This Day in the Battle of Britain

[Njaco]

Let me check. You could be right and I apologize as I'm not that familiar with the RAF.

You are righ! I must have transposed the numbers! It was from 601 that lost a Hurricane that day!

 

[Njaco]

15 September 1940 Sunday
"BATTLE OF BRITAIN DAY"
UNITED KINGDOM: Sunday September 15th 1940, was not only the turning point of the Battle of Britain, it was the turning point of the whole war. For Adolf Hitler and the German commanders, time was now running out. If an invasion was to take place on 17 September as planned, the lead-up would have to commence no later than today. The weather had shown, just how quickly it could turn at this time of year, and with winter not too far away, the German forces would have to take advantage of the better conditions that now seemed to prevail. Göring had sent out the instructions the day previous to all bomber and fighter bases that preparations for an all out assault on England was to be made on this day. Bomber units were given times and flight paths of their attack. Over the last few weeks, the Luftwaffe had experimented with different flying formations. Needless to say, none had really been successful, losses had still been high, but they had discovered that on the occasions that they had kept at high altitudes, they had on a number of occasions surprised Fighter Command.

This was mainly due to the fact that the British radar was ineffective above 20,000 feet, and by flying at a height above this level they could cross the Channel undetected, but, the Germans did not know this. All that they were aware of, was the fact that those formations that flew at higher altitudes were not intercepted until they were usually well over the English coast. The most logical reason for this, thought the Germans, was due to the fact that it took the British fighters much longer to gain the required height to intercept. The sending of advance Ju 87 and Bf 110 units to bomb the radar stations along the southern coastline was, in the opinion of the Luftwaffe, a waste of time. As fast as they seemed to be destroyed, they were back in operational use again, and mobile units too were brought in to replace any radar station damaged. Over the last few days, the Germans had practiced at electronic jamming. This they believed was successful and plans were made to intensify the jamming procedure in an effort to further reduce detection.

The spirit of the German aircrews was still far from high. Time and time again, they had been told that the 'Glorious Luftwaffe' was ready to strike the final blow. But they had been told that in July, and again in August when 'Alderangriff' had been announced, and it was to be repeated yet again. Early in the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe aircrews were told that the Royal Air Force would be wiped out in two or three weeks. Now, whenever they flew over the British countryside they were still met with masses of British fighters in the hands of pilots that were gaining in skill and techniques. Many firmly believed that they were no nearer victory than they were two months previous. Commented Adolph Galland;

"Failure to achieve any notable success, constantly changing orders betraying lack of purpose and obvious misjudgment of the situation by the Command, and unjustified accusation had a most demoralizing effect on us fighter pilots, who were already overtaxed by physical and mental strain."

In Britain, things were slightly different. Most of the pilots were relatively fresh unlike their German counterparts. Combat action had been very infrequent, with only one really heavy day. Fighter Command was now stronger than it had been for weeks, aerodromes repaired, planes and personnel had replaced many that had been shot down and the radar stations were all functioning at 100%.

Heavy cloud and rain overnight was expected to clear and the forecast for the day was fine in most areas with patchy cloud. No rain was forecast but some areas could expect an odd shower to develop. The cloud was expected to clear during the afternoon giving way to a fine and clear evening. It was not long after breakfast that AVM Keith Park knew that today was to be different from all the others. For the first time in a week, he had been notified that there was a build up of German formations along the enemy coast.

"This, I think is what we have been waiting for. I think that it is about to happen."

Unaware of what was about to unfold within Fighter Command, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his wife decided that he would call upon AVM Park at 11 Group Headquarters at Uxbridge.

AVM Park took his visitors to the operations room, and as he began to explain some of the complexities of the operations, a radar report had come through that a number of German aircraft had been detected building up in the vicinity of Dieppe and another smaller formation had been detected over the Channel off the coast near Dover. Park told the Prime Minister that he was lucky because it looked like that he could witness the activities of operations because a couple of German formations had been spotted. Winston Churchill replied that he would let the C-in-C carry on with his job and that he would just sit and watch.

By 0930 hours the two formations had spread themselves out and were detected near the coasts off Dover, Harwich and in the Thames Estuary. RAF Squadrons were dispatched from Hornchurch, Gravesend and Croydon. But most of the German formations were ordered to turn back. The Fighter Command squadrons were recalled. The only other activity was just off the Devon coast where a lone reconnaissance aircraft was detected and a flight from RAF No.87 Squadron (Hurricanes) was scrambled. It turned out to be a He111 on weather reconnaissance and was shot down by P/O D.T. Jay.

By late morning the weather cleared and an all out attack was ordered by Göring. New formations were detected at 10:30 hours positioned between the towns of Calais and Boulogne. It appeared that the German formations were in no great hurry and were forming up very slowly. This worked to the advantage of Keith Park as it gave him the chance to organize his defense forces.

"This, Mr. Prime Minister looks like the big one."

said Park.

At 1100 hours the first wave of German bombers - hundreds of Ju 88s and Do 17s - flew across the Channel and up the Thames towards London. Just as the first Fighter Command squadrons approached the southern coast of Kent, the leaders of the German formation still had a few miles to go before they crossed the tall cliffs of the British coastline. The German bombers consisted of practically the whole of I./KG 76 flying Dornier Do 17s. These had met up with the Do 17s of III./KG 76 and KG 3 behind Calais and now the combined force, escorted by Bf 109 formed a vast armada almost two miles wide crossing the coast. All the Luftwaffe aircraft departed from bases in the Brussels and Antwerp areas. The heights of the German formations were between 15,000 and 26,000 feet and the Observer Corps reported that they were crossing the coast just north of Dungeness, to the south of Dover and at Ramsgate.

Thirty minutes later the first wave of bombers consisting of twenty-five Do 17s from KG 2 and KG 76 with the He-111s of KG 26 and KG 53 and twenty-one Bf 109 Jabos from II.(Schlacht)./LG 2 escorted by 150 fighters, crossed the Kent coast. The bombers came across the coastline in a number of vic formations. Some of these consisted of three aircraft, some in five while others were in vics of seven, but as they crossed the tall cliffs they looked something like a giant herringbone. The bombers, which consisted of Dorniers, Heinkels and Junkers were escorted by Bf 110 aircraft flying in close support while the Bf 109s flew top cover high above the bombers. Hundreds streamed across the Channel, many of them decorated with insignia as colorful as any air force had ever boasted . . . the green dragon signifying Hptm. Hans von Hahn's I./JG 3, Major Adolf Galland's Mickey Mouse, armed with gun and hatchet, puffing a cigar strangely like Galland's own, the eagle's head of Werner Mölders, Major von Cramon-Taubadel's jet-black ace of spades, the green heart of Major Trautloft's JG 54, the white and red lightning flashes of KG 3, the poised black sledgehammer that marked Oberst Johannes Fink's Dorniers and the bared shark's teeth of II./ZG 76.

Almost every RAF squadron from 11 Group was committed and soon more from 12 Group, known as the 'Duxford Wing', were scrambled. The German formation was making slow progress and RAF No.72 Squadron (Spitfires) and RAF No.92 Squadron (Spitfires) were vectored to intercept the bombers between Maidstone and Ashford. Some of the other squadrons that had been vectored further south were now re-vectored. These included the Hurricanes of RAF No.253 Squadron and RAF No.501 Squadron, with the Spitfires of RAF No.66 Squadron, RAF No.603 Squadron and RAF No.609 Squadron and within minutes were reinforced with RAF No.72 and RAF No.92 Squadrons. Soon after the initial interception, RAF No.229 Squadron (Hurricanes) and RAF No.303 Squadron (Hurricanes) met the raiders between Rochester and South London while RAF No.17 Squadron and RAF No.73 Squadron (Hurricanes) met the bombers over Maidstone. The heavy bomber formation was still stepped between 15,000 and 25,000 feet with a massive Bf 109 fighter escort above and slightly to the rear of the main formation.

 

[Njaco]

(15 September 1940 continued....)

Great air battles ensued when the British fighters and German bombers and fighters clashed over the English countryside. The combat action was exceptionally heavy, and most of the defending British fighters managed to keep the Messerschmitt escorts from providing the cover for the bombers. The Spitfires harassed the Bf 109s, criss-crossing them at every opportunity, and one by one they were sent spiraling towards earth trailing plumes of smoke. The Bf 109s tried to continue to escort the bombers who now were being attacked by the Hurricane squadrons. The British fighter pilots were slowly breaking up the formation with a steady application of force causing the bombers to straggle out of formation. Luftwaffe Do 17 Front Gunner Hans Zonderlind reported,

"From the time that we had been over Maidstone until reaching the outskirts of London, we had been under extreme pressure. The British fighters had been with us since we had first crossed the English coast and had gathered in intensity all the time. Our escort had been doing a grand job with the Spitfires at keeping them away from us, and we thought that should things remain like this, then this bombing run would be made easy. We saw the Hurricanes coming towards us and it seemed that the whole of the RAF was there, we had never seen so many British fighters coming at us at once. I saw a couple of our comrades go down, and we got hit once but it did no great damage. All around us were dogfights as the fighters went after each other, then as we were getting ready for our approach to the target, we saw what must have been a hundred RAF fighters coming at us. We thought that this must have been all the RAF planes were up at once, but where were they coming from, as we had been told that the RAF fighters were very close to extinction. We could not keep our present course, we turned to starboard and done all that we could to avoid the fighters and after a while I am sure we had lost our bearings, so we just dropped our bombs and made our retreat."

Numerous aircraft from both sides were shot down out of the skies.

One particular pilot engaged several Do17s over London during the action, which was to be immortalised in the movie "The Battle of Britain". Over central London, a Do 17 of 1./KG 76 piloted by Oblt. Robert Zehbe was hit by gunfire from several fighters and caught fire. As Sgt. Ray Holmes of RAF No.504 Sqd vectored in for a last shot, the two planes collided. Sgt. Holmes managed to free himself and jumped, the parachute breaking his fall just twenty feet or so above the rooftops of some houses in fashionable Chelsea. His backside hit the sloping roof of one of the houses, and he began to slide down the roof, fall off over the guttering and straight down into the garden below, into a garbage bin. The Dornier came down about a mile away crashing into the forecourt of Victoria Station, practically demolishing a small tobacconist's shop.

The hundreds of Bf 109s covered a wide area and they too were having their successes. Two Hurricanes of RAF No.229 Sqd were shot down over the Sevenoaks area, with P/O Doutrepont's aircraft being shot up badly and he was killed as the Hurricane went down and crashed on Staplehurst Railway Station. Another member of the squadron, P/O R. Smith managed to bale out of his bullet riddled aircraft also over Sevenoaks and he suffered severe leg injuries. Over Tunbridge Wells, F/O A.D. Nesbitt of 1 (RCAF) Squadron was swooped on by Bf 109s and he baled out as his aircraft spiraled to earth. F/O R. Smither was not so lucky, as he went down with his aircraft also over Tunbridge Wells. The combat now covered a wide area, and as the minutes ticked by, the intensity of the battle increased as more fighters of Fighter Command arrived on the scene. RAF No.501 Sqd (Hurricanes) was one of them. They intercepted the Germans over northern Kent and mixed it with both bombers and fighter escort.

The Bf 109s were being held over the northern area of Kent with only a few managing to escape the onslaught by the Spitfires. The bombers were being harassed by the Hurricanes, and one by one they began to turn away smoke trailing from engines and desperately trying to evade any further attack by the British fighters. Others dropped their bombs at random. Some of the more courageous tried in vain to make it to their target, riddled with bullets, crewmen either dead or injured at their posts. But more was in store for them as they approached London. Keith Park's timing of requesting the 'Duxford Wing' to cover the airfields of Hornchurch and North Weald was to perfection, as was everything else that was taking place. It seemed that Fighter Command could do no wrong.

As the German bomber formation, with about only one third of its Bf 109 escorts, approached the outskirts of London, the Luftwaffe was in disarray. The Bf 109s peeled away one by one. Some had sustained damage but most were now low on fuel. With the city now in their sights, they were confronted by the awesome sight of the four squadrons of the 'Big Wing'. Where everything was running in favor of 11 Group, as for once, Douglas Bader's 'Big Wing' also ran to perfection and in unison. The squadrons were able to take off as ordered, and the formation had collected perfectly over Duxford and fifty-six fighter aircraft made the steady climb towards their vectored area, and had time to position themselves at the correct height and head towards Gravesend. As they approached the Thames, the Hurricanes were stepped between 25,000 and 26,000 feet. As the 'Big Wing' closed in, they were joined by RAF No.41 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.46 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.504 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires). The Bombers were confronted by British fighters on all sides, and one of the biggest combat actions ever seen over London developed.

Perfectly positioned, with the bombers 3,000 feet below them they were about to make their attack, when a formation of Bf 109s came out of the sun. Bader immediately ordered the Spitfires of RAF No.19 and RAF No.611 Sqds to take on the German fighters, which they did, scattering them by a surprise attack so effectively that they left the bomber formation and flew off to the south-east. While the 'Big Wing' were holding, the Hurricanes of RAF No.257 Sqd and RAF No.504 Sqd (Hurricanes) attacked the German bombers. Bader waited for them to complete their sweep, then instructed his three Hurricane squadrons to fall into line astern and attack. Bader selected the most westerly of the three German formations, while RAF No.302 Sqd took on the middle formation while the remaining formation was left to RAF No.310 Sqd.

Hurricanes came in to deal with the bombers in an unusual way, head-on in a shallow climb, claiming three of the bombers. Others joined in, and in such numbers and with such aggression that it was like gulls mobbing an albatross. Seven more Dorniers were claimed as destroyed before the 'Big Wing', in all its multiple glory, hurled itself into the whirling melee. The raid had now entirely broke up over south London, and any idea the bomb-aimers had of identifying let alone attacking their assigned target had disappeared, like so many of their own kind.

There was not much for the bombers to do, the pressure on them was that intense. They would be attacked by a couple of squadrons of RAF fighters, then as soon as they broke off the engagement, another couple of squadrons were ready to pounce at an already decimated bomber force. The bombers began to drop their bomb loads at random, hoping that this would lighten their load and they could make as hasty retreat as possible without any further damage to their aircraft. South London was the worst affected, with Lewisham, Lambeth, Camberwell and a couple of the bridges across the River Thames all recording bomb damage. One high explosive bomb fell in the grounds of Buckingham Palace causing slight structural damage to the building but a bigger hole was made in the lawns at the rear as the bomb failed to explode. A power station in Beckenham was also hit.

The German formations headed out towards the west, turning south near Weybridge. RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires) chased them as they headed for the coast and took on fifteen Dornier Do17s. A formation of Bf 109s saw the desperate situation that their bombers were in and joined in as did a few Bf 110s. Over Ewhurst in Surrey, RAF No.605 Sqd (Hurricanes) came in to assist and as the fierce action continued over the town of Billingshurst just west of Horsham they were joined by RCAF No.1 Sqd (Hurricanes) who took on the troublesome Bf 109s. In the other direction, some eighty German bombers were trying to make good their escape towards the Thames Estuary. Fighter Command attacked in large numbers with squadrons attacking any of the escorts while others took on the merciless bombers.

Horst Zander, a radio operator in a Do 17 of 6./KG 3, reported,

"Our Gruppe had become split up. Every crew sought its own safety in a powered gliding race down over the sea and for home."

Suddenly his Dornier was struck hard.

"The cabin was full of blood. Our pilot was hit. In the inter-com I heard him say feebly; Heinz Laube, you have to fly us home. Meanwhile we had reached the North Sea and so had peace in which to change over. The flight mechanic put a first-aid dressing on the badly wounded pilot, and after we had disobeyed orders by requesting a bearing from Antwerp-Deurne, our observer, with his B-2 pilot's license, took over the shot-up machine. Twenty minutes later, the aircraft bucking like a horse, he managed to land us safely."

The raid was deflected and KG 3 did not make its objective.

 

[Njaco]

(15 September 1940 continued......)

The first morning battle had been a disaster for the Luftwaffe, as many aircraft crashed, and others blew up in mid-air, while the remainder struggled for the safety of the French coast. For the Germans, after about ten minutes over London, there was now no such thing as a formation. German bombers were at all levels of altitude and most were scattered over an area fifteen miles wide. To give an example of the intensity of this morning battle, the combat area was approximately eighty miles long by thirty-eight miles wide, and up to six miles high. Because of the intensity and aggression shown by the pilots of Fighter Command, the bombers dropped most of their bombs randomly over a wide area. Damage was done, but not as much as was intended by the Luftwaffe commanders. For the Luftwaffe, the raid was doomed to failure the moment that the first formations had crossed the Channel. This time, everything had gone right for Fighter Command and 11 Group. Timing, position and height was all on the side of the RAF. AVM Park and his pilots had won the first round of the day.

As the clocks in Britain showed 1230 hours, the first battle of the day had finished. Most of the German bombers who had intentions of again dropping hundreds of tons of bombs on the city had been fought off by Fighter Command. In scattered areas of Kent and Sussex the odd skirmish still took place as patrolling squadrons observed a few Dorniers and Heinkels desperately trying to make their way back to their bases in northern France and Belgium. The pilots of the Hurricanes and Spitfires showed no mercy. It made no difference whether the bombers were crippled or not. Some, which it was obvious that they would never make it back, were shot down, the broken hulks of German aircraft could be seen from the outskirts of London to the Channel coast.

By 1300 hours the radar stations along the Kent coast picked up new movements across the Channel. It was the commencement of German bombers busily forming up for yet another raid on the British capital. Fighter Command was notified, but as there was no indication yet that the bombers were heading across the coast, it was just a 'wait and see' game. All RAF squadrons that had been involved with the mornings action, were again placed at readiness and this included the 'Duxford Wing' and the two squadrons from 10 Group. As time progressed, radar had reported that the formation had broke up into three distinct groups, and that it was possible that each group was following a short distance behind another. The first of the bomber formations crossed the Kent coast between Dungeness and Dover at 14:15 hours, with the other formations behind and flying at 15 minute intervals. The German formations were made up of three distinct formations. All consisted of Dornier Do 17s, Heinkel He 111s and Do 215s from KG 2, KG 53 and KG 76. Smaller Gruppen came from KG 1, KG 4 and KG 26 which made up a total bomber force of 170 aircraft. These were supported by Bf 110 and Bf 109s from JG 26 and JG 54 among others as escorts and their number was in excess of 300. Most of the bomber formations had come from airfields in the Beauvais and Antwerp areas. In total, there was a combined force of 600 plus aircraft heading north towards London on a front some thirty miles wide.

Even though all the RAF squadrons had been brought to readiness, some squadrons, especially those some distance from London were still being re-armed and refueled, and quite a few pilots were not with their squadrons. These had been shot down or baled out of their stricken aircraft and had made their way to other airfields and had telephoned in to their home bases, while some were being ferried back but had not yet arrived. Those that had got back, found the time to have a bit of lunch while their aircraft were in the hands of the ground crews. This was one of the reasons that the Luftwaffe had made this second raid so soon after midday, as they knew that it would take Fighter Command to take at least two hours to get all their squadrons back to full strength. The hoped that by the time that they crossed the coast that most of the RAF fighters would still be on the ground.

AVM Park scrambled squadrons in almost the same order as he had done so only three hours earlier, but because the German formation had taken less time in forming up the 11 Group commander had less time to get his fighters into the air, coupled with the fact that some squadrons were still re-arming and refueling, the efficiency was not as good as it had been during the morning period. 12 Group were called up by 11 Group who again requested maximum assistance just as they had done during the morning. The same applied to 10 Group. The only change that Park made that differed from the morning attack, was that he held more of his fighters back, giving orders that they patrol areas to the east, south and west of London. The squadrons that were vectored to the forward areas were mainly instructed to attack the German escort fighters. This was due to the fact that by forcing the German escorts into combat early, they would use up far more fuel, and the morning raid had showed him that the bombers were far more vulnerable when they reached the outskirts of London, and the net result was that Fighter Command inflicted far more damage to aircraft over London than over the Kent coast.

The first engagements took place over Kent. Squadrons from Hornchurch intercepted a large formation of Dorniers south of Canterbury. Diving down in line astern they managed to destroy two of the bombers and another couple as they were wheeling away leaving behind a trail of thick black smoke. But they were jumped upon by Bf 109s and intense combat took place between the fighters of both sides allowing the Do 17s to continue their journey. The Bf 109s, of JG 26 led by Adolf Galland and of JG 54 led by Hannes Trautloft, engaged the RAF fighters before they had to return low on fuel. Two aircraft of the Hornchurch squadrons were damaged.

Another formation consisting of Dornier Do 17s and Heinkel He 111s was detected south of Maidstone, and without any Bf 109 protection, they became the targets for RAF No.73 Sqd (Hurricanes) who managed to destroy three of the bombers without loss to themselves. West of this attack near Dartford, RAF No.66 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires) intercepted another column of German aircraft where again the combat action was intense. The Spitfires weaved in and out of the bombers managing to avoid collision in the huge traffic jam that was forming. Bombers started to take evasive action by banking either left or right. Just as another bomber formation was approaching from the south, the melee was joined by RAF No.249 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.504 Sqd (Hurricanes) and the large colossus of Luftwaffe bombers went into a frantic flight pattern. RAF No.73 Sqd who had engaged the formation from the outset, had now been entwined into the huge dogfight as well as RAF No.253 Sqd (Hurricanes).

The western flank saw Do 17s, He 111s and Ju 88s which numbered about eighty curve right from Kent, across the outskirts of Surrey and head towards the western side of London. A terrific battle ensued as fighters from RAF No.213 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.607 Sqd (Hurricanes) which had been vectored to cover Biggin Hill intercepted the large formation. Again, Bf 109s were seen to the south of London, but decided not to come to the aid of the bomber formation which managed to get mauled by the Hurricane squadrons. This was one of the most intense battles of the day. The British fighters tore into the Germans like hungry cats to a flock of wounded birds.

Even though most of the attacking bombers had been thrown off their planned flight path, many of them managed to get through to the southern areas of London. If they thought that most of Fighter Commands fighters were behind them and still engaged in combat over Kent and Surrey, they were in for a big surprise. Wing Commander Woodall at Duxford, had scrambled his 'Duxford Wing' which comprised RAF No.19 Sqd (Spitfires), 242 Sqd (Hurricanes), 302 Sqd (Hurricanes), 310 Sqd (Hurricanes) and 611 Sqd (Spitfires). Now, as in the morning session, the Luftwaffe were met by forty-nine fighters of Bader's "Big Wing". Combined with a number of other squadrons that had followed the leading bombers and two other squadrons that had just joined the action, a total of some 150 more fighters awaited them. Again, Bader ordered the Spitfires to attack the Bf 109s, who for some strange reason had not left their bombers early as on previous occasions, while the Hurricanes attacked the bombers. They were at a disadvantage as they were still climbing and had not had the time to get into position. The "Duxford Wing" leader complained later that it was the case again of being called on far too late, but the real reason this time was that the Germans had formed up much quicker this time and that almost caught even Keith Park off guard. The 'Wing' was scrambled again to patrol North Weald, and Bader led them through a gap in the clouds. At 16,000 feet, flak burst ahead, and in moments he saw the bombers; about forty of them, some 4,000 feet above the Hurricanes. But Bf 109s were diving on them and he yelled as he steep-turned, "Break up!" Around him the sky was full of wheeling Hurricanes and Bf109s. A yellow spinner was sitting behind his tail, and as he yanked hard back on the stick an aeroplane shot by, feet away. Bader hit its slipstream and the Hurricane shuddered, stalled and spun off the turn. He let it spin a few turns to shake off the 109 and came out of it at 5,000 feet. When Bader had first spun out, he almost collided with P/O Denis Crowley-Milling, and it was while in Crowley-Milling's slipstream that he went into the spin and did not pull out until 5,000 feet. He was unable to reach the bombers.

 

[Njaco]

(15 September 1940 continued....)

The combat action over the southern and south western areas of London was extreme. The formation that had been intercepted as far away as Maidstone somehow managed to straggle through, many of the Bf 109s managed to stay as long as they could, but with fuel tanks getting into the danger zone, they had to break off and leave many of the bombers at the mercy of the British fighters. The German bombers, who had intended to drop their bomb loads on London itself, had jettisoned them in scattered areas in London's eastern and southern suburbs that suffered most. The most severe damage was done in West Ham, East Ham, Stratford, Stepney, Hackney, Erith, Dartford and Penge. Fighter Command now had everything that they possessed in the air.

Squadron leader John Sample RAF No.501 Squadron Kenley;

"I started to chase one Dornier which was flying through the tops of the clouds. Did you ever see that film "Hells Angels?" You'll remember how the Zeppelin came so slowly out of the cloud. Well, this Dornier reminded me of that. I attacked him four times altogether. When he first appeared through the cloud - you know how clouds go up and down like foam on water - I fired at him from the left, swung over to the right, turned in towards another hollow in the cloud, where I expected him to reappear, and fired at him again. After my fourth attack he dived down headlong into a clump of trees in front of a house, and I saw one or two cars parked in the gravel drive in front. I wondered whether there was anyone in the doorway watching the bomber crash. Then I climbed up again to look for some more trouble and found it in the shape of a Heinkel III which was being attacked by three Hurricanes and a couple of Spitfires. I had a few cracks at the thing before it made a perfect landing on an RAF aerodrome. The Heinkels undercarriage collapsed and the pilot pulled up, after skidding 50 yards in a cloud of dust. I saw a tall man get out of the right-hand side of the aircraft, and when I turned back he was helping a small man across the aerodrome towards a hangar."

RAF No.303 Sqd had been ordered up at Northolt at 1420 hours and were vectored to cover the north Kent coast along the Thames. The squadron consisted of nine Hurricanes and was led by S/L R. Kellett when they sighted a large formation coming towards them. Interception was made over Gravesend. RAF No.303 Sqd was in the air just one hour and ten minutes before they returned back to Northolt. In this time, they had destroyed three Dornier Do 215's, two Messerschmitt Bf 110's and one Bf 109. One Do 215 was seen to break away from the combat action trailing smoke and losing altitude, but its fate was not known and the squadron was also credited with a probable. But only seven of the nine Hurricanes returned, with one pilot missing and another Hurricane crashing near Dartford with the pilot managing to bale out of his aircraft.

One of the Luftwaffe pilots who had to make a rather ungracious landing was the veteran Obstlt Dr. Hasso von Wedel. Like most of the Bf 109 pilots, he stayed with the Dorniers as long as possible, but the fuel situation forced him to leave early, leaving the bombers in a very vulnerable position. On the return journey, his flight of Bf 109s were attacked by RAF No. 605 Sqd, RCAF No.1 Sqd and RAF No.229 Sqd all flying Hurricanes. It is believed that one of the Hurricanes of RCAF No.1 Sqd followed von Wedel down, the veteran not being able to out maneuver the Hurricane. He was hit and his Bf 109 lost its controls. He tried in vain to make a landing on Romney Marsh, but the controls did not respond, and he made a heavy wheels up landing at a farmhouse, destroying a shed in which a mother and daughter were sitting in a car awaiting the father who was about to take them out on a Sunday drive. Both mother and daughter were killed instantly. A local policeman arrived on the scene to find a battered and bruised von Wedel wandering around in an almost tearful state, and as he apologized to the policeman for what he had done, the constable simply asked " would you like a cup of tea sir?".

The bulk of the fighting took place over London and its outskirts from Dartford westward, where five pairs of squadrons from 11 Group and the wing from 12 Group were all in action between ten minutes to three and a quarter past, mainly with the third formation but probably also with survivors of the other two. Again retiring by two distinct routes, the attackers were engaged on the way out by another four squadrons, including two from 10 Group. Guns of the inner artillery zone and the Thames and Medway defences were also in action and claimed a number of successes. Flight Lieutenant W.G.Clouston of RAF No.19 Sqd Duxford (Spitfires) took the two sections of his squadron to attack a formation of Do17s over Shoeburyness. Making their attack in line astern they made their attacks before any Bf109s arrived. F/L Couston lined up one, and gave a series of short bursts, one of the engines of the Dornier exploded in flame and smoke. Before he lost sight of it, ten feet of the bombers wing broke away and fell earthwards causing the bomber to roll over and spiral down to a watery grave below.

For the German bomber crews, it was now a no win situation. They were outnumbered over their target area, so much so that accurate bombing was virtually impossible. More and more fighter squadrons were moving into areas to cut off any retreat so that when they did decide to abort, trying to get into the protection of the cloud cover would be their only hope of survival.

As the last of the bombers were being chased back across the Channel, and many of the squadrons who had fought one of the heaviest air combats of the Battle of Britain retired to their respective aerodromes, another small raid had been detected and was approaching the Dorset town of Portland. It was just a small force of about ten He 111s from II./KG 55 and 10 Group scrambled RAF No.152 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.607 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires). The German target was the Woolston Spitfire factory which was hit. The bombing was not accurate and severe damage was kept to a minimum. RAF No.602 and RAF No.609 Squadrons both intercepted after the bombers attacked their target, and both claimed that they had destroyed two aircraft each. One bomber crashed in the Channel and another on its return to Villacoublay.

A small formation of Bf 110s from Epr.Gr 210, once the crack dive bombing Gruppe of the Luftwaffe, made an attack again on the Woolston factory complex at 1800 hours. Most of the British fighters that had been up on constant sorties during the afternoon had returned to their bases and by this time were busy being rearmed, refueled and many were undergoing their usual repairs from damage sustained during the hectic afternoon. Therefore the Bf 110s were free from any attack or interception by Hurricanes or Spitfires. The task of defense was by the AA gun batteries who put up a tremendous fight in defense with accurate gunfire, which although they did not shoot down any German aircraft, the barrage that they put up was so aggressive that not a single bomb was dropped onto the Spitfire factory.

As the afternoon attack came slowly to an end, one by one the often tired and exhausted pilots from both sides returned to their bases. By evening, ninety-nine bombers and fighters were counted as shot down from the German formations including Lt. Julius Haase, the Staffelkapitän of 3./JG 53 with five victories, who was shot down and killed. Numerous German pilots were shot down and taken prisoner by the British. Six victory Experte Lt Hans Berthel, the Gruppe-Adjutant of I./JG 52 baled out of his crippled Bf 109 following combat and was taken prisoner. Uffz. August Klick of 3.(J)/LG 2 and Uffz. Andreas Walburger of 2./JG 27 were both shot down and made POWs. This attrition rate of bombers and fighters forced Hitler to consider postponing "Unternehmen Seelöwe" and halting anymore daylight raids on London. It was clear to all Luftwaffe aircrews on this day that RAF Fighter Command was far from being a spent force and without air superiority the invasion could not proceed.

Fighter Command lost thirty-six aircraft damaged or destroyed, ten pilots killed or missing and thirteen wounded. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, watching the battle with Air Marshal Park at the command room at Uxbridge, declared that the "fifteenth of September 1940 was the day of our Victory!" This day was to belong to the Royal Air Force Fighter Command, and in future years was to become known as "Battle of Britain Day".

During the night the main German raids were centered on London with others on Liverpool, the Midlands, South Wales and Bristol. London continued to bear the brunt of the attack. The first hostile raids were plotted leaving the French Coast at Le Havre at about 2000 hours. They crossed the Coast at Shoreham and penetrated to the London area which was to be the main objective throughout the night. At about 2230 hours raids to London started to come from the Dieppe area crossing the coast between Selsey Bill and Dover. Another raid on London was conducted by He 111s of II./KG 27 around 2330 hours. Between 0100 and 0300 hours raids were coming in via the Thames Estuary and Essex. About fifteen raids were plotted out of the Cherbourg area to South Wales and the Bristol Channel, some of which penetrated to the Midlands and others to Liverpool. By 0130 hours these raids had withdrawn but the activity over London and the South-east continued until about 05:00 hours.

Over Belgium Sgt John Hannah (1921-47), a wireless operator and air gunner in Hampden P 1355 of No. 83 Squadron, was terribly burnt putting out a fire aboard his flak-ridden bomber, which returned to base safely after attacking Antwerp. (Victoria Cross)

 

[Glider]

Cleary this was a major effort on your part NJ, many thanks

 

[Njaco]

(15 September 1940 continued.......)

Just after 1000 hours, nineteen Dornier 17s of III./KG 76 took off from their airfield at Cormeilles-En-Vexin, near Paris. Once the Dorniers had formed up, they headed northwest towards London, to take part in what would be the fifth daylight bombing raid on the capital. The aiming point for the bombers was to be the maze of railway lines between the Thames and Clapham Common. Amongst the III Gruppe Dorniers was Werk Nr 2555, F1+FS, of the 8th Staffel, flown by Fw. R Heitsch. With him were Fw. S Schmid, Fw. H Pfeiffer, and Fw. M Sauter. Also on board was a new 'secret weapon'. An infantry flamethrower had been fitted in the Dornier's fuselage, facing rearwards. Any RAF fighter attacking from close behind was going to be assured of a warm reception, or so it was intended. Controlled by the radio operator, Fw Schmid, the new weapon would see action for the first time. If it didn't set the attackers on fire, it might at least deter them from getting too close. Should it prove successful, the weapon would be introduced on other bombers.

The Dorniers reached the outskirts of London without loss. The escorting fighters, and the advance guard of fighters 'free hunting' ahead, had done their job well. In the rear of the formation was Werk Nr 2555, it's secret weapon as yet unused. Soon Fw. Schmid reported a British fighter closing in from behind. Sgt Ray Holmes, in his RAF No 504 Sqdn Hurricane, closed in to four hundred yards before opening fire. As he did so, his windscreen was suddenly coated in black oil, which completely blocked his view. The flamethrower, obviously intended for use on the ground, was not working properly at 16,000 feet, giving a jet of flame only some 100 yards long. A lot of the oil had not caught fire, and it was this that had found it's way onto the Hurricane. Knowing that the airflow would clear the oil away, Ray Holmes waited for his view to be restored. As his windscreen cleared Ray realised that he was dangerously close to the Dornier, and ramming the stick forward, passed beneath the bomber.

If Ray Holmes had escaped the clutches of the secret weapon without damage, the same could not be said of the Dornier. The starboard engine had been hit by machine gun fire, forcing Rolf Heitsch to feather the propeller and leaving him to struggle with the controls. With one engine out, Rolf was forced to drop out of the bomber formation. Below was a bank of cloud, and he headed the Dornier towards it, knowing that it would shield him from enemy fighters. Before they could reach the enveloping cloud, they came under attack from several RAF fighters. Each time one approached, the flamethrower was triggered, but perversely it seemed to have the wrong effect! To the RAF pilots, the jet of flame and smoke made the Dornier look as if it was on fire, and sensing an easy victory they went in to attack! Several pilots reported attacking the Dornier. Sgt Robinson, of RAF No 257 Sqdn reported that the Dornier 'caught fire in the rear', P/O Campbell, of RAF No 242 Sqdn, stated that;

'When I opened fire, smoke was observed issuing from the lower part of the fuselage of the enemy aircraft', whilst Sgt Suidak, of No 302 Sqdn noted 'Black smoke pouring from the cockpit'.

He also reported that as another pilot attacked, the Dornier caught fire BEFORE the pilot fired on it.

Eventually, the flamethrower's operator, Fw Schmid was hit by machine gun fire, and severely wounded, which put an end to its use. It was obvious that all hope of reaching France had gone. With the radio operator badly wounded, there was no question of bailing out, and leaving him behind, a forced landing was the only option. The Dornier came to rest, undercarriage up, on the brow of a field above Castle Farm, on the outskirts of Shoreham Village, Kent, narrowly missing the high-tension cables that ran over the field. Having released the escape hatch, the crew of the Dornier carefully brought the unconscious Stefan Schmid out of the cockpit, and laid him on the grass. The radio operator was badly wounded in the chest, and Rolf Heitsch, who had trained as a doctor before the war, could see that there was nothing that could be done to save him. Fw Martin Sauter, and the observer, Fw Pfeiffer had also been wounded, but less seriously. Schmid was taken to Sevenoaks Hospital, but was found to be dead on arrival. The Castle Farm Dornier turned up at Lowestoft in late October 1940, when it was exhibited on the Crown Meadow in aid of the local Spitfire fund.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Thank you so much for your efforts on this, Njaco.

What a day - September 15, 1940.

MM
Proud Canadian

 

[Njaco]

16 September 1940 Monday
UNITED KINGDOM: At meetings held this morning, on both sides of the Channel, two completely different attitudes were emerging over the analysis of the previous days combat actions. Keith Park, the C-in-C of 11 Group, even though the success of the previous days events had exhilarated him, he still felt that improvements could be made. He was not going to rest on his laurels as there was always the chance that Göring would send his Luftwaffe over again if not with a stronger force. He was concerned that individual squadrons were failing to rendezvous at the right times at given vectored positions. That paired squadrons were meeting up with each other far too early and too low for that matter. And he also showed concern that paired squadrons were not committing themselves to the task that paired squadrons were supposed to do.

In Germany, if Göring was disappointed, Hitler was furious. London was supposed to have been decimated, the capital was supposed to have been flattened and in flames and the people were supposed to have been bombed almost into submission. The fighters of the Royal Air Force were to have been knocked out of the sky, after all, the Luftwaffe had send more than enough aircraft to put an end to Fighter Command once and for all. In actual fact, London did not receive the full scale bombing that was intended, but, compared with the number of German aircraft that had orders to bomb London, damage was only slight. The German fighters had no chance of destroying Fighter Command because they were met with far more fighters than they anticipated, and pilots that, after the lull of the previous week fought with renewed vigor and enthusiasm. Couple this with the attack on the night of the 15th and 16th by Bomber Command who repeated their raids of the previous night and sent 155 bombers to attack all the Channel ports along the French, Belgian and Dutch coasts including a large attack on the docks at Antwerp where the hundreds of barges were docked in preparation for the planned invasion of England.

Göring called a meeting of his Luftflotten commanders on this day;

"The British air force is far from finished, their fighters proved that yesterday. Their bombers are continually attacking our barge installations and although we must admit they have achieved some form of success, but I will only say and repeat what I have said before, and that is our orders to attempt full scale attacks on London, instead of the destruction of their air force will not achieve the success we need, it will only act as our demise."

A thought that was indeed shared by one of Germany's best fighter pilots. Commented Major Adolf Galland of III./JG 26, referring to the battle;

"Our greatest mistake was not keeping the pressure up on the airfields of southern England. Göring thought that he was master when he said that he was now in charge of the battle. He thought he was losing too many aircraft in attacking the RAF airfields, they were always there, not in great numbers, but they were always there. He thought that by trying to bomb London by night, he knew that Britain had no night fighter squadrons, he could devastate London and the people of Britain would be crying for mercy. This was his greatest mistake. He himself gave the RAF room to breathe, time to reorganize, time to rebuild. The result was, we were losing the Battle of Britain."

But it was always the fact that 'someone else was at fault'. Adolf Hitler placed the blame on Göring for the way that the attacks had been implemented. Göring in turn gave criticism to his fighter pilots because they did not give adequate protection to the bomber force, and in turn both fighter and bomber forces of the Luftwaffe initiated bitter arguments between each other. The bomber forces argued that much of the time forming up over the French coast was because the fighter escort failed to rendezvous at the correct time, while the fighter units claimed that it was the time that the bomber units took to form up over the airfields and that they had wasted precious time and most importantly precious fuel which shortened the amount of time that they could spend over England.

Göring decided that further daylight attacks on the British capital and other British cities and towns were right out of the question. His conversation with the Führer that morning was one that Hitler displayed his disappointment of the events of the previous day, there was no mention of future plans. His decision now, was to continue where he had left off prior to Hitler's intervention with his directive No.16, only his task was now made even harder because Fighter Command was now stronger than ever before, and the success of September 15th had given the leaders and the pilots of 11 Group renewed confidence. He would continue with daylight bombing of RAF fighter aerodromes and fighter production factories. This way, as before he could hope to destroy Fighter Command on the ground as well as in the air, just as he had planned in early July. To keep Hitler happy, he would mount a campaign of night attacks on London for as long as possible, knowing full well that the British fighters had no answer to night fighting.

The thought of any major raid on Britain was obviously out of the question. Conditions were in fact disastrous and only a few small feints were intercepted with the odd reconnaissance aircraft. The largest was an impending raid towards North Kent targets, but nothing really developed.

Although the weather was poor, an early raid was detected over the Channel at about 0730hours. British radar picked up a medium plot of nearly 350 aircraft heading directly towards London in several waves and spread out along the Kent coastline. By 0832 hours all the aircraft had re-crossed the Coast. No interception was made. 21 Fighter Squadrons were in the air, and it may have been on this account that the enemy turned away so soon.

One raid crossed the Estuary into Essex and towards London but soon turned back. This was confirmed as 100 plus, but turned out to be Bf 109s, probably looking for targets of opportunity rather than any pre-planned raid. Hurricanes of RAF No.605 Sqd were scrambled to intercept, but most of the German fighters had turned back and the squadron engaged in combat with the last remaining Bf 109s of JG 51. RAF No.605 Sqd appeared to damage two of the German fighters, but Major Werner Mölders attacked the Hurricane of P/O E.J. Watson and caused enough damage for it to make an emergency landing at Detling. It was the Kommodore's thirty-eighth victory.

A few German aircraft had been detected off the Suffolk coast, but made no attempt to cross. One of these was a reconnaissance Ju88 plotted off the east coast of Norfolk and Lincolnshire. Hurricanes of RAF No. 257 Sqd were scrambled from Martlesham Heath along with Spitfires of RAF No. 616 Sqd from Kirton-in-Lindsey. The Ju 88 was chased by a Spitfire of RAF No.616 Sqd, who after damaging the German bomber by gunfire, aborted the chase because of a critical fuel situation. The Spitfire ran out of fuel about 20 miles north of Cromer and Sgt T.C. Iveson was forced to abandon the aircraft. While the Spitfire sank in the North Sea, the pilot was picked up by a Navy motor torpedo boat and brought ashore at Great Yarmouth.

 

[Njaco]

(16 september 1940 continued....)

The few Luftwaffe planes on sorties that day also experienced the fuel shortage problem. During a protection flight in the morning, Hptm. Erich von Selle's II./JG 3 lost the bomber formation they were escorting in heavy cloud, despite weather reports to the contrary. Trying to return to France, the eighteen planes of von Selle's Gruppe found themselves running out of fuel. When they finally landed, eight of the planes had no measurable fuel left in their tanks. Two hours later, the Gruppe were ordered up for another escort mission. Hptm. von Selle refused, stating he was twenty-two planes understrength and could not afford to lose the rest. Told that it was an order, von Selle replied that he will take his flight up. If the cloud cover was too thick to see at 1,000 feet, he would take the planes to 3500 feet and order every man to bail out. The Gruppe received no more orders for the day.

Throughout the remainder of the day there were no large-scale raids made by the Luftwaffe, but only reconnaissance and fighter sweeps across southern England. Patrolling RAF squadrons made interceptions with a few of these raids. RAF No.73 Sqd Debden (Hurricanes), 257 Sqd Debden (Hurricanes) and 504 Sqd Hendon (Hurricanes) were ordered to patrol the north Kent coast in the vicinity of Gravesend. They returned after about one hour and the official record book of 257 Sqd stated that there was no contact made with the enemy.

It was hard to ascertain as to who shot down who on this day. Besides a few squadrons on training flights, only two RAF squadrons were reported to have flown on operational duty. Yet statistics indicate that nine German aircraft were shot down. Ten German aircraft, in fact did crash while on operational sorties, but who takes the credit for their destruction? The Luftwaffe lost one He 111, two He 115s and seven Ju 88s. Only three claims were awarded to the Jagdflieger. In addition to Major Werner Mölders kill, Uffz. August Dilling of 6./JG 3 and Oblt. Georg Claus of Stab./JG 51 were awarded with two Spitfires destroyed.

RAF Losses: 5 aircraft damaged or destroyed and 1 pilot wounded. Luftwaffe Losses: 18 aircraft damaged or destroyed, 17 pilots and aircrew killed or missing and 5 wounded.

As soon as darkness fell, the Blitz on London was renewed with a number of night bombing raids starting a little earlier than normal. Wave after wave approached the city of London with very little respite. Many heavy high explosive bombs were dropped in the West End and the City, starting serious fires, most of which however, came under control after a time. Minor bombing was reported from most districts in Greater London, and communications were interrupted. In all, 170 German aircraft dropped over 200 tons of high explosive. The targets followed a pattern very similar to that of the early bombing raids, and that was the London dock area, the residential districts of West Ham, East Ham, Hackney, Bethnal Green and Shoreditch. Bombing over the rest of the country during the night was rather more widespread. Others dropped their loads on the southern boroughs of Southwark, Bermondsey and Brixton, and in the west at Finchley, Willesden and Stanmore. More formations of German bombers made their way to Liverpool and Manchester, while others targeted Coventry, Birmingham and Bristol. The people of Britain were now to take the night bombing in their stride, from now on, the evening movement down to the shelter was to become a part of the daily ritual, for it was in these often cold and damp places, often cramped that people were to spend as much time down in their 'Anderson' as they did in their home. In London itself, the deep underground stations of the 'tube' became the nightime mecca for thousands. Beds and bunks lined the station platforms, and this too became so much a ritual for thousands, many of the voluntary services brought down pots of tea and plates of food, and as time went on entertainers and bands joined in and many an enjoyable concert was held deep down below the surface of London. In other towns and cities, the story was very much the same. The lifestyles of the people was now beginning to change, but the thing was now, for how long could the people last.

HEs fell in the grounds of Heaton Secondary Girls School for a second time, this time destroying an empty house adjoining the School. Eleven IBs were dropped on the Golf Links at Hebburn in the vicinity of Hebburn Lakes. No injury or damage.

The first of the 'Pirateneinsatze' or Pirate Attacks was carried out by a lone He 111 of I./KG 55 on the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton. But the raider soon aborted his mission and returned to its airbase at Dreux. Another raid on London by He 111s of I./KG 27 did succeed with bombs failing on the city shortly after 2100 hours. Another He 111 from the same Gruppe dropped its load on the ancient city of Bath.

A Heinkel 115C Seaplane from Seenotflugkdo 3/506 was severely damaged by AA gunfire during a torpedo attack on a convoy and force-landed on the sea 7 miles off Alnwick at 1500 hours. The crew took to their dinghy and tried to sink the plane by shooting at the floats, but were only partially successful. The crew of four were rescued and the plane was taken in tow by a fishing boat and towed, upside down, to Eyemouth Harbour and beached. The fishing boat crew possibly expecting a reward, got nothing, except the petrol in the tanks and some parachute silk for their wives.

 

[Njaco]

17 September 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM: During the morning, just as the Luftflotten commanders were giving instruction of the impending days raids, and the crews were being briefed, a communiqué came through stating that "Unternehmen Seelöwe" had yet again been postponed. It was due to the present circumstances, and the message was obviously under the direction of Hitler, he being the only one who could announce such a decision. Later, the German General Staff sent a message by radio to the commanding officer handling the loading and supply of troop-carrying aircraft in Holland. It gave the commanding officer the authorization to dismantle all of the air-loading equipment at all the Dutch airfields. Without this vital equipment, there could be no such invasion, and by the withdrawal of the air-loading equipment and possibly the barges at Antwerp, it appeared that this postponement was more like an abandonment.

In the deciphering rooms at Bletchley Park, the message was intercepted by Ultra loud and clear. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Cyril Newhall stated to his ministry that with this great news of the air-loading equipment being ordered to disband, and with the unreliable weather conditions that could be expected for the remainder of the year, any planned invasion would now not take place, not in 1940 anyway. In Germany, Hitler's new directive stated that "Unternehmen Seelöwe" could still be expected, even as late as October, but only if the air and weather conditions permitted, otherwise such an invasion could not now take place until 1941.

There was very little activity during the morning period. Radar had picked up several small blips over the Channel, but these being either German aircraft flying singularly or in pairs were ignored by Fighter Command as they were probably just weather or photo-reconnaissance aircraft and caused no threat. One German bomber came very close over the town of Dover and the air raid warning sounded but the bomber flew along the coastline for a while before turning back out over the Channel towards its base.

The weather was unsuitable for mass raids on London and in accordance with Goring's directive of the 16th September, Luftflotte 2 sent waves of fighters across, with a few bombers as bait, in the hope of luring 11 Group into an unprofitable battle.

In the afternoon a formation of Ju 88s was detected heading in a northerly direction over Bristol. Their target was believed to be the factory areas of north of Bristol. RAF No.152 Sqd (Spitfires) was scrambled to intercept. One of the Ju 88s was hit and it was further harassed by the Spitfires until it crashed near Warminster south-east of Bath. The pilot was killed while three others were captured, one of them being a Gruppenkommandeur. With the brightening of the weather allowing better visibility, another large formation was detected crossing the Channel from Calais. As they crossed the coastline between Dover and Dungeness, the Observer Corps had trouble identifying them. The German formation was only flying at 15,000 feet, but they were a large contingent of Bf 109s consisting of units from JG 26, JG 27 and JG 53, heading across the Kent coast.

11 Group dispatched at varying times a number of squadrons, most of them Hurricanes while No 12 Group had 5 Squadrons patrolling at 15,000 to 20,000 feet north of the Estuary. RAF No.17 Sqd, 73 Sqd, and 253 Sqd and the all Hurricane squadrons from Debden were vectored to the Hendon and Northolt area. The formation of Bf 109s, accompanied by a small number of Ju 88 bombers were heading in the general direction of Sheerness and Tilbury, and over the Kent countryside, quite a number of bombs were dropped indiscriminately indicating that a number of the Bf 109s had taken to the new role of carrying bombs. But over various areas of mid Kent, furious dogfights broke out involving Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 17, 303, 501, 504 and 607 Squadrons and Spitfires of RAF Nos. 19, 41 and 611 Squadrons.

One of the combat areas was in the Dover area. Heavily involved was RAF No.41 Sqd who took on a large formation of Bf 109s. Two of the Messerschmitts became sandwiched between RAF No.41 Sqd Spitfires and trailing smoke, dived down to low levels in a bid to make good their escape. Both of these managed to return to Wissant without any further attack being made on them. But three other Bf 109s were not so lucky. Two were shot down and crashed into the Channel, another was destroyed when it crashed near Deal, but not after RAF No.41 Sqd sustained some bruising from the German fighters. At 1535 hours, F/O J.G. Boyle's Spitfire was hit by gunfire from a Bf 109 over Manston, and had to return to Hornchurch. At 1540 hours, P/O J.N. Mackenzie's Spitfire was severely damaged and while the pilot was unhurt, his aircraft was beyond repair after it crash landed. P/O H.H. Chalder was another who had to return to base while P/O H.C. Baker of RAF No.41 Sqd had to make a forced landing at Stelling Minnis after he took a hit while in combat over Manston.

Over "Hells Corner" another Bf 109 broke away and attempted to return to its base after receiving damage, but the damage was too severe and it had to make a forced landing. This may have been the Bf 109E-1 of Uffz. Heinz Bock of 7./JG 26 who force-landed his machine with engine damage near Rye.

RAF No.501 Sqd took on some Bf 109s over Ashford but were not as lucky as RAF No.41 Sqd. 501 Squadron was to lose two Hurricanes in this engagement while claiming one victory. One of them was Sgt J.H. Lacey who managed to bale out of his stricken aircraft, while the other was Sgt E.J. Egan who went down with his Hurricane that had burst into flames. One of the Luftwaffe victors was Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke of Stab III./JG 53 who claimed a Hurricane over Ashford. Hptm. Eduard Neumann of Stab I./JG 27 claimed two Hurricanes over Gatwick. P/O Bennions of RAF No.501 Sqd described their only success of the day:

"After the commencement of the engagement, I found myself about 2,000 feet below a section of 5 Me109s. Two of the Me109s dived down onto me and I evaded by turning sharply right; then one dived away and as I turned to follow three more came down on me. After turning and twisting violently, I spun out and, on pulling out I found that one only had followed me down. I turned to engage and he disappeared into the clouds. I climbed back to 15,000 feet and sighted a loose formation of four Me109s circling. I attacked the rear one from the inside of a left hand turn and, after a short burst, I saw pieces fly off the aircraft, which then rolled over and spun inverted for about 8,000 feet and then dive straight into the ground midway between Canterbury and Herne Bay, near a very large wood."

RAF No.19 Sqd also got into the action and over north Kent was credited with two destroyed Messerschmitts. As it turned out, both were shot down by Sub Lt "Tony" Blake, who as it happens turned out to be the Navy's highest scoring fighter pilot. Oblt. Jakob Stoll of 9./JG 53 went missing in action and with fourteen victories, was presumed dead. The engine of 7./JG 26's Uffz. Karl-Heinz Bock's Messerschmitt seized and he force landed at Rye to become a prisoner of war.

Later at 1800 hours Hurricanes of RAF No. 151 Squadron scrambled from Digby, intercepted a He111.

The usual night raids began to commence at about 2000 hours. London was bombed again along with raids on Liverpool, South Wales, East Anglia, Middlesborough and Glasgow. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary and off the coasts of Kent and Suffolk. The first raids were on London where continuous waves of bombers pounded the city. Several He 111s of III./KG 27 returned over London with a midnight raid. Later in the evening, Junkers Ju 88s went on a bombing spree over Merseyside. The Dornier Do 17s of KGr 606 flying out of Brest targeted Liverpool. Again, the bombing was either not accurate or the Germans just dropped their bombs anywhere as long as they were over the city. There were plenty of industrial and dock areas that could be bombed, but the residential areas were also taking a beating and again, many lives were lost. The cities of Newcastle and Durham were also hit, but many houses were damaged and destroyed. Reports of bombs landing in open country were again reported well away from towns and cities. One HE was dropped in a field south of Southbrook Farm and West of Catcote Farm, West Hartlepool. Cattle were grazing in the field with the result that one was seriously injured and another slightly injured. Windows at Southbrook Farm and in adjacent residential property were damaged.

Night raiders use the 1000-kg blast bombs for the first time. Adapted from sea mines these cylindrical objects are about eight feet long and two feet in diameter. Each descends suspended from a 27-foot diameter silk parachute. Thin case and large charge combine to produce a colossal hollow bang, tremendous shock waves and extensive blast damage over a quarter mile radius.

Fireman Harry Errington (b. 1910) rescued two trapped colleagues after a direct hit on a building which was being used as a shelter by auxiliary firemen. (George Cross)

Losses: Luftwaffe 8: Fighter Command 8.

Victory came at 2345 hours to one of the Defiants of RAF No.141 Sqd converted to night fighter operations and based at Biggin Hill. A number of Junkers Ju 88s were detected crossing the coast near Dover and 11 Group dispatched a flight from RAF No.141 Sqd. Interception was made north of Ashford and Sgt Lawrence and Sgt Chard began their attack on 'B3+OL'. The badly damaged bomber finally crashed in a residential street in Maidstone killing all the aircrew.

 

[T Bolt]

Keep it comming Chris!

 

[Njaco]

18 September 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM: It now appeared that the Royal Air Force were starting to gain the upper hand, but even though London suffered serious damage and hundreds of casualties from 7 September onwards, the battle was far from being over. Adolf Hitler may have postponed the invasion once again, but the intensity of day and especially night raids were about to increase. Göring was under instructions to continue bombing attacks on the British capital although personally, he would have like to revert back to destroying the fighters, the airfields and ground support installations of the RAF. Daytime attacks would still continue, and by increasing Bf 109 and Bf 110 escort duties to the bombers, he could hopefully destroy at least some of the RAF by forcing them to send fighters into the air. But with instructions to concentrate on bombing London, it was going to be a big task if the targets were not the fighter aerodromes themselves. Night time bombing would continue, and this was to become more widespread with greater intensity and with more high HEs followed by thousands of incendiary bombs.

Conditions were expected to be a continuation of the previous day except that the low to medium cloud that brought the rain periods would disappear. The day was expected to be bright and clear although the squally winds would continue. At 0900 hours 150 German aircraft were plotted concentrating in the Calais area. At 0927 hours about fifty aircraft crossed the coast near Hythe followed by another fifty. The Observer Corps reported tiny specks at high altitude which indicated that it was a formation of fighters flying at heights in the region of 20,000 feet between Folkestone and North Foreland. But they weren't only fighters. II(Schlacht)./LG 2 committed 21 Bf 109s in a bombing attack against the Tilbury docks where several bombs were dropped hitting the rail triangle and houses west of the docksat 0953 hours.

The other German fighters including those of JG 26 reached Maidstone and decided to break up into two separate formations. One headed towards Sheerness while the other veered north towards the open waters of the Thames Estuary. At varying intervals, a total of fifteen squadrons of Fighter Command were scrambled to intercept. Only six of the fifteen Fighter Command squadrons made contact between Maidstone and Chatham. These were RAF No.17 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.46 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.73 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.257 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.501 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.603 Sqd (Spitfires). Most of these squadrons, once they observed that the enemy were all Bf 109 fighters, made their presence felt but broke off any form of attack in accordance with Park's instructions not to be drawn into combat with German fighters unless they were escorting their bombers.

A couple of flights from both RAF No.501 Sqd and RAF No.603 Sqd did become involved in combat after being jumped by the Bf 109s. One pilot baled out of his Hurricane over Staplehurst while a Spitfire pilot of RAF No.603 Sqd was killed after his aircraft was shot up and crashed near Ashford. Oblt. Roloff von Aspern of 4./JG 54 and Fw. Hermann Neuhoff of 7./JG 53 were each credited with a Spitfire destroyed over Ashford.

No sooner had a number of the squadrons landed that others were scrambled and vectored to intercept German formations detected over Dover and over the Thames Estuary. Some of the squadrons that were scrambled earlier were vectored to new locations while more squadrons were released. A number of the squadrons engaged the Germans over the Estuary and a number of individual combat actions take place at various locations at the mouth of the River Thames. RCAF No.1 Sqd (Hurricanes) became involved and had one of its fighters shot down, but P/O E.W.B. Beardmore baled out and received slight injuries. Hptm. Dietrich Hrabak from Stab II./JG 54 was credited with a Spitfire at this time. RAF No.66 Sqd (Spitfires) engaged Bf 109s over North Kent and one of the Spitfires was hit and the pilot, Sgt D.F. Corfe sustained injuries after he managed to crash land the aircraft at Perham. RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires) managed to turn a formation of Bf 109s around while over Sheerness and continued the chase as the German fighters headed towards Dover and the Channel. Three Spitfires were damaged with two of their pilots receiving injuries while the third was unhurt.

By 1200 hours the first German bombing raid of the day was detected coming in north of Dover. It consisted of a small formation of Ju 88s escorted by 100 Bf 109 fighters from JG 3, JG 26, JG 51 and JG 27. Further raids crossed the coast at Deal and also proceeded to Maidstone. These three movements constituted the first wave. At 1245 hours the second wave consisting of three raids of 54 aircraft crossed the coast near Dover leaving 12+ aircraft circling in the Straits. At 1300 hours, the two raids were already in the London area with another 120 aircraft distributed from Rye to the Mouth of the Thames. The Stabschwarm of JG 26 tore into the Hurricanes of RAF No. 46 Sqd who were scrambled to intercept. Major Adolf Galland from Stab./JG 26 shot down three Hurricanes in twenty minutes to bring his score to thirty-five kills and Hptm. Walter Oesau of Stab III./JG 51 shot down his twenty-eighth victim over Ashford. But there were losses. Oblt. Rudolf Krafftschick of 1./JG 27 went missing in action over England while Uffz. Ernst Schulz of 3./JG 1 and Gefr. Walter Glockner of 9./JG 27 were both shot down and captured, Uffz. Schulz, wounded so severely that he died of his wounds three months later. At 1300 hours aircraft started to return home and by 1345 hours, the majority had left.

Shortly after 1530 hours contacts of the third raid of the day were made by the south coast radar stations. Again the German bombers were forming up in position over Calais, where two separate formations were detected. Early sightings indicated that there were between one hundred and one hundred and fifty aircraft heading towards the English coast and the Observer Corps reported that they were crossing the coastline between Dungeness and Folkestone and towards Ashford and Chatham. This time, it was reported that there were no sign of fighter escorts, and that the formation was made up of mainly Do 17 and Ju 88 bombers of III./KG 77. What fighters there were conducted a sweep up the Thames but turned back before they could be intercepted. Fighter Command put up at least ten squadrons where most of the action was taking place over Maidstone and Chatham.

II(Schlact)./LG 2 were back over Britain with an escort of 100 fighters and went after the Port Victoria oil depot at 1615 hours. Fighter Command dispatched another twelve squadrons who engaged, but not before many bombs fell on the dockyards and surrounding areas of Chatham. The Medway Oil Company, Port Victoria, was attacked and although no damage was done to the Oil Company's premises, an Admiralty Tank was set on fire and soon under control.

By now, a number of squadrons had engaged the Luftwaffe over the north Kent coast with many squadrons that had left aerodromes in the protective area around London. Park again called on 12 Group and in response Woodhall scrambled the 'Duxford Wing' to patrol the area from London to Gravesend. Flying up the Thames, two groups of between twenty and thirty bombers were heading for London. The wing found the two formations south of the river below Gravesend and Northfleet and ordered the squadrons to attack. Leaving RAF No. 611 Sqd on patrol and RAF No. 19 Sqd to look after any escorts, Bader led his three Hurricane squadrons in an almost vertical diving attack on the first formation. Immediately they broke up the formations with Bader's RAF No.242 Sqd diving into the centre with all guns blazing. Against the white of the cloud base the German bombers stood out almost beckoning to be picked off one by one. The sky was a kaleidoscope of frantically weaving bombers and marauding fighters leaving trails in the air of criss-crossing vapor trails. One by one the bombers went down in flames and by 1730 hours the action was still continuing to the south of London. The 'Big Wing' continued its success in the combat claiming thirty bombers destroyed while losing none although in actually only nineteen bombers were lost. Many of the bombers scattered going in all different directions, but it was estimated that sixty managed to get though and head towards London. Most bombs fell on the central area of the city, but within forty minutes most of the bombers were heading back towards the coast.

By 1930 hours, the first of the night-time bombers came over and the night raids began. Approximately 200 aircraft were plotted approaching Dungeness, the first time that formations of aircraft were plotted at night. From 2100 hours onwards steady flows of German aircraft were mainly concentrated on the London area. London was again hit bad and many buildings which had just their fires extinguished where hit again and it started all over. Just before midnight, heavy bombing occurred along the Thames and as the night wore on this was extended closer to the city centre. As one formation arrived, dropped its bombload, another formation was approaching lining up in the queue to add further destruction as the other formation left. Other targets were Liverpool and Manchester where the Merseyside docks received some heavy attacks. Although other bombs were dropped in various areas of Kent, Surrey, Herefordshire and Middlesex, it was believed that they were bombs from aircraft dropped at random to lighten the load for the return journey.

WESTERN FRONT: Hptm. Günther "Fränzl" Lützow of Stab./JG 3 was awarded the Ritterkreuz.


(Thanks to Juha for corrections!)

 

[Njaco]

19 September 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM: Heavy cloud was expected to continue throughout the day and rain periods, heavy at times was expected over most of Britain. The Channel areas could expect a very low cloud base with early morning fog and mist patches in coastal districts. Ironically, it was not on the south coast that the first attacks of the day occurred. A small formation made a surprise attack on Liverpool. No serious damage was done as most of the German aircraft were flying in singly or in pairs. Later in the morning, a number of Ju 88s were heading towards London. These were met by RAF No.249 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.302 Sqd (Hurricanes) over north Kent. The Ju 88s scattered and were turned back with one of the bombers being shot down by F/O J. Kowalski of RAF No.302 Sqd at 1130 hours and it crashed near Bury St Edmunds. Another was to sustain engine damage and crash landed near Cambridge.

During the rest of the day, the Luftwaffe made a number of reconnaissance flights over the Channel and off the English east coast over the North Sea. One of the aircraft, a Ju 88 was spotted crossing the coast near Harwich at 1045 hours and was soon intercepted by British fighters and it crashed on the coast near Orfordness. Everything was rather quiet up until 1600 hours when radar picked up small blips off the coast near Swanage.

RAF No.152 Sqd consisting of two Spitfires, was scrambled from Warmwell. Not long afterwards a bomber was sighted over the Channel. The German plane, a Ju 88, disappeared into the murk but moments later it reappeared about two miles in front. The squadron closed in, making alternate quarter attacks from left and right, aiming first at the gunners positions and then at each engine. The Ju 88 was badly battered and it dived into the sea. This downed Ju 88 was probably one from 1./KG 51 that was recorded as being shot down by British fighters off Britain's south coast, although the cause of crash was stated to be "Cause Unknown". Those killed were Obfw. Luckard and Uffz. Henker while Fw. Walter and Gefr. Roeder were listed as missing.

Across the Channel, the Germans were busy during the day cleaning up the Channel ports from Calais to Antwerp after Wellingtons, Hampdens and Whitleys unleashed another successful night attack on the barges during the night of the 18th/19th September. It was the biggest operation yet by Bomber Command on the barge installations when 194 bombers were involved. Of these, 187 crews reported that their mission was successful. The German invasion fleet started to pull out of the Channel ports to avoid further damage from Bomber Command.

Inclement weather conditions in the evening, curtailed many German operations although scattered attacks did occur. Mine laying continued along the coastline, Northumberland and County Durham were bombed although no serious damage was reported. Liverpool prepared for night raids and many sirens sounded, but it appears that German aircraft kept well out into the Irish Sea as no attack was made on the city. A formation of German bombers was detected off the Welsh coast at 1950 hours and appeared to be heading for the port of Liverpool, but they were lost and there was no record of them reaching Liverpool. The London area came under warning signals at 1955 hours and a number of separate raids on the capital commenced at 2100 hours, and damage was done at Heston aerodrome in Middlesex when bombs destroyed a hangar and a number of buildings. Thirteen aircraft were damaged, some seriously. These included Spitfires of the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit, a Wellington bomber that was 'just visiting' and the famous Lockheed 12A that was used by the famous war photographer Sidney Cotton. In London, a bomb exploded at the entrance to a large air raid shelter in the borough of Tottenham and estimates put the casualty count at about seventy. Bombs fell at Edmonton, Golders Green and Willesden, but damage was not serious. By 2100 hours, much of the heavy cloud cover either thinned out or cleared, especially in the North Wales and north west coast of England and a number of German aircraft were spotted. Most came under AA gunfire, but there were no reports of any of the bombers being brought down.

The weather seriously hampered Bomber Commands operations. Only a handful of Blenheims left for a raid on Dunkirk Harbour bombing German shipping and buildings.

Losses: Luftwaffe, 9; RAF, 0.

In general, it was a day of spasmodic and scattered raids, quite often only consisting of a single German bomber. It was just the second time during the battle that Fighter Command did not suffer any casualties with the exception that one aircraft of RAF No.257 Sqd suffered engine failure while on convoy patrol but landed safely. But the Luftwaffe did sustain a number of casualties. Excluding about six Luftwaffe bombers that crashed on landing on internal flights or crashed on take off, there were a number of them that crashed after being involved in operations against the RAF. One Ju 88 of 4(F)/121 had to make a forced landing at Oakington aerodrome due to engine failure while on a photo-reconnaissance flight and was involved with British fighters and its crew captured. Another Ju 88 of 5(F)/122 was involved in a British fighter attack and had to return to base carrying one dead and one seriously injured crewmember. A Do17 of 7./KG 2 was attacked by Spitfires over southern England and although it managed to return to France it crashed. Another Do17 of 2./KG 3 was believed to have suffered damage from AA gunfire and crashed on landing causing minor damage to the aircraft. 3./KG 55 also lost a He 111 to anti-aircraft fire during the raid on London and it crashed in Essex. A Ju 88 was shot down by fighters over London with all the crew either killed or missing. A He 111 of 4./KG 4 was pursued by Hurricanes over the Thames Estuary and was last seen heading out towards the North Sea and was presumed to have crashed into the sea. The crew of a He111 were captured after their aircraft was brought down by AA gunfire near Bishops Stortford in Herefordshire.

RAF No. 71 was formed at RAF Church Fenton with Brewster Buffalos. These were unsuitable for European conditions and Hawker Hurricanes replaced them from November. The RAF picked an Englishman, W. M. Churchill, to be Squadron Leader. The squadron became operational at RAF Kirton-in-Lindsey on 5 February 1941 but moved in April to RAF Martlesham Heath. The squadron's first confirmed victory came on 21 July 1941 during a bomber escort mission when Pilot Officer Dunn destroyed a Bf 109F over Lille.

GERMANY: Hitler formally announced that "under the present circumstances it is not possible to contemplate any invasion plans against England" and ordered the assembly of the invasion fleet to be stopped, and the shipping in the Channel ports to be dispersed "so that the loss of shipping space caused by enemy air attacks may be reduced to a minimum". The invasion was now postponed indefinitely and there would be no further discussion on the matter until the spring when the weather conditions would more suited to any implementation of an invasion. Plans were put into place where the majority of German troops, that had been placed in readiness for an invasion of Britain, were now given fresh orders and were posted to alternative fronts. Most of them were to go to the east in preparation for "Operation Barbarossa" that was to take place the following year, some had been sent to Crete while the remaining troops dismantled all the barges at the various ports along the Channel coast.

Of course this news did not reach Britain, as they remained unaware of the situation. But what was making news in Germany, was the headlines in most of the German newspapers. They accused RAF Bomber Command of murdering twenty-one deficient children at Bethel and stated that this bloody act was cause for revenge. Yet these same newspapers drowned in their own glee in reporting that German bombers had attacked London with devastating results killing thousands of civilians which included hundreds of children. Another newspaper, The Diplo stated that Germany was waging war with clean weapons and in a chivalrous manner.

But although all plans now had been postponed, that was not say that hostilities against Britain were to cease. Air attacks were to continue, especially at night. The regular daylight sortie was still to occur which kept Fighter Command busy, but the continuous bombing of British cities and towns was to achieve nothing, except that Hitler hoped that it would demoralize the people. But in actual effect it had the opposite. The more the Luftwaffe bombed Britain, the stronger the people became.

 

[Glider]

Never knew about Buffalo's going into action in the ETO, let alone claiming an Me109F

 

[Njaco]

20 September 1940 Friday
"ENTER THE JABO"
UNITED KINGDOM: It was another of those mornings where there was an abundance of blue sky and scattered cloud, but the radar screens at the south coast radar stations were totally clear. The quiet of the early morning was broken at 1030 hours when radar picked up a German formation that was coming across the Channel from the direction of Calais and by 1100 hours a formation of about twenty-two Bf 109s of II./LG 2 at 15,000 feet crossed the coast at Dungeness, with other formations of fifty plus Bf 109s crossing the coast in the region of Dover. The LG 2 Messerschmitts were flying the first 'Jabo' raid, bombing from a medioum height and supported by several Jagdgruppen flying a freie jagd. Several Gruppen from JG 26 led by their Kommodore were escort for the Jabos. The radar at Foreness picked up another formation that had stayed out to sea and came in through the Thames Estuary. It consisted of several waves of Bf 109s and Ju88s that headed straight through into Kent. This was another change of tactic by the Luftwaffe, although it was not the first time that they had sent in Bf 109s en masse on daytime attacking raids.

Fighter Command released fifteen squadrons including RAF No.41 Sqd, RAF No.72 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.92 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.222 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.253 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No.605 Sqd (Hurricanes). Once it was determined that the main formations were made up of fighters, 11 Group issued a recall for the squadrons already heading for interceptions. They soon countermanded the order when it became clear that these were bomb-carrying fighters.

The Luftwaffe had the upper hand by sheer weight of numbers. It was a possibility that both waves of German fighters were targeting London, but over the Kentish countryside, what the RAF fighter pilots lacked in numbers they made up for in skill even if they did sustain many casualties. The German aircraft converged on East London and the attack reached Biggin Hill, Kenley, the Inner Thames Estuary and Hornchurch. The main combat action was over the fields of Kent and at the mouth of the Thames near Southend and Sheppy with neither formation making much progress towards their objective. LG 2 managed to cross the coast at 25,000 feet, drop to 12,000 feet and drop their bombs over London unchallenged by the defenders. HEs were dropped near the viaduct on the Lewes Road in Brighton. Eleven persons were killed and several injured. Water supply was affected for a short time. there was major damage reported and fires from Dock Head to London Bridge, including Kitchen's Wharf, Shad Thames. All the Jabos returned to France safely, the only loss being a Bf 109 from 9./JG 27. When finally released from escort duties, the staffel leaders of JG 26 went into the attack.

One of the first aircraft of Fighter Command to go down was the Spitfire of P/O H.L. Whitbread of RAF No.222 Sqd at 1115 hours. A Bf 109 came from above and took him by surprise and the Spitfire crashed at Higham near Rochester killing the pilot. The victorious Luftwaffe pilot was Major Galland, the Kommodore of JG 26 and the Spitfire was his thirty-sixth victory. RAF No.222 Sqd 'B' Flight reformed after this attack but was bounced yet again, this time possibly by II./JG 2 and lost two more Spitfires over the Thames Estuary.

At about 1130 hours, RAF No.253 Sqd had three Hurricanes shot down between Ashford and Maidstone. Two of the crashed Hurricanes were credited to Hptm. Johannes Seifert of 3./JG 26. All three pilots, P/O A.R.H. Barton, Sgt A.R. Innes and an unnamed pilot all escaped serious injury. P/O W.J. Glowacki was unhurt as his Hurricane of RAF No.605 Sqd was hit by gunfire from a Bf 109 but was one of the lucky ones in being able to return to base. By 1135 hours, RAF No.92 Sqd lost two pilots when they became seriously involved in combat in the Dover/Dungeness area. One Spitfire crashed at West Hougham and another crashed in the Channel, both the victims of JG 51's Kommodore, Major Mölders. Bringing his tally to forty, he was awarded the Eichenlaub on returning back to base, the first pilot so honored. Jafu 2 claimed fifteen fighters for the loss of two Bf 109s but Fighter Command's true losses were 8 fighters lost and 4 damaged.

The sheer weight of numbers were causing all sorts of headaches for both Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons. The techniques involved when fighter was against fighter were quite different to those when the Bf 109s were involved with providing escort. Günther Rall of 8./JG 52 commented;

" We in JG 52 were very inexperienced. In two months our strength fell from thirty-six pilots to just four. We really wasted our fighters. We didn't have enough to begin with, and we used them in the wrong way, for direct close escort. We were tied to the bombers, flying slowly - sometimes with flaps down - over England. We couldn't use our altitude advantage nor our superiority in a dive. Of course, the Spitfire had a marvelous rate of turn, and when we were tied to the bombers and had to dogfight them, that turn was very important."

Losses: Luftwaffe 8: Fighter Command 8

The morning's attack was the only main combat of the day. But it had been a terrible blow to Fighter Command. Eight aircraft were lost with five pilots killed or missing while the Luftwaffe lost four aircraft. Of the five RAF pilots killed in the attack, four of them at least were experienced seasoned pilots, pilots that were still badly needed. The Bf 109 pilots, whether experienced or not had this day gained a slight advantage by downing more British fighters than they had lost themselves.

The Jabo raid was pronounced an unqualified success and Goring immediately ordered that all eight of the Jagdgeschwadern operating against Britain were to convert fully one third of their aircraft to fighter-bombers. Specially formed teams of mechanics quickly carried out the conversions and between 20 September and 1 October, the aircraft of one staffel in each Gruppe or one Gruppe within each Geschwader, were fitted with bomb racks, creating a Jabo force of some 200 - 250 fighter bombers. Major Galland was frustrated with this, commenting that operating the Bf 109 in this role was behaving like a fool whose sword has become blunt in battle and, rather than sharpen the blade, turns it around and tries to use the hilt. General Osterkamp, leader of the fighters under Luftflotte 2, complained to the Luftwaffe Chief-of-Staff and was told:

"We have very reliable information that the English are completely demoralized. The next bomb might be the one that will make them crack."

WESTERN FRONT: A Ju 88D-1 belonging to 1./ Küstenfliegergruppe 106 took off from Fliegerhorst Barth near Stralsund on a navigation training flight. When it was over Hærup, 15 kilometres southwest of Hobro the weather had become foggy and the Ju 88 was heard circling the area, becoming lower with each pass. At 1730 hours it was too low and one wing touched a field belonging to Farmer Niels Jensen. The aircraft cart wheeled across the field and "became smaller and smaller" while breaking up. One flyer was thrown out of the wreck while the rest remained inside the wreckage. The Ju 88 was a total loss and the crew of four died. Navigator Oblt. z. See Hans Helmut Thiele, pilot Uffz. Otto Harbich, wireless operator Ogfr. Hans-Joachim Freund and Student Pilot Gefr. Heinz Schlegel were all laid to rest in Friedrichshaven cemetery.

 

[Crimea_River]

Tsk, tsk Chris. Pic of a 109F in the BoB thread?

 

[Njaco]

I was waiting for someone to catch that. Only pic I found of a jabo.

(slaps self on arm and tweaks his own nipples)

 

[Njaco]

21 September 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM: Early morning dawned with cloudless skies with no sign of the Luftwaffe and it was to remain that way for most of the day. Radar picked up an occasional aircraft, but these were believed to be on reconnaissance flights as they kept clear of the English coast. This was to be one of the quietest days of the battle, with more action being seen behind the scenes than in the air. But just as the Battle of Britain in the air seemed to be slowing down, so was the possibility of any German invasion for at least this year. Now, almost into the month of October, the days would be becoming shorter, the weather would soon deteriorate with the waters of the Channel becoming rougher and the signs from the German held Channel ports indicated that Bomber Command had all but destroyed any hope of the German infantry using the ports as a dispersal point for the Channel crossing.

In general, this was an exceptionally quiet day. Small nuisance raids by small formations of German aircraft had attacked both Kenley and Biggin Hill aerodromes but these were thwarted by fighters from Kenley, Biggin Hill and Croydon. The Hawker Aircraft Factory was bombed and machine-gunned at 0833 hours by a Ju 88 of LG 1. The boiler house was hit and unexploded bombs were in the dope shop and main shop. The effect on production was small and only slight casualties were reported. Small raids were made against targets at Weybridge, Ramsgate and Rye and many more reconnaissance flights across southern England. The only large raid during daylight materialized at about 1800 hours when over 200 aircraft crossed the coast in several waves and made for the airfields south of London. All five squadrons of the 'Duxford Wing' were scrambled along with Spitfires of RAF No. 41, 72, 92 and 603 Squadrons and Hurricanes of RAF No. 253 and 501 Squadrons to intercept the raid.

RAF No.238 Sqd accounted for one aircraft destroyed, a Ju 88 near Tangmere just before 1500 hours, while the Spitfires of RAF No.602 and RAF No.611 Squadrons accounted for one each destroyed. One of the Do17s damaged by RAF No.802 Sqd managed to get back to the French coast, but was to crash land at Landerneau, killing all on board. Major Galland, the Kommodore of JG 26, gained the Luftwaffe's only success, a Spitfire west of Ashford from RAF No. 92 Sqd which force-landed near Hildenborough. It was his thirty-seventh victory.

The usual night raids continued on London and Liverpool which was now becoming a regular occurrence. Bombing was again chiefly directed against the East End and the Dock areas where very serious fires resulted. Although the East End of London still came under constant bombardment, other targets in and around London were now being hit. Grand Union Canal was bombed at 1030 hours and the explosion cracked the wall of Limehouse Cut and also damaged part of a warehouse. Liverpool and adjoining areas were also the scenes of bombing resulting in several fires. Mines were dropped in the Thames Estuary, off the Yorkshire coast, in the Tyne area and off the East coast of Scotland. The raids dropped a mine on Hornchurch's landing ground which failed to explode, seriously damaged Bethnal Green medical works and started a fire in Howard's Timber Yard, Poplar, attended by 80 pumps.

A parachute mine that delivered itself into central Ipswich could not be defused and had to be blown in-situ. The controlled explosion produced a crater 50 feet wide and 25 feet deep, demolished 70 houses, damaged 750 and broke windows 650 yards away.

Lt. John MacMillan Stevenson Patton (b. 1915), Royal Canadian Engineers, towed a bomb from an aircraft factory to a bomb crater, where it went off harmlessly. (George Cross). Lt-Cdr Richard John Hammersley Ryan (b. 1903) and his assistant, CPO Reginald Vincent Ellingworth (b. 1898), who had shared many dangerous assignments, were killed when a sensitive magnetic mine, which was dangling from a parachute in a warehouse, went off as they tackled it. (George Cross for both). Mr. Leonard John Miles, ARP, saved several lives when he left his air-raid shelter to warn others nearby of an unexploded bomb. He was fatally wounded when it went off. (George Cross).

Losses: Luftwaffe 11: Fighter Command 0.

To Churchill's suggestion that one Pole is worth three Frenchmen, General Lord Gort replied that it is nearer ten.

Official permission was given to use the London Underground as an air raid shelter.

 

[Njaco]

22 September 1940 Sunday
UNITED KINGDOM: Again, just like the day previous turned out to be a relatively quiet day and was far from the usual 'business as normal' that had been experienced during the latter part of August into early September. In general things had quieted down considerably and one would possibly have feelings that the worst was over. Gone were the waves upon waves of bombers and fighter escorts that had previously crossed the Channel with monotonous regularity. The daytime activities had now slowed down to just the occasional bomber formation being detected and over the last few days the Luftwaffe had tried out the new tactic of massed Bf 109s. But these hardly created any impression or panic and combat losses on both sides were fairly even, and considerably low. This day would have the smallest number of Fighter Command sorties since the start of the battle.

The day opened to many fog covered areas and a mist layer remained for most of the morning period. The first air activity of the day was during the late morning when a formation of Bf 109s managed to get through and fly high over London. Two RAF squadrons were dispatched to intercept, but there appears not to be any record of action and the Luftwaffe database does not show if any of the fighters were shot down in the area.

A lone Ju 88 on a photo or weather reconnaissance mission was detected over the Channel south of the Isle of Wight and RAF No.234 Squadron from Middle Wallop sent one flight to intercept. The Junkers was shot down and made a belly landing in the sea. All the crew managed to get out of the sinking aircraft and were captured by British authorities. Another small number of German aircraft got through and according to the station records book at Fowlmere, they came under attack at 1530 hours. One Spitfire on the ground was destroyed and a number were damaged. There was no damage to any buildings or to the airfield. There is a possibility that the attack on Fowlmere, was by the Bf 109s that were detected earlier over London.

The afternoon was again peaceful, much to the delight of the aircrews, although one station commander stated to one of his squadron leaders "....that if things remain this quiet, you sure you won't get bored!!" There was a report that 4 HEs fell at Queens Crescent at 1715 hours without damage. But during the evening, as usual, things started to change. The usual night activity started at an early hour, the first raids having been plotted arriving during the hours of daylight. Wave upon wave of Heinkels, Junkers and Dorniers threw everything at London. The city had many heavy nights of bombing, but this was by far the heaviest. By 2030 hours there was very considerable activity concentrated almost exclusively on the London area. By midnight, it looked as if there was a sunset over London, the night sky was that red. South of the River several fires were started but in most cases these were quickly extinguished. There were very large fires raging at Dagenham and Woolwich. The fire in the Royal Arsenal Timber Field was the result of bombing, but at 0328 hours on the 23rd this increased to two major conflagrations, involving the Arsenal. 100 houses were demolished and 100 damaged and direct hits were registered on two Air Raid Shelters killing between thirty and fifty people in addition to numerous others injured. The British Museums King Edward buildings were damaged and Mile End 'tubestation was closed by a direct hit.

Fighter Command sent up a number of Defiant and Blenheim night fighters, but with Britain night fighting ability still in its infancy, and about a dozen 'nighties' up against an estimated 125 bombers, their task was almost an impossibility. After forty five minutes they returned to their bases. But the first known victim of German night intruder patrols was shot down near Thornaby in Yorkshire, - a Whitley bomber of RAF No.58 Squadron.

The weather conditions in the north were considerably different to those in the south. This is shown by three Hurricanes of 85 Squadron who were at Church Fenton who crashed in bad weather conditions. All three were on a routine patrol off the coast when bad visibility caused them trouble in locating base. All three had extinguished their fuel and had to make forced landings well short of Church Fenton aerodrome. F/L G.Allard made his forced landing at Clitheroe, P/O J.E.Marshall forced landed at Burnley while P/O J.A.Hemingway made his force landing outside the town of Burnley.

Losses: Luftwaffe 17: Fighter Command 1

GERMANY: Flight testing begins on the unpowered airframe of the Heinkel He 280 V1 twin turbojet fighter. The He 280 was towed aloft by a Heinkel He 111B bomber and cast off for gliding flight.