US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros (1 Viewer)

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Another serious concern is the defensive AA, the Japanese didn't have anything equivalent to the Bofors or Oerlikon, later in the war proximity fuses changed the game

Americans had very little of that at Midway, to the point of the thread. Proximity fuses were a pipe-dream at that point, and the Bofors was still in the process of being cadged from the paperwork. Oerlikons were just starting into service with USN at the time of Midway iirc.
 
The IJN's first mistake was letting Kido Butai range ahead of the fleet.
Yamamoto should have closed with Midway Atoll and shelled the island with his battleships and cruisers while his carriers (he had six) provided fleet cover and interdiction.
Instead, allowing the first and second carrier divisions to take the lead against the well defended Atoll was literally letting his arse dangle in the breeze.

Considering how Wake Island put up a ferocious defense despite the odds only a few months prior, they should have learned from that and expected a similar reception and planned accordingly.
I kind of agree and kind of don't. In a perfect world, you don't let Kido Butai range ahead of the fleet, but you don't have a perfect world. The Kido Butai was made up of the fastest ships. It needs separation for freedom of action to conduct air operations. It's my understanding that the invasion fleet and main body took advantage of mutual air cover and destroyer support. If you move the Main Body forward so that it can provide gun fire at the very beginning of the fleet, you can only approach Midway at night. The Main Body and invasion fleet becomes more susceptible to submarine attack, and maybe air attack. - And if there is an undetected US fleet - surface or carrier - sneaking up behind the invasion fleet? - Big trouble.

Due to the difference in speeds of the various formations, you can really only bring them together for a short window without sacrificing the speed advantage of the faster ships. What window do you choose??
 
Due to the difference in speeds of the various formations, you can really only bring them together for a short window without sacrificing the speed advantage of the faster ships. What window do you choose??

Keep KdB close enough to assist CAP provided by the light carriers, and far enough away to avoid counter-attacks. If needed, they can spool up 28 kts (Kaga's max) and respond to flanks.

Of course assuming no Aleutian prong, and re-assigning those carriers to cover the bombardment force.
 
I kind of agree and kind of don't. In a perfect world, you don't let Kido Butai range ahead of the fleet, but you don't have a perfect world. The Kido Butai was made up of the fastest ships. It needs separation for freedom of action to conduct air operations. It's my understanding that the invasion fleet and main body took advantage of mutual air cover and destroyer support. If you move the Main Body forward so that it can provide gun fire at the very beginning of the fleet, you can only approach Midway at night. The Main Body and invasion fleet becomes more susceptible to submarine attack, and maybe air attack. - And if there is an undetected US fleet - surface or carrier - sneaking up behind the invasion fleet? - Big trouble.

Due to the difference in speeds of the various formations, you can really only bring them together for a short window without sacrificing the speed advantage of the faster ships. What window do you choose??
I agree with your post but the IJN operated to a different plan than what we would come up with. They "knew" the USN was a demoralized force that would have to be dragged into a fight. There would be no US fleet sneaking up because the USN would be cowering at Pearl Harbor. IJN planners fell into the trap of what they thought the enemy would do as opposed to what the enemy is capable of doing. I too would have thought, following the capture of Wake Island, that Midway would require a lot more softening up and more troops. I get the impression that the IJN would give the Yankees another chance to "follow the script". Wake must have been an aberration. Any operational glitches could be countered with a "touch of the armored gauntlet".
 
It sure is one fugly bird ... the French would be proud!
The Barracuda was ugly, but swap out every Swordfish and Albacore with a Barracuda and the FAA will get some different results.

With twice the speed and twice the range over the Swordfish, the Barracuda would have been able to hit Bismarck earlier. The Swordfish missed the final battle with Bismarck, arriving too late to engage. Of course we'd need the Barracuda's more powerful Merlin engine and four blade prop, so we'd need to see some expedited moves at RR and the prop firms.
 
The Barracuda was ugly, but swap out every Swordfish and Albacore with a Barracuda and the FAA will get some different results. With twice the speed and twice the range over the Swordfish, the Barracuda would have been able to hit Bismarck earlier. The Swordfish missed the final battle with Bismarck, arriving too late to engage. Of course we'd need the Barracuda's more powerful Merlin engine, so we'd need to see some expedited moves at RR.

It's looks could scare a ship or two underwater!
 
One of the few times the Zero seems to have saved its carrier(s) from crippling damage or destruction by air strike is at Ceylon where the A6M encountered Blenheims and Fulmars. Otherwise, the Zeros fail to protect at least eleven IJN carriers from USN air attack: Shōhō at Coral Sea; Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū at Midway; Ryūjō at Eastern Solomons; Zuikaku, Zuihō, Chitose and Chiyoda at Leyte Gulf; and Hiyō at Philippine Sea. Only the Fairey Fulmar in the Med (allowing crippling strikes on Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable) appears to be a worse fleet air defence fighter.

To be fair, Zuikaku did survive Coral Sea intact, so we can give the Zeros credit there, but basically if you're an IJN carrier you cannot depend on the A6M to protect you whatsoever. With few guns, little ammunition, no working radios and no protection for the pilot or fuel the Zero seems to be about the worst you could get in a single seat, monoplane fleet defence fighter.
The USN record of defending carriers wasn't much better. People forget that the USN lost 4 fleet carriers in 1942 they just didn't lose then all at once. Again I suggest reading Fighters Over the Fleet. Coral Sea was a bit of a fiasco. Midway was somewhat better but still poor. Their performance actually regressed in the Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.
 
The USN record of defending carriers wasn't much better. People forget that the USN lost 4 fleet carriers in 1942 they just didn't lose then all at once. Again I suggest reading Fighters Over the Fleet. Coral Sea was a bit of a fiasco. Midway was somewhat better but still poor. Their performance actually regressed in the Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.
Which is one of my thoughts behind this thread. Give the IJN a little more tech and organization and the USN is in for a ton of trouble. Had the SBD strike been detected 30 miles out, intercepted and broken up, none of the IJN carriers would have been crippled that day, or at least at that moment. So, the USN has just lost much of their TBDs and SBDs.... what happens now? My prediction is that the IJN launches a full, four carrier strike against the USN carriers, and then both sides withdraw, the USN to Pearl and the IJN to Truk Lagoon (or home to Japan) since the Kido Butai is now seriously low on aircraft itself, plus fuel.
 
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The USN record of defending carriers wasn't much better. People forget that the USN lost 4 fleet carriers in 1942 they just didn't lose then all at once. Again I suggest reading Fighters Over the Fleet. Coral Sea was a bit of a fiasco. Midway was somewhat better but still poor. Their performance actually regressed in the Battles of the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.

Wasp's loss had nothing to do with fighter cover, though.
 
Wasp's loss had nothing to do with fighter cover, though.
True. Still 3 fleet carriers is not trivial. The point is that interception was very much a hit or miss affair for both navies in 1942. It is unfair to castigate the Zero for the failings of the SYSTEM.
in fact the USN didnt really get their act together until HMS Victorious joined Saratoga in early 1943. A key component was adopting the British vertical plot, allowing information to be readily understood by everyone in the CIC.
 
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True. Still 3 fleet carriers is not trivial. The point is that interception was very much a hit or miss affair for both navies in 1942. It is unfair to castigate the Zero for the failings of the SYSTEM.
in fact the USN didnt really get their act together until HMS Victorious joined Saratoga in early 1943. A key component was adopting the British vertical plot, allowing information to be readily understood by everyone in the CIC.

Definitely agreed. The USN, with its technical advantage in mid-1942, still took another six months or so to integrate ELINT systems, doctrine, and tactical weaponry to the point they could be somewhat useful. And even two years later, in spring of '45, we see USS Franklin catching a surprise bombing that almost sank the ship.

ADC&C was still in its infancy. So much of the battles of 1942 relied largely on luck, and not only in hindsight. It took scathing reports from Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz veterans to get USN to finally put together a system that was somewhat effective.

I don't know much about British vertical plots. If you feel like laying that out further, you're guaranteed at least one interested reader.
 
I agree with your post but the IJN operated to a different plan than what we would come up with. They "knew" the USN was a demoralized force that would have to be dragged into a fight. There would be no US fleet sneaking up because the USN would be cowering at Pearl Harbor. IJN planners fell into the trap of what they thought the enemy would do as opposed to what the enemy is capable of doing. I too would have thought, following the capture of Wake Island, that Midway would require a lot more softening up and more troops. I get the impression that the IJN would give the Yankees another chance to "follow the script". Wake must have been an aberration. Any operational glitches could be countered with a "touch of the armored gauntlet".
IJN needed the USN to race across the Pacific for the decisive battle.

So, long as USN patiently built up strength, the IJN were ever more in danger of losing that battle. Yamamoto knew the Two Ocean Act was adding 7 BBs to the 4 South Dakota class already under construction and USN had involved the escalator clause to LNT '36, so the Yamato BBs might not have any advantage at individual level, let alone when out numbered 2 or 3 to one.

If anything Pearl Harbor was too successful. Japan needed America mad enough to fight, have them race into a battle, then send enough bodies back from some place in South Asia Pacific (i.e. Vietnam)* that the US public had never heard of and therefore would stop the nonsense and agree to leave the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to Japan.

But PH attack was so good that there was no way that the US would charge to Philippines and fight the battle in Japan's backyard with its entire battle line in shambles. So, in '42, Japan is trying to take a little piece of sand in middle of Pacific in order to provoke USN into doing something stupid.

However, USA was too smart to get dragged into a battle that they might lose big. Thanks to code breakers, they knew what was coming, so built a battle plan that should allow them to at least trade CV for CV which given USN has 18 ordered is win for USA. The US, of course, hopes with forces from Midway to do better than 1:1.

So, if you want different Midway - start with better code protection of your radio traffic - i.e. some 4 wheel enigma machines from the Germans. Then you are taking Midway by surprise and can trumpet the news round the world and try to force the USN's hand.

Aside: USN ships were just getting their 1st RADAR sets in mid-41. Given the knowledge of the importance of RADAR passed along via RAF from BoB, the greater manufacturing capability of USA and the greater willingness to try new things, its not surprising that IJN doesn't have RADAR on its CVs.

*There's a lot of question to this day if USA would have ever fought WWII without victory in Pacific (without the surprise attack on PH; without atomic bombs). The Axis countries ideas of short, sharp contests seem to have been...delusional.
 
Definitely agreed. The USN, with its technical advantage in mid-1942, still took another six months or so to integrate ELINT systems, doctrine, and tactical weaponry to the point they could be somewhat useful. And even two years later, in spring of '45, we see USS Franklin catching a surprise bombing that almost sank the ship.

ADC&C was still in its infancy. So much of the battles of 1942 relied largely on luck, and not only in hindsight. It took scathing reports from Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz veterans to get USN to finally put together a system that was somewhat effective.

I don't know much about British vertical plots. If you feel like laying that out further, you're guaranteed at least one interested reader.
Scroll down to see an image of a vertical plot. If you are old enough you will remember TV weathermen standing behind a plexiglass map while writing backwards on it. The picture below it labeled Mark 1 Mod 1 Plotting Table is actually another British invention they called the Skiatron after the type of cathode ray tube used to project the radar image onto the table. The Skiatron was put into production in the US for both the RN and USN.

The article is part of a series tracing the development of fighter direction in the USN starting from its origins in RAF Fighter Command. I suggest reading the entire article from the beginning.

Here is another image of a Skiatron.
This website has lots of info on the development of radar systems. I have found a few errors but overall a great site.
 
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Scroll down to see an image of a vertical plot. If you are old enough you will remember TV weathermen standing behind a plexiglass map while writing backwards on it. The picture below it labeled Mark 1 Mod 1 Plotting Table is actually another British invention they called the Skiatron after the type of cathode ray tube used to project the radar image onto the table. The Skiatron was put into production in the US for both the RN and USN.

The article is part of a series tracing the development of fighter direction in the USN starting from its origins in RAF Fighter Command. I suggest reading the entire article from the beginning.

Here is another image of a Skiatron.
This website has lots of info on the development of radar systems. I have found a few errors but overall a great site.
Many thanks for the link,. much appreciated
 
Scroll down to see an image of a vertical plot. If you are old enough you will remember TV weathermen standing behind a plexiglass map while writing backwards on it. The picture below it labeled Mark 1 Mod 1 Plotting Table is actually another British invention they called the Skiatron after the type of cathode ray tube used to project the radar image onto the table. The Skiatron was put into production in the US for both the RN and USN.

The article is part of a series tracing the development of fighter direction in the USN starting from its origins in RAF Fighter Command. I suggest reading the entire article from the beginning.

Here is another image of a Skiatron.
This website has lots of info on the development of radar systems. I have found a few errors but overall a great site.

Thanks so much!
 
Scroll down to see an image of a vertical plot. If you are old enough you will remember TV weathermen standing behind a plexiglass map while writing backwards on it. The picture below it labeled Mark 1 Mod 1 Plotting Table is actually another British invention they called the Skiatron after the type of cathode ray tube used to project the radar image onto the table. The Skiatron was put into production in the US for both the RN and USN.

The article is part of a series tracing the development of fighter direction in the USN starting from its origins in RAF Fighter Command. I suggest reading the entire article from the beginning.

Here is another image of a Skiatron.
This website has lots of info on the development of radar systems. I have found a few errors but overall a great site.
Thanks for this post. I'm going to save some quality time to re-read it at length.
 
The Type 96 flak gun used by the IJN is a very good case to start with.

What is it and why and when and how.

It was chosen in 1935 so aircraft like the F4U are nowhere to be seen so against biplanes it would be effective.

So Yamato and its suicide run in 1945 was not part of the design.

Do you blame the gun or the people who chose it or that fact it still is the main gun in 1945?

Was it as useless as people say? Still gonna hurt below 1Km.

So choices are chosen 10 years earlier which are getting men killed. Welcome to military procurement 101.

The whole point of a flak gun is to stop the enemy flying down your funnel. If the Type 96 meant an enemy torpedo bomber had to launch their torpedo at extreme range then that's a win. If it meant a bomber got a miss rather than a hit then that's a win.

You don't have to shoot down aircraft or even hit to achieve a military advantageous outcome.
 

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