US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros

[Admiral Beez]

From my earlier post....

Imagine Midway with working radar connected to experienced CIC, and working/shielded radios in the Zeros. Nagumo's dilemma is no more. All Zeros can be recalled, refueled and rearmed and pilots rested between attacks. Kate and Val strikes can be orderly launched and formed up without hurry. Fuel lines can be flushed and secured when incoming strikes detected. McClusky's SBD attack is detected well out, etc.

Assuming the USN knows Japan has radar, CIC and good radios in the Zeros, how does the USN approach the coming Battle of Midway?

 

[The Basket]

Well the scouts have radar. Picket Destroyers have radar. The Kates have radar. Carriers have radar and the Kongos have radar directed flak.

So not well. The USN carriers will quickly be discovered and any USN air fleet will be quickly picked up.

So the usual. Chaff, fly very low, electronic warfare, radio jamming or spoofing. Feints. Decoys.

Often said USN had radar but IJN didn't. But plenty American carriers got sunk so radar is only a help and not a magic wand.

Even in 1945, USN were still taking losses to air power.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Well the scouts have radar. Picket Destroyers have radar. The Kates have radar. Carriers have radar and the Kongos have radar directed flak.

So not well. The USN carriers will quickly be discovered and any USN air fleet will be quickly picked up.

So the usual. Chaff, fly very low, electronic warfare, radio jamming or spoofing. Feints. Decoys.

Often said USN had radar but IJN didn't. But plenty American carriers got sunk so radar is only a help and not a magic wand.

Even in 1945, USN were still taking losses to air power.

The American carriers will probably stay undiscovered for a while, given that radar was in its infancy and there were no OTH radars yet invented. I don't think Kates flew any of the search-legs, either. So an ambush still could have happened.

If the Americans did not know about the hypothetical Japanese radars and CIC, then they probably would launched at the same time as they did historically, and taken an even bigger mauling provided the Japanese could provide sufficient CAP to attack either, or both, Yorktown's or Enterprise's SBDs.

If the Americans did know of these tech and doctrinal updates, then I think their smart money would have been to wait until the KdB carriers were firmly tied up in supporting the amphibious invasion, and then strike the ships. In other words, Midway is still the bait in the American trap, but it might get fully eaten in this alternative scenario.

Quick question: was Window known to the Americans at this time? I was under the impression it hadn't been used until about a year later, at Hamburg, by the Allies.

ETA: contrary to my above assertion that no Kates were on search, two apparently did so (were these the B6Ns being tested?). My apologies.

Between 0130 and 0200, 1 ship-based torpedo plane each from Akagi and Kaga, 2 Type 0 Float Recco each from Tone and Chikuma (distance 300 miles, to the left 60 miles) and 1 Type-95 Float Recco from the Haruna (distance 150 miles, to the left 40 miles), took off in search of enemy task forces to the South and to the East.

Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Americans had CIC, radar and working radios and they still lost a carrier, so we should expect the IJN to take some losses.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The Americans had CIC, radar and working radios and they still lost a carrier, so we should expect the IJN to take some losses.

The Americans didn't have CIC at the time. That didn't come about until after Santa Cruz and the disastrous intercept there couldn't defend Hornet, so far as I've read:

The need for better shipboard facilities for command and control was already obvious to many naval officers, and Nimitz issued Tactical Bulletin 4TB-42 on Thanksgiving Day, 1942, calling for establishment of a Combat Operations Center on every warship. King was profoundly impressed with the concept, but renamed it the Combat Information Center after discussion with other Navy chiefs in a conference on 8 January 1943. Critical facilities and components were identified, and Mahlon S. Tisdale became the driving force behind implementation.

The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Combat Information Center

In the summer of 1942, the Brits almost certainly had the best perspective on this issue, after BoB and the evacuation of Crete. Integrating radar at sea with CAP was still unresolved, I think. Hopefully someone more fully-informed can pull me up by any short hairs here.

 

[Conslaw]

I think if the USN evaluated the IJN's air defenses highly, they would simply have declined to engage at Midway. They might have evacuated the island and let them have it. The Battle of Midway was an optional engagement for the Americans. They could have avoided it completely if the odds did not look favorable.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm under the impression that the USN assumed the Japanese had radar. At one the battles off Guadal Canal, the American CO had issues with radar as he was afraid the Japanese could detect it. Was it Adm. Callahan?

 

[The Basket]

Good question

Did the Americans understand the true capability of Japanese naval air power?

 

[SaparotRob]

I think they learned the hard way.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm under the impression that the USN assumed the Japanese had radar. At one the battles off Guadal Canal, the American CO had issues with radar as he was afraid the Japanese could detect it. Was it Adm. Callahan?

It was either him or Wright, but I don't think it was so much he was afraid to use it out of concern for enemy detection, but rather that he didn't trust the returns enough to shoot at them.

 

[Glider]

Interestingly the Japanese did have radar, but only in small numbers and only on some of the battleships. Had the Japanese kept the BB's with the carriers the whole thing could easily have ended very differently.

As for tactics, I don't think the USN would have changed a thing. They didn't take into account the possible use of radar so why do anything differently

 

[The Basket]

The only battleship I know that had radar was Ise and she is not fast. Not sure if Ise had radar fitted at Midway.

I think Yamato in June 1942 didn't have radar. I could be wrong. Shokaku got radar after Midway.

Not sure if any Japanese ship had radar at Midway.

Japan had 4 problems with radar. Lack of industry, lack of research and development, lack of support from the military until too late and the usual bitching between IJA and IJN.

 

[GrauGeist]

RADAR would have made no difference to the continuous assault on the Japanese carriers.
The IJN's CAP was being pulled in many different directions and levels, burning up their fuel and spreading them thin.

So assuming they had RADAR, how would it have helped their CAP get from the deck to the SBDs in time?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Had the Japanese kept the BB's with the carriers the whole thing could easily have ended very differently.

Very true. Tying the carriers to slower BBs would almost certainly influence the pace of Japanese operations in early '42.

I think the Japanese chose right selecting Kirishima-class BCs for escort. Of course they should have upgraded the AA suite. But those BCs could about keep up with KdB (compared to Nagatos or Ises), and provide heavy support if needed; they just needed more and better AA.

 

[Glider]

RADAR would have made no difference to the continuous assault on the Japanese carriers.
The IJN's CAP was being pulled in many different directions and levels, burning up their fuel and spreading them thin.

So assuming they had RADAR, how would it have helped their CAP get from the deck to the SBDs in time?

I think the biggest difference would have been the IJN having more warning that there were incoming enemy aircraft. Any additional warning could only increase the chances of intercepting or even just disrupting the dive bomber attack. Even if this wasn't possible, the ships themselves might have been better prepared for the raid.

The impact depends on the scenario for instance:-

a) Install the radar on the carriers not the BB's
b) Keep the carriers with the BB's who had the radar

Clearly what happened from the Japanese perspective was the worst of both worlds resulting in a catastrophic defeat.

 

[The Basket]

The carriers even Kaga was too fast for the battleships. So having battleships with them even Yamato was more a hinderence.

It would be interesting to know exact Intel the Americans had on the IJN in June 1942.

One aspect is the Kido Butai operated together as one big group whereas USN policy was to split the carriers.

Having all carriers together meant one big strike group but meant once discovered then all carriers are found.

The USN were less coordinated and each carrier operated independently. But as with finding Yorktown then all you found was Yorktown.

So the USN would split so when the 2 IJN carriers were sighted it meant that 2 or 3 carriers were elsewhere rather than thinking all the carriers would be together. So thinking USN and how they would operate carriers had a negative effect because the IJN thought different.

 

[SaparotRob]

I was thinking about the Admiral's post about having radar equipped Swordfish at Midway. I wonder if the USN had them at the night actions off Guadal Canal, the USN might have fared better. Perhaps the Battle of Savo Island might not have been so disastrous?

 

[The Basket]

To be Honest IJN weakness and failure are legion at Midway.

So where do you start?

Have to write a book on it.

Radar is up there but only one of many.

 

[Conslaw]

If my memory of Lundstrom, et al is accurate, even with radar, fighter direction from Task Force 16 (Hornet and Enterprise) at Midway was poor, and if it had been better, CAP from TF-16 may have been able to help save TF 17 (Yorktown). In the Battle of Santa Cruz (or was it the Eastern Solomons), a fighter director's confusion of direct and relative bearing botched an important interception. The moral to the story is that there was a huge learning curve to get the tactics set and implemented even when you had the hardware in place.

 

[Conslaw]

The carriers even Kaga was too fast for the battleships. So having battleships with them even Yamato was more a hinderence.

It would be interesting to know exact Intel the Americans had on the IJN in June 1942.

One aspect is the Kido Butai operated together as one big group whereas USN policy was to split the carriers.

Having all carriers together meant one big strike group but meant once discovered then all carriers are found.

The USN were less coordinated and each carrier operated independently. But as with finding Yorktown then all you found was Yorktown.

So the USN would split so when the 2 IJN carriers were sighted it meant that 2 or 3 carriers were elsewhere rather than thinking all the carriers would be together. So thinking USN and how they would operate carriers had a negative effect because the IJN thought different.

I don't think the Kongo-class battleships were too slow to render antiaicraft support to the carriers. They were maybe a little faster than the North Carolina and South Dakota battleships that the US used for that purpose. The carrier can zig-zag violently with the battleship going straight at maximum sustained speed behind and they could stay pretty close. The Kongos, like all Japanese ships, needed to upgrade its AA suite regardless.