US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros

[Reluctant Poster]

Thanks for this post. I'm going to save some quality time to re-read it at length.

Also the testimony of Commander William Taylor before the Roberts Commission (Inquiry into the attack on Pearl Harbor) gives a lot of info on the development of fighter control, based on his personal experiences. He was fighter pilot who served in the USN and the Marines pre war, then the RN and the RAF in the early years of WWII and rejoined the USN, whereupon he was loaned to the US Army to help them set up the fighter control system at Pearl.

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION: Taylor

Here's a few more testimony's

INDEX TO WITNESS TESTIMONY REGARDING OPANA POINT RADAR.

Kermit Tyler's testimony is also interesting as he is often blamed for failing to realize that the blip reported by the radar operators at Opana Point was a Japanese attack. It should be clear that he had no chance of interpreting it as such and even if he did there was no means of getting a warning to the Navy.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Considering all the innovations to naval aviation the RN had introduced, I'm surprised the RN didn't require some aviation experience for carrier skippers.

Your post reminded me of ex-submariner Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward. He did just fine commanding surface vessels. So perhaps I'm too quick to connect Glorious' command failures with submariners.

 

[EwenS]

Considering all the innovations to naval aviation the RN had introduced, I'm surprised the RN didn't require some aviation experience for carrier skippers.

Your post reminded me of ex-submariner Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward. He did just fine commanding surface vessels. So perhaps I'm too quick to connect Glorious' command failures with submariners.

Some research I did last year on the COs of British & US carriers early in WW2 in response to queries on another site.

Britain

"Looking at the carrier COs of the early war period it was taking 22-24 years to rise from Midshipman to Captain. Then on reaching that rank, it took another 5-8 years to have sufficient seniority to get a carrier command. For example:-

HC Bovell promoted Captain 31/12/34 after 24 years. Nearly 6 years to command of Argus and another year to CO of Victorious.
G D'Oly Hughes promoted captain 31/12/32 after 24 years. 5.5 years to CO of Glorious.
TH Troubridge promoted Captain 31/12/34 after 23 years. 5 years to CO of Furious.
Denis Boyd promoted Captain 31/12/31 after 23 years. 8 years to CO of Illustrious.
AW La T Bisset promoted Captain 31/12/32 after 22 years. 7.5 years to CO of Formidable (incl 6 months as Executive Officer on Glorious before promotion to Captain).
AG Talbot promoted Captain 30/6/34 after 24 years. 6.5 years to CO of Furious.

So the generation of officers we are talking about have c30 years of service starting before WW1. So how many of their colleagues who were in the RNAS on 31 March 1918 chose to return to the RN on or after 1 April 1918? And how many of those were able to rise to the rank of Captain in the early 1930s? I'd venture to guess that it wasn't more than a handful.

Or alternatively, how many officers of that generation sought out a career in the FAA during the 1920s and 1930s when the organisation was very small relative to the size of the RN as a whole and were then able to rise up through the ranks in time?

One I did find was LD Mackintosh, promoted Captain in June 1938 after 24 years, who was appointed as CO of Eagle 4 years later, and then to Victorious after Eagle was sunk, and then Implacable in 1944. He spent most of his career after 1922 in FAA related posts. I've just finished reading Hobbs "The Fleet Air Arm and the War in Europe 1939-1945" where he makes a point of mentioning the number of officers who had been on the very earliest FAA Pilot & Observer courses in the 1920s who, as captains or Acting Captains, were appointed to command escort carriers, but not until 1944.

So by the late 1930s it seems to me that the potential pool of officers with the rank and seniority to command a carrier is relatively small before anyone even thinks of adding in experience of aviation. This seems like another legacy from the merger of the RNAS and RFC on 1 April 1918."



US (note "backgrounds in naval aviation" runs much wider than captain of a carrier as noted towards the end)

"So in Dec 1941, 7 CV and 1 CVE all with captains with backgrounds in naval aviation between the wars. (The years after their names are the years of graduation from the Naval Academy.)

Lexington - Ted Sherman 1910. Took command June 1940. Submarine CO in WW1. Switched to naval aviation.
Saratoga - AH Douglas 1908. Took command June 1940. Naval Aviator #753 June 1918.
Ranger - WK Harrill 1914. Took command June 1941
Yorktown - Elliot Buckmaster 1912. Took command Feb 1941
Enterprise - GD Murray 1911. Took command March 1941. Naval Aviator #22 1915.
Wasp - JW Reeves 1911. Took command April 1940
Hornet - Marc Mitscher 1910. Took command Oct 1941
Long Island - DB Duncan 1917. Took command June 1941.

Marc Mitscher obtained his wings in 1916, the 33rd USN officer to do so, and stuck closely with it throughout the inter-war period. Promoted Captain in 1938, Hornet seems to have been his first ship command according to the brief Wiki summary of his career.

Buckmaster was able to switch into naval aviation as late as 1936 gaining his wings while holding the rank of Commander and having had command of a destroyer.

The striking thing compared to the RN, is the number of naval aviation positions held by these officers ashore, including command of naval air stations, during their careers or on, or even in command of, seaplane carriers. There were hardly any seaplane carrier in the RN (only Pegasus after 1930 for trials and training). And of course everything connected to naval aviation ashore in Britain was an RAF responsibility and in particular what the USN would classify as patrol aircraft.

So to answer one question, naval aviators do not appear to have been getting accelerated promotion inter-war to carrier commands. The first COs of both Washington and North Carolina graduated from the naval academy in 1909 for example. But they were able to build naval aviation careers in a way that RN officers could only dream of because so much was in he hands of the RAF."

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The A6M2 hate a rate of climb of roughly 3,150 fpm and the SBDs were coming in over 12,000 feet from two different directions.

Good point . One of the problems with radar directed interception in 1942 was determining the height of in coming raid. The Zeros better rate of climb as compared to the F4F would have helped if the attitude was out by a couple of thousand feet but certainly not from sea level or even a 5000 ft difference. The defense had to be layered to handle all possible threats. The radar data had to be correctly interpreted.
Unless the Japanese had the system in place at Coral Sea for a trial it is doubtful that it would work well at Midway.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I think somebody's tail gunner got one.

Lunstrom gives a possible Zero to either a TBD or an SDB

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The aircraft belowdecks of the three carriers were fueled and armed.
Even if the crews had enough time to drain and stow the fuel lines plus ventilating the hangar area AND secure the bombs and torpedoes that had been strewn about, there is still the issue of the SBDs' bombs setting off the aircraft that were crammed into the carrier's hangars.
There is also the issue if IJN fire-control measures. The USN had an "everyone hands-on" training for fire-control, where the Japanese Navy relied on a special team to manage fire aboard a ship.
If any of the members of that team were hurt/killed in an attack, there was no one to take his place. If most the team were hurt/killed, then it was literally amateur night at the bonfire by any personnel that could be rounded up to man the fire hoses.

Proper fire training for the entire crew didn't happen before Midway. The first trading school was established in June 1942. There were also major problems with equipment such as breathing apparatus in 1942.

https://boshw.us/sign/naval-firefighting-school/?lang=english

 

[Glider]

Fighting a fire on board a ship is a truly frightening experience. In all navies there have been a number of instances where lessons have been forgotten and relearned, almost always after people have been killed or injured after a fire.

I don't pretend to know what training is like now but in the mid 70's, I and everyone on board a ship had to undergo a two week firefighting course. Going into the burning mock up wearing the breathing equipment and putting out the fire blind because you cannot see an inch, scared me half to death.

 

[Shortround6]

Fighting a fire on board a ship is a truly frightening experience. In all navies there have been a number of instances where lessons have been forgotten and relearned, almost always after people have been killed or injured after a fire.

I don't pretend to know what training is like now but in the mid 70's, I and everyone on board a ship had to undergo a two week firefighting course. Going into the burning mock up wearing the breathing equipment and putting out the fire blind because you cannot see an inch, scared me half to death.

I was a city firefighter for 33 years starting in the mid 70s, what you guys did was scarier than anything I did.

 

[Glider]

I was a city firefighter for 33 years starting in the mid 70s, what you guys did was scarier than anything I did.

I appreciate our sentiment, but I wasn't a firefighter, just an Artificer, and this was the basic training. The specialists had far more training than us, one of them explained and demonstrated how it was possible in certain very limited scenarios, how to put out a small oil fire with a water extinguisher. For very obvious reasons we were not allowed anywhere near this type of exercise.

 

[Shortround6]

I appreciate our sentiment, but I wasn't a firefighter, just an Artificer, and this was the basic training. The specialists had far more training than us, one of them explained and demonstrated how it was possible in certain very limited scenarios, how to put out a small oil fire with a water extinguisher. For very obvious reasons we were not allowed anywhere near this type of exercise.

I was never in a steel box and we always had more the one exit in training. We also started with a few of those SG48 and SG60 nozzles (and applicators) and I hope you had better nozzles. As time went on we got better nozzles that flowed twice the GPM which meant we could do more. Bouncing the spray off the ceiling (overhead) to rain it down on what you could not see was almost standard. I almost always had the option of retreating while Navy firefighters could only retreat temporarily.

We also trained on going through sheet rock walls if needed which navy crews cannot do. A different type of work even if you only did it for two weeks.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

We had a couple of USN firefighters training at our USAF fire-school. Pondering their particular issues, like S Shortround6 I came to the conclusion that shipboard firefighting takes some serious cojones.