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Why? historically the Japanese did attack Pearl, the Philippines and South-East-Asia more or less simultaneously.
Bringing in their Naval assets (free from engaging Pearl and the Philippines) towards South-East-Asia would have contributed even more to their already Blitzkrieg like actions - or
this part of the IJN and Japans Taiwan based Air-force would have been set aside as a "guarantor" for keeping their Pacific flank protected in case the USA would have decided to disagree with Japans war-plans.
Okay, that is why I had asked if in this "fictional" scenario, the Japanese would have been aware of their plans being known to the others.What I'm saying is if the fleet is already on the way to Pearl and the Americans suddenly are obviously aware they are coming then they can't just divert the Hawaiian raid to the south. They are either going to need to go ahead and attack anyway or return to a safe area to regroup.
Option 1 was my intention. In early October 1941 Churchill and FDR are aware of and accept as legit Japan's plans in late November to early December 1941 to strike the USN at PH and to mount simultaneous invasions of Malaya (incl. via Thailand), DEI and the Philippines. Japan is not aware of the Wallies knowledge and continues its plans as were. I suggested the Wallies have an option to announce the plans, but likely won't.Not criticizing Admiral Beez thread idea - I am just trying to find out the intention of his thread.
1.Japan continues as history shows - okay then the war might have been shortened by 6-12 month
2. Or Japan changing it's plans due to being aware about it's intentions/attack-plans being known
I like it. Since the Wallies only know that the strike is planned for sometime from mid November to early December they'll need to remain at a high preparedness level for several weeks. Good thing the Allies know that Japan plans to concentrate the force in the Kuril Islands before departing for the strike. That's within sailing distance of USN submarines from the Philippines to monitor any fleet buildup.The U.S. can lay a trap for the coming Japanese. Get submarines out and patrolling for the incoming IJN fleet; get the fighters on Hawaii on stand-by, ready for immediate action; get more radar stations set up and make sure that information is quickly relayed to commanders for air defense so as to be able to get the fighters up to intercept the incoming Japanese; bring all the USN ships up to combat readiness to make them harder to sink and able to respond with anti-aircraft fire even quicker. The IJN raid would be walking into a hornet's nest.
Kantei Kessen in reverse. I like!I'd expect the opposite. The U.S. can lay a trap for the coming Japanese. Get submarines out and patrolling for the incoming IJN fleet; get the fighters on Hawaii on stand-by, ready for immediate action; get more radar stations set up and make sure that information is quickly relayed to commanders for air defense so as to be able to get the fighters up to intercept the incoming Japanese; bring all the USN ships up to combat readiness to make them harder to sink and able to respond with anti-aircraft fire even quicker.
The IJN raid would be walking into a hornet's nest.
I agree. Especially as sea transport aide, taking Malaya, DEI and the Philippines is an IJA affair. The IJA and IJN do not get along.
I'd describe it as the Navy and Army planned and executed their plans more or less separately. Did the Kido Butai or the IJN's battlefleet ever provide air cover or NGFS for the IJA's offensives?
Okay, so since I am not very fit in regards to the PTO, two questions before developing a counter planOption 1 was my intention.
Okay, so since I am not very fit in regards to the PTO, two questions before developing a counter plan
1. Besides Singapore is there a harbor/naval base along the South China Sea, that would be able to accommodate a USN fleet, approx. the size of the fleet at Pearl?
e.g. on the Philippines or French Indochina/particularly South Vietnam
2. Would the "mere" existence of a known plan to strike Pearl, enable the USA/Roosevelt to declare war prior onto Japan?
Thanks, so in order to repair major damages on bigger navel vessels - they would need to go back to Pearl or even San Diego, Singapore might have the necessary port infrastructure....That's harder to answer. The isolationist movement had lost a lot of steam by winter '41. According to contemporary Gallup polling, a majority of Americans believed we would end up being involved in WWII, but I don't know that learning of such a plan from the Japanese would be sufficient to convert that belief to an active desire to plunge in.
Thanks, so in order to repair major damages on bigger navel vessels - they would need to go back to Pearl or even San Diego, Singapore might have the necessary port infrastructure
but not the necessary material and as such not the repair capabilities.
Secondly to give this scenario some realistic features we would need to take into account that the US Fleet or US installations actually need to be struck first - agreed?
The Japanese strike towards Malay and Indonesia is a separate planing and agenda by the Japanese Army - merely using the IJN as a means of transport IMOI know Manila didn't have a drydock sufficient to hoist even a Standard American BB of the era, and it lacked the fuel storage for ongoing operations. I can't speak with any authority about Singapore's facilities. I do know that both hypothetical bases were in Japanese air range, and both lacked adequate air defenses. Not a good place to park valuable naval assets. So yes, damaged American ships would likely return to PH, holing up in Manila only to make them seaworthy for the voyage, but no permanent repairs.
As for your last question, I believe, and this is only my opinion, that there may have been a chance that the Japanese could mount a southern drive to Singapore and NEI without first attacking American assets, but that would require the Japanese to accept the risk of the Philippines flanking the sea-lanes between the southern seas and Japan proper, which was clearly a risk they did not accept. At that point America could conceivably launch a war at any time and strand Japanese forces south of Formosa is perhaps what the Japanese were thinking?
The problem with an initial Japanese attack on America-- even were it not surprise -- would be that it would entirely undercut any remaining isolationism and gather the country behind FDR's obvious inclination to join the Allies. But it's hard to say.
So the plan[n]ed strike onto Pearl and the Philippines will definitely go into action. Totally independent off the Japanese attack towards Malaya and Indonesia.
Did I say that? , the strike onto Pearl ran simultaneously with the Philippine operation and the Malayan/Indonesian operation.... I disagree with the idea that the surprise attack on PH was entirely divorced from the South Seas operations....
Did I say that? ,
So the plan[n]ed strike onto Pearl and the Philippines will definitely go into action. Totally independent off the Japanese attack towards Malaya and Indonesia.
I hadn't finished my answer yet - sorryWhen you wrote this:
[Bolding added -- Thump]
That was certainly the impression I got. In English the two phrases ("totally independent" and "entirely divorced") are interchangeable and synonymous. I understand English isn't your native tongue and I'm not taking the piss here, just responding to what I've read.
I agree that had the raid on PH proved to be a failure or incomplete success, the drive South would still have occurred. You can't pull a card back once it's laid upon the table. But the attack on PH was certainly designed to aid the drive south, according to Toland and others, and so strategically was not "totally independent" of the southern move. The Japanese attack on PH was designed to forestall an American counter to the invasions of Malaya and NEI.
I hadn't finished my answer yet - sorry
So once again:
Did I say that? , the strike onto Pearl ran simultaneously with the Philippine operation and the Malayan/Indonesian operation
Meaning if Pearl would proof to be a failure, the strike towards Malaya, Indonesia (would still have been executed) That the strike onto the Philippines might have been called off - I wouldn't be totally surprised.
IIRC the Japanese anticipated/planed that the conquest of Malaya incl.Singapore would take 10-12 weeks. actually it took only 6-7 weeks. With the IJN (those elements planed for the Philippine attack) still being available - those and assets not needed for Malaya could be used to fend of a USN strike coming from Pearl.
So to me the Pearl and Philippine operation is independent of the Malaya operation.
I don't think so - Pearl was directed towards a logical anticipated US interference upon the Japanese attacking US Philippines - not attacking the Brits and Dutch, or did I miss out on some crucial information?We see it differently. Forestalling the American response by attacking PH was designed to prevent the USN from intervening for six months or so.
I would like to suggest you look up the combat record of the Japanese cruiser Mogami while escorting the Imperial Japanese Army's navy. I'm thinking Battle of Sunda Strait.The Japanese strike towards Malay and Indonesia is a separate planing and agenda by the Japanese Army - merely using the IJN as a means of transport IMO
The Japanese strike onto the Philippines is also an agenda hosted by the Japanese Army, whereby the latter includes the IJN taking out Pearl in order to ensure the flanks safety.
So the planed strike onto Pearl and the Philippines will definitely go into action. Totally independent off the Japanese attack towards Malaya and Indonesia.
The Brits. basically can't do much - since they never expected the Japanese to land on the east-cost of West-Malaysia but supposedly steering right into the formidable naval cannons based in Singapore and foremost Sentosa island - facing/operational only in the southern direction. So IMO Singapore and Malaya are screwed anyway.
Meaning the USN will have to come up with a plan in regards to Pearl and the Philippines.
I don't think so - Pearl was directed towards a logical anticipated US interference upon the Japanese attacking US Philippines - not attacking the Brits and Dutch, or did I miss out on some crucial information?