The Winning Strategy - WW2 air campaign against Germany

[z42]

Industrial targets were hit many times. From the aero engine factories, tank/AFV factories and indeed oil targets.
Just because there was no great accuracy, bombers (and bombs) still came in. Further, there is nothing to prevent greater effort in training and developing of optical and electronics aids. Even the humble flares as used by FAA would've been a boon for the night bombing, but problem with that idea was that it was developed in the late 1930s by an entity that was not true & pure RAF.

AFAIU the decision to focus on bombing cities ('dehousing') was made because they came to the conclusion that a target smaller than a city was very unlikely to be hit at night, given the technology available at the time. Sending lots of men to their deaths just to bomb some cows in a field wasn't seen as a good trade. Technology did improve rapidly, with the radio navigation (e.g. "battle of the beams during the BoB"), and starting in beginning of 1943 bombing radar (H2S) started to enter service. Which I guess was kind of a game changer, allowing bombing at night or through cloud cover during the day, as accurately as day bombing on a clear day (?)(not that daylight high altitude bombing was very accurate to begin with, but at least it's something).

Unless WAllies are not deep in France by, say, August-September of 1943, there is no way that the war can end by May of 1944. Especially with LW being with full stocks of fuel and their aircraft manned with the pilots that have full set of flying hours as the WAllied pilots, and not just a half - or worse - as it was the case historically.
The historical Normandy landings were supported by hordes of bombers and light bombers as-is.

Yeah. That's kind of a big issue with these "end the war sooner by better air strategy allowing an earlier Normandy invasion" what-if scenarios. If you want to do the invasion during the summer, well maybe you could pull it in from the historical by a month or so. But an invasion during the summer 1943, well a rather huge number of things need to be in place to make that a possibility (win the battle of the Atlantic, ferry a huge number of men and material over to the UK, train the men, beat the LW, etc.). It seems quite unlikely that everything would be in place so that an invasion is possible in the summer (or even early autumn) 1943.

 

[tomo pauk]

AFAIU the decision to focus on bombing cities ('dehousing') was made because they came to the conclusion that a target smaller than a city was very unlikely to be hit at night, given the technology available at the time.

Both UK and USA were more than capable of making long-range fighters in great quantities already in the late 1930s/very early 1940s, yet that didn't happened because there was no such doctrine in either RAF or AAF. Nobody prevented the AAF to order the P-47s to have a workable drop tank installation from day one, or that RAF orders all the Spitfires to have the rear tank installed + drop tanks. Long range day fighters allow for the daylight bombing.
FAA trashed the Italian fleet in 1940 using flare-dropping Swordfishes to illuminate the pin-point targets. RAF introduced flares as means of marking the target in 1943 at 1st?

My point is that there were the ways to improve the odds for the bombers to hit the targets, however the institutional inertia was a thing.

But an invasion during the summer 1943, well a rather huge number of things need to be in place to make that a possibility (win the battle of the Atlantic, ferry a huge number of men and material over to the UK, train the men, beat the LW, etc.). It seems quite unlikely that everything would be in place so that an invasion is possible in the summer (or even early autumn) 1943.

Invasion of N. Africa, Sicily and Italy happened before the Battle of Atlantic was won. There were no factories in Egypt or Tunisia to support Allies in MTO, no soldiers to be recruited there (apart from the diminutive contigent of zouaves and similar); everything needed to be sent from UK and USA - same as if the over-the-Channel invasion happens.

RAF+AAF have had several:1 numerical advantage against the LW in the ETO come late spring/early summer of 1943, and, in case of invasion, LW would've been forced to deploy their fighters above Belgium and France instead of 'hiding' them in Germany - playing to the hands of WAllies.

 

[Bergjon12]

There is a huge amount of things that need to sorted out here.

Yadda yadda

These things are indeed more or less the rationale for the strategy I have outlined previously.

Precision bombing can't be relied upon.

Deep penetration missions incur unjustifiable losses.

So bomb NW Germany w. escort. Destroy everything there, down to the last city, town, village, or railroad. That's half the war won.

I didn't want to single out the British, but the Americans do seem to have brought the right tools. Unescorted daylight bombing is an obvious mistake, which I implied in 'escorted bombing'.

Leigh-Mallory's father was a toolmaker, he just didn't produce the right tool.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

So bomb NW Germany w. escort. Destroy everything there, down to the last city, town, village, or railroad. That's half the war won.

I didn't want to single out the British, but the Americans do seem to have brought the right tools.

I think the Brits did a pretty good job showing that they could destroy large swathes of major cities and render them crippled. Down to the last village or railroad, you'll need good attack aircraft and lots of 'em.

 

[Bergjon12]

I think the Brits did a pretty good job showing that they could destroy large swathes of major cities and render them crippled. Down to the last village or railroad, you'll need good attack aircraft and lots of 'em.

The way they did it took too long, losses were too heavy and it was too distributed. Concentrate everything in NW Germany and you get faster de-functioning of cities, refugee deluge, production ended etc. while the distance is small enough that medium bombers and tactical aircraft can join in for increased tempo and greater diversity of targets, including systematically destroying heavy AA assets, and interdiction of the logistics for the air defense system.

Have I thought of everything? Yes. All of the things I have thought of anyway.

 

[MiTasol]

The way they did it took too long, losses were too heavy and it was too distributed. Concentrate everything in NW Germany and you get faster de-functioning of cities, refugee deluge, production ended etc. while the distance is small enough that medium bombers and tactical aircraft can join in for increased tempo and greater diversity of targets, including systematically destroying heavy AA assets, and interdiction of the logistics for the air defense system.

Have I thought of everything? Yes. All of the things I have thought of anyway.

It is difficult to systematically destroy something that is mobile. Your PR aircraft gets a photo of a heavy AA installation today, it takes a day or two to set up the raid and in the raid photos you find the Germans have moved it and you have bombed an empty site. A total waste of planning and raid.

 

[Bergjon12]

It is difficult to systematically destroy something that is mobile. Your PR aircraft gets a photo of a heavy AA installation today, it takes a day or two to set up the raid and in the raid photos you find the Germans have moved it and you have bombed an empty site. A total waste of planning and raid.

There's no need for that tat.

While the bombers are flattening the last town or village, the AA fire at them and are spotted and engaged by prowling tactical aircraft.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The way they did it took too long, losses were too heavy and it was too distributed. Concentrate everything in NW Germany and you get faster de-functioning of cities, refugee deluge, production ended etc. while the distance is small enough that medium bombers and tactical aircraft can join in for increased tempo and greater diversity of targets, including systematically destroying heavy AA assets, and interdiction of the logistics for the air defense system.

Have I thought of everything? Yes. All of the things I have thought of anyway.

Sure hope your armies in the field don't need those fighters to protect them from airstrike, or tac-air to work on a hard-point or twenty. It's not like those B-26s were sitting around collecting dust.

Also, interdicting the logistics for AA is also pretty much interdicting logistics for other arms. You'll get more efficient use by cutting bridges and marshalling yards than flattening every.single.hamlet along the way.

There's no need for that tat.

While the bombers are flattening the last town or village, the AA fire at them and are spotted and engaged by prowling tactical aircraft.

Pretty expensive. I'd rather pull up some artillery five or six miles away and do a ToT, if we're going with simple "solutions".

 

[Bergjon12]

Sure hope your armies in the field don't need those fighters to protect them from airstrike, or tac-air to work on a hard-point or twenty. It's not like those B-26s were sitting around collecting dust.

Also, interdicting the logistics for AA is also pretty much interdicting logistics for other arms. You'll get more efficient use by cutting bridges and marshalling yards than flattening every.single.hamlet along the way.



Pretty expensive. I'd rather pull up some artillery five or six miles away and do a ToT, if we're going with simple "solutions".

Perhaps I neglected to mention that this plan is for the pre-invasion period.

Simple solutions are the best. No plan survives contact with the enemy, as the actual WE air campaign proves. The greatest faults in American strategy in this theater were rooted in blind adherence to preconceptions. When dealing with targets of opportunity, cab ranks of planes up to medium bombers should be maintained.

I would have thought my plan implied that bridges and marshalling yards were higher on the priority list than a hamlet.

Finally, in the immortal words of General Turgidson, "I didn't say we wouldn't get our hair mussed".

 

[Shortround6]

An advantage of the spread out attacks on Germany is that it forced the Germans to disperse their defenses.
This may not have worked as well as hoped but but switching to a concentrated attack on NW Germany may not go as hoped either. Double the amount of AA? More fighters over NW Germany? Germany could have pulled a lot of fighters just another 50-100 miles east and still covered the Ruhr Valley. But Fighters near Stuttgart are too far away. Germany doesn't need to put fighter fields (or at least not many) in Belgium and Holland. German Radar can pick up Allied bombers forming up over Britain let alone the North Sea. They have got over an hour to get planes into the air and in position. They don't have to rapidly climb from fields in Belgium and Holland to intercept incoming (or returning) allied bombers.

Now things changed a lot in just 4 years, British bomber strategy in 1938-39 and early 40 had to take into account NOT flying over Belgium and Holland because they were Neutral.
They could hope they could fly over in time of war but they sure could not plan on it. Turns out they couldn't even plan on promised French air bases. Many had seen little or no improvement since WW I.

Both UK and USA were more than capable of making long-range fighters in great quantities already in the late 1930s/very early 1940s, yet that didn't happened because there was no such doctrine in either RAF or AAF. Nobody prevented the AAF to order the P-47s to have a workable drop tank installation from day one

They could not build such aircraft. Or if they could they had trouble operating them. P-40s with even a largish (larger than 52 US gal) drop tank needed about the same size runway as a British medium bomber (or even early heavy bombers).
You not only need the aircraft, you need the infrastructure.
You also need the 1942 engines, not 1939/40 engines. The 1939/40 engines will not give the needed power for combat while carrying the needed fuel to return home.
P-47s are 1943 aircraft. Maybe they could have been used in early 1943 but 1942 is pushing things.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Perhaps I neglected to mention that this plan is for the pre-invasion period.

Simple solutions are the best. No plan survives contact with the enemy, as the actual WE air campaign proves. The greatest faults in American strategy in this theater were rooted in blind adherence to preconceptions. When dealing with targets of opportunity, cab ranks of planes up to medium bombers should be maintained.

I would have thought my plan implied that bridges and marshalling yards were higher on the priority list than a hamlet.

Finally, in the immortal words of General Turgidson, "I didn't say we wouldn't get our hair mussed".

I just think the idea of wallpapering western Germany with bombs and paving an easy march-in by the boots just isn't doable. Allied air assets had limits, and German defenses were good even when SHTF.

Of course you put bombs in front of the troops to ease their path. Quesada and Cunningham , and others, worked on that, to good effect.

But I think the idea, as you put it, of "Destroy everything there, down to the last city, town, village, or railroad. That's half the war won" is not realistic or doable. Losses and maintenance will cut into air forces, attrition will take hold, lack of accuracy, etc etc. More targets than planes that can take them out if you're serious about it.

 

[EwenS]

The way they did it took too long, losses were too heavy and it was too distributed. Concentrate everything in NW Germany and you get faster de-functioning of cities, refugee deluge, production ended etc. while the distance is small enough that medium bombers and tactical aircraft can join in for increased tempo and greater diversity of targets, including systematically destroying heavy AA assets, and interdiction of the logistics for the air defense system.

Have I thought of everything? Yes. All of the things I have thought of anyway.

A Luftwaffe AA battery generally dispersed its 4 heavy guns at the corners of a 70 yard sq with Command Post 1 (the primary) about 100 yards to one side and often a Command Post 2 (secondary) in the centre of the square. Any Wurzburg gun direction radar would also be off to the side. They also had LAA protection (2 guns per site) to put off low level attackers. Around a large target batteries would be 6,000 yards (over 3 miles) apart. They tended to be laid out along the most likely lines of attack. Some were mobile, some fixed, and they mixed dummies in to confuse any PR interpreters.

So each battery is a very small target and they are well spaced out from each other. These were pin point targets. If you are having problems hitting a city or even an industrial site, then .......

1943 US Manual here

https://aviationarchaeology.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/German-Anti-aircraft-Artillery.pdf

See page 88 onwards.

I can't find a map of dispositions in Germany quickly, but AA battery layout was very similar in Britain. There is a zoomable map showing all these on this site, which gives a good idea of just how dispersed batteries could be around major industrial targets like cities and ports. Sites in brown have links to Google maps helping to give an idea of the size of surviving sites.

Map of Heavy Anti-Aircraft gun sites in England, Scotland and Wales

British and Canadian Anti-Aircraft equipment of World War 2

www.anti-aircraft.co.uk

 

[MiTasol]

I just think the idea of wallpapering western Germany with bombs and paving an easy march-in by the boots just isn't doable. Allied air assets had limits, and German defenses were good even when SHTF.

Of course you put bombs in front of the troops to ease their path. Quesada and Cunningham , and others, worked on that, to good effect.

But I think the idea, as you put it, of "Destroy everything there, down to the last city, town, village, or railroad. That's half the war won" is not realistic or doable. Losses and maintenance will cut into air forces, attrition will take hold, lack of accuracy, etc etc. More targets than planes that can take them out if you're serious about it.

and as soon as the Germans work out you are only attacking one area they will move all their defences there and your losses will skyrocket.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Putting an external load under the fuselage near the centre of gravity is usually simple enough, short links and using the strongest part of the airframe, wing racks require longer internal runs and raise issues about wing strength. So how often did pre war fighters have wing racks then expand that to pre war combat types? Wing racks were the way to carry a lot of external fuel.

Before the start of WWII no one had tried to fly that many aircraft over those sorts of distances at those altitudes, the result was regular logging of new weather phenomena.

Imperial gallons for British, US gallons for US.

Putting more range into western allied fighters pre war is solving the problems of end 1942 and later, not 1939/40/41 when the axis were mostly on the offensive. The RAF was moving to constant speed propellers for its fighters, starting with the Hurricane in February 1940, the Spitfire plan appeared to be mark I two pitch, constant speed introduced with mark II, the better take off performance enabled higher weights. Early in the Spitfire design process fuel capacity was removed in order to carry heavier armament.

The USAAF had the issue that by building the B-17 so early its heavy bomber program was running well ahead of its modern fighter program.

Bomber Command used distances from Lincoln UK to target,
Berlin 583 miles
Schweinfurt 510 miles
Hamburg 435 miles
Bremen 394 miles
Cologne 356 miles
Emden 320 miles

The Spitfire VIII, 90 gallon external tank, 20,000 feet fast cruise combat radius about 300 miles allowing for reserves. Early P-47D under similar conditions would need a 108 gallon tank to make the radius. At 315 mph the P-47B was calculated to use 123 gallons per hour, at 280 mph 73 gallons both at 16,000 feet.

The two stage Merlins were about 300 pounds heavier than the Merlin III, similar versus the Allison. That helped enable more weight in rear fuselage, but the Spitfire needed better elevators, something Westland came up with. The aerodynamics (and finish) of the Mustang gave it below average drag plus above average internal room for fuel.

The USAAF noted the P-40F with 300 gallons of external fuel did not have the power to maintain 210mph indicated at 25,000 feet.

Changes to the Spitfire until the second half of 1943 had to be balanced against the way every front wanted them and of the latest type, a pressure that was eased once the P-47 and P-51 proved themselves. For the USAAF in 1942/43 the P-47 was similar to the Spitfire in that it was understood other USAAF single engine fighters did not have the performance required, getting the P-47 in service in numbers was important enough to have an impact on what modifications could be done.

The Luftwaffe in 1940 only attacked part of Britain by day, which enabled it to outnumber the defending fighters in the area by 2 to 3 to 1, but enabled the defenders safe areas to rest units and make new weapons.

U-boats were ordered to withdraw from the North Atlantic about the same time as Tunisia fell. The US army had a corps in North Africa, it would require a couple of armies for an invasion of France, with associated increases in air support.

 

[tomo pauk]

They could not build such aircraft. Or if they could they had trouble operating them. P-40s with even a largish (larger than 52 US gal) drop tank needed about the same size runway as a British medium bomber (or even early heavy bombers).
You not only need the aircraft, you need the infrastructure.
You also need the 1942 engines, not 1939/40 engines. The 1939/40 engines will not give the needed power for combat while carrying the needed fuel to return home.

RAF was free to order the Whirlwind to be something like the Fw 187+ (ie. a long-range performer). Or/and that a long-range performer is made around two Merlins or Hercules engines. However, under the doctrine of the day, even a Hurricane with drop tanks in 1938 was not gonna fly. But Botha, 1000-1500 of extra Batlles, Defiant - these were green-lit, no worries.
Blenheim - yes, use two engines and two propellers for 450 kg of bombs??

AAF was busy to out-Defiant the Defiant with the Airacuda, instead of specifying a long-range fighter. They were free to order both P-38 and P-43 to be fitted with drop tanks from day one. Ditto for the P-47. Same for the Mustang for the AAF needs, instead of trying to ignore it out.
One needs 1942 engines for 1942, but not for 1939-40. As seen by Japanese and, less well, by Germans.

P-47s are 1943 aircraft. Maybe they could have been used in early 1943 but 1942 is pushing things.

So make them more useful by installing a proper drop tank facility from day one, so once they are abroad, they can make a really lasting impact by killing the Axis airforces hundreds of miles away,

 

[z42]

or that RAF orders all the Spitfires to have the rear tank installed + drop tanks.

There was also the possibility of leading edge tanks. Not huge, 2x13G IIRC, but less CoG issues than the rear fuselage tanks. IIRC some of the later Griffon powered Spits had these leading edge tanks as standard.

Long range day fighters allow for the daylight bombing.

Yes. But that wasn't pre war doctrine, and it took some time for the painful early war experiences to turn into into new longer ranged fighters. Could the wheels of bureaucracy have turned quicker? Probably, but how much is realistic?

 

[tomo pauk]

There was also the possibility of leading edge tanks. Not huge, 2x13G IIRC, but less CoG issues than the rear fuselage tanks. IIRC some of the later Griffon powered Spits had these leading edge tanks as standard.

LE tanks, as well as more fuel in the main tanks - both of these worked.
Issues with the rear tank(s) are solvable - use 30 gals of that fuel to climb to, say, 20000 ft and to travel perhaps 30 gals x 5 mpg = 150 miles, then switch to the drop tank.

Yes. But that wasn't pre war doctrine, and it took some time for the painful early war experiences to turn into into new longer ranged fighters. Could the wheels of bureaucracy have turned quicker? Probably, but how much is realistic?

I've tried to point out several times, not just on this forum, that the change in the heads needs to happen 1st, in order for the RAF to get themselves a new gear that still uses current technolgy.
How easy is to influence the institutional inertia? Not easy at all, especially if someone is still trying to justify his previous doctrine(s).

 

[pinehilljoe]

This is an excerpt from a lecture series by Professor of History Thomas Childers of U-Penn. This is his view of the Bombing Campaign. The complete lecture series is available The Great Courses who holds the copyright.

I found the CDs at the local library.

I checked YouTube, Professor Childers' complete lecture series is available. Its a very good lecture series. Skip to video 24 for the War in the Air in Europe.

He also wrote the book Wings of Morning, about the what is thought to be the last American plane (a B-24) shot down in Europe during the war, his Uncle was the radio operator. https://www.amazon.com/Wings-Morning-Thomas-Childers/dp/0201407221



View: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLez3PPtnpncQwBr1NpPomURXD26GTcsEr

 

[Bergjon12]

An advantage of the spread out attacks on Germany is that it forced the Germans to disperse their defenses.
This may not have worked as well as hoped but but switching to a concentrated attack on NW Germany may not go as hoped either. Double the amount of AA? More fighters over NW Germany? Germany could have pulled a lot of fighters just another 50-100 miles east and still covered the Ruhr Valley. But Fighters near Stuttgart are too far away. Germany doesn't need to put fighter fields (or at least not many) in Belgium and Holland. German Radar can pick up Allied bombers forming up over Britain let alone the North Sea. They have got over an hour to get planes into the air and in position. They don't have to rapidly climb from fields in Belgium and Holland to intercept incoming (or returning) allied bombers.

I have problems with this logic.

Was it a strong move for the LW to start attacking targets further inland during the BoB?

That aside, one major problem is that bombers are not flying saucers. They don't appear out of the blue above their targets, they travel by straight or crooked paths to their target. A deep penetration assault needs to travel from SE England over the North Sea, over the low countries or the German coast and then through Germany proper. These intruders can be intercepted on a line running approx NNW through the Ruhr or at any point downtravel.

When attacking the NW only, the attackers MUST be engaged over the Ruhr, approximately. So the deep penetration strategy gives the defender more options. If one interception fails, another can be mustered. With a NW strategy, airfields MUST be concentrated near the NW, making them more vulnerable.

Another major problem with this logic is that we WANT LW fighters to engage. We DON'T want to avoid them, bc they will be running into escort fighters and thus can be destroyed in a relatively short time. That is a major part of the plan.

 

[Bergjon12]

I just think the idea of wallpapering western Germany with bombs and paving an easy march-in by the boots just isn't doable. Allied air assets had limits, and German defenses were good even when SHTF.

Of course you put bombs in front of the troops to ease their path. Quesada and Cunningham , and others, worked on that, to good effect.

But I think the idea, as you put it, of "Destroy everything there, down to the last city, town, village, or railroad. That's half the war won" is not realistic or doable. Losses and maintenance will cut into air forces, attrition will take hold, lack of accuracy, etc etc. More targets than planes that can take them out if you're serious about it.

I'll say again, this is a pre-invasion strategy. The object it not to create an advance for ground forces, it is to destroy Germany.

Speer estimated that 6 x Hamburg43 would knock Germany out of the war. That's what we're going for.

Concentration is key. Dropping 1000 bombs on one city creates much greater disruption than 100 bombs each on 10 cities. A city has a great deal of self-generation capability. To be taken out of the picture a city must be de-functioned, so the population leaves.