quite effective against synthetic fuel plants, as confirmed by the Germans themselves. You just had to bomb. Large scale chemical plants are much more vulnerable than any steel or metal plants.American bombs were pretty ineffectual in killing refineries, in Europe at least.
A big advantage, I think, that Bomber Command had over 8th AF in attacking oil facilities was that RAF bombers could carry much larger bombs. The 500- or even 1000-lb bombs carried by 8th AF weren't sufficient to deliver longer-term damage like some 4000-lb Cookies and a bunch of smallers to rip up the works.
American bombs were pretty ineffectual in killing refineries, in Europe at least.
The Leuna plant measured 11,600 by 3,500 feet, works out to about 3.8 sq km, 930 acres (though another figure is 737 acres) or about Wuppertal-Elberfeld size, the 40th largest city target listed in the Arthur Harris Acreage of destroyed city areas table, the smallest was Friedrichshafen at 148 acres of at least 40% built up area H2S was not good at clearly identifying pure land targets.but what prevented the RAF from doing it at night with H2S? We're talking about an object on the order of several square kilometers - that's about as big as a town, and not the smallest one.
The sort of Navigation errors that has the accuracy table of night bombing of German cities excluding Berlin, via plotted photographs in good to moderate weather, within 3 miles of the aiming point, an area of 28 square miles, 18,000 acres, looking like 23% in April 1942, moving to 33% in June, back to 25% in December, then 27% in April, big jump to 50% in June, mid 50%, then a jump to 62% in April 1944, 60% in July, near straight line to 87% in December 1944. On that basis you could expect the average raid in the second half of 1944 to put at least 50% more bombs on target, pushing the tonnage needed in 1943 for the same effect to over 72,000 tons, or around 70% of total effort.What navigational problems had been solved by May 1944 that would have prevented the bombing of Leuna in 1943?
Leuna had smoke screens. While the oil plants could self destruct the piping was designed to take 10,000 lb/square inch pressures and temperatures of several thousand degrees, direct hits were usually needed. The day raids using H2X had all causes missing of an average of 2.38% of attacking, one strike had no losses, one 12.5%, then when visual bombing was possible the average loss rate was 3.3%, varying between 0.45 and 13.86%, the one H2X/Visual strike 2.61% losses.Also, it is difficult to camouflage - there will be torches to burn some by-product gases, etc. In addition, the main bomber losses in the raids on the area of Leuna suffered from the AAA fire, not fighters, and the losses can be characterized as very moderate.
1. You have confirmed the size of the object.The Leuna plant measured 11,600 by 3,500 feet, works out to about 3.8 sq km, 930 acres (though another figure is 737 acres) or about Wuppertal-Elberfeld size, the 40th largest city target listed in the Arthur Harris Acreage of destroyed city areas table, the smallest was Friedrichshafen at 148 acres of at least 40% built up area H2S was not good at clearly identifying pure land targets.
It was not necessary to disperse forces on pointless attacks on cities and towns, it was necessary to concentrate forces exclusively on bombing chemical plants, which 1) were more vulnerable; 2) gave a greater integral effect, since a large number of militarily critical industries depended on them.Wuppertal-Elberfeld had its first and only main force raid on 24 June 1943. Of the 40 smaller targets 25 were attacked once.
First attacks in 1942, Lubeck, Rostock, Emden, Saarbrucken, Osnabruck, Oberhausen, Kassel
First attacks in 1943, Bochum, Mulheim, Gelsenkirchen, Remscheid, Hagen, Wuppertal-Elberfeld
First attacks in 1944 Schweinfurt, Friedrichshafen, Darmstadt, Konigsberg, Bremerhaven, Neuss, Kaiserslautern, Bonn, Solingen, Coblenz, Harburg, Freiburg, Giessen, Heilbronn, Hamm, Ulm, Trier
First attacks in 1945 Hanau, Wiesbaden, Worms, Pforzheim, Dessau, Wurzburg, Witten, Hildesheim, Plauen, Potsdam
Considering the vulnerability of chemical plants, this accuracy was quite sufficient to achieve a tangible effect. At the same time, huge manpower was diverted to rebuild the chemical plants.The sort of Navigation errors that has the accuracy table of night bombing of German cities excluding Berlin, via plotted photographs in good to moderate weather, within 3 miles of the aiming point, an area of 28 square miles, 18,000 acres, looking like 23% in April 1942, moving to 33% in June, back to 25% in December, then 27% in April, big jump to 50% in June, mid 50%, then a jump to 62% in April 1944, 60% in July, near straight line to 87% in December 1944. On that basis you could expect the average raid in the second half of 1944 to put at least 50% more bombs on target, pushing the tonnage needed in 1943 for the same effect to over 72,000 tons, or around 70% of total effort.
If you heat any body to a temperature of several thousand degrees, it will glow brightly. It is impossible to make long pipes resistant to strong vibration loads a la bomb blast. They start to break, the contents of these pipes are usually flammable organic liquids. Already one raid in May 1944 had caused enormous damage to the plant, which, despite the labor of thousands of workers, could not be repaired. The concentrated air attacks on the chemical plants were much more sensible than the bombing of Hamburg - not because I feel sorry for the people of Hamburg, but purely from the point of view of military expediency.Leuna had smoke screens. While the oil plants could self destruct the piping was designed to take 10,000 lb/square inch pressures and temperatures of several thousand degrees, direct hits were usually needed.
So in terms of navigation, nothing much has changed. So why not bomb Leuna in 1943?Despite all the experience and navigation aids navigation errors kept occurring, the 8th Air Force bombing Basel in February and March 1945 and Zurich in March 1945. Switzerland usually received a number of RAF bombs every time Bomber Command attacked an Italian target.
Conclusion: the bombing should have started earlier.The B-17s and B-24s forced the upgunning of the Luftwaffe interceptors, one interesting way of measuring this was to count the holes in damaged but safely returned bombers, then calculate the ratio of cannon to machine gun hits.
8 to 12/42 40 Cannon to 100 Machine gun hits
1 to 4/43 77 to 100
5 to 8/43 70 to 100
9 to 12/43 81 to 100
1 to 2/44 88 to 100
3 to 4/44 127 to 100
5 to 6/44 135 to 100
In Q4/42 5.8 Heavy bombers were lost per 100 cases of reported combat, in Q1/44 the ratio was double that. Both sides were learning.
The question in my opinion is less what choice did Harris have and more what choice did the Combined Chiefs have in directing war production. Should more tactical aircraft have been produced, and less strategic bombers? More tactical aircraft would kill more German soldiers and less civilians. If you could build and deploy three Mosquitos, A-20s or B-25s for every two Lancasters or B-24s not built (the ratio is a guess) would the war have been shortened?Well, 1943 is some four years after 1939. I agree that H2S was a very difficult tool to identify a target without larger water surfaces in the vicinity. H2S was first used large scale during the large attacks on Hamburg in july 1943, a city with a very large system of water surfaces. H2S operated on the 9,1 cm wavelength which gave only a vague picture of the landscape below. The introduction of H2S Mk III, which operated at the 3 cm wavelength, was far more precise, but that was introduced only in december 1943. That was also the time that the Luftwaffe improved their tactics to fight the night attacks and took a heavy toll of the bombers.
I am not sure what exact targets were designated by Bomber Command in that period other than target Berlin or other cities. The ORB's give only the city's name, but no specific Aiming Points. In the case of Essen, for instance, it usually was Kruppstadt, which by the way was larger than the old city center. And that centre has been also destroyed thoroughly. So it may well be that transportation networks or specific industrial targets were actually intended in other cases.
However, the attacks on cities were the easier approach. And they cost the civilian population heavy. But they tied down enormous numbers of people who fed the homeless, took care of the wounded, cleared the streets and railroads, repaired the water mains and other infrastructure. Above that they tied down about two thirds of all artillery Germany produced in flak batteries. Guns that were sorely missed at the fronts. As well as the shells they used. An entire industry was set up to prepare prefab dwellings for the 'de-housed'. A huge effort was made to disperse production over the entire country. That caused great difficulties for the co-ordination of production and the transportation of all the components to the place where they were assembled. And if the different parts arrived at the place of assembly, very often they lacked the standards of precision needed to fit them actually together. There are many examples of these difficulties. Furthermore some production couldn't be made elsewhere. Just look at the giant sumbarine factory that was built on the Weser River near Bremen. Under the name of 'Bunker Valentin'. The construction started in the summer of 1943. It consists of an enourmous structure with a roof of concrete of 15 to 20 ft thick. 500.000 cubic metres of concrete were used. Tens of thousands of tonnes of steel were used. Tens of thousands of POW's, prisoners and forced labourers were involved in the project. In March 1945 No 617 Sqn plastered it with Tall Boy and Grand Slam bombs. This is just one example. There were many more. Surely, the Germans wouldn't have gone through all this trouble if not the bombing offensive forced them to it?
And there is always the other argument. What other possibilities did Harris have say in early 1943? He was rapidly building a bomber force that was to pummel Germany. The instruments, the training of the crews, the whole effort was geared to that aim. I believe it is very simple in hindsight to say what should have been done otherways. But that's war. The tremendous loss of lives, monuments, libraries, hospitals and what not in Germany was terrible. Of course terrible mistakes were made. Of course many things could have been done better. But consider the circumstances under which these decisions were made. And don't forget that the losses of a gound campaign without the strategic bombings would have been monumental also.
The offensive against the oil production reached its peak after the Normandy landings. Considering the above, I can't see how that could have been otherwise.
And no notice taken of when targets of this size were attacked by Bomber Command and how many of them were classified as easy to find, like ports and that Leuna was the biggest of the oil plants1. You have confirmed the size of the object.
So where was the nearby reasonably large, well defined shore line, lake or sea?2. It was not "pure land target" -
So what was the radically distinguishing feature as displayed on the H2S/X scopes? And why was radar bombing so inaccurate? Did the dummy site replicate the return?it was a pile of metal structures of huge mass, the height of which could reach many dozens of meters. This radically distinguishes Leuna and similar production areas from any other German town with 2-3 storey buildings.
The loss rates and weather conditions state otherwise, the Battle of the Ruhr in 1943 was helped by being just within Oboe range, Leuna was out of range. Who decides pointless, what level of damage is required?It was not necessary to disperse forces on pointless attacks on cities and towns,
So what sort of loss rate will occur when the enemy knows the attackers are only after a definite list of targets? Bomber Commands loss rate was continually heading to unacceptable through 1943. Also a number of plans were out of range during summer, not enough darkness.it was necessary to concentrate forces exclusively on bombing chemical plants,
Straight out of the 1930's theory. The USSBS is 1940's fact. The results would be a Battle of Berlin defeat of Bomber Command in 1943.which 1) were more vulnerable; 2) gave a greater integral effect, since a large number of militarily critical industries depended on them.
Except the USSBS contradicts this. Simply put Bomber Command could hurt some of the oil installations in 1943, but without anything like the effect of 1944, meantime the 8th Air Force was worse off. While the Germans obtain a year or maybe more to do something about passive and active defences. For example smoke screens, and what they would do to the good weather attacks.Considering the vulnerability of chemical plants, this accuracy was quite sufficient to achieve a tangible effect.
From the combined attack damage, not just Bomber Command in 1944 and the fact the damage was much greater than anything possible in 1943, and occurring more rapidly.At the same time, huge manpower was diverted to rebuild the chemical plants.
Is the idea the Germans ware that foolish? Or that these sections were large?If you heat any body to a temperature of several thousand degrees, it will glow brightly.
Would you please read the USSBS, which makes clear damage to the actual plant was one thing and difficult to achieve, while being repairable, the disruption of water and gas pipelines etc. was a major factor in loss of production?It is impossible to make long pipes resistant to strong vibration loads a la bomb blast. They start to break, the contents of these pipes are usually flammable organic liquids. Already one raid in May 1944 had caused enormous damage to the plant, which, despite the labor of thousands of workers, could not be repaired.
Having your bomber force suffer a heavy defeat is not sensible and in July 1943 Leuna was largely out of range for a night raid.The concentrated air attacks on the chemical plants were much more sensible than the bombing of Hamburg - not because I feel sorry for the people of Hamburg, but purely from the point of view of military expediency.
Nothing quite like using USAAF day navigation outliers in 1945 to decide that Bomber Command could do in 1943 at night.So in terms of navigation, nothing much has changed. So why not bomb Leuna in 1943?
France collapsed in 6 weeks in 1940, conclusion the bombing of Fighter Command airfields should have started earlier, say mid May, surely given the factors assumed for the attackers in 1943, a similar result will be obtained, Fighter Command bombed into dire straits before the historical Battle of Britain?Conclusion: the bombing should have started earlier.