What if the Germans had radar proximity fused AA shells?

[33k in the air]

How so in your mind specifically? The Germans were outnumbered in 1940 and 1941 and in 1944 in all categories. Yet they continued advancing the Allies stalled.

As stated, the political, economic, and military conditions were entirely different. Start by itemizing those differences.

What were the areas of operation? What was the terrain like in those areas? What was the state of the transportation networks in those areas? And leading to those areas? What were the opposing units composed of in terms of equipment? What were the levels of training and experience? What about the command structure — how was their level of experience? What tactics and doctrines were they trained to use? Were these appropriate to the level of experience and equipment in the component forces? What was the supply status of the units prior to action? What was the level of coordination with the air forces?

And so on. The above is just a partial list of the differences between 1940 and 1944.

 

[MIflyer]

The German field sets were more advanced than the British ones in 1940, but not the ones under development.

In fact, late war German night fighters equipped with microwave radar used magnetrons from shot down RAF bomber H2S systems.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

In fact, late war German night fighters equipped with microwave radar used magnetrons from shot down RAF bomber H2S systems.

Once in a plane wearing swastikas, the range improved 40-50%. FACT.

 

[MIflyer]

Once in a plane wearing swastikas, the range improved 40-50%. FACT.

Sure, and Hitler was a better dancer than Churchill.

 

[33k in the air]

Sure, and Hitler was a better dancer than Churchill

Perhaps. But do not overlook Dr. Frankenstein and his Monster's rendition of Puttin' on the Ritz.

 

[SaparotRob]

Sure, and Hitler was a better dancer than Churchill.

Churchill was no painter. Hitler could paint a room, two coats, one afternoon.

 

[Tkdog]

I took thousands of at least semi skilled, if not skilled workers to make these fuses.
Where's the Germans going to get these people, from their usual pool of slave labor ?
Working under the threat of death.
They really seemed to think that insured quality, but then they were Nazis.

this is really the key comment. They didn't make this stuff because they couldn't. A handful of wonder jets they could do. Some terror rockets. Tens of thousands of sophisticated shells? No hope. They didn't have the raw materials. They didn't have the factories. They didn't have the workforce.

 

[Shortround6]

Tens of thousands of sophisticated shells?

Per day. every day.

 

[wiking85]

It's all quite well to write that from the comfort of a computer desk, but the only thing harder than an amphibious landing is an amphibious retreat. The Allies figured that in order to slow the flow of reinforcements and supplies the Transportation Plan had to be undertaken. The alternative, allowing Panzer divisions to attack the beachhead intact and in formation, was deemed to risk more than saving the road and rail net for an advance that might be snuffed out before it started.

Could have started AFTER the invasion or really during the beginning, rather than wreck it beforehand. Certainly some of it helped, but there were heaps of problems with all sorts of logistics that had nothing to do with the bombed French infrastructure if you check out that book review I linked about Allied logistics.

Not seizing a port was certainly a major problem, but to be fair, after the seizure of Cherbourg, the Germans made it clear that any port seized was going to be out of servise for a while.

And? Still need them close to the front given the rail situation.

The Allies got lucky grabbing Antwerp on the fly. I think their biggest blunder was not immediately clearing the Scheldt as a priority even over M-G.

Given the circumstances wasn't that lucky, it was a massive blunder not to immediately clear the Scheldt, which has been my major point.

I don't think either side were geniuses, but I think it's obvious the Allies were superior at the practice. Their supply lines, after all, went all the way back to Ohio and Michigan and Dallas. And that's not even counting what the Americans did in the Pacific.

Depends on what you mean. Certainly the trans-Atlantic shipping was superb as was the Mediterranean situation. Though in all cases they learned a ton on the job rather than entering into it perfect. I wouldn't say they were superior in practice overall, but they were just as good as the best of the Axis. In NWE however the Allies made a ton of logistical mistakes despite lots of previous experience in other theaters, which is what makes it all so inexcusable. I'm not claiming any of the Axis were paragons of virtue regarding logistics, but they weren't morons as often portrayed and the Allies hardly uniformly skilled either. At seas of course the Allies had the massive skillset for it, since their entire existence, either at peace or war, depended on shipping. Inland things changed considerably.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The first quote was about Russia, the second was about how the Germans didn't conduct a Transportation Plan level wrecking of infrastructure for months ahead of the ground campaign, and final one was that they did attack infrastructure during the operation, just not to the level that the Allies did in 1944 in the run up to the invasion so were able to cope with the issues their bombing caused because it wasn't as extensive.

Since the USSR and Germany were at peace, and the USSR supplying Germany with lots of useful items and the mud season was occurring bombing the USSR was going to hurt Germany more than the USSR. A better example is France, no bombings before 10 May, but then mainly airfields, remembering part of the German plan was to have allied mobile forces advance into Belgium, then hinder their withdrawal. In any case the 1940 allies made little use of rail for military movement.

Part of logistical planning is to also avoid wrecking that which you will need to advance and containing attacks to that which is necessary to conduct operations.

The allies pre Overlord assumed Germany would keep control of most of France for months to come. Having worked out how much harder it was to land troops from the sea versus railing them the allies did not want a working northern French rail system, and that was before putting in a safety margin if there were storms or the Mulberries did not perform, or unloading was hindered by air attack or mining and so on.

Also to avoid overextending yourselves logistically, especially when you could also simply seize at low cost a major port and the waterway that services it, in pursuit of a logistically unsustainable military operation, which is what the Allies did in NWE in 1944 and suffered the consequences as a result.

21st Army Group had already grounded combat troops to use their transport, and were breaking up others or sending them back to Britain, the supply situation and number of allied troops at Antwerp were limited, as both banks of the river had to be cleared the Antwerp forces were needed to both hold the port, the front line was in the suburbs, as well as try and clear the north bank, with its bottlenecks, while the mostly Canadian forces roped off everything along the coast and concentrated on clearing the south bank, remembering 15th Army was still quite strong with intact units, it had the option of withdrawing to the north bank.

My entire point though hinges on the narrative that the Allies were fantastic at logistics and the Germans sucked, which the historical record doesn't support, especially with the NWE campaign of 1944. Barbarossa wasn't the logistical disaster that it is often portrayed as, though it did cause considerable issues, which compounded with Hitler's serious operational/strategic mistakes.

21st Army Group command included the people who had advanced across North Africa, they made few operational mistakes compared with the US and the French rail lines mostly going through Paris did not run the way the Army Group advanced. Clearing the channel ports was better. Barbarossa was a supply disaster given the many weather related casualties in the winter and before that the original supply plan.

Could have started AFTER the invasion or really during the beginning, rather than wreck it beforehand.

Ever worked out the size of the allied bomb lift versus the size of the French rail system? Or that the allies did little damage to the southern French rail system? The idea of starting even just before the invasion, beyond the obvious of telling the Germans to be on special alert, is that using air power to disrupt a big rail system was a new idea, no one knew if it could be done or the best way to do it. Experience was needed. The debate about bombing bridges for example, whether the heavy bombers could or should contribute. Wrecking the northern part of the system was considered necessary and most of it would remain in German hands for months to come as the allies did not expect to do a pursuit, so damage was not going to be a problem.

The final Overlord Supply plan assumed the Germans would fall back using the river lines as defences, requiring a build up to cross the rivers. It is interesting to note how the plan, with its steady 1918 like daily advance and neatly marked maps with "here by D+x" has become some sort of measurement of the Normandy Campaign, at least partly due it being a reason in the push to remove Montgomery. The saying no plan survives the first encounter with the enemy but the territorial advances in the Overlord supply plan apparently should have, at least to D+50 or so. Followed by the disconnect of how the planned D+365 line was reached around D+90.

The D+25 line I have says the US have St Malo and Rennes, with the border with second army being at Alencon, with the line then running slightly beyond Argentan to Lisieux to the channel. From what I can see that would mean US forces holding about twice the front of the Commonwealth forces. This expands to something like 4 times the frontage on D+35 as Brittany is cut off, the assumed US front on D+50 was Brest, the Loire to around Tours and then North to 2nd Army, the US front line reduces to 3 times the Commonwealth front on D+60 with Brittany taken and the line then running along the Loire from St Nazaire to Tours then about straight to the channel at the mouth of the Seine.

Caen, a D-Day objective was fully secured by Goodwood on D+43, St Lo, due to be captured by around D+7 was captured on D+43, Avranches the objective for D+19 was captured on D+55.

There would be a steady advance, uncovering a steady amount of railways, roads, bridges and ports per day. The railway repair plans included all bridges down, needing 90% new bridging, 75% of track destroyed, which meant 55% would need new ties and rails. A detailed plan was made for the rail to Rennes, which would take three months. There were 5 engineer service regiments assigned to rail repair. It was known the Germans had a rail demolition vehicle that broke the ties and automatically dropped explosive charges at intervals to destroy tracks. Ports would be back in service in around 3 days after capture. The ports would be opened, that is take their first ship even if not at 100% pre war capacity, after capture and repair as follows, Isigny D+11, Cherbourg D+12, Grandchamp D+15 St Vaast D+16, Barfleur D+20, Granville D+26, St Malo D+27, Brest D+53, Quiberon Bay D+54, Lorient D+57. Note Cherbourg was mainly a passenger port, it was number 22 on the ranking of French Ports, cargo capacity at 900 tons/day pre war.

The US had no railway bridging repair equipment and intended to use British equipment. When they arrived on the continent they found the German equipment better than the British, and the plant that made it was the Hadir works in Luxembourg. Since this fell relatively quickly into US hands, in October 1944, the rubber stamps came out to certify the new US rail bridge repair equipment. Some 90% of bridges reconstructed used the Hadir beams, some 50,000 tons of steel I beams were made at the plant.

The US did much better in 1945, things like,

As part of the POL support each US army has a fuel pipeline laid across the Rhine after it advances beyond the river, bulk shipments are put into the line on the west bank and drawn again from the east bank end point. This enables bulk shipments without straining bridge capacity, since POL is around 1/3 supply tonnage. These stand alone systems are connected as soon as possible to the lines from the ports. The "Major System" fuel pipelines from the ports terminate at Maastricht (north), Thionville (middle) and Saaralbe (South). The speed of the advance after crossing the Rhine is so great no advanced depots can be created until after the pursuit slows down, this is at least post 12th April.

On 29th March round the clock work starts on the railway bridge at Wesel, 2 engineer general service regiments, a construction battalion and other units begin work. Careful planning has been needed to assemble the required materials including naval craft and steel beams up to 92 feet long and 3 feet deep, and 100 foot pilings, using roads that can take such long loads by if necessary demolishing obstacles. The Rhine is large enough to justify a flood prediction service. The rail bridge is 23 span 1,753 feet long across the Rhine plus a 6 span 463 feet structure across the Lippe.

In Sicily the US Army learnt beach head supply units did not work to support an army, a proper supply system had to be landed as well. Prior to late July 1944 the biggest field force the US had to supply was the army in Italy. It had to move up to Army Group size, then 2 Army Group size August/September 1944.

Certainly some of it helped, but there were heaps of problems with all sorts of logistics that had nothing to do with the bombed French infrastructure if you check out that book review I linked about Allied logistics.

The fundamental allied situation in August/September 1944 was the lack of port capacity, even 21st Army Group was landing about half its supply requirements, the trucks could help clear the ports or haul supplies to the front. The US compounded its problems through inexperience and the way it set up its supply system.

Given the circumstances wasn't that lucky, it was a massive blunder not to immediately clear the Scheldt, which has been my major point.

The Germans had good defensive terrain on both banks, the allied forces in the area were operating with limited supplies. It was the reverse of Alamein, if the Germans took Alexandria all their supply problems were solved but they really needed the port to supply the assault to take it.

Certainly the trans-Atlantic shipping was superb as was the Mediterranean situation.

It took until mid 1943 for the US Army to work out and put in place a standard set of mandatory labels for cargo, what was in it and who it was for, standard manifests followed in 1944. The failure to do this in 1942 had caused considerable angst. In mid 1942 an example given was one ship 30% of the cargo had no markings, 25% no addressee and just general description, e.g. Quartermaster. This was compounded by the lack of shipping, resulting in loading ships to capacity with what was on the docks, and the shortage of army equipment, leading to piecemeal arrivals of equipment on the docks. In September 1942 the equipment of 1 infantry regiment was sent to England split up between 55 ships.

The result was although the equipment was in England for the US troops already in England allocated to Torch some of the equipment had to be sent a second or even third time because it became lost somewhere in England. Mainly thanks to inadequate markings with help from an inexperienced supply system in England.

As part of the new labelling system cargo was inspected before it was allowed onto the US ports and sent back unless it was clearly labelled. The final label codes were no less than 5 groups of ID letters and numbers, 1) the port of destination, 2) the priority, 3) the type of cargo, 4) identification as part of a group of containers, 5) shipping ID, from address, requisition drawn against. As an example, BOBO-A-ORDII-GT3-A302RA3.

Sailing notification cables also started to be sent direct, not through Washington which meant a minimisation of the previously all too common problem of the ship arriving before or about the same time as the manifest arrived in England. In January 1943 only 40% of manifests made it to England in time, during May 1943 it was raised to 91%. Convoys from the US were broken up and ships routed to the "best" port, which required cargo knowledge a few days before arrival, to arrange for the relevant berth and trains to clear the cargo. For example a convoy from the US to England, in March 1944, 18 full and 24 part ship Army cargoes (1,500 vehicles on wheels, 200 cased, 200 aircraft and gliders, 50,000 tons of supplies). Eight days to discharge, 75 trains using 10,000 cars to clear, plus some road transport, these land movements also generated the need for 27 trains with 8,000 cars for things like inter depot movements and railway supplies.

Though in all cases they learned a ton on the job rather than entering into it perfect. I wouldn't say they were superior in practice overall, but they were just as good as the best of the Axis.

If you drop the sea part of the equation and use 1944 you can make this comparison for the US, otherwise show the German use of things like fuel pipelines under rivers to free bridge capacity.

In NWE however the Allies made a ton of logistical mistakes despite lots of previous experience in other theaters, which is what makes it all so inexcusable.

So which other theatres did the US support Army Groups landing and entering intense combats? Or do pursuit operations? Or support troops more than a few tens of miles from the ports? When German resistance collapsed in August 1944 the allied supply system suddenly needed lots more supplies as did the civil populations the allies freed, and a working rail system required lots of coal, coal required workers and pit props, German PoWs were used in the French mines. The original Overlord plan assumed like 1918 the mines would be deliberately flooded before the Germans left.

I'm not claiming any of the Axis were paragons of virtue regarding logistics, but they weren't morons as often portrayed and the Allies hardly uniformly skilled either. At seas of course the Allies had the massive skillset for it, since their entire existence, either at peace or war, depended on shipping. Inland things changed considerably.

It is interesting how few US Army units did operations before June 1944, the MTO had peaked at 9 divisions in July 1943, then 3 sent to England, replaced by 3 new divisions in 1944 but one was the never to see combat 2nd Cavalry, by end 1943 there were 13 divisions in the Pacific but that included the Hawaii garrison for example. By end June 1944 the US had 13 divisions in France, 23 end August (after the 2 airborne were withdrawn to England), plus the French units, 46 divisions by end December 1944, including 2 airborne.

21st Army Group made few of the operational level mistakes the US army made post Normandy, whether it could clear the approaches to Antwerp in a timely manner is quite debatable given strength and supply limits, the latter would require shifting US truck lift plus giving priority to opening rail lines the Army Group could use. The British had lent 3rd Army some truck companies for a time as part of the break out, and there was a special run to move US Supplies as part of Market Garden. On 21st September Von Rundstedt considers his forces to be the equivalent of 21 Volksgrenadier and 6 to 7 Panzer divisions. In other words close to a 1 to 1 ratio with the allied forces operating on the front line, using a HQ count.

As the shipping congestion increased, until the end of August, ships are selectively unloaded, leaving many in a partially loaded state as effectively floating magazines. Washington strongly objects to the build up of shipping and as a result some of the partially unloaded ships are returned to the US.

 

[MIflyer]

Perhaps. But do not overlook Dr. Frankenstein and his Monster's rendition of Puttin' on the Ritz.

Reference: "The Producers."

 

[RCAFson]

Unfortunately you have several misconceptions. At the start of the war they were ahead in radar, but lost the lead due to the US and UK merging their programs, the Germans giving up on cavity magnetron research (which they had the lead in until 1940), and the Japanese not sharing their technology (they were at the same place with cavity magnetron research as the British in 1940 and arguably kept pace until the end of the war). They also had the best air defense system in the world until US production was able to take Britain to the next level somewhere in 1943-44. Cryptography saw the German achieve immense success, something the Allies covered up until the 2000s:

The KM had an early lead, but by the end of 1940 they had lost the lead to the UK/RN, and this was before the USA made any note worthy contributions. By mid 1941 the RN had introduced short range shipborne FC radar (Type 282), Long range AW/FC radar (Type 279/281) medium and main calibre FC radar (Type 285/284) and microwave/cavity magnetron surface search radar (Type 271/273). By June 1941, HMS Prince of Wales, for example, had Type 271, 281. 6 x type 282, 4 x type 285 and Type 284. Plus the UK/RN began deploying airborne ASVII radar on a wide scale, and this was instrumental in the sinking of the Bismarck.

The Japanese never came close to developing their cavity magnetrons to the same level as the UK.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Could have started AFTER the invasion or really during the beginning, rather than wreck it beforehand. Certainly some of it helped, but there were heaps of problems with all sorts of logistics that had nothing to do with the bombed French infrastructure if you check out that book review I linked about Allied logistics.

Really? Given the difficulties of dropping a bridge with unguided weapons, multiple missions will be needed, upon multiple bridges. And are you going to divert fighter-bombers from attacking Panzers and other divisions on the move to attacking locomotives and rolling stock?

That shit requires lead time. The Allies were good, but they weren't snap-your-fingers-and-it's-done good.

And aside from all that, no matter when the bridges, rail cars/locomotives, and marshaling yards are destroyed, they will still need to be repaired before use, meaning just-in-time bombing doesn't solve the issue.

Given the circumstances wasn't that lucky, it was a massive blunder not to immediately clear the Scheldt, which has been my major point.

The capture of intact facilities was lucky, the skipping its exploitation was the blunder, was my point.

Depends on what you mean. Certainly the trans-Atlantic shipping was superb as was the Mediterranean situation. Though in all cases they learned a ton on the job rather than entering into it perfect. I wouldn't say they were superior in practice overall, but they were just as good as the best of the Axis. In NWE however the Allies made a ton of logistical mistakes despite lots of previous experience in other theaters, which is what makes it all so inexcusable. I'm not claiming any of the Axis were paragons of virtue regarding logistics, but they weren't morons as often portrayed and the Allies hardly uniformly skilled either. At seas of course the Allies had the massive skillset for it, since their entire existence, either at peace or war, depended on shipping. Inland things changed considerably.

Both sides had successes and failures in logistics. Criticizing the Allies for destroying transport resources ignores the likelihood that leaving those resources intact until the invasion might well have caused the invasion to fail. That was a risk the Allies would not run -- rightfully so, in my opinion.

 

[33k in the air]

Reference: "The Producers."

Close but no cigar.

 

[EwenS]

When discussions about Allied strategy being wrong in Sept 1944 and that the Scheldt should have been cleared rather than carrying out Market Garden, the claim is that the Allied logistics problems would have been cured by reopening Antwerp sooner. But no one ever puts a date on how soon that could have occurred.

The first coasters arrived in Antwerp on 26 Nov and the first convoy of ocean going ships arrived on 28 Nov.

So, to find out just how much everyone understands about the campaign, let's start with what everyone's best guess as to how much sooner Antwerp could have been opened?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

When discussions about Allied strategy being wrong in Sept 1944 and that the Scheldt should have been cleared rather than carrying out Market Garden, the claim is that the Allied logistics problems would have been cured by reopening Antwerp sooner. But no one ever puts a date on how soon that could have occurred.

The first coasters arrived in Antwerp on 26 Nov and the first convoy of ocean going ships arrived on 28 Nov.

So, to find out just how much everyone understands about the campaign, let's start with what everyone's best guess as to how much sooner Antwerp could have been opened?

That depends. When does Monty designate troops and resources, and cut orders?

 

[EwenS]

That depends. When does Monty designate troops and resources, and cut orders?

Antwerp fell on 4 Sept. How soon do you want?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Antwerp fell on 4 Sept. How soon do you want?

Market-Garden was planned in haste. Let's look at those airborne troops helping out, since they were scrubbing more missions than flying.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The US did not expect to use Antwerp, plans had to be recast to share the port.

During August the British VIII corps of 2 divisions and independent brigades will be grounded so their transport can be used for the pursuit. The UK 59th division is also left behind as it is being disbanded. VIII corps will be back in the line for Arnhem. Since many bridges are captured intact it is also possible for 21st Army to use bridge companies as well as anti aircraft and tank transporter units for supplies.

On 25th August first major US attack on Brest by the US VIII corps.

On 30th August Rouen is captured.

On 4th September Antwerp captured

On 8th September Dunkirk attacked.

On 10th September 12th Army Group confirms equal priority for 1st and 3rd armies, subject only to the supply requirements of the operation to capture Brest.

On 11th September a patrol of 1st Army are the first US troops into Germany territory, near Aachen. Third and 7th armies join hands. SHAEF officer in charge of movements and transportation recommends turning Rouen and Le Havre over to the US forces noting that every 5,000 tons of supplies Landed in these ports will save the equivalent of 70 truck companies in vehicle turn around time compared with the cargo being discharged in the south Brittany ports, Antwerp is even better needing only a third the supply lift of Cherbourg to support a given force. Conflicting ideas about whether to develop Brest, Quiberon Bay or wait for Antwerp delay any decision on the proposal. Ghent is fully cleared.

12 September Le Havre surrenders.

On 16th September start of Red Lion run, 8 US truck companies (6 with 2.5 ton trucks, 2 with 10 ton semi trailers) to ship around 650 tons/day for a total of 18,000 tons for Market Garden, half these supplies are for the 82nd and 101st. The route is very efficient thanks to denser cargo and the fact all cargo comes from the one dump near Caen to a single dump near Brussels, a distance of 300 miles. Each truck carries an average load of 5.9 tons.

On 17th September Brest is captured, not worth repairing, the army using around 22,500 tons of ammunition in the siege and capture. (note much of the supplies used in the operation were landed at Quiberon Bay). Market Garden begins.

On 22nd September Absolute priority given to clearing the Scheldt estuary to open Antwerp, under 3 weeks since capture.

On 30th September Calais surrenders.

On 5th October US and UK officials meet at Brussels to review the port situation, assuming Antwerp will not open until 15th November, in a 4 day meeting they conclude only 4 channel ports should be developed, Boulogne, Dieppe and Ostend for 21st Army Group, with the US sharing POL facilities at Ostend, with Calais for the US, it provides LST berths for landing vehicles.

On 6th October the assault on the Breskens Pocket begins.

On 15th October Rouen is opened as a US Army port, it has 15 liberty and 26 coaster berths, mainly intended as a bulk POL port.

South Beveland was taken by the 2nd Can. Inf. Div. between Oct. 24th and the 30th. 1944. They were supported by the crossing of the Scheldt on Oct.26th of a brigade of the British 52nd (Lowland) Inf. Div. Operation Infatuate started on November 1st on Walcheren itself.

All attacks to reach Walcheren over the badly battered Sloedam (road and railway connection of 1200 metres long) from Oct. 31st until Nov. 2nd first by the 2nd Canadian Inf. div. and later by the 52nd British Lowland Div. failed. Amphibious vehicles could not be used because the mud was too thick to be able to "swim" across and not solid enough for the wheels and the tracks to drive across. Another brigade from this division however succeeded in crossing the muddy grounds some miles south of this dam on Nov. 3rd on foot, on a dark cloudy night and during low tide. They entered Walcheren near the ancient fortress of Rammekens and eliminated the German gun positions at the Sloedam from the South.

On 2 November the Breskens pocket is eliminated, freeing the south bank of the Scheldt.

On 4 November the first minesweeper makes it to Antwerp, sweeping operations are commenced which take about 3 weeks.

On 8th November Walcheren island is captured, freeing the north bank of the Scheldt.

The first merchant ships reached Antwerp on 26 November. On 28th November Antwerp is opened for US cargo as the first liberty ship arrives, but while the port can discharge 80 to 100,000 tons/day the land links can initially only clear 10 to 20,000 tons/day. The US Army supply system into and out of Antwerp to the forward dumps is finally working well just in time to be disrupted by the Ardennes offensive.

Alternative on 5 September absolute priority given to Antwerp, the Canadians do not assault any more of the Channel ports, (so Le Havre opens later for a start), they rope the ports off, enabling the attack on the Breskens pocket to occur earlier. The US similarly ropes off Brest, UK VIII corps is moved forward and supplied using US transport made available to 21st Army Group, while 12th Army Group holds in place or even pulls back. On 17 September operations to clear the Scheldt commence using at least the forces and supplies assigned to Market Garden, compared to the 6 October start of south bank operations, 2 to 3 weeks gained versus historical, the 4 to 22 September time gap above. Even so Antwerp opens early November, well after the pursuit had finished. Then comes having the troops to use the supplies, end September 32 US divisions in France/Belgium, to 36 end October, 40 end November, 46 end December, 55 end January (which is when the last of the US divisions leave Britain.) Noting the Ardennes were lightly held in December due to a lack of troops. The above assumes the clearing operations take about as long as historical, a month, extra force would help but not a lot given the battlefield bottlenecks. Given Walcheren held out the longest speeding up the amphibious assault on it is probably the way to conclude the battle earlier, going in at the same time as the ground assaults or slightly earlier. The mythical scenario has the Germans in the area surrendering just after Antwerp was taken, enabling it to open in early October after minesweeping operations finished and workers were found, maintenance done etc. remembering since mid 1940 the port had seen minimal cargo. Still after the pursuit had finished.

Logistical Support of the Armies, volume II, p395.

"The port of Ghent, which had been captured by British forces in September, was not brought into use until late in January, An inland port, Ghent had access to the sea by means of the twenty mile Terneuzen Canal and the mouth of the Schelde. Like Antwerp, therefore, its use was denied until the enemy was cleared from Walcheren and the Beveland Peninsula in November. Ghent ranked as the second port of Belgium, and before the war had been counted among the ten busiest ports in western Europe. An extensive canal system connected it with Bruges, Ostend, Antwerp, and Liège. Damage to the port was not extensive. The main obstacles to rapid restoration were several destroyed bridges over the canal, damaged lock gates, sunken vessels, and the fact that some cranes had been removed. The harbor was also badly silted and had to be dredged to accommodate deep-draft vessels.

British forces started repairing the port in December.

Ghent had not figured seriously in early COMZ port planning. In mid-January, however, U.S. and British officials agreed on a plan for its joint use, the main thought being that it would serve as a standby to Antwerp in case operations at the latter were interrupted. The arrangements were very similar to those made for Antwerp. A port executive committee was appointed to decide on allocations of space, the joint use of certain facilities, and so on. Initially the port's capacity was divided to allow a discharge of 5,000 tons per day for the British and 7,500 tons for the Americans. The 17th Port, then operating the Bristol Channel ports, was assigned the mission of working the U.S. sector. Ghent had been used almost exclusively by barges, coasters, and small freighters, and there was doubt at first as to whether ocean-going ships could be accommodated. The first ship to enter on 23 January was a Liberty, however, whose 57-foot beam barely cleared the Terneuzen locks, and the port thereafter handled both Liberties and coasters regularly. Some ships had to be lightened by discharge to barges at Terneuzen, at the entrance to the canal, before they could proceed to the port. Ghent unloaded only about 2,500 tons per day in the first month of operations, but it more than doubled that record in March, and discharged an average of 9,300 tons in the final month before V-E Day."

 

[EwenS]

First understand the terrain over which this clearance operation will have to be made.
The whole area of north Belgium & southern Netheralands is criss crossed with canals, many of considerable width. That meant organised "river" crossings against defended positions. Not work for the armoured divisions that took part in the Great Swan. 1st Polish Armd Div fought an unsuccessful 3 day battle 9-11 Sept attempting a crossing of the Ghent Bruges Canal.

List of canals in Belgium - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

https://www.eurocanals.com/Buy-Guides/belgium-guide.html

So that has to await infantry divisions being brought up. I very much doubt that airborne divisions would have the necessary equipment & firpower to achieve that.

Then understand who was involved in the Great Swan and where they ended up about 4/5 Sept 1944.
5 Armoured divisions (2 reinforced by an additional armoured brigade). The infantry was left behind for logistical reasons. When 11th Armoured reached Antwerp it was 35-40 miles ahead of the divisions on either side of it, with large numbers of German units to its rear that had to be cleared out. Think of it as a giant wedge with Antwerp at its tip. This rapid advance forced cancellation of a number of planned airborne operations.

Then we have to consider air support.
Most of the tactical air support remained West of the Seine until early Sept. 2nd TAF was leapfrogged forward in stages. B44 at Amiens for example opened on 3 Sept, with airfields around Brussels becoming available around the 6/7. At least part of the RAF Dakota transport fleet (which totalled about 5 squadrons) was engaged in moving 2nd TAF forward so isn't available for your proposed airborne movement. Operations in Sept were also hampered by bad weather and the priority allocated to Big Ben operations (anti V2 strikes - the first V2 hit London on the evening of 8 Sept). The RAF Narrative covers much of what happened air wise (p123 onwards).

https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/our-history/air-historical-branch/second-world-war-campaign-narratives/liberation-of-north-west-europe-vol-iv-the-breakout-and-advance-to-the-lower-rhine-12-jun-30-sep-1944/

Then we have the German movements to consider
Despite the air operations that did take place, the Germans between 4 & 21 Sept successfully evacuated some 100,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, 6,000 horse drawn wagons, 750 artillery pieces (20 - 210mm) from the Breskens Pocket south of the Scheldt to the North side who then moved East out of the Beveland peninsula, in the area north of Antwerp.

It is often said that if the Allies had immediately pushed north from Antwerp immediately after its capture, then the clearance of the north side of the Scheldt could have begun sooner. But if that happened there would be all those extra German troops and equipment trapped either on one side or the other, very willing to put up a fight, just as those who remained were. The battle would be that much harder.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent ... ontext=cmh

Opening the Scheldt itself
As Geoffrey noted, that couldn't begin until the gun batteries on on both sides were captured / destroyed. Once it did, then the clearance operation took over 3 weeks.

Conclusion
Ultimately, like Geoffrey, I have concluded that if the effort had been put into clearing the Scheldt then maybe Antwerp could have been reopened 2 or at most 3 weeks sooner than historical. And the sacrifice for achieving that would have been clearance of some or all of the French Channel ports as well as some, or all, of the ground gained before & during Market Garden including the bridgeheads achieved over the significant waterways north and east of the city - the various major canals, and culminating with the Waal & Lower Rhine at Nijmegen. That bridgehead was then expanded over the winter of 1944/45. I doubt if all of these river crossings could have been achieved over winter 1944/45.


You will find much information about the difficulties of clearing the Scheldt over on the Navweaps site in a discussion from three and a half years ago. It has details of:-

1. - mine clearance efforts
2. - Amphibious lift available to the British
3. - shore bombardment
4. - Allied intentions as laid out by Eisenhower
5. - terrain over which the campaign was fought
6. - where responsibility lay for not taking the Scheldt
7. - Movements of 21AG divisions
8. - Details of ports and liberation dates & when they reopened to traffic
9. - effort that went into defending Antwerp from V weapon attack
10 - Movement of RAF squadrons between 2nd TAF and ADGB
11. - Assembly of trucks at Antwerp 1944/45 from CKD kits
12. - Strange decisions made by US generals in the same timeframe
13. - German recovery in the West Sept - Nov 1944
And probably a whole lot more. The title is not indicative of the bulk of the subject matter.

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