This Day in the Battle of Britain

I'll have to think a bit on that. My first impression is that Park and Douglas shepherded their forces too much. I'm leaning towards the opinion that if the RAF used everything available in the first few weeks to put a hurtin' on the Luftwaffe, it might not have gone on so long - who knows. And it might have gone differently for the RAF if dumb pride on the Luftwaffe's part hadn't blinded them. Reading the book "Miracle of Dunkirk" by Walter Lord and I can only surmise that Goering was eager to show his buddy his planes could do the job after being embarassed at Dunkirk.

Hate to do this guys but I've found some more info and pics and I'm updating parts of the thread. If it helps, the post should state update by njaco at the bottom. But its some great stuff.

Still want to apply gentle pressure on you about a summary NJ. I see it as an important end point to reach

Ok will do.

While I believe there was no clear winner, the UK comes out on top as winner for the fact that it destroyed the plans of Hitler and created the first true opponent for Germany. Add in the fact that it woke up Wash DC that the Brits weren't going to go down quietly and were a worthwhile endeavour for the US.

For me, it appears as the proving ground for many tranis of thought between the wars as to how to implement this new war machine - the airplane - into battle plans. Both sides lived and learned from mistakes ( the Brits with 'Vic' formations and the Germans with restricted close fighter support of bombers among others). The one thing I get out of this is how so different the two sides were in the armed forces. While a pilot in the RAF could go against convention, such as Malan with the finger four, The LW pilot really had no outlet and looked upon the daily orders as tiring and sometimes useless which destroyed moral and cohesion. While I think the LW airman was better trained, the RAF pilot had a cause.

But I will tell you, there are so many factors that come up when looking at this period, I sometimes find it hard to pinpoint one particular 'Ah-hah' moment.

"tranis of thought" I didnt know we had thoughtful cross dressing pilots in WWII.......

Seriously I think I agree with you on all points. Bravo Zulu NJ

NJACO .....

Britain comes out a clear winner simply because it accomplished its strategic and tactical goals.

For tactical goals, keep control of the air and preventing the destruction of the RAF.
For strategic goals, preventing an invasion of the homeland.

I agree. Its just that I don't think the RAF had very much of a goal after Dunkirk except to prepare whereas the LW was on the offensive and couldn't achive its goals because of the RAF. That seems -to me - more important. But I agree with what you posted.

'tranis'....d@mn, missed that one!!

The Allied losses were 544 aircrew killed, 422 wounded and 1547 aircraft destroyed, while the Luftwaffe lost 2698 aircrew killed, and lost 1887 aircraft. During the first four months, (1 July - 31 October 1940), one Luftwaffe bomber unit, KG 51 lost 13 Ju 88s and 21 damaged.

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Doesnt sound like much of a victory. When we were kids, we were told the RAF shot down the LW at a rate of 4:1 explaining why it was such a victory. I remember my mom saying that was rubbish, and during the blitz they always cut all the BBC claims in half when they heard them. More resently the claim was revised down to 1150 RAF planes lost Vs 1750 LW planes. Still a victory but much more of a mariginal one. Now we are claiming 1547 RAF destroyed Vs 1887 LW aircraft. Maybe if we wait long enough the Germans will shoot down more British planes than they lose?

The objective of Goering and Hitler wasn't achieved because of the RAF. Sounds like a victory to me.

Njaco said:

The objective of Goering and Hitler wasn't achieved because of the RAF. Sounds like a victory to me.

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Close but not quite. The objectives of Hitler and Goering wasn't achieved because they were unreachable in the context of the situation they created. A secret LW wargame in 1937 predicted, that even if their bombers were entirely Ju-88 and they operated from the French, Beligian and Dutch coasts, they could still not defeat the RAF, without a multi engined long-range strategic bomber.

psteel said:

Close but not quite. The objectives of Hitler and Goering wasn't achieved because they were unreachable in the context of the situation they created. A secret LW wargame in 1937 predicted, that even if their bombers were entirely Ju-88 and they operated from the French, Beligian and Dutch coasts, they could still not defeat the RAF, without a multi engined long-range strategic bomber.

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I agree, the BoB was supposed to be the start of an invasion. To mount an invasion Germany needed to clear the RAF from the sky and still have an airforce themselves. During the battle fighter production increased markedly in the UK but hardly at all in Germany. If you call the end of the Battle October then the RAF was stronger than when it started and the LW was weaker.

IMO the victory was purely psychological, in 1939 the LW was considered by many to be unbeatable and a war winning service on its own by the end of 1940 it wasnt.

Looking through some internet sites [Uboat Net and Navypedia] plus books [O'Hara's German fleet at war 1939-1945 and Smith "Hold the Narrow Sea"], I have some more info on the channel naval engagements.

Royal Navy (United Kingdom)
http://www.uboat.net/allies/warships/types.html?navy=HMS&type=Destroyer

July 4th Stuka attacked the channel convoy OA178, sinking 4 merchants and damaging 6 more. Then they hit Portland Harbor and sunk a tug plus a flak ship and damaged 3 more merchant ships.

July 4th German SBoot attacked the channel convoy, sinking 3 merchants.
July 7-9th LW attacks damaged one Steamers and a minesweeper and slightly damaged a couple of more vessels

July 10th Stuka attacks damaged two Steamers and sunk two more while damaging a couple of auxiliary warships.
July 13th More Stuka attacks damaged two Steamers and sunk another as well as crippling the destroyer's HMS Vanessa and under repair for 4 months

July 19th More Stuka attacks damaging the destroyer's HMS Beagle which had to be taken under tow.
July 20th LW attacks damaged two armed trawlers while 3 Steamers were sunk along with the destroyer HMS Brazen

July 24th three armed trawlers were sunk by LW attacks
July 25th Convoy CW8 was hammered by 90 LW aircraft including Stuka attacks and sunk 5 merchant vessels plus damaged another 5 vessels. Later two RN DD each took couple of bomb hits in further LW attacks.

July 26th 3 German Sboot attacked a convoy sinking three small merchant vessels
July 27th In the port of Dover HMS Sandhurst HMS Codrington were sunk after several surprise by 2 dozen Me-109 Jubo /110 attacks , while HMS Walpole was crippled, the day after it arrived as a replacement. In addition 40-escorted Stuka heavily bombed Dover and two more auxiliary warships were crippled, for the loss of 6 Stuka.

July 27th HMS Wren sunk after attack by He111 bombers
July 29th HMS Delight sunk after attack by 15 LW bombers
July 30th HMS Whitshed is mined and crippled off the Thames
Aug 2nd a Merchant ship was sunk in an attack

Aug 8th 4 German SBoot attacked a channel convoy sinking 4 merchants and damaging a couple more. This was followed by several massed Stuka attacks that suffered 32 lost DB in exchange for the loss of 20 RAF fighters. These strikes sunk 3 more merchant vessels as well as damaging another 7 more.

Aug 24th HMS Acheron Attacked by 40 Ju-88 suffered a direct hit and 3 near misses, that put the ship in repairs for 4 months.

Aug 31st

HMS Express struck a mine and was badly damaged, HMS Esk went to her assistance and hit mine and sank immediately, HMS Ivanhoe also went to her assistance and hit a mine and was badly damaged, so much so she she had to be sunk by HMS Kelvin.

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Allied Warships of WWII - Destroyer HMS Esk - uboat.net

Sept 8th HMS Galatea was damaged knocked out for a month ,by newly laid mines.
Sept 10/11th three British Destroyers swept the Channel at night and sank two barges a trawler and a tugboat.

Sept 11th HMS Atherstone was crippled by 3 direct hits and 5 near misses from a Ju-88 squadron attack.
October 7 ; HMS Hambeldon was crippled by mines laid by the KM near South Forland.

October 12th the 5 German TB expended the bulk of their ammo [~ 300 shells per TB], to sink the four anti invasion Trawlers. A RN destroyer squadron then set upon the Germans at night. Despite out gunning the Germans 3:1 [probably 10:1 in main gun ammo] ; being 3-4 knots faster and opening fire at ~ 5000 yards, the Germans escaped using smoke, maneuvers and clever deception involving depth charges to simulate minefield.

Dusk on the 17th October, A British Cruiser - Destroyer squadron of 7 warships engaged a flotilla of 4 German Destroyers also out gunning them 3:1. While the British opened fire at long range [25,000 yards], the German destroyers were only able to make 29knots in the moderate seas. The British seemed to close the range to 17,000 yards but several LW attacks on the British combined with torpedoes launched from the German destroyers allowed them to open range again and make good an escape. The British Cruiser expended 1200 shells getting a couple of near misses on one German Destroyer and hitting another destroyer twice with little apparent damage. In both of these encounters it took the British warships 8 hours to react to the German flotillas. As the British squadron returned to base they were attacked several times by RAF Blenheim's .All though both sides fired, no hits were recorded.

On the 19th October the HMS Venetia was lost to mines laid by the KM in the Channel.

Oct 28th the HMS Walpole and Windsor was crippled to mines laid by the KM in the south coast and out of repairs for months.



Over a three-month period in the Channel area [July-Oct], the LW/KM sank 8 destroyers and crippled 13 more [each out for months]. A further 37 Steamers and auxiliary vessels were also sunk, while another 33 were damaged.

I appriciate your opinion psteel. Regardless as to whether it was unreachable or not, it was still attempted and thwarted by the RAF. Are there any historical examples of an unreachable objective finally being overcome?

Hi Njaco. I have no answers only more questions. I suppose anything can be said to be impossible until it is attempted.

As an aside I was looking at the data and note that in July the Germans mounted 13 attacks on these convoys/Harbors and many more mining missions in between, while the activity in Aug-Sep-Oct, looks like no more than 3-5 incidents per month and most of those were mining incidents. Also I note that the bulk of the incidents in July were air attacks. I also note that 9 RN destroyers were either crippled or sunk during July. Given the length of time they were in repair, they would not have been able to participate in any anti invasion mission.

The Germans also sunk or crippled another 48 merchant/Auxiliary warships. Given that the majority of the anti invasion fleet were small slow auxiliary vessels with minimum armament, they would best resemble these merchant vessels as targets. It also looks like the LW attacks involved only 1/4 of their Stuka fleet, at most.

From the German perspective, they should have kept up the pressure of July, through Aug-Sept-Oct. Infact they should have expanded these attacks on coastal targets/naval targets. It seems these LW attacks were costly to the RN and difficult to counter for the RAF, since they were at the limits of intercept range.

I think until they had sufficent resources to properly attack the RAF, the LW contented itself with going after the shipping in July. Later, the attacks were more to bring the RAF up to battle and destroy, as this was the true objective on the part of LW. After a few encounters the RAF caught on and backed off.

I agree that shipping attacks should have had greater weight within the LW or Kriegsmarine but outside the scope of the BoB. I've always thought that more LW a/c committed to shipping strikes coupled with the wolf packs might have crippled the shipping for a bit.

My two cents worth

RAF can only claim a partial victory in thwarting invasion. The failure of the Germans to implement an invasion in fact was the product of a number of converging failures, including

1) a lack of prewar preprations. The consequent makeshift prepration in the channel were viewed with outright skepticism by the people on the ground. The preparations were never a serious attempt at a channel crossing in my opinion, or if they were, were a prime example of amateur hour. I say that because of point (2) (see below).

2) Reading the actual Fuhrer directive for Sealion, I am struck by its lack of committmnt. I forget the precise wording of the document, it basically says...."preparations are to be made for a cross channel assualt, and if neccessary are to be carried out. This suggst hitler himself was never committed to the assault. He actually did not want Britainor her empire to be defeated, because he thought this would only benefit other enemies of germany. He clung to the view that britain would cave in to the threat of invasion

3) expanding on Point (1), the invasion fleet had an expected fleet speed of just 2 knots, but thats with a favourable current. Remember the Germans were atttempting to utilize river barges in an open water body, towed by tugs. Problems would arise for this arrangement, however, if ther was any sort of current. A post war study by the RN, estimated that the real rate of advance would be more like 1 knot in the prevailing current, and the distance to the landing point more like 80 miles, after the embarkation and debarkation points are considered, as well as the currents. That means that the all up time for the cross channel voyage was something i the order of 120 hours....more than enough time for the RN to tear it to pieces. thats with or without the Germans holding air superiority over southern England. Having control of the air is just a bonus, not a prequisite for crossong the channel, but the abject preparations would gurantee failure.

4) That is not to say that control of the air was not a critical battle, its just not critical to a crossing of the channel. The importance of the battle is simply about who controlled the airspace over southern England and the survival of the RAF. Saying that the British objectives were simplistic is generally true, but achieving that objective was incredibly difficult. Dowdings defensive plans could not have been achieved by any other force in 1940, including the LW. his handling of the battle was as close to perfect as one can be. He always avoided th pitfall of over-comitting the RAF, this cost more aircraft overall, but minimised the risk of exhausting the RAF at any particular point. By contrast the LW, particularly its fighter arm was exhausted by October. Its seviceability rates were down to below 50%, its formations worn thin, its resolve shaken. Like it or not, they had been defeated, and they knew it.

5) Mention needs to be made about how th world viewed Britain and the battle. Most nations prior to the battle did not give britain much chance of survival. This included the US and Spain. As the battle progressed, this view was generally reversed, and by battles end Britain had pretty much guranteed US support and deterred Spanish entry into the war. Most of the neutrals or exiled governments had pledged their supports (and their extensive merchant fleets) to the allied cause. This was a crucial and tremendous victory in itself

6) A cautionary note on losses. I assume that these figures only include full write offs, and dont include aircraft damaged. This probably makes the respective totals not comparable. What the RAF might classify as a write off might not be a write off in LW terms. Im not as sure as the RAF, but the LW had a procedure of giving a percentage figure for damage. They classified anything above 70% as a write off. However this is a totally unrealistic benchmark. Truth is, anything much above 30% damage was never going to fly again. I am willing to bet the RAF was more realistic in its damage assessments than the LW...reason.....Hitler and Goring were obsessed with totals, not with airworthy craft...

7) In any event, loss of machines is not so important. Its the loss of aircrew thats the important number. NJ mentioned 544 pilots lost from the RAF. I agree with that number. Missing though are the numbers of german aircrew. Because they were employing Bombers, there losses are going to exceed 1800, probably more like 4000. Given the Germans were losing highly experienced air crew, in exchange for only moderately expereineced or even inexperienced RAF aircrew, and that the RAF re-supply of aircrew was alrady overtaking the LW re-supply, the extent of the material victory is brought into sharp focus.

Excellent points. I would add to this the LW switching from military targets to civilian ones. IMO The RAF was on the ropes but the LW switch gave them enough time to regroup.

The lack of targetting priorities and a clear strategy by the LW was always a problem. Deighton argues that any one of the strategies explored by the LW during the battle, if they stuck to it, was likley to succeed, but they lacked the sense of purpose and direction that the RAF had. For the RAF there were just two matters to consider....continued dispute of the airspace, and continued existence of the RAF as a credible challenge to the LW over SE England. The RAF achieved their objectives, whilst the LW was still making up its mind as to what strategy it should be following....

I wanted to add a fantastic website that did just what I have done here but is far more extensive. Really a great site!!!!

The Battle Of Britain Weather Diary - Netweather Community Forums

Mustang nut said:

I agree, the BoB was supposed to be the start of an invasion.

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No it wasn't. The means to mount a seaborne landing were not available to the Germans in 1940. Tanks landed from Rhine barges with concrete and railway line in their bottoms?Assault troops paddling ashore in inflatables?
It was an effort to force Britain to a negotiated peace favourable to Germany and allowing her to enact her agenda in Eastern Europe.
I notice that Parsifal has gone into some detailed reasoning in a later post so I won't.
Steve