Twin Engine Day Fighters Europe/Africa Theaters (the bests).

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We seem to be overlooking a at least one basic point. In many cases the twin engine fighters were NOT designed to do the SAME job as the single engine fighters. ESPECIALLY single engine fighters designed at the SAME time.
For instance the P-38 was designed to a different specification than the P-39. It called for twice the endurance as the P-39 while having the same speed and armament. The extra fuel required a bigger aircraft which required more power. The guys at Lockheed figured they could use either a 1500hp single engine or TWO 1000hp engines compared to the P-39 with a single 1000hp engine. When design work started there was no single 1500hp engine immediately available. Both planes did change considerable from initial designs to even the first combat ready units but the single engine planes could not do the P-38s job (eventual jobs) until later in the war when newer engines were able to increase the performance of single engine fighters.
In some ways some of the European (and even Asian) Twin engine fighters start with the same story. A requirement that a single engine cannot meet. Payload or range wanted is too great for the existing single engines. Even the Whirlwind was considered the smallest fighter that could carry four 20mm guns. Hawker may have offered a four cannon Hurricane in 1937 but with the Merlin III ( or II?) and a fixed pitch prop the result would NOT have been any more combat capable than the French Potez 631.
Twins were seldom, if ever, envisioned as dog fighters but rather as bomber interceptors or strike aircraft.

Excellent point. The P-38 was designed to intercept enemy bombers, not as an air superiority fighter. Nor was it designed with mass production in mind, as were the Bf109 and P-51. However, the fact was that when the USA entered the war it was the only fighter even close to par with the opposition in Europe. It is a testament to the design and American industrial expertise that this complex and expensive fighter was produced in thousands and eventually developed to a point where it could match the best opposition.
 
By that reasoning the P-38 should have had a lower loss rate than single engine fighters - was that the case? I don't think having an expendable engine is much compensation for lacking the agility to avoid getting hit in the first place. After all, how many P-38 pilots were heartbroken at having to turn their Lightnings in for Mustangs?

Many! Mike Alba, 338th FS 55FG was a personal friend and flew both P-38s and 51s. In the ground support role he thought the P-38 was a better aircraft and he mentioned that his squadron took many losses when they convered to the P-51. Mike passed away in 2007.

There was at least one ETO squadron that did not want to give up their P-38s for the P-51. I'll have to look around for the info...

As far as the loss rate - I beleive they did have a lower loss rate in the PTO (when compared to other AAF fighters) till the P-51 came along. By that time most of the extensive air to air combat were over the Japanese mainland with a severely beaten Japanese fighter force.
 
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Just to give an image from US manual
P-38L gross weight 17,400 lbs (410 gals of fuel) V-1710-111113 (54", 1425 hp at 29k (26.6k no ram), 60", 1600 hp at 28.7k (25.8k no ram) 100/130 grade fuel)
P-38J gross weight 17,400 lbs (410 gals of fuel) V-1710-8991 (54", 1425 hp at 29k (26.6k no ram), 60", 1600 hp at 28.7k (25.8k no ram) 100/130 grade fuel)
P-38H gross weight 16,100 lbs (300 gals of fuel) V-1710-8991 (54", 1425 hp at 24,9k (22k no ram), 60", 1600 hp at 10k (7k no ram) 100/130 grade fuel)
P-38F&G gross weight ~15,900 lbs (300 gals of fuel) V-1710-4953 (F), V-1710-5155 (G) (51", 1425 hp at 15k (G), 47", 1325 hp at 15k (F) 100 grade fuel)
 
P-38 is a survivable aircraft able to assume the air superiority role and long range escort role with considerable ability.

Mosquito were not designed or used for the same purpose but were more adpatable. In daylight operations with SE Fighters, by using their superior endurance and high sustained speeds. They were good divers and climbers, by all the accounts i have read. This has to have had some effect on their low loss rates to LW day or night fighters (the exchange rate was about 6:1 in favour of the Mossie).

Me 110 was a pioneer aircraft, that really has copped a lot of bad press that is unjustified. It could not fulfil its primary role of long range escort, because it could not turn to keep itself out of trouble, and just lacked the speed to run away effectively. But it had a lot of niche roles just the same, and deservesd better than it generally gets....heavy punch, good range, good speed, pleasant and easy to fly. Its other roles included night fighter, maritime strike and escort, ground attack. It did these jobs pretty well by all accounts. In the east they did pretty well in their original role I have read, so they should be seen as reasonably good value
 
IIRC the things got wrong for the Bf-110 when it was tried in the role it was unfit for - the close escort.
Bf-110 was almost as fast as the 109 Spit, but faster than Hurricane of BoB era. It was assumed the it would go ahead of the bomber stream, using it's cruising speed altitude to dive on climbing defenders, then to destroy (hence 'Zerstoerer' ) them with it's heavy armament. After the diving pass, climb up and repeat. Multiple crew, long range radio - essential for situational awareness over enemy territory. But, when flying at bombers' speed altitude, for the pilot making an attack vs, bomber stream it was just another 'bomber' to be killed.
 
That seems pretty fair.

I would note that the P-38 was not saddled with the long range radio requirement that the 110 was so didn't need a dedicated radio operator. The P-38 was also a bit later in timing and also benefited from engines/fuel that offered a big increase in power with little increase in size or weight.
 
Bf 110G-2 weight 16,500 lbs, 335 gals fuel, wing area 413 ftsq, AR 6.87, 2 DB 605E 1233 HP 30' combat&climb at 21.325 ft.
Max Speed 358 mph at 21.325 ft, 287 mph at S.L. Climb to 19.685 in 7.4 minutes Climb to 6.562 in 1.2 minutes.

P-38G weight 15,800/15,900 lbs (blocks changes), 300 gals fuel, wing area 327 ftsq, AR 8.26, 2 V-1710-5155 1225 HP 44.5" boost at 22.600 ft.
Max Speed 404 mph at 22.600 ft, (Tactical trials 2.800rpm 385.5 mph at 25.000 ft, 319 mph at S.L.) Climb to 6.000 1.71 minutes, Climb to 20.000 in 5.68 minutes (Tactical trials 2.800 rpm climb to 20.000 in 8.5, climb to 5.000 in 2), the performance not a tactical trials are at 13.900 lbs (only 88% of full weight) and only 3 weapons, the tactical trials condition are unknown. Note trouble with cooling did that rated power not go over 1240 hp include the 38H variant. (higher boost were available only to low altitude)

adding fuel flow
P-38G 44.5" 3000 rpm 135 gals for hour, max continuos (41" 2600 rpm, nominal 1100 hp) 115 gals for hour, max cruise (31" 2300 rpm, nominal 740 HP) 58 gals for hour minimum (23" 1800 rpm nominal 350 HP) 22 gals for hour, military (51" 3000 rpm, nominal 1425 hp) 150 gals for hour. GPH for engine.
Bf 110G-2 max continuos (1045 HP at 19.690 ft) 160 gals for hours both the engines

range
P-38G max continuos (355 mph) at 12k ft 360 miles with 40 gals of allowance
Bf 110G-2 max continuos (332 mph) at 19.690 ft 590 miles, allowance not indicated but the fuel is theoretically for 2h and 5 minutes and range is around 1h and 45 minutes so almost 50 gals.

calculated theorical endurance&range at max continuos w/o allowance, w/o drop tank
P-38G at 20k ft 1h and 19 minutes (493 miles)
Bf 109G-2 at 19.690 ft 2h and 6 minutes (700 miles)
 
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Compare for what?

The P-38 might have not worked so well as a night fighter in 1942 with the bulkier radar gear. It might also be interesting to compare field performance.
 
ther was not a NF P-38 in '42 and this thread is on day fighters. typical fighter mission free fighter, escort, interception
 
I know there was no NF P-38 in 1942, I am trying to point out that the two planes were not designed for the same mission and even if forced into the same mission at times the fact that one was better at one mission or another at different times doesn't really mean that one plane was better overall than the other.
 
What fighter aircraft did Britain employ during their failed attempt to seize the Aegean and force Turkey into the war as an ally?
There was limited indirect support by the USAAF, bombers escorted by P-38's, bombing German a/f's in Greece, Crete and the other islands to try to suppress them during the British operation in early October-mid November 1943. But the whole problem with that operation, the British attempt to take over islands surrendered by Italian garrisons at Italy's armistice, and prevent the Germans taking them, was lack of direct air cover. It's debateable if the actual purpose was to get Turkey into the war; rather, a trick the British tried to use was for their destroyers, carrying troops and supplies, to violate Turkish territorial waters hoping the Germans wouldn't attack them there out of respect for Turkish neutrality. But the whole operation was a pretty remarkable example of ignoring multiple earlier lessons of the war about cruiser/destroyer operations in the face of strong enemy air contingents without direct air support of their own, and where the distances and locations of enemy air bases didn't allow the ships to operate strictly in darkness.

Joe
 
Air cover was mostly provided by by two Spitfire squadrons (7 Squadron, SAAF and 74 Squadron, RAF). There were also 2 or 3 squadrons of strike aircraft. i do not know the types, but suspect either Hudsons or Venturas. the strike aircraft remained based in Egypt, whilst the Spitfires were transferred to Kos airfield after its capture. Allies lost a total of 104 aircraft during the operation, more than 80% of these losses were due to non combat related causes. Spitfires did not do well on the rough strip at Kos and many strike aircraft were lost to or from the target.

Once the size of the Allied effort had been assessed, the germans moved very quickly to reinforce. FliegerKorps X trasnsferred 362 aircraft from other fronts, to reinforce the 30 or so fighters already stationed in the region. I dont know the actual losses suffered by the germans, but I have read somewhere that their losses ran at between 40 and 50%. Most of those, like the allies, were related to non-combat related causes. If that second number is corect, German losses were comparable to Allied losses. Which is strange, since the Germans had the use of the first class strips on Rhodes, whilst the allies were using rough, damaged dirt strip at Kos.
 
But the whole problem with that operation, the British attempt to take over islands surrendered by Italian garrisons at Italy's armistice, and prevent the Germans taking them, was lack of direct air cover.


Incorrect Im afraid Joe, at least at the beginning of the operation. There was no aircover intially, but the british were content with that, since initially the germ,ans had no strike aircraft either. From the 1st october, FK-X began to arrive and the situation turned very serious very quickly. Strike aircraft were unavailable and the Spits based there had a terrible time of it. Outnumbered, Kos fell on the 3rd October, and from there it all fell apart. The plan envisaged that the germans would reinforce, which they did, but it had been considered a manageable problem, since the british would be in control of Kos airfield. Whilst the aircover was in place Allied losses were tolerable, but the Germans mounted their first, and most concentrated effort to take Kos. After that, the fleet was exposed and took losses accordingly.

It's debateable if the actual purpose was to get Turkey into the war; rather, a trick the British tried to use was for their destroyers, carrying troops and supplies, to violate Turkish territorial waters hoping the Germans wouldn't attack them there out of respect for Turkish neutrality.


Absolutely, the Brits hoped the germans would not attack in those waters, but they did

But the whole operation was a pretty remarkable example of ignoring multiple earlier lessons of the war about cruiser/destroyer operations in the face of strong enemy air contingents without direct air support of their own, and where the distances and locations of enemy air bases didn't allow the ships to operate strictly in darkness.

Ah no, this is not correct. provision was made for aircover, and it was provided, until Kos airstrip fell. Its more accurate to describe the operation as making allowance for aircover, but the extent of opposition raised under-estimated, and the difficulties of operating from the rough strip of Kos also under-estimated
 
I I am trying to point out that the two planes were not designed for the same mission and even if forced into the same mission at times the fact that one was better at one mission or another at different times doesn't really mean that one plane was better overall than the other.

i never told that the resulted of camparison must be that one is better overall. Can be one better for high altitude escort an other for low altitude free fighter sweep over the frontline, or a better interceptor
 
The operation moreover, was largely torpedoed by Eisenhower who wanted nothing to do with it, whereas Churchill believed it to be classic application of the "soft underbelly" strategy. Despite American refusal of help ( i was led to believe no help, but evidently some was provided), the operation was ordered to proceed, largely due to Churchills direct interference.

The British planned a series of small actions in the Agean. Churchiill was determined to launch the attack. Operation Accolade focused on the Dodecanese Islands. Operation Hercules was planned to assault Rhodes. Churchill saw it as a way of following up on the Sicily invasion. The British failed to gain American support for the enterprise. General Eisenhower was dubious about diverting resources from the planned cross-Chasnnel invasion to Italy. Operations in the Aegean struck him as a British attemp to delay the cross-channel invasion. Failure to gain American support significantly limited the resources available, and explains why the british forces were spread so thin, and using innappropriate aircraft. The LRDG, SBS and various other Allied units participated along with assorted Naval assets. The British seized Leros, Cos and Samos and several smaller islands (September 1943) as preparation for the planned invasion of Rhodes. The German reacted quickly. The Luftwaffe made a key difference in the whole operation. The Luftwaffe flew in reinforcements to Rhodes. The Germans retook Cos (early October). Thev British suspended operations (Late November), They suffered over 5,000 casualties and lost 26 ships.

Still, there was a flip side to this disaster. The Germans then maintained a garrison force of 300000 German troops (in 10 Corps to defend this area for another year....300000 men could have made a difference on the eastern Front or in Italy at that time. I dont think much of FK-X remained by the end of the operation....looking at the forces available for bari, the KJorps could muster 105 aircraft for the attack, whilst the attacks at Anzio the Korps was down to about 50 Jabos and roughly 30 bombers.
 
Many! Mike Alba, 338th FS 55FG was a personal friend and flew both P-38s and 51s. In the ground support role he thought the P-38 was a better aircraft and he mentioned that his squadron took many losses when they convered to the P-51. Mike passed away in 2007.

There was at least one ETO squadron that did not want to give up their P-38s for the P-51. I'll have to look around for the info...

As far as the loss rate - I beleive they did have a lower loss rate in the PTO (when compared to other AAF fighters) till the P-51 came along. By that time most of the extensive air to air combat were over the Japanese mainland with a severely beaten Japanese fighter force.


Many perhaps, but still the minority, although I agree with you and your friend that the P-38's extra engine made it a much better proposition for ground attack - though maybe not so good as the P-47. I read somewhere that USAAF pilots used to say "If you want to impress your girl, fly a P-38. If you want to come home to your girl, fly a P-47"
Re the P-38's loss record, I'm sure it did have a better kill loss record than other AAF fighters in the Pacific- for much of the time it was in action it's stablmates were P-39s and P-40s. And the nature of the opposition in the pacific suited the P-38 perfectly. Everywhere the Zero and Oscar were weak the Lightning was strong. With a 70mph + speed advantage the P-38 pilot could engage and disengage at will. If one of the Japanese fighters got on their tail the American pilot could dive and escape at speeds well short of compressability. In a way the P-38 was almost the perfect fighter to take on the Japanese (I realise I'm excluding tha later war Japanese fighters, but they were few and far between compared to the Zero and Oscar).
In Europe things were different. The Lightning had little or no speed advantage over the Bf 109 or Fw190, and was no more (probably less) manourerable in the horizontal. And unlike the Zero the german fighters dived fine, which denied the P-38 an escape option - in fact the Germans quickly learned that if a P-38 was on their tail the best thing they could do was to split-s for the deck in the knowedge that if the P-38 tried to follow them to the higher speeds it would lose control. This, coupled with the fact that the German pilots usually commenced the fight with an altitude advantage, meant that the P-38 had a tough time of it when it arrived in the ETO. As one pilot said; "We couldn't outrun them, we couldn't out-turn them and we couldn't out-dive them - it was their show for quite a while."
The arrival of the P-38L largely addressed the lightning's defficiencies and gave it's pilots a tool to match the Luftwaffe head on. But by that time the Thunderbolt and Mustang were already doing the same thing for much less cost.
The P38 was an excellent fighter in the Pacific and not much less so in the MTO, but in the ETO it's greatest virtue was that it was available when there was nothing better. With the development of the P47 and arrival of merlin powered P-51s there wasn't really anything the Lightning could do that the others couldn't do as well and for much less.
 
HyperWar: Royal Air Force 1939-1945: Volume II: The Fight Avails [Appendix XII]
It appears to me Britain had quite a few long range fighter aircraft in the Mediterranean region. Why weren't some employed to provide fighter cover for Operation Accolade?

Nos. 227, 252 Beaufighter
No. 680 Lightning, Hurricane
Nos. 39, 47, 144 Beaufighter
No. 60 (S.A.A.F.) Squadron Mosquito
No. 1437 Flight Mustang
Nos. 108, 272 Beaufighter
 
Many perhaps, but still the minority, although I agree with you and your friend that the P-38's extra engine made it a much better proposition for ground attack - though maybe not so good as the P-47. I read somewhere that USAAF pilots used to say "If you want to impress your girl, fly a P-38. If you want to come home to your girl, fly a P-47"
Re the P-38's loss record, I'm sure it did have a better kill loss record than other AAF fighters in the Pacific- for much of the time it was in action it's stablmates were P-39s and P-40s. And the nature of the opposition in the pacific suited the P-38 perfectly. Everywhere the Zero and Oscar were weak the Lightning was strong. With a 70mph + speed advantage the P-38 pilot could engage and disengage at will. If one of the Japanese fighters got on their tail the American pilot could dive and escape at speeds well short of compressability. In a way the P-38 was almost the perfect fighter to take on the Japanese (I realise I'm excluding tha later war Japanese fighters, but they were few and far between compared to the Zero and Oscar).
Agree to a point - In the Pacific tactics and training was a lot different then the ETO. A lot of USAAF brass did not like the P-38 and it was a complicated aircraft to maintain and fly.

In Europe things were different. The Lightning had little or no speed advantage over the Bf 109 or Fw190, and was no more (probably less) manourerable in the horizontal. And unlike the Zero the german fighters dived fine, which denied the P-38 an escape option - in fact the Germans quickly learned that if a P-38 was on their tail the best thing they could do was to split-s for the deck in the knowedge that if the P-38 tried to follow them to the higher speeds it would lose control. This, coupled with the fact that the German pilots usually commenced the fight with an altitude advantage, meant that the P-38 had a tough time of it when it arrived in the ETO. As one pilot said; "We couldn't outrun them, we couldn't out-turn them and we couldn't out-dive them - it was their show for quite a while."
True to a point on the earlier models, the P-38J and L changed that a bit
The arrival of the P-38L largely addressed the lightning's defficiencies and gave it's pilots a tool to match the Luftwaffe head on. But by that time the Thunderbolt and Mustang were already doing the same thing for much less cost.
True - The P-38K "would have" also addressed the same issue but it was decided not to halt a production line for the modification needed to produce this aircraft.
The P38 was an excellent fighter in the Pacific and not much less so in the MTO, but in the ETO it's greatest virtue was that it was available when there was nothing better. With the development of the P47 and arrival of merlin powered P-51s there wasn't really anything the Lightning could do that the others couldn't do as well and for much less.
Agree
 
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Interesting thread!

I'm wondering if anybody have some opinions to spare on the Do-335.

Obviously it accomplished nothing which could influence the course of the war, never the less it's specifications were impressive and I read somewhere that the arrangement of the push-pull gave some advantages for manouverability.

I'd love to hear something substantial on its good and bad points...
 

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