Today 08/06 the first Atomic Bomb was dropped on Japan 1945

[Marcel]

There is nothing glorious about war or the killing of innocent women and children, regardless of what side did it, or for what reasons.

Thanks Chris, this means even more coming from a war veteran like yourself.

I'm also not naive enough to believe the myth that the bombings were solely done to end the war…

Actually, there is quite a bit of evidence that Truman had the true intention to end the war. Whether that was to save US lives or to prevent Russia to get too much influence (or both) is debatable, as the timing of the bombing is a bit suspiciously close to the Russion involvement in Manchuria.

Regardless of the intent, the actual discussion is about the real impact that the bombs had. The book that muskeg13 advised here tries to proof that the Japanese were so scared about the bomb that they were forced to end the war there and then, saving thousands of lives in the process. The one I advised here has a different take. It notes that the council meeting about the surrender took place as late a s 3 days after the bomb as council members had "more important things to do first". This indicates that they were not much fazed by the mass killing of their own innocent citizens. This is hardly surprising giving the generous way the Japanese leaders had spend the lives of their own people during the previous years. They were more concerned about keeping the Japanese traditions than keeping people alive. The discussions therefore were not mostly about the atomic bomb, but about the Russian invasion in Manchuria. They decided it was better to surrender to the Americans as they thought, compared to the Russians, the US would be more inclined to leave the traditions and especially the Emperor alone (history proved that right).

But all is just academic talk of course. As you said, regardless of the effect or intent, fact is that many thousands of innocent lives were lost in a single blast and many more were affected for live up until this day. That is not something glorious. That is just really sad.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

As I said, I am a firm believer at least part of the motive was to end the war and save lives (both Allied and Japanese believe it or not…). And I am firm believer Operation Downfall would have led to more casualties than both atomic bombs combined. I do, however, think part of it was definitely a show of force to Stalin.

But nothing changes the fact that bombing and killing civilians is never glorious, regardless of who did it, German, Japanese, British, USA, etc.

 

[rochie]

First time I've been called a bleeding heart liberal

 

[EwenS]

You might find this video of interest. Jon Parshall, the naval historian (and one of the authors of "Shattered Sword" one of the best books about the Battle of Midway), gave a presentation last year on the 80th anniversary of VJ- Day in which he laid out the timeline year of events leading up to the Japanese surrender.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Xvzc37tVJc

 

[Alan Stevens]

Hirohito was openly impressed with the atom bombs, he mentioned the two cities destroyed with one aircraft and one bomb and did not mention the firebombing of cities or the USSR.

The writing was on the wall that more cities including the rest of Tokyo were about to disappear in a blinding flash of light and a mushroom cloud.

This was a super weapon that they had no defense for and they knew it.

These blasts were visible a long way away. There were many reports in the 10 to 40 mile range, outside of the immediate blast area, but multitudes of people saw the huge luminous cloud rise in the sky and hang there for over 30 minutes before it dissipated, and many were jabbering in terror at what they saw.

The atomic bombings demonstrated utterly the futility of the Japanese military leadership's delusions of a heroic last defense of Japan using bamboo sticks and the like. It would have been very clear that that idea would not sell to an already increasingly disaffected Japanese civilian population. Waving around bamboo spears was not going to look credible when a single plane could wipe out an entire city or an entire army.

Japanese atomic scientists knew immediately what had happened in those cities.

The USSR was no near term threat to Japan itself and Japan knew it.

The Soviet Navy in the Pacific was small, antiquated, had no aircraft carriers, no aircraft capable of carrier operation, no pilots trained in carrier operations, and it had no experience with or modern equipment for equipment for amphibious operations. The Soviet Air Force had no strategic bombers and no long range fighters.

In short, the USSR was a threat to the Japanese Army in China but not a near term threat to Japan. All that the USSR entry into the war meant was that the vain hope that the USSR could be used as an intermediary for negotiations with the US had come to an end.

 

[Marcel]

Hirohito was openly impressed with the atom bombs, he mentioned the two cities destroyed with one aircraft and one bomb and did not mention the firebombing of cities or the USSR.

The writing was on the wall that more cities including the rest of Tokyo were about to disappear in a blinding flash of light and a mushroom cloud.

This was a super weapon that they had no defense for and they knew it.

These blasts were visible a long way away. There were many reports in the 10 to 40 mile range, outside of the immediate blast area, but multitudes of people saw the huge luminous cloud rise in the sky and hang there for over 30 minutes before it dissipated, and many were jabbering in terror at what they saw.

The atomic bombings demonstrated utterly the futility of the Japanese military leadership's delusions of a heroic last defense of Japan using bamboo sticks and the like. It would have been very clear that that idea would not sell to an already increasingly disaffected Japanese civilian population. Waving around bamboo spears was not going to look credible when a single plane could wipe out an entire city or an entire army.

Japanese atomic scientists knew immediately what had happened in those cities.

The USSR was no near term threat to Japan itself and Japan knew it.

The Soviet Navy in the Pacific was small, antiquated, had no aircraft carriers, no aircraft capable of carrier operation, no pilots trained in carrier operations, and it had no experience with or modern equipment for equipment for amphibious operations. The Soviet Air Force had no strategic bombers and no long range fighters.

In short, the USSR was a threat to the Japanese Army in China but not a near term threat to Japan. All that the USSR entry into the war meant was that the vain hope that the USSR could be used as an intermediary for negotiations with the US had come to an end.

Yes, that is the classic story indeed.

 

[EwenS]

The Soviet Navy in the Pacific was small, antiquated, had no aircraft carriers, no aircraft capable of carrier operation, no pilots trained in carrier operations, and it had no experience with or modern equipment for equipment for amphibious operations. The Soviet Air Force had no strategic bombers and no long range fighters.

In short, the USSR was a threat to the Japanese Army in China but not a near term threat to Japan. All that the USSR entry into the war meant was that the vain hope that the USSR could be used as an intermediary for negotiations with the US had come to an end.

The Soviets didn't need carriers, or strategic bombers or long range fighters for their Far Eastern Campaigns.

They did have amphibious forces able to operate over short distances and did so during those final campaigns in Korea, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils. That was all they needed. They had the experience of major river crossings in Europe as a base of experience.

You have clearly not heard about Project Hula. The USA trained Soviet personnel in the Aleutians to operate US built amphibious craft, minesweepers, subchasers, and patrol frigates from April 1945, with ships beginning to sail for the USSR at the end of May, with the first amphibious craft sailing mid-June. Some of these were available for use in the final Soviet campaigns.

Project Hula - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

While the attacks through Manchuria gain most off the attention, the Soviets also ran campaigns, which involved amphibious landings to take Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Those began a few days after the assault in Manchuria and continued until 2 Sept 1945. The Japanese fought hard, even managing to initially repulse one Soviet amphibious landing but not the follow up on one of the islands. At that point the Soviets were poised to make the jump into Hokkaido, the most northerly of the Japanese home islands. All in the space of three weeks.

Soviet invasion of South Sakhalin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Soviet invasion of the Kuril Islands - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

So, while the Manchurian campaign had pushed South into the Korean peninsula there was a real "near term threat to Japan" but from a different direction. The distance between southern Sakhalin and northern Hokkaido across the La Perouse Strait was only 42km (26 miles). To put that in context the Dover Strait in the English Channel is about 20 miles at its narrowest.

David Glantz in his 2003 book noted:-

"Newly released Soviet documentary materials, however, now clearly indicate that Hokkaido was also among the targets of the Soviet Far East Command in August 1945. This, and the fact that the Soviet Hokkaido invasion ultimately did not occur, should prompt further speculation over why the Soviets aborted the invasion and its consequences if it had occurred."

Soviet Far East Command had been planning the jump to Hokkaido from southern Sakhalin on 23rd Aug. Delays in clearing the latter would probably have delayed that until 24th or 25th or even a few days after that. In the end Stalin intervened personally at mid-day on 22nd Aug to order a halt to any such operation. Glantz again:-

"No doubt political factors as much as military realities influenced Stalin's fateful decision to abort the invasion of Hokkaido. Partial review of fragmentary diplomatic correspondence permits certain judgements to be made about the cancellation. Clearly Stalin considered operations against Hokkaido, where the Japanese Fifth Area Army was headquartered, to have both military and political significance and to be an integral part of operations against southern Sakhalin. Despite the Potsdam demarcation line that ran north of Hokkaido, Stalin approved planning for the operation; Potsdam did, after all, permit contingency planning, which Allied Command's could later approve."

https://www.amazon.co.uk/August-Storm-Strategic-Offensive-Illustrated-ebook/dp/B06XG94GVC/ref=sr_1_4?crid=1G5C9QU7DE3HU&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.ekZNuJSsUr3Oqxoe-apNvgPbyDJ3Tfr6l2JdC853bmMSjfGjwdmSNg_6r9tk6ts2OEKdR3bax-RECElsAaJLYU1LaLlPOOkH43nmXM5Gs7fspchuybrcrHPv0XFpt52MSJ3BY12goixRcIMQszHiOJEzsbhCJHV8lRpbTnoO0oEFcCSAAeXEWneySpg4DaI9.xTM1hcWrLOZ4LsURKy40Ey1V6HWxqdwsmTpLkYwolDU&dib_tag=se&keywords=david+glantz+books+august+storm&qid=1786352127&sprefix=david+glantz+books+august+torm%2Caps%2C442&sr=8-4

Amazon.co.uk

 

[EwenS]

As for the modernity of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1945, the core surface fleet was based around:-

2 x Kirov class light cruiser both built in the Far East. Kalinin completed in Dec 1942. Lazar Kaganovich (as she was from 3rd Aug 1945) commissioned in Dec 1944 but was not fully completed until Jan 1947.

1 x Leningrad class destroyer leader. Tbilisi completed Dec 1940.

10 x Project 7 destroyers. R'yanyi, Rezvyi, Razyashchiy, Rekordnyi, Reskiy, Rastoropnyi, Retivyi, Reshitel'nyi, Revnostnyi, Redkyi. Completed Aug 1939 to Nov 1942.

There were also 19 "destroyer escorts", 49 sub chasers (20 of which would probably have been ex-USN delivered May-July 1945 under Project Hula) ,78 submarines, and 204 MTB all being of varying ages some more modern than others. The MTB for example included a Soviet batch built in 1945. Some may also have been of Lend Lease origin, the US having supplied several hundred PT boats to the USSR during WW2, though none under Project Hula.

And of course you need to add in all the war built ex-USN delivered under Project Hula. Some of those vessels from the Tacoma class Patrol Frigates on down arrived in time to participate in some of the amphibious landings.

So while the Soviet Pacific Fleet might have been small, especially compared to the RN or USN, it was far from "antiquated".

 

[SaparotRob]

I believe the two PT boats used for the TV show McHales Navy were of those built for the Soviet Union.

 

[EwenS]

Just to pick up on a couple of points from some of the earlier posts.

Soviet entry into the war against Japan.
Stalin agreed in principle to enter the war against Japan after the end of the war in Europe at the Tehran Conference in Nov 1943.

At the Yalta Conference in Feb 1945, Roosevelt managed to pin Stalin down to a commitment that the USSR would act some 3 months after the end of the European war, then still three months in the future. Soviet planning began immediately with improvements to the transport infrastructure needed for the mass movement of troops and equipment East (e.g. the Trans-Siberian Railway). Troop movements eastwards began BEFORE the end of the war in Europe and had been virtually completed by 25th July 1945. However, many of the forces involved were already in the Far East, efforts having been made since at least 1943 to build up forces in that theatre. The Pacific Fleet was to be ready by 1st Aug 1945.

On 13th April 1941, the Soviets and Japanese had signed a 5 year Non-Aggression Pact. On 5th April 1945 the Japanese were informed that it would not be renewed on its expiry in 1946. All in accordance with the terms of the Pact requiring notice of a year. It seems however that the Japanese did not believe a Soviet attack would come until late in 1945 or even into early 1946.

Soviet plans were for the invasion of Manchuria to begin at 2400 on 10th Aug / 0000 on 11th Aug 1945 Soviet Far East time. BUT on the afternoon of 7th Aug Moscow time (late evening / early nightime Far East time) orders were issued to bring the start time FORWARD by two days. That was no doubt a reaction to the news of the dropping of "Little Boy" on Hiroshima, which Truman had announced on 6th Aug some 16 hours after the bomb was dropped (exact times for sequence of events get confusing crossing the International Date Line)

At 2300 on 8th Aug 1945 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, handed the formal declaration of war to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. At 0010 on 9th Aug the Soviet advance began with no preparatory artillery or air bombardment.

So the fact that the Soviet commencement of war against Japan happened EXACTLY 3 months after VE-Day on 8th May 1945 became a pure coincidence caused by events.

Truman and the dropping of the A-bombs.
Truman never gave an explicit order to use the A-bomb on Hiroshima or Nagasaki or any other Japanese target.

It was Gen Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, was who drew up the necessary orders on 24th July which was then approved hy Secretary of State Stimson and General Marshall, head of the US Army, the next day.
That authorised the use of atomic weapons against Japan, but with the proviso that they should not be used before 3rd Aug 1945 initially on one of the following targets, Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata or Nagasaki. Actual target selection and the timing of any drops of atomic weapons was then a matter for the military, and in particular General Carl Spaatz, Commander of US Army Strategic Air Forces, which controlled the 20th AF. Weather over Japan intervened to delay the Hiroshima drop to 6th Aug.

What Truman did do was stop any later A-bombings and to bring the dropping of a third and any subsequent A-bombs back under the control of the politicians i.e him. That happened on 10th Aug 1945 at which point the Japanese were reponding to the Potsdam Declaration, albeit with strings attached.

https://thebulletin.org/2025/08/truman-never-ordered-the-use-of-the-atomic-bombs-but-he-did-order-atomic-bombings-to-be-stopped/

Also of interest is Gen Groves memo of 30th July regarding the expected A-bomb production schedule. Without Truman's intervention on 10th Aug, the USAAF would have been free to continue dropping A-bombs on Japan as soon as they became available. Bomb number 3 was being readied in the USA as the war ended.

Atomic Bomb: Decision -- Bomb Production Schedule, July 30, 1945

The Manhattan Project could make atomic bombs at an ever-increasing rate

www.dannen.com

 

[R Leonard]

My father was Lieutenant Commander and assistant operations officer on Vice Admiral McCain's staff of the Fast Carrier Task Force operating off the coast of the Japan at the time. He wrote home in serial letter missives, each covering about a week or so, I have most of them for the entire war, some relevant of the times snippets:

The entry dated 7 August 1945:
"Guess you have been reading about 'the bomb' as everyone else has. It has been quite an interesting and depressing topic for me. All I can say, I can't think of any other people who I would prefer to possess it and no better target upon which it should be used. Just the same, it can be quite a problem for the future. Then again, with the right control it may ensure the future. All the same, it's dangerous and I just have my doubts whether we are ready to control such power. Such worries did not trouble the man who invented gunpowder."

On the installment for the 8th, he continued:
"Lots of news has been coming in about the big bomb, but not much to rely on as to the Jap reaction. They are too unpredictable to depend on even when bopped this hard. Press notice seems to give this bomb quite a bopping factor. Hope it never has to be used again."

On the 10th:
"Things have been doing pretty well the last day or so and tonight's news makes it look as though this war is about in its last hours. The news about the Russians coming into the fight seemed insignificant beside the news about the bomb and then both of them seem insignificant in the light of the news of a possible surrender. It's too close to see just what effect that is going to have on our immediate movements, but, gosh, it is something and the possibilities leave me excited."

But the war went on. On the 11th:
"Busy day as usual. Seems to be much expectation in the air but not much change of plans at this point."

On the 13th:
"Looks as though I were dreaming just dreams the other night because we are back in business as usual without a let-up. Today was a pretty active one if you noticed. If these people want to fight, we are just the ones to oblige them. To coin a term I might say they will be obliged by experts."

Bottom line . . . Yes, the bombs, both of them, were necessary, absolutely, no question. And, no, they were not to impress the Soviets.

The purpose the bombs were to slap the Japanese leadership hard enough that they would pay attention and realize that to continue the contest would mean eventual destruction of their entire country, society and people. The first one came close but failed. The second got their attention.

Regards,

 

[EwenS]

I don't think that it is true to say that the Hiroshima bomb didn't grab the attention of the Japanese Govt. These weren't the days of instant communications. As Jon Parshall lays out the timetable of events using relatively new information from Japanese records:-

6th Aug
0816 Little Boy explodes over Hiroshima
0830 naval base at Kure signals Tokyo that city has been destroyed but at that stage what happened is not entirely clear.
Late afternoon around 1800 the Govt decides to send a mission to Hiroshima, including Japan's foremost nuclear phyicist, to determine the exact cause.

Then Truman makes his announcement of the use of the atomic bomb.

8th Aug
Japanese mission to Hiroshima reports back early morning.
1000 Togo meets with Emperor to advise him of this new weapon and its destructive power, and he is advised that now would be a good time to end the war somehow. There us a quote from Togo's diary about that meeting that indicates Hirohito immediately understood that this changed everything (see from about 14.50 in the video). So to at least some in the Japanese Govt the only option is surrender. The only question after that was on what terms. Could something better than unconditional surrender under the Potsdam Declaration be obtained.

This is still before the Soviet declaration of war. To clarify the timings I gave before, the declaration of war was made 2300 Soviet Far East & Tokyo time which was 1700 Moscow time. It was however two days before word filtered back to Tokyo about the full extent of the Soviet attack.

Then we get into the machinations of Japanese Cabinet of the time with the "Big Six" being split at their meeting the following morning, 1030 9th Aug. During that meeting news of the Nagasaki bomb arrives. That meeting ends at 1300 with, as Parshall puts it, surrender with 1 condition camp and a surrender with 4 condition camp. From there the politics ramps up with the various stages / meetings / decisions etc laid out in the video.

 

[Retattack]

The Soviets didn't need carriers, or strategic bombers or long range fighters for their Far Eastern Campaigns.

They did have amphibious forces able to operate over short distances and did so during those final campaigns in Korea, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils. That was all they needed. They had the experience of major river crossings in Europe as a base of experience.

You have clearly not heard about Project Hula. The USA trained Soviet personnel in the Aleutians to operate US built amphibious craft, minesweepers, subchasers, and patrol frigates from April 1945, with ships beginning to sail for the USSR at the end of May, with the first amphibious craft sailing mid-June. Some of these were available for use in the final Soviet campaigns.

They didn't need them because the US Navy (and allies) were already there. [17 Aug 1945, FADM Halsey ordered the 20 carriers, 9 battleships, 25 cruisers and 79 destroyers of TF 38 and the British Pacific Fleet to perform high-speed maneuvers near the coast of Japan so that the awesome fleet could be documented with aerial photos in Operation Snapshot.]

Moreover, South Sakhalin was primarily invaded from the Northern land border, the Kuril island invasion commenced three days after the surrender declaration, and the demoralized Japanese troops were ordered to surrender before it was half begun.

There is an ongoing revisionist attempt to characterize the atomic bomb attacks as unnecessary because the Soviets, with borrowed landing craft, were about to invade the home islands, and that's what convinced the Japanese to surrender. I've yet to see convincing evidence this was more than a minor consideration for Japanese decision makers, in the face of a devastating air campaign, starvation inducing blockade, and naval forces bombarding shore facilities at will. The contrast with available Soviet naval forces is stark.

 

[SaparotRob]

Did not know about Operation Snapshot.

 

[Alan Stevens]

The Soviets didn't need carriers, or strategic bombers or long range fighters for their Far Eastern Campaigns.

They did have amphibious forces able to operate over short distances and did so during those final campaigns in Korea, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurils. That was all they needed. They had the experience of major river crossings in Europe as a base of experience.

You have clearly not heard about Project Hula. The USA trained Soviet personnel in the Aleutians to operate US built amphibious craft, minesweepers, subchasers, and patrol frigates from April 1945, with ships beginning to sail for the USSR at the end of May, with the first amphibious craft sailing mid-June. Some of these were available for use in the final Soviet campaigns.

The Soviets had no demonstrated major amphibious warfare capability to invade the Home Islands. We're talking about a million troops on the scale of Normandy, not a few thousand troops to obtain an outlying island.

We have to start from that standpoint. The important thing is whether Japan's government was fearful of the Soviets invading Hokkaido and that impacting their surrender – and the answer is "no" compared to what the U.S. had already demonstrated, on land, air and sea. Landing 9 or 10 thousand troops is nothing compared to a real invasion.

Japan's government was very fearful of a U.S. invasion, based on past amphibious invasions, and they knew that the U.S. could quickly land millions of troops and build many airbases and naval ports.

As far as Hokkaido being relatively lightly defended – well guess who caused that – it was the U.S. with its obvious plans and ability to massively invade Kyushu and Honshu! Japanese forces were being concentrated in central and southern Japan. They could see the progression from the Marianas to the Philippines to Iwo Jima to Okinawa and see that Kyushu was next.

Besides, it was the US military that caused Hokkaido to be almost defenseless, in the first place. We had destroyed almost all of their navy, cargo shipping, and the rail ferries between Honshu and Hokkaido were in the process of being eliminated. They had no air force to speak of that far north.

The U.S. also had plans in the works to add Shikoku and Hokkaido to its invasions, if they deemed it necessary.

The USSR cynically invaded Manchuria two days after Hiroshima to "get a piece of the action" and they continued after Nagasaki a day later. They had no business declaring war on Japan when the war was nearly over.

This whole meme about the USSR getting credit for the surrender of Japan is based on late-1940s early Cold War Soviet propaganda, anyhow.

 

[EwenS]

This whole meme about the USSR getting credit for the surrender of Japan is based on late-1940s early Cold War Soviet propaganda, anyhow.

At no point have I claimed to support the idea that the Soviets deserved the credit for triggering the Japanese surrender. That was the whole point of my posting the link to the Jon Parshall video in the first place (have you even watched it?), which clearly set out the sequence of events based on more recent information from Japanese archives.

What I have sought to do with my posts is set out what actually happened with regard to the Soviet invasions to correct the inaccuracies that you in particular, and others, have posted in this thread. For example your claims of:-

1. no Soviet amphibious capability. As they managed it in Sakhalin & the Kuriles, it was perfectly possible for them to make the short hop to Hokkaido.
2. an "antiquated" Soviet Pacific Fleet, which I've shown it was not
3. a need for carriers, naval aviation, long range strategic bombers just because the western allies had them.

You seem to contradict yourself when writing about a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.

. "We're talking about a million troops on the scale of Normandy, not a few thousand troops to obtain an outlying island."

"As far as Hokkaido being relatively lightly defended...."

Not sure why you need an amphibious operation capable of transporting a million troops, when the Japanese Fifth Area Army was a relatively weak and ill-trained force by all accounts. And Soviet plans had limited objectives in such an invasion. Even historians can't agree as to whether the Soviets could have pulled it off or not. As it never happened you can choose to believe what you like.

Proposed Soviet invasion of Hokkaido - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

And as for your statement:-
"The U.S. also had plans in the works to add Shikoku and Hokkaido to its invasions, if they deemed it necessary."

Operation Olympic plans to invade and occupy the southern half of Kyushu only starting 1 Nov 1945 were well advanced. The object of that operation was to gain real estate for airfields to support the next phase. That was Operation Coronet scheduled for 1 March 1946. Planning for that was much less well advanced and didn't extend beyond the first 3 months of such a campaign in the area of the Kanto Plain.

If Japan had still not surrendered then it was recognised that further action might be required. But no planning beyond a vague outline had been carried out AFAICT

"While U.S. planners hoped that the Japanese would surrender after Coronet (or better still, after Olympic), they did not discount the possibility that the enemy might still hold significant reserves elsewhere in Japan and refuse to capitulate. In case of such a contingency, the committee drafted a plan, JWPC 333/1, which called for assaults against remaining Japanese pockets in the Home Islands in order to destroy major enemy forces and secure key areas.25​ The plan listed five potential targets: the Shimonoseki Strait area of Kyushu, the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto area of central Honshu, the Nagoya area of Honshu, the Hakodate-Aomori-Ominato area of Honshu and Hokkaido, and the Sapporo Plain of Hokkaido. The committee estimated that the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto, Nagoya, and Hakodate- Aomori-Ominato operations each would require eight divisions, Shimonoseki Strait nine, and the Sapporo Plain five. If possible, these operations would employ troops already in the Western Pacific in order to simplify logistics and avoid the use of the strategic reserve based in the United States. The first attack was tentatively scheduled for 1 July 1946, with the target dependent upon the strategic situation.26"​

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1995/august/invasion-never-was

​
Note that while those additional outline plans envisaged the possibility of additional invasions on Kyushu, Honshu or Hokkaido, they did not include Shikoku. That wasn't the first time Shikoku had been rejected as a possible target for invasion.

 

[SaparotRob]

At no point have I claimed to support the idea that the Soviets deserved the credit for triggering the Japanese surrender. That was the whole point of my posting the link to the Jon Parshall video in the first place (have you even watched it?), which clearly set out the sequence of events based on more recent information from Japanese archives.

What I have sought to do with my posts is set out what actually happened with regard to the Soviet invasions to correct the inaccuracies that you in particular, and others, have posted in this thread. For example your claims of:-

1. no Soviet amphibious capability. As they managed it in Sakhalin & the Kuriles, it was perfectly possible for them to make the short hop to Hokkaido.
2. an "antiquated" Soviet Pacific Fleet, which I've shown it was not
3. a need for carriers, naval aviation, long range strategic bombers just because the western allies had them.

You seem to contradict yourself when writing about a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.

. "We're talking about a million troops on the scale of Normandy, not a few thousand troops to obtain an outlying island."

"As far as Hokkaido being relatively lightly defended...."

Not sure why you need an amphibious operation capable of transporting a million troops, when the Japanese Fifth Area Army was a relatively weak and ill-trained force by all accounts. And Soviet plans had limited objectives in such an invasion. Even historians can't agree as to whether the Soviets could have pulled it off or not. As it never happened you can choose to believe what you like.

Proposed Soviet invasion of Hokkaido - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

And as for your statement:-
"The U.S. also had plans in the works to add Shikoku and Hokkaido to its invasions, if they deemed it necessary."

Operation Olympic to invade and occupy the southern half only of Kyushu only starting 1 Nov 1945 were well advanced. The object of that operation was to gain real estate for airfields to support the next phase. That was Operation Coronet scheduled for 1 March 1946. Planning for that was much less well advanced and didn't extend beyond the first 3 months of such a campaign in the area of the Kanto Plain.

If Japan had still not surrendered then it was recognised that further action might be required. But no planning beyond a vague outline had been carried out AFAICT

"While U.S. planners hoped that the Japanese would surrender after Coronet (or better still, after Olympic), they did not discount the possibility that the enemy might still hold significant reserves elsewhere in Japan and refuse to capitulate. In case of such a contingency, the committee drafted a plan, JWPC 333/1, which called for assaults against remaining Japanese pockets in the Home Islands in order to destroy major enemy forces and secure key areas.25​ The plan listed five potential targets: the Shimonoseki Strait area of Kyushu, the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto area of central Honshu, the Nagoya area of Honshu, the Hakodate-Aomori-Ominato area of Honshu and Hokkaido, and the Sapporo Plain of Hokkaido. The committee estimated that the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto, Nagoya, and Hakodate- Aomori-Ominato operations each would require eight divisions, Shimonoseki Strait nine, and the Sapporo Plain five. If possible, these operations would employ troops already in the Western Pacific in order to simplify logistics and avoid the use of the strategic reserve based in the United States. The first attack was tentatively scheduled for 1 July 1946, with the target dependent upon the strategic situation.26"​

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1995/august/invasion-never-was

​
Note that while those additional outline plans envisaged the possibility of additional invasions on Kyushu, Honshu or Hokkaido, they did not include Shikoku. That wasn't the first time Shikoku had been rejected as a possible target for invasion.

I felt your post deserved more than just an informative.

 

[Alan Stevens]

What I have sought to do with my posts is set out what actually happened with regard to the Soviet invasions to correct the inaccuracies that you in particular, and others, have posted in this thread. For example your claims of:-

1. no Soviet amphibious capability. As they managed it in Sakhalin & the Kuriles, it was perfectly possible for them to make the short hop to Hokkaido.
2. an "antiquated" Soviet Pacific Fleet, which I've shown it was not
3. a need for carriers, naval aviation, long range strategic bombers just because the western allies had them.

You seem to contradict yourself when writing about a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.

. "We're talking about a million troops on the scale of Normandy, not a few thousand troops to obtain an outlying island."

"As far as Hokkaido being relatively lightly defended...."

Not sure why you need an amphibious operation capable of transporting a million troops, when the Japanese Fifth Area Army was a relatively weak and ill-trained force by all accounts. And Soviet plans had limited objectives in such an invasion. Even historians can't agree as to whether the Soviets could have pulled it off or not. As it never happened you can choose to believe what you like.

Landing a few battalions on Sakhalin or the Kurils does not translate into the ability to invade Hokkaido. Those were short‑range coastal hops using small craft, while Hokkaido requires corps‑scale lift, naval gunfire support, air superiority, and sustained logistics across the Sea of Japan — none of which the Soviets possessed. A weak Japanese Fifth Area Army doesn't change the physics of amphibious warfare; it was still far larger than anything the Soviets had ever assaulted amphibiously.

And Hokkaido was "lightly defended" only because U.S. operations had already destroyed Japan's navy, merchant fleet, northern airpower, and the rail ferries linking Honshu to Hokkaido, forcing Japan to concentrate its remaining forces in Kyushu and Honshu where the U.S. invasion was actually coming. Light defenses do not reduce the attacker's required lift, fire support, or air cover. Historians disagree only about whether the Soviets might have attempted a token landing, not whether they could have executed a full invasion — a plan Stalin himself canceled once he saw the logistical requirements.

Downfall wasn't just an American invasion — it would have been supported by the British Pacific Fleet, Australian divisions, Canadian air and naval units, and other Commonwealth forces. Japan knew that a U.S.-led coalition could land and sustain millions of troops. By contrast, the Soviets had no amphibious lift, no carrier aviation, no naval gunfire support, and no Allied partners for a Home Islands assault. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria shocked Japan politically, but it did not make them fear a Soviet landing on Japan. They feared the U.S. coalition because only it had the demonstrated capability to actually invade. THAT was my main original point.

 

[Oliverlovesplanes]

I Found this website you can recreate the two atom bombs that were dropped on Japan and so many others

NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein

NUKEMAP is a website for visualizing the effects of nuclear detonations.

nuclearsecrecy.com