What I'm saying is if the fleet is already on the way to Pearl and the Americans suddenly are obviously aware they are coming then they can't just divert the Hawaiian raid to the south. They are either going to need to go ahead and attack anyway or return to a safe area to regroup.
UK & US discover Japan's plans in detail October 1941
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
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What I'm saying is if the fleet is already on the way to Pearl and the Americans suddenly are obviously aware they are coming then they can't just divert the Hawaiian raid to the south. They are either going to need to go ahead and attack anyway or return to a safe area to regroup.
Jagdflieger
Senior Airman
- 580
- Mar 23, 2022
Okay, that is why I had asked if in this "fictional" scenario, the Japanese would have been aware of their plans being known to the others.
If yes, they most likely would have come up with another plan regarding the USN pacific fleet. therefore theoretically setting the Pearl task-force free for some other task.
If not, they would most likley have lost almost every asset in their Pearl task force but still continued their simultaneous operations towards the Philippines and South-East-Asia.
Not criticizing Admiral Beez thread idea - I am just trying to find out the intention of his thread.
1.Japan continues as history shows - okay then the war might have been shortened by 6-12 month
1. Or Japan changing it's plans due to being aware about it's intentions/attack-plans being known
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- Thread starter
- #23
Admiral Beez
Captain
Option 1 was my intention. In early October 1941 Churchill and FDR are aware of and accept as legit Japan's plans in late November to early December 1941 to strike the USN at PH and to mount simultaneous invasions of Malaya (incl. via Thailand), DEI and the Philippines. Japan is not aware of the Wallies knowledge and continues its plans as were. I suggested the Wallies have an option to announce the plans, but likely won't.
I'd like to see the Wallies run an early version of Operation Mincemeat to deceive the Japanese. I wouldn't let the DEI or Aussies in on it until they need to know. Too many loose lips otherwise. What are our ideas for the deception?
I like it. Since the Wallies only know that the strike is planned for sometime from mid November to early December they'll need to remain at a high preparedness level for several weeks. Good thing the Allies know that Japan plans to concentrate the force in the Kuril Islands before departing for the strike. That's within sailing distance of USN submarines from the Philippines to monitor any fleet buildup.
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Kantei Kessen in reverse. I like!
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
CarDiv2 broke off from Kido Butai to help the second assault on Wake Island in Dec 1941. And the IJN continually provided both supply an bombardment support to the Army soldiers on Guadalcanal. Pretty sure they provided support for the Battle of Shanghai in 1937, too.
ETA: that said, I have to admit that there are more difficulties to that idea than I had at first conceived. Y'all's input is definitely appreciated.
Jagdflieger
Senior Airman
- 580
- Mar 23, 2022
Okay, so since I am not very fit in regards to the PTO, two questions before developing a counter plan
1. Besides Singapore is there a harbor/naval base along the South China Sea, that would be able to accommodate a USN fleet, approx. the size of the fleet at Pearl?
e.g. on the Philippines or French Indochina/particularly South Vietnam
2. Would the "mere" existence of a known plan to strike Pearl, enable the USA/Roosevelt to declare war prior onto Japan?
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
No. Manila Bay is of course large enough, but its facilities and support infrastructure aren't nearly as well-developed as Pearl Harbor's. It was also, obviously from history, under the Japanese air umbrella, so once Clark Field got neutralized it would be very vulnerable.
I don't know about basing conditions in southern Indochina, but I'd imagine they would be even more primitive, and much closer to Japanese air bases.
That's harder to answer. The isolationist movement had lost a lot of steam by winter '41. According to contemporary Gallup polling, a majority of Americans believed we would end up being involved in WWII, but I don't know that learning of such a plan from the Japanese would be sufficient to convert that belief to an active desire to plunge in.
Jagdflieger
Senior Airman
- 580
- Mar 23, 2022
Thanks, so in order to repair major damages on bigger navel vessels - they would need to go back to Pearl or even San Diego, Singapore might have the necessary port infrastructure
but not the necessary material and as such not the repair capabilities.
Secondly to give this scenario some realistic features we would need to take into account that the US Fleet or US installations actually need to be struck first - agreed?
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
I know Manila didn't have a drydock sufficient to hoist even a Standard American BB of the era, and it lacked the fuel storage for ongoing operations. I can't speak with any authority about Singapore's facilities. I do know that both hypothetical bases were in Japanese air range, and both lacked adequate air defenses. Not a good place to park valuable naval assets. So yes, damaged American ships would likely return to PH, holing up in Manila only to make them seaworthy for the voyage, but no permanent repairs.
As for your last question, I believe, and this is only my opinion, that there may have been a chance that the Japanese could mount a southern drive to Singapore and NEI without first attacking American assets, but that would require the Japanese to accept the risk of the Philippines flanking the sea-lanes between the southern seas and Japan proper, which was clearly a risk they did not accept. At that point America could conceivably launch a war at any time and strand Japanese forces south of Formosa is perhaps what the Japanese were thinking?
The problem with an initial Japanese attack on America-- even were it not surprise -- would be that it would entirely undercut any remaining isolationism and gather the country behind FDR's obvious inclination to join the Allies. But it's hard to say.
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Jagdflieger
Senior Airman
- 580
- Mar 23, 2022
The Japanese strike towards Malay and Indonesia is a separate planing and agenda by the Japanese Army - merely using the IJN as a means of transport IMO
The Japanese strike onto the Philippines is also an agenda hosted by the Japanese Army, whereby the latter includes the IJN taking out Pearl in order to ensure the flanks safety.
So the planed strike onto Pearl and the Philippines will definitely go into action. Totally independent off the Japanese attack towards Malaya and Indonesia.
The Brits. basically can't do much - since they never expected the Japanese to land on the east-cost of West-Malaysia but supposedly steering right into the formidable naval cannons based in Singapore and foremost Sentosa island - facing/operational only in the southern direction. So IMO Singapore and Malaya are screwed anyway.
Meaning the USN will have to come up with a plan in regards to Pearl and the Philippines.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
While I agree the Brits were essentially powerless to change the course of events, I disagree with the idea that the surprise attack on PH was entirely divorced from the South Seas operations. Yamamoto in 1941 offered his resignation -- if the attack on Pearl Harbor were refused -- precisely because he wanted to negate any American power to respond to the southern offensive, precisely at the outset of operations. He feared that the Americans would join in without being attacked anyway, and so wanted to nullify our ability to join in. Thus, in Japanese strategy, the two were conjoined.
Operationally, Yamamoto's demand worked, as the Americans were rendered helpless as well to counter the southern drive.
ETA: The planned American response to any Japanese offensive, WPO and later Rainbow-5, were both utterly unrealistic, and were largely abandoned forthwith, though elements of the plans, namely the seizure of island bases, survived.
Jagdflieger
Senior Airman
- 580
- Mar 23, 2022
Did I say that? , the strike onto Pearl ran simultaneously with the Philippine operation and the Malayan/Indonesian operation
Meaning if Pearl would proof to be a failure, the strike towards Malaya, Indonesia (would still have been executed) That the strike onto the Philippines might have been called off - I wouldn't be totally surprised.
IIRC the Japanese anticipated/planed that the conquest of Malaya incl.Singapore would take 10-12 weeks. actually it took only 6-7 weeks. With the IJN (those elements planed for the Philippine attack) still being available - those and assets not needed for Malaya could be used to fend of a USN strike coming from Pearl.
So to me the Pearl and Philippine operation is independent of the Malaya operation.
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Thumpalumpacus
Captain
When you wrote this:
[Bolding added -- Thump]
That was certainly the impression I got. In English the two phrases ("totally independent" and "entirely divorced") are interchangeable and synonymous. I understand English isn't your native tongue and I'm not taking the piss here, just responding to what I've read.
I agree that had the raid on PH proved to be a failure or incomplete success, the drive South would still have occurred. You can't pull a card back once it's laid upon the table. But the attack on PH was certainly designed to aid the drive south, according to Toland and others, and so strategically was not "totally independent" of the southern move. The Japanese attack on PH was designed to forestall an American counter to the invasions of Malaya and NEI.
Jagdflieger
Senior Airman
- 580
- Mar 23, 2022
I hadn't finished my answer yet - sorry
So once again:
Did I say that? , the strike onto Pearl ran simultaneously with the Philippine operation and the Malayan/Indonesian operation
Meaning if Pearl would proof to be a failure, the strike towards Malaya, Indonesia (would still have been executed) That the strike onto the Philippines might have been called off - I wouldn't be totally surprised.
IIRC the Japanese anticipated/planed that the conquest of Malaya incl.Singapore would take 10-12 weeks. actually it took only 6-7 weeks. With the IJN (those elements planed for the Philippine attack) still being available - those and assets not needed for Malaya could be used to fend of a USN strike coming from Pearl.
So to me the Pearl and Philippine operation is independent of the Malaya operation.
As to disinformation. Large fleet exercise -explicitly denied to have anything to do with a planned transit to the Suez Canal. Why would you even think we were going to go enforce the neutrality of the canal? We didn't say that, nobody saw anything, you can't prove anything! We are just working with the British cause we are friends. We've always been friends, well for decades anyway. We are NOT planning to free up their assets from protecting the Canal Zone while still pretending we aren't at war with Germany. Totally not doing that.
What does Japan do if they think the Pacific Fleet is joining the European war? Well, probably attack anyway. But it gives you a reason to be shuffling things all around. And it might almost sort of make sense that a "neutral party" could guard the canal. I mean, it's ridiculous as Germany would instantly declare war. But maybe that's the plan and anyway they sure are sending a bunch of stuff to Hawaii aren't they?
But look - they have announced they are doing a big "fleet week" in Pearl Harbor set for the second week of December… they can't possibly know we are coming if they are having a party!
What does Japan do if they think the Pacific Fleet is joining the European war? Well, probably attack anyway. But it gives you a reason to be shuffling things all around. And it might almost sort of make sense that a "neutral party" could guard the canal. I mean, it's ridiculous as Germany would instantly declare war. But maybe that's the plan and anyway they sure are sending a bunch of stuff to Hawaii aren't they?
But look - they have announced they are doing a big "fleet week" in Pearl Harbor set for the second week of December… they can't possibly know we are coming if they are having a party!
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
We see it differently. Forestalling the American response by attacking PH was designed to prevent the USN from intervening for six months or so.
Jagdflieger
Senior Airman
- 580
- Mar 23, 2022
I don't think so - Pearl was directed towards a logical anticipated US interference upon the Japanese attacking US Philippines - not attacking the Brits and Dutch, or did I miss out on some crucial information?
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I would like to suggest you look up the combat record of the Japanese cruiser Mogami while escorting the Imperial Japanese Army's navy. I'm thinking Battle of Sunda Strait.
The Japanese Army had its own navy. (Thanks GrauGeist!)
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
Attacking the Philippines was in order to defend the flanks of the invasion routes and supply lines of the NEI invasion, so yes, in Yamamoto's mind, and the overall plan design, the two operations were interconnected.
Attacking the PI to guard communications between Japan and NEI required neutralizing the Philippines. Attacking the PI for that purpose would garner a sure American response. The attack on PH was designed to hamper that by neutralizing the Pacific Fleet.
Again: you have a different view upon it. Read Toland's The Rising Sun (recounts Japanese GHQ discussions about this) for an old but still good recounting of the Japanese decision-making in the year leading up to Pearl Harbor and the onset of hostilities. Prange in At Dawn We Slept also touches upon this.
Shortround6
Major General
The Americans were beefing up the defenses of the Philippines all during 1941.
The Naval base at Cavite dated to before the Spanish-American war and was the only repair facility in the Western Pacific for the US.
It had been allowed to stagnate or even be weakened during the period of the peace treaties when the nations weren't supposed to be fortifying /reinforcing their forward bases.
The US was shipping aircraft and materials into the Philippines including tanks, SP guns and artillery for the Philippine army.
The Japanese could NOT bypass the Philippines and move on to Malaya, Burma, Indonesia and expect to get their booty back to Japan.
The Naval base at Cavite dated to before the Spanish-American war and was the only repair facility in the Western Pacific for the US.
It had been allowed to stagnate or even be weakened during the period of the peace treaties when the nations weren't supposed to be fortifying /reinforcing their forward bases.
The US was shipping aircraft and materials into the Philippines including tanks, SP guns and artillery for the Philippine army.
The Japanese could NOT bypass the Philippines and move on to Malaya, Burma, Indonesia and expect to get their booty back to Japan.
