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As for the P-47, there were some that served in Korea, but most were kept in Europe due to the fear that the USSR could come pouring across Europe. When it came to Vietnam, the A-7 was largely McNamara's doing. I'm not sure if he forced the A-1's down the USAF's throat, or they adopted it for some reason.
For USAF, yes. USN had already launched ITSELF down that primrose path.When it came to Vietnam, the A-7 was largely McNamara's doing.
After all the blood, sweat, and tears that went into creating the OV10, the mission it was supposed to fulfill had already grown beyond its capabilities. It was supposed to be the do-it-all machine to defeat the Viet Cong, but by the time it arrived the opponent was the NVA and the scale of weaponry and scope of the mission had escalated. The Bronco wasn't up to protecting Jolly Greens on deep penetration aircrew recoveries and recon insertions along the HCMT or in Laos or The North. The Nav was retiring A1s at the time, trading for A7s, so Mac prodded USAF to once again swallow its pride and adopt another "tailhooker".I'm not sure if he forced the A-1's down the USAF's throat, or they adopted it for some reason.
You're not alone, brother! He wasn't lacking in smarts, just in wisdom and in humility.my beliefs are that McNamara is responsible for most of the 58 thousand dead Americans. I guess it's just me.
"Oh, come on! We've always done things our own way; it's just plain logical. We invented it, and we've always done it this way."The reason, of course, the whiz kids couldn't understand the logic of the need for three distinct systems was because there wasn't any
I'm curious what problems did Taylor and Adams cause? From what I remember, Westmoreland's seemed to be a guy who was unequipped for counter-insurgency operations, and felt as if adopting a "kill 'em all, let God sort it out" mentality was what would work (well, if you kill everybody on the other side -- it sort of does, but there might be some reasons you might not want to do that...)....and the generals. Don't forget Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Creighton Abrams. There was more than enough blame to go around.
I was under the impression that he initially started to increase aid in 1961. Now, for all I know, he might have begun the steps to start scaling things back. You are correct though, Johnson generally was whole-heartedly in support of scaling things up.President Kennedy had begun troop with drawls and wanted less U.S. involvement.
I can agree with that.I'm no fan of McN, but aligning service nomenclature and logistics is logical, insofar as the equipment can get the job done. Using similar equipment reduces training and resupply costs, and using similar terminology reduces misunderstandings.
Generally, to a degree -- that is correct. It's much easier to do things when you can understand everything.I'm not defending the political aspects of the war, just saying that operationally, simplification is usually a good thing.
I was under the impression that he initially started to increase aid in 1961. Now, for all I know, he might have begun the steps to start scaling things back.
I think LBJ came from a constituency that was more prone to commie-phobia and domino-think than Kennedy, and was more middle America oriented and less cosmopolitan in his thinking.He may have wanted a larger US presence in 1961, but by 1963 he'd already issued NSAM 263 with the stated goal of winding down our involvement by 1965. LBJ reversed that in one of his worst decisions.
I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government. If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.I still believe that under its original conditions (both Kennedy and Diem alive) it would have resulted in our early withdrawal. Once both leaders were killed, I think, 263 was doomed to be dead letter no matter
I think LBJ came from a constituency that was more prone to commie-phobia and domino-think than Kennedy, and was more middle America oriented and less cosmopolitan in his thinking.
I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully be saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government.
If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.
I was still in high school when the first conventional troops went ashore after the Tonkin Gulf charade, and my sense of optimism about the Vietnam situation vanished.
Did LBJ realize the benefits of special forces? I remember a guy handling diplomatic affairs in Thailand(?) was basically overseeing most matters, and wouldn't allow proper training for jungle-warfare teams.I think Kennedy quite astutely realized that the south could only be successfully saved through the hearts and minds of the people, and that the war could only be "won" at a special forces, counter-insurgency level. This required what has always been the bugaboo of US interventions: a respect-worthy indigenous government. If not already in place, this is damn difficult (impossible?) to establish through outside pressure. In any case, it requires cultural sensitivity and grass roots relationships which are the antithesis of LBJ's brute force approach.
Keep reading. There's always more to the picture.Honestly, I remember there were three basic proposals for dealing with Vietnam, of which one was Rolling Thunder, and the other two I forgot.
That's a good point...Much agreed. I also wonder how much information Kennedy shared with Johnson, given their distaste for and distrust of each other.
The Civil Rights & Great Society stuff? You'd think he'd be able to delegate, but he micromanaged things like you wouldn't believe. Honestly, I think he was terrified that there'd be people who would escalate everything to nuclear war if they weren't watched like hawks.Johnson of course had his focus on his domestic agenda, and never gave the problems in SE Asia the thought they demanded if we were to remain.
Well, those scenarios were mostly regarding aviation operations. There's probably more, of course. I just forgot what the (at least two) were.Keep reading. There's always more to the picture.
Honestly, I think he was terrified that there'd be people who would escalate everything to nuclear war if they weren't watched like hawks.
In a Kissinger video interview done a few years back, he admitted that attacks on Hanoi targets were given to NVA leaders the day before the attack. The routes were also given. This was a result of the Paris peace talks so "civilian casualties are minimised". In addition, our troops on the ground could not take advantage of an unexpected opportunity in battle. A Captain or above had to radio for permission to attack if such an incident occurred. The signal went to the White House and back in about 20 minutes during which time the opportunity was lost. Johnson is alleged to have bragged. "They can't blow up a shithouse with out me."
Attack planes usually require more agility, but a bomber with agility is also quite beneficial.I don't agree that the distinction between bombers and attack aircraft is semantics. Sure, they're both laying ordnance on the ground, but the missions are very different and usually require different specs and planforms.
I don't know much about Taylor and Abrams. What was wrong with them?...and the generals. Don't forget Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Creighton Abrams. There was more than enough blame to go around.
Attack planes usually require more agility, but a bomber with agility is also quite beneficial.