If Italy is neutral what does its air force look like by Sept 1942

[GrauGeist]

There are two types of information being used here.
The Figures for personnel are just for the Germans.
The Figures for material a combined total of German and Italian. For instance the Germans may only have shipped 1434 tanks to North Africa, Now maybe the Germans lost around 1100 armored cars, sp guns and armored 1/2 tracks or perhaps hundreds of Italian tanks are included in the total?
The Italians did loose 10s of thousands of truck and the vast majority of the shipping was Italian.

Of the German tanks sent to North Africa 54 were Pz 1s, 177 were Pz IIs, 832 were Pz IIIs (a small number still had 37mm guns), 307 were Pz IVs and 31 were Tigers. 33 were command tanks (?).
Another source claims that the Germans lost 240 Pz II, III, IV tanks in NA from June 1941 through Dec. Germans lost total, on both fronts over 3300 tanks/tank chassis vehicles of all types during that time period. A number of the vehicles lost in Russia were salvaged/rebuilt. What the German workshop units in the NA were able to do I don't know. They did some work but compared to shipping tanks back to the factories it was not as much and their is a difference between break downs and combat damage.

Those numbers were a quick overview.

I still don't have my books ot computers to give a solid breakdown.

Here's a good overview of the MTO with numbers:
GI -- World War II Commemoration

This page also brings up a good point, too: the large amount of German manpower and equipment used to fight the Allies in Italy itself.

So in the end, Italy cost Germany a considerable amount of assets that could have been used to both fortify Europe as well as fighting the Soviet Union.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It's noteworthy that in both their greatest successes, that against Poland and France, the Germans benefited from an "ally" opening up a second front that disrupted the defenders. OTOH, when the Germans faced an opponent who was entirely focused against them, be it Sealion or Barbarossa, the Germans were found wanting.

I don't think the Alpine front made much for the Germans -- they'd already done all the driving up north before the Italians decided to step in. The Alpine troops, like the Maginot troops, were screwed by the sichelschnitt and subsequent pivot to the south.

Yes, those troops would have made things tougher for the Germans, but no, they weren't enough in number -- and had little enough mobility -- to be meaningful. Not much armor, not much transport to allow them to get into Gamelin's checkerboard-defense in time to stave off the second Wehrmacht offensive in June. Given Italy's leanings, those French troops were pinned down whether or not Italy joined into active combat, especially given their largely static nature.

 

[EwenS]

I was half paying attention to a video about Italy in WW II. It was postulated that had Italy not bothered with Greece and other adventures, Italy may have been able to grab Malta instead. That sounded intriguing. I didn't watch it through since Shortround6, EwenS, and Geoffrey Sinclair weren't part of the panel.

If you want to spend (waste?) hours of your life reading about possible means of invading Malta by the Axis at any time from 1940 to 1943 you could spend time over on the Axis History Forum where it has been done to death on multiple occasions involving all sorts of permutations. Bottom line. Not so easy as it might appear at any time. A few links to get you started.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=168777 (711 posts over 48 pages)
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=262281 (362 posts over 25 pages)

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=278395

Also a PhD thesis study of the proposed Operation Herkules invasion of 1942.

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1003811.pdf

But in this thread Italy stays neutral. Invading Malta is not staying neutral.

 

[EwenS]

I don't think the Alpine front made much for the Germans -- they'd already done all the driving up north before the Italians decided to step in. The Alpine troops, like the Maginot troops, were screwed by the sichelschnitt and subsequent pivot to the south.

Yes, those troops would have made things tougher for the Germans, but no, they weren't enough in number -- and had little enough mobility -- to be meaningful. Not much armor, not much transport to allow them to get into Gamelin's checkerboard-defense in time to stave off the second Wehrmacht offensive in June. Given Italy's leanings, those French troops were pinned down whether or not Italy joined into active combat, especially given their largely static nature.

This may be of interest. Note how far south the German advance was when hostilities ceased compared to the Italian penetration along the coast.

A forgotten battle - The Alps, 10th - 25th June 1940 | Chemins de mémoire

www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Assumption, Italy remains neutral, which means no invasion of Greece. Thereby avoiding the Balkan fighting, including Yugoslavia, Germany keeps the Balkans neutral to friendly while recruiting Hungary and Romania as active allies, though note the small Hungarian ground troop commitment in 1941. This mainly saves wear and tear on German equipment, but does leave the paratroop force intact along with the confidence to use it and more transports available.

For Operation Crusader in November 1941 the Germans had 15th and 21st Panzer plus what later became 90th light Division. The logistics of North Africa required more truck capacity per combat unit, which is why so much of Rommel's truck fleet was captured British vehicles. On 30 June 1941 Fliegerkorps X had 525 aircraft, of which 260 were operational, holdings included 178 transports, on 20 July 1942 Luftflotte 2 held 927 aircraft, 463 operational, holdings included 180 transports.

Consider the length of the front and the way it ran North South and the closer to the poles the cooler the weather and the longer the snow lingers and the later it melts as the general rule. Add the melt tends to make the rivers run high. The initial front, ignoring Romania was around 500 miles / 800 km. Add Romania, which attacked about a week later and Hungary and the front is up to 1,400 km, or 750 miles / 1,200 km if you simply measure north to south. There is no one day, it is quite clear the terrain in the south was passable before that in the north (on average). Remembering time zones are roughly 15 degrees and 1 hour, which means the people in the east of the zone see things like sun rises an hour ahead of the people in the west of the zone. At Odessa on the Black Sea around 21 June sunrise is about 5:04, set 20:54, there is about 2.5 hours of night, that is outside of Astronomical then Nautical then Civil Twilight, then day. At Kaunas in Lithuania, sunrise 4:46, sunset 22:07 the sky never becomes darker than nautical twilight. So not much effect on a pre dawn attack.

The Barbarossa plan had the main German attack in the North, an area that usually receives more rainfall than the steppe. It seems the basic rule is in the north of the front, the direct route to Moscow, mid May is about right on average for the start of the passable terrain season, the longer you wait into June the overall better the initial going will be. That is as much as the Germans had to go on.

Seaclimate.com

"The year 1941 it was throughout too cold and dull with high precipitation for the whole Reich (Witterungsbericht, 1948)[3]. Actually, this applied more to the southern part of Germany, with 130 to 160% more rain northwest of the river Danube (Donau), the middle part of the river Elbe and Silesia. At the same time all coastal areas had good weather with above average parameters: 85 to 95% of precipitation, less cloud cover (2-5%), less dull days (2-10 days), and up to 200 hours more sunshine"

The reports are the Bug river, forming part of the German USSR border was over its banks until early June. Heavy rain kept falling in the north during early June. The weather is the main reason the date was set for the 22nd and means the invasion was unlikely to have occurred much earlier even without the Balkans fighting. After the invasion there are a number of accounts where local rainfall made movement, including by road, very hard.

All accounts say the attack could not have happened a month earlier without significant mobility problems. It seems like a fortnight earlier would have been a problem in the north, a week earlier would more depend on local weather over that week. Hitler gave the go ahead on 17 June. If you look at Lithuania's weather records you find monthly precipitation rising from 30.1mm in February to around 77mm in June and July, and the May to September period sees about 40% of annual precipitation. Essentially little change in the start date unless the German Generals are telling lies about the weather and the first hurdle is why would they?

The Germans held back some reserves from Barbarossa, amongst other formations 2nd and 5th Panzer first deployed east in September 1941.

Late August/early September 1941, data for the original 17 panzer divisions, starting strength 3,502 panzers, currently 1,603 operational, 915 repairable, 970 total losses. As of 1 January 1942 none of the 1,015 Panzers on the eastern front were reported operational, from those with the original forces, 89 replacements and 512 more in new units arriving by end December 1941. General Halder personnel cumulative loss figures, to 31 August 1941, 409,998 including 107,171 killed or missing, to 30 September 1941, 551,039 including 141,292 killed or missing, to 16 November 1941, 709,597 including 179,848 killed or missing. Starting strength of over 3,000,000, but of course that includes lots of support units, while the combat units were taking most of the casualties.

In the 11 months of combat operations June 1944 to May 1945, the US in the ETO reports 552,117 casualties, including 105,887 deaths.

Army Group Centre stopped where it did due to supply as well as Red Army resistance. It was able to support the strike south by one army while lending another to Army Group North which had the advantage of the Baltic ports for supply. Even with these changes it took until mid November to build up just enough supplies to launch Operation Typhoon, partly by neglecting winter requirements, partly as the combat units were below strength. The Germans did not deploy enough rail troops for Barbarossa, nor were they all fully trained, the combat forces tended to capture the roads rather than the rail lines, meaning rail troops had to engage in combat at times, instead of rail work. The truck fleet was gathered from around Europe, causing maintenance issues, the poor roads made things worse, the lack of rail required more truck movements and the fleet size was based on optimistic assumptions of requirements. Adding more combat troops for much of 1941 would tend to be counter productive. A plan with more logistics focus was required.

The Eastern campaign was expected to see more one sided fighting but last longer due to the distances involved, yet as it was assumed to be over in one season the tank and aircraft repair systems stayed in Germany. The 6 weeks of fighting in France had seen 35% of the gun armed panzers committed destroyed, with others needing significant repairs, with insufficient rail connections preventing shipment to Germany (to end May 516 panzers were destroyed or needed more than 5 days repairs out of 2,582 on strength 10 May), the Luftwaffe had lost 28% of its original strength, with another 36% damaged. There was a major misjudgement about the support needed despite earlier evidence.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Let's consider Poland-Italy relations. The Polish–Italian Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on February 6, 1930 in Rome.

If we can agree that Wikipedia is worth anything, here goes... Italy–Poland relations - Wikipedia

"Italy supported Poland in the Polish–Soviet War of 1919–1921, and sold large amounts of weapons to Poland, including millions of rifles and bullets, 45 cannons and many uniforms.
Italy did not approve of Germany's invasion of Poland, which started World War II in 1939. Some of the escape routes of Poles who fled from occupied Poland to Hungary and Romania led through Italy. Via Italy the Poles further reached Polish-allied France, where the Polish Army was reconstituted to continue the fight against Germany. The Polish II Corps participated in the Italian Campaign, and 11,379 men died, many of them being buried at the Monte Cassino Polish War Cemetery or at Casamassima. Meanwhile, despite little contact between Italians and Poles throughout the war, the Italian Army was believed to be among the most lenient toward Poles and never treated Poles as brutally as their German counterparts."

Could Mussolini and Italy overall continue positive relations with Poland into the 1930s? Perhaps a strong relationship with Poland will see Mussolini pressing Hitler to not invade, while OTOH Mussolini could try to reduce the British-French relationship with Poland. If so, what does Poland's relationship with Germany look like in the late 1930s? 1939 German ultimatum to Poland - Wikipedia

 

[Howard Gibson]

Let's consider Poland-Italy relations. The Polish–Italian Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on February 6, 1930 in Rome.

If we can agree that Wikipedia is worth anything, here goes... Italy–Poland relations - Wikipedia

"Italy supported Poland in the Polish–Soviet War of 1919–1921, and sold large amounts of weapons to Poland, including millions of rifles and bullets, 45 cannons and many uniforms.
Italy did not approve of Germany's invasion of Poland, which started World War II in 1939. Some of the escape routes of Poles who fled from occupied Poland to Hungary and Romania led through Italy. Via Italy the Poles further reached Polish-allied France, where the Polish Army was reconstituted to continue the fight against Germany. The Polish II Corps participated in the Italian Campaign, and 11,379 men died, many of them being buried at the Monte Cassino Polish War Cemetery or at Casamassima. Meanwhile, despite little contact between Italians and Poles throughout the war, the Italian Army was believed to be among the most lenient toward Poles and never treated Poles as brutally as their German counterparts."

Could Mussolini and Italy overall continue positive relations with Poland into the 1930s? Perhaps a strong relationship with Poland will see Mussolini pressing Hitler to not invade, while OTOH Mussolini could try to reduce the British-French relationship with Poland. If so, what does Poland's relationship with Germany look like in the late 1930s? 1939 German ultimatum to Poland - Wikipedia

The whole point of World War II was to conquer Russia. If Hitler decides that Russians are okay, that they have a right to continue existing and controlling territory, there is no WWII in the west. The war in China continues, of course.

Any German plan to attack Russia means getting Poland out of the way. A remote possibility is that Poland can be persuaded to join in the attack on Russia, but this means massaging all sorts of Nazi anti-Slavic propaganda. The Poles defeated the Russians back in the twenties, but is a resumed war a good idea for them? In 1931, the Poles produced bleeding edge aircraft technology in the form of the PZL P7. The depression, and probably a lack of good engines, shut down their aircraft development, and in 1939, the PZL P11 was just a minor improvement.

If Mussolini declares himself a friend of Poland, joining France and Great Britain, what is he going to do about the German invasion. The Italian people did not want to be at war with anybody.

 

[z42]

Discussion about Italy-UK relations, particularly wrt naval stuff but generally interesting as well.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwUSZK6I4NA

 

[EwenS]

By autumn 1942, Britain should have a sizeable fleet ready to sail for Ceylon in preparation for an earlier execution of Operation Zipper, Mailfist and Dracula, perhaps in 1943. Assuming that Malaya, Singapore and Burma have fallen in the first place.

Many problems:-
1. The Allies "Germany First" policy, from the point the US entered the war.

Europe first - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

2. When does the invasion of France take place, given no Med campaign in 1943? Can it be advanced? As the planners for Operation Roundup found, probably not due to a lack of amphibious shipping amongst many other problems, to put an army ashore and then support it. Again a well debated internet topic. For example.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=54&t=218549

3. As for any amphibious assaults in the Indian Ocean, they would have to be worked around the SW monsoon season that runs roughly from May to Sept.

4. Then the US attitude to assisting any actions in the IO/CBI area that was not to do with getting supplies to China. Supporting the retaking of European colonies was a no no. It took a lot of persuasion in late 1944 to get them to lend 2 Combat Cargo Groups of transport aircraft to support operations in northern Burma. When Rangoon fell at the beginning of May 1945, all US air support, transport, fighter & bomber was withdrawn. At no point do they even appear to have been in the least supportive of the idea of retaking Burma from the southern end.

5. The build up of construction of amphibious shipping was a major task for 1943. LSTs illustrate the problem quite well as they were seen as critical to amphibious operations generally and IO operations in particular due to the distances involved.
Maracaibo conversions - 3 in 1941 (Bachaquero first used in Operation Ironclad)
LST(1) - 3 completed Jan, Mar, April 1943 (Thruster, Bruiser & Boxer respectively ordered March 1941)
LST(2) - 23 commissioned by RN Nov / Dec 1942. Another 45 Jan-April 1943 and another 12 in July /Aug 1943. Add in time to work them up, get them across the Atlantic, let alone onwards to India. 3 diverted to convert to FDT in early 1944 for Normandy. It was Oct-Dec 1944 before another 35 were transferred in part to compensate for losses. First use in Europe was in Operation Husky at Sicily in July 1943.
LST(3) - this programme was triggered in Dec 1943 because of a lack of LST(2) coming from the US and were seen as needed for amphibious operations in the IO in 1945.

Any amphibious shipping sent East in 1943 needs to be back in Britain and refitted in time for an invasion of France. That was what happened after Salerno, with the exception of a small amount Churchill fought to hold back for Shingle at Anzio. All this stuff moves slowly. The eastward move of amphibious shipping like LCI/LCT via the Med took months from Nov 1944. See Operation Appian. So any window to use such shipping in the IO is limited even if D-Day occurs as historical.

Incidentally, in 1945 only 11 LST(2) were available for Dracula. Zipper used 33 LST(2) and 17 brand new, fresh from the yards, LST(3) as well as 54 British built LCT plus other amphibious craft. There were about 50 LSI and ships designated as Personnel Ships, many of which had also been at Normandy.

6. The Japanese were also much stronger militarily in Burma in 1943 before their invasion of India, to be able to respond to an invasion of southern Burma, with Allied troops having to be drawn from existing fronts. As for Zipper I don't think that some of the other related operations that were planned would have been cancelled, or that landings so deep into the Malacca Strait would have been possible in 1943/44. Much more likely, the resources would have gone into Operation Culverin to seize the northern part of Sumatra for air bases to support further landings.

Another complication was the movement of the Japanese Fleet to Singapore from Feb 1944 to be near its oil supplies.

7. From Aug 1943 Churchill was pushing Operation Culverin against opposition from the Chiefs of Staff, but it refused to die until Spring 1944

Culverin | Operations & Codenames of WWII

codenames.info

Operation Culverin - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

For a study of all the various IO plans I'd recommend

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Grave-Dozen-Schemes-British-Planning/dp/1853107778/ref=mp_s_a_1_1?crid=2ADPVRSLIOCYA&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.0M4tv0kX7ko4ZEQLUeTnlg.eklbDzwRNsOLsXdt8GoW6aYHUE2xDntua-gYwyYtRJk&dib_tag=se&keywords=grave+of+a+dozen+schemes&qid=1742986083&sprefix=grave+of+a+dozen+schemes%2Caps%2C170&sr=8-1

 

[Howard Gibson]

2. When does the invasion of France take place, given no Med campaign in 1943? Can it be advanced? As the planners for Operation Roundup found, probably not due to a lack of amphibious shipping amongst many other problems, to put an army ashore and then support it. Again a well debated internet topic. For example.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=54&t=218549

Let us not forget that Lloyd Fredendall will hold a significant command in a non-battle hardened US army.

 

[wiking85]

The French lost the cream of their army in northern France, and the British were evicted. Would Gamelin's strategy have been different without Italian involvement? I don't think so; he still has to consider the Italian threat and can't strip that front. Metropolitan France is still lost.

Whether some continue to fight on from North Africa doesn't save France itself.

Fair, but it does complicate things for the Germans if the Brits get French gold (billions of dollars worth) plus the fleet and manpower of the colonies.

It's noteworthy that in both their greatest successes, that against Poland and France, the Germans benefited from an "ally" opening up a second front that disrupted the defenders. OTOH, when the Germans faced an opponent who was entirely focused against them, be it Sealion or Barbarossa, the Germans were found wanting.

I mean in France Germany was outnumbered by 4 nations fighting them while still fighting in Norway. The Italians only showed up later. In Poland the Poles were basically defeated by the time the Soviets showed up and they only hastened the end of the campaign. Also don't forget that France invaded Germany somewhat during the Polish campaign and caused some diversion of German troops, so that isn't really all that accurate. In the BoB there were other things going on, so not really a fair comparison. In Barbarossa the Soviets nearly lost and if not for Hitler's mistakes they probably would have collapsed, despite Germany also fighting on multiple other fronts and being delayed.

The armistice allowed the transfer of some troops and civilians across to FNA without an engagement between the three fleets in the Mediterranean. Had the metropolitan front stabilised long enough for a transfer of the French army and equipment to FNA then inevitably the Italians would have intervened to stop it and the transports be defended by the French and British naval forces. Should the transfer been able to send the major part of the forces to FNA it would put the Italians in a difficult place in Libya. Again the Armistice played its part in the OTL situation. Essentially the opportunity was taken to make French PoWs and Southern France into hostages to Germany and control the problem politically rather than by a sea war.

If Italy was neutral you think they'd have intervened? Or do you mean in the context of them fighting in the war already?

The French forces in the Alps were capable of holding off the Italians by themselves but were the same forces that would be evacuated to FNA had France fought on. The Germans were very clever to agree to an Armistice, delay evacuations and neutralise any chance of France fighting on. The raison d'etre of Vichy was to prevent the occupation of Southern France and this coloured Vichy actions thereafter. It was the saviour of what was left of France in the eyes of many at the time and the legitimate government.

Had the evacuation been successful and Germany taking over all of Metropolitan France one might find the Mediterranean to be a Franco British lake and Italian Libya attacked from both East and West and rolling up Italian Libya by the middle of 1941. French colonies across the world continuing the fight and French Indo China reinforced to deter Japanese aggression and avoid the loss of Malaya and Burma. Maybe deterring Japan from beginning a war at all.

Why would they attack Italy if it were neutral?

A neutral Italy allows the evacuation of the French army to FNA and continue the war to liberate France with the same knock ons as above across the world with no need to take Libya.

Right. Also potentially pressure Greece into the war even without Italian entry, not to mention Turkey. Of course then there is the entire problem of Operation Pike...

Operation Pike - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

With France fighting on that might actually happen. Also there is potentially the issue of Spain getting sucked into the war, as with France fighting on and Italy neutral, then Hitler would have no reason not to give them everything they asked for in terms of French colonies. IOTL the Italians had demands too plus with not wanting to piss off Vichy then the Germans had to basically deny Franco all his territorial demands.

It still leaves the Franco British with the problem of where to go next to find a way to engage Germany on land. Italy, the Balkans and Iberia are neutral counties determined not to provoke the Germans, who have now buffer states protecting their southern flank when Barbarossa is launched. With the Commonwealth and American industry supplying all the Franco British allies it limits the aid that can be supplied to the Soviet Union but at least there is a warm water route to southern Russia either through Syria etc. or through the Suez Canal and Iran. This can run all year round and is largely out of range of major German air and naval attack with Franco British airfields all along the shore of North Africa and naval bases there and in the Indian Ocean.

That didn't stop the Allies in WW1, the French basically invaded Salonika and IOTL were planning on doing the same:

https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article-abstract/119/481/333/520397

If the Yugoslavs still revolt there is a chance the Allies could intervene there. Plus there is the whole issue of an early Franco-British strategic bombing campaign supplied by the US. Eventually you might see a 1941 or 42 invasion of France itself to provoke a revolt.

China, which has been fighting the Japanese for years, will now have a direct land route for military supplies to combat the Japanese so that war will be very different in countless ways.

In Indochina? That was already being used IIRC, which is why the Japanese moved into the country in 1940-41.

It opens up the whole 'what if' history to a wholesale change to post BoF history. Maybe the eventual engagement with the Germans may be in Northern France in 1943 and a far slower advance across France into Germany?

Depends on how long the war goes on in the east.

With no Japanese attack upon the USA in the Pacific America may have no involvement except industrially. Not entirely unakin to the British role in the Russo Japanese war whereby Japan was propped up by British loans and financial guarantees without which they would have found it difficult to prosecute the war at all.

Oh the US would still try to provoke that war.

 

[swampyankee]

Oh the US would still try to provoke that war.

I know this is a long-standing myth, but the only way the US "provoked" the war was by not kowtowing to Japan's attacks on China.

 

[wiking85]

I know this is a long-standing myth, but the only way the US "provoked" the war was by not kowtowing to Japan's attacks on China.

https://www.amazon.com/Day-Deceit-Truth-About-Harbor/dp/0743201299

Read and judge for yourself. The Japanese were trying to negotiate a way out and save face, the US wasn't having it. Also why was China a fight or die issue for the US? After all the US has the Munro doctrine for our backyard.

McCollum memo - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Eight-Action plan

[edit]

McCollum memo, page 1
The McCollum memo contained an eight-part plan to counter rising Japanese power over East Asia, introduced with this short, explicit paragraph:[7]​

It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore the following course of action is suggested:A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly SingaporeB. Make an arrangement with the Netherlands for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East IndiesC. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-ShekD. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or SingaporeE. Send two divisions of submarines to the OrientF. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific[,] in the vicinity of the Hawaiian IslandsG. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oilH. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British EmpireIf by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Oh the US would still try to provoke that war.

FDR desperately wanted in against Germany. Public opinion was split about Germany. It was much more against the Japanese, but that was not the nation FDR and the US military established as most dangerous.

Their big mistake was not listening to their ambassador in Japan, Joseph Grew, who had a much better idea how the Japanese would react to the scrap-iron and oil embargoes.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

German infantry September 1939, the east had 23 first, 6 second, 9 third and 3 fourth wave divisions, the west had 12 first, 10 second, 12 third and 9 fourth wave units. There were other units in places like Czechoslovakia. At the point of contact in the Saarland the French had 12 divisions under two separate army commands; the Germans ten divisions, plus a division-size frontier command. The offensive occupied two small pieces of German territory jutting into France and never reached more than some of the covering outposts of the Westwall. The Germans had mobilised earlier than the French.

When negotiations with the US became serious in 1941 the Japanese terms to China were set in a message to the US on 22 September as,

1. A good neighbour policy
2. Respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
3. Mutual defence by Japan and China.
4. Withdrawal of troops: Troops sent to China to carry on the "China Incident" to stay, 25 years was the preferred time.
5. Economic cooperation. which translated into preferential tariffs and treatment for Japanese goods and services.
6. Merger of the Chiang and Wang governments.
7. No annexation of territory, (Except for Manchuria.)
8. No reparations.
9. Recognition of Manchukuo

Then on 4th November came two offers for the US, proposal A

Non discriminatory trade with China, but Japan has a special case because it is a neighbour, if the US does not like this then Japan will give the non proposal of universal free trade, which we still do not have. In other words Japan is considered special or nothing. When to activate the Tripartite pact is for Japan's discretion, and there will be no explanation of Japan's defence sphere. Troops to stay in North China, Mongolian Border areas, Hainan Island, for suitable period (Note ambassador forbidden to give a firm time figure). Rest of troops to be removed at the end of the war. Immediate resumption of trade. Help Japan obtain needed resources from SW Pacific. Japan will respect Thailand, NEI, the Philippines after independence, the US will "alleviate military measures in the SW Pacific area".

Final point none of the troop proposals are to be allowed into the draft treaty. The explanatory note to the ambassador says Japan will call the troop removals evacuations "but although it would please the US for us to make it the exception rather than the rule (to retain garrisons) this would be out of the question" No more troop concessions. In other words get out of the way and give us what we need to go conquering.

The other (B) milder one was as follows, The most generous terms of Japan's solution were

1) Japan would stop were it is, keep French Indo China
2) US helps Japan obtain oil from Dutch East Indies
3) All trade restrictions lifted, US sells oil to Japan according to Japanese requests.
4) US will engage in no activity which might put an obstacle in the way of Japan in her efforts to make peace with China. (Japan to
define activity)
5) Japan will withdraw from French Indo China after peace has been obtained.
6) Non discriminatory trade
7) If the US is involved in a European war Japan will automatically carry out what she understands to be her obligations under the agreements with Italy and Germany.

it was all of this or nothing as the bottom line.

Hull's reply was

A seven power non aggression pact
Evacuation of China and Indo China
Mutual renunciation of extra territorial rights in China
Japanese recognition of Chunking government
A new US-Japan trade agreement on most favoured nation basis.
Mutual unfreezing of assets
Stabilisation of the Dollar-Yen exchange rate.

In other words the 1922 nine power treaty, UK, China, Japan, Dutch, USSR, Thailand and US.

The McCollum Memo is addressed to the directors, not someone in the white house, yet it is supposed to make it to FDR in time for him to make it the lunchtime conversation the next day, the "proof" FDR saw the memo, just ignore the diary of the person FDR lunched with.

"Op-16-F-2 ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) 7 October 1940 Memorandum For The Directors Subject: ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES..."

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore." The USN did not use British bases until after the war started. There was a conference in Manila about cooperation but it ended with the sighting of the IJN invasion convoys heading for Malaya. So this never happened pre war. By the way the German Japanese naval base agreement had been signed in 1940 or earlier.

"B. Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies" (now Indonesia)." As for point A. Never happened pre war.

"C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek." 30 aircraft in 1940, 141 in 1941, compared with 1,507 for the British in 1940 and 5,249 in 1941. The USSR received more aircraft than China, in fact the "other foreign" column has 787 aircraft delivered at the US factories. All possible aid would have been a lot more aircraft for a start. By the way the 30 aircraft for China in 1940 were trainers, 70 of the 1941 aircraft were trainers, 53 fighters, 18 light bombers. I presume the German sale of 12 aircraft to China in 1937 is an indicator Germany is giving all aid as well? How about the German military advisors present on the Chinese side in the late 1930s? I think they were withdrawn in 1939.

"D. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Western Pacific, the Philippines and Singapore." Didn't happen, hint Manila is in the Western Pacific, it had a heavy and a light cruiser plus the occasional extra cruiser passing through.

"E. Send two divisions of submarines to the western Pacific."

There were already USN submarines based in Manila, and the memo's ideas of reinforcements was not followed. USN submarine deployments to Manila from DANFS, according to my by hand counts. Note this only counts the submarines that were still in service in 1939, Manila was a submarine base from pre WWI.

11/24 (yes 24) onward S-36, S-37, S-38, S-39, S-40, S-41

7/1925 to 5/1932 S-30, S-31, S-32, S-33, S-34, S-35

So until the depression the USN had 12 submarines present.

12/39 onward Porpoise, Pike, Tarpon, Perch, Pickerel, Permit. So the 12 submarine force is restored.

1939 Searaven "two years before war" my bet it should be with the 5 following submarines to make another 6 strong squadron and arrived at the end of 1940.

1940 Seawolf (autumn)

10 or 11/40 Stingray, Seadragon, Sealion, 12/40 Shark

1941 month unknown Snapper (probably 11/41), Sailfish (after 3/41 at least since that was the month it started a refit in the US)

11/41 Salmon, Seal, Sturgeon, Sargo, Saury, Spearfish, Sculpin, Swordfish, Skipjack

Total 29, the force at the start of the war, I think 4 were refitting on 8 December.

By the looks of it submarine strengths were increased at Pearl Harbor as well as Panama during this time. USN submarines available went from 96 in 9/39 to 106 in 12/40 to 112 in 11/41. Note around 14 submarines that were in reserve were reactivated at the end of 1940 or early 1941, so in effect the USN went from around 82 active submarines in 9/39. The strengthening of the submarine forces in the Philippines was not unique and in fact largely happened well before 1940 or in the last month of peace.

"F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands." Done before the memo was written, the memo is dated in October, the basing decision was on 1 May 1940.

"G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, Particularly oil." Add the British as well, it made no sense for the US to embargo oil if the Dutch and British would replace the lost sales. The US did not need to do much to persuade the Dutch, the Japanese idea of terms of trade did much to persuade the Dutch extra trade was not worth it.

"H. Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire." Finally happened, however the memo forgets to add the Dutch to the embargo.

FDR had imposed trade embargoes on aviation fuel, lubricants and high grade scrap metal on 25 July 1940. On 26 September scrap iron was added to the list. In the first week in October, that is just before the memo was written the US ordered all Americans out of the far east, called up the naval reserve and authorised Anglo-American staff talks in Singapore. Additional supplies were sent to the Philippines as well.

The memo is supposed to be the blueprint, apparently able to influence decisions before it was written. The Japanese negotiations with the Dutch over oil finally ended in the first week in October, with no gains for the Japanese.

"10. If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all event we must be fully prepared to accept the treat of war." Yes, Japan preferred war to giving up the chance to colonise China.

My summary of the memo, 8 recommendations, the first 4 were not followed, the fifth was not followed at the time, though more submarines were sent and then even more in late 1941, the sixth and seventh had already happened before the memo was written, the eighth finally happened around 9 months later and only after further Japanese expansion.

If you really want to believe Stinnett is the authority check out his page 324 of his hardcover edition where he states "There is no reliable evidence, found by the author, that establishes how much of the 5 - Num [JN25] could be deciphered, translated and read by naval cryptographers in 1941". Now go back and read the book where it assumes, his opinion, his assumption, the USN could read the signals Stinnett wants them to have read, including the ones he tries to pretend were sent by radio instead of hand delivered. Stinnett has no idea what the USN could read, he simply gives his opinion.

Much abridged review

"Stinnett fails to mention that it was prohibited by the Navy's regulations for an officer to sent any memo forward without sending it first to his superiors, including copies to his superiors, including Adm. Kimmel. One of the central lynchpins of Stinnett's argument---that FDR was engaged in manipulation behind Kimmel's back- --thus collapses."

"It gets worse for Stinnett's argument. On pp. 45-47, Stinnett supposedly uncovers four radio dispatches---two by Nagano and two by Yamamoto---that were "intercepted" and decoded, and thus warned FDR (but not Kimmel) that the Japanese fleet was on the move. Virtually all of Stinnett's thesis hangs on these four intercepts indicating that the Japanese did not keep radio silence. It is the lynchpin of his "new" information, and the core of his book. No originals exist, but rather, Stinnett's source for this "new" information is "two US naval histories: Pearl Harbor by Vice Admiral Homer N. Wallin and The Campaigns of the Pacific War prepared by the . . . Strategic Bombing Survey." Wallin's source was the 1979 Pearl Harbor hearings, which referenced the Navy's History Section. Both of these came from a November 29, 1945 document produced by the History Section, based on October 1945 interviews with principal Japanese actors!

Let's reconstruct this: Stinnett cites Wallin, who cites the Hearings, which cite the History Section's "reconstructions" with Japanese four years after the incident. Even then, the Strategic Bombing survey, cited in the classic book by Gordon Prange, et. al., At Dawn We Slept, quotes the Strategic Bombing survey as saying that none of the four were transmitted by radio and that all four messages were hand-delivered. This is confirmed by virtually all of the Japanese participants, including Genda, in repeated interviews. Stinnett's key evidence then---which is hardly new, and has been in the open for years---is that there is no "new" evidence, and that the Hitokappu Bay message was hand delivered. Had Stinnett traced the citations back, to use his waffle terms, it's hard to believe that he would have relied on this as evidence of anything."

Stinnett's lack of historical training also produces a tunnel vision that sees one potential path of actions (among many thousands) as the only possible route that could have unfolded. The result is that at every critical point where Stinnett prepares the reader for a "gotcha" of FDR, he aborts his mission, employing a host of "mush" terms that reveal that in fact has does not have the incriminating evidence that his title purports to contain. I have counted at least 23 such term uses, but I am sure there are many more that I missed. Among them:

*(introduction, xiv) "The commanders in Hawaii . . . were deprived of intelligence that might have made them more alert to risks entailed in Roosevelt's policy . . . ." Would it made them more "alert" or not? How so?

*(5) Journalist Edward Murrow, commenting on what "he and Murrow were told by FDR" "hinted" at a "tantalizing" conclusion: "The President's surprise [at the attack] was not as great as that of other men around him. Nor was the attack unwelcome." Then Stinnett admits, "Any conclusion about the Murrow meeting must remain speculative." Oh? So why report it?

*(9) "The paper trail of the McCollum memo ends with the Knox endorsement. Although the proposal was addressed to Anderson, no specific record has been found by the author indicating whether he or Roosevelt actually saw it." Yet Stinnett builds much of his early case on the McCollum memo, ... Why bother, when there is no proof FDR "actually saw it?"

*(9) "Throughout 1941, it seems, providing Japan into an overt act of war was the principal policy that guided FDR's actions toward Japan." Was this the policy, or not? Can you prove it?

*(9) "Roosevelt's fingerprints' can be found on each of McCollum's proposals." Yet Stinnett has no proof FDR "actually saw it." So Roosevelt must have handled it without seeing it.

*(12) "There is no evidence that Admiral Kimmel knew of the action plans advanced by McCollum, because Admiral Richardson never told him of them." This raises an incredible possibility that Stinnett appears not to have considered: if Kimmel had known of the "action plans" (if, indeed, such things did exist, and which FDR saw---which Stinnett says he cannot prove), would Kimmel have enthusiastically gone along with them? In retrospect, Kimmel supporters portray him as "set up." In reality, did he feel "left out?"

*(14) "A link to some of McCollum's provocations surfaced earlier in 1940 but did not produce a written directive." Or, in plain speak, either no one saw McCollum's memo, or the people who did see it did not act on it.

*(35) Director Walter S. Anderson, the head of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) "obviously believed in the McCollum strategy and went to Hawaii knowing of the risks inherent in increasing American pressure on a militant Japan." First, Stinnett does not know what Anderson "believed," and second, his comments virtually apologize for "increasing pressure" on "poow wittle Japan," whom he admits was "militant." But the kicker comes in the next sentence. Again, on p. 35, Stinnett writes, "Yet in an oral-history interview conducted by Columbia University in March 1962, he [Anderson] claimed to know nothing of the Richardson-Roosevelt discussion concerning keeping the fleet in Hawaiian waters." It appears as an interpreter of thoughts, Stinnett knows what Anderson "obviously believed," despite what the man himself "claimed."

*(37) "Had he been briefed, Kimmel could have requested that Purple decryptions be sent to him from either Washington or Corregidor." Or, he could not have. The man who did not put up long range reconnaissance, who did not coordinate well with General Short, who did not have the fleet on full alert despite numerous and abundantly clear warnings, who did not have torpedo nets up---that admiral would "have requested" decryptions if only he had been briefed.

*(44) Dutch naval attache Johan Ranneft, monitoring Japanese fleet movements for the Dutch, reported in a diary that he had plotted carrier groups, but had one unnamed port location. "Ranneft's unnamed port could only be Hitokappu Bay . . . ." Stinnett goes on to say "There was no way Ranneft could mistake the southern Japanese carrier movement for an eastern foray."

*(48) "Dropping Hitokappu Bay' from the typewritten summary may have been done deliberately to conceal American success in decoding Japanese naval communications." Or, it may not have been done deliberately.

*(134) "How much was disclosed to Admiral Kimmel and the White House [by the codebreakers] is obscured by continued US censorship." This tack gets old. The author is plenty eager to pat himself on the back for using FOIA to obtain some documents, but retreats to the "censorship" canard when the documents he does get don't make his case.

*(136) Commander Vincent R. Murphy was "the man who was responsible for evaluating Japanese intentions" as the assistant war plans officer for Kimmel. "Murphy attended major meetings with America's top naval brass [who? how top'?] while in Washington in late 1940, which suggests that he learned of FDR's policy of let Japan commit the first act of war.'" While working with the U.S. Air Force, I hung out with some of the "top brass" (generals, colonels, and Senior Executive Service-types) related to aerospace transport programs. How much do you think I learned from them about strategic bomber programs? Or about policies related to "no-fly" zones in Iraq?

*(136) Stinnett follows these two "shoulda/wouldas" with a third on the same page: "It is unreasonable to believe [Adm.] Richardson [Kimmel's superior] did not convey Roosevelt's policy to his top aide---Murphy." Now Stinnett has two degrees of separation from reality: he has no proof that Murphy knew and he has not proof that Richardson told him, and he cites both as evidence to the contrary!

*(145) "Neither Kimmel nor his family ever mentioned the mysterious sortie and the sudden recall from the North Pacific waters." But Stinnett thinks this sortie important enough to dwell on at length.

*(168) After stating that "the Kimmel-Bloch-Rochefort alert of November 25 is the only intelligence report generated by Station HYPO that can be linked to President Roosevelt," on the following page he backtracks, saying "Tracing the Navy's copy of the HYPO message to the White House during this time frame is difficult." He then spends the remainder of the paragraph explaining that he cannot prove that this alert "can be linked to President Roosevelt."

*(207) Edwin Layton, responding to a comment by Kimmel, "may not have been completely frank. . . . He then expanded the falsification." So is it a lack of frankness, or an outright falsification? The answer comes soon enough when we learn that Joseph Rochefort is in on the plot: "Rochefort . . . backed up Layton . . . ."

Other contradictions and flat-out errors abound. A central point in the Stinnett thesis is that Adm. Anderson was promoted shortly before December 1941 to act as FDR's "enforcement" mechanism. But Anderson's own oral history, and national biographical sources confirm, that he was promoted in July 1936, and he attributed his position as a demotion based on a falling out with Frank Knox. If Anderson was friendly with FDR, it doesn't come through in his oral history.

 

[swampyankee]

For a lot of reasons, including US domestic racial politics, relations between the US and Japan had been deteriorating for a long time. I suspect any US administration would have behaved similarly to FDR's; the "Yellow Peril" was very much part of that era's zeitgeist.

There are reasons why the USN had more of its forces in the Pacific and designed its ships for operations there; they focus around long-term US interests in the Pacific. I seriously doubt any US government would have done anything much differently than did FDR.