USA too much variety?

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I don't know about the British (but I do know that it was not the rosy picture in the newsreels) and I am NOT saying some of the american factories didn't have problems. In many cases the US companies worked on "cost plus" contracts. The company AND the government figured out what it would cost to build the airplane and the contract was signed for that cost PLUS 3% or some other figure. Grumman worked this and yes 3% of the actual cost of over 12,000 Hellcats is a LOT of money in total but is it an outrageous amount of money for the work done? Grumman also did not get a contract for 12,000 planes up front but a succession of contracts with costs to manufacture being reviewed and costs of later planes being lower than the first contract planes.
The oft quoted price of the F6F may very well NOT include government furnished equipment like engine, prop, radios, guns and oxygen equipment.

In many cases companies were paid to manage factories owned by the government that were shuttered at the end of the war and either reopened during the cold war/Korean war or never re-opened and sold off (some times with sweetheart deals?)

I worked at a P&W plant during the early 70s and there were a LOT of machines with little brass tags saying they were the property of the US government. Still were or had been at one time? long term lease? bought "used" after 2-3 years at teh end of the war? but then there was a LOT of surplus machinery at the end of the war. If you could by a fighter plane for a few thousand dollars what could you get a 24"-36" Bullard vertical turret lathe for?

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The US government controlled a lot of what went on, at least nominally. At one point in 1941 Allison had an A1A priority rating and yet was short around 800 machine tools to fill recently completed factory space ( and even steel I beams needed government approval to purchase). I am sure that some wheeling dealing went on but the idea that MOST companies made large profits needs looking at. Millions were made but at what percentage of the total contract?

Again I remember newspaper articles from the 70s cheering and saying P&W got a contract for XX million dollars from YY airline and laughing. 42 million at time was good for fewer than 10 engines and wouldn't meet the 5 Connecticut factories payroll for more than a few weeks.
Number published by Grumman ( I don't know if there was a 2nd set of books) for 1944 had gross sales of 324 million dollars ( not exceeded until 1960) for a NET income of about 11.5 million dollars ( not exceeded until 1965).

Other companies may have done better.
 
When I worked at Lycoming-Stratford, right out of college, the building was US government property, as was a lot of the furniture. I don't know about the machinery, although I think that a big automated welding system used for making the AGT-1500 recuperator was US Army property.

It's hard to determine which country managed its industrial resources best because they all started with somewhat different types of economy. Except for the USSR, all used a mix of the arsenal system and private enterprise for military production and they all tried some level of central control (again, except for the USSR, which seemed to run its industry more like a badly managed and particularly brutal centrally-controlled conglomerate).
 
The aircraft industries in all combatant countries were businesses. All the governments struggled to a greater or lesser extent to impose control over those businesses. The individual businesses that composed the aircraft industries were not in it specifically to win the war (though they would all have seen this as desirable on economic grounds) they were in it to win contracts and make money for their shareholders.
Wartime government contracts were a bonanza for these industries and gave them the opportunity to squander eye watering amounts of public, i.e. taxpayers money. I believe Howard Hughes gave a figure of many billions of dollars which he believed had been wasted by various US aviation companies on unsuccessful and incompleted projects throughout the war.


Cheers
Steve

Yes, but as businesses they often had somewhat incompatible requirements, i.e. keeping the customer happy, producing the best and most appropriate product by the company's lights, making the credits and debits reasonably match and getting the job done. It was someone else's job to figure out how to win the war.
 
Some businesses did not always keep standards up as the war went on. MAP inspectors were supposed to ensure quality control and yet some manufacturers were better than others. The Air Ministry had a very poor opinion of Westland for example, probably originating in the poor quality of the Lysander.
Cheers
Steve
 
Now I am getting that Pilots were the bottleneck?

If more planes can be produced faster than pilots....

i would like to see the numbers on that. not saying it isnt true....but at the beginning of the war it might have been more the case. when the war began the army ac wanted college grads as pilots. my father was in one of the first groups "fast tracked"....he quit high school after being given the chance and went to be a cadet ( fall 1943 ). they gave an assessment and took 300 recruits from the pittsburgh area. he was in advanced flight training with guys who had been in the military ( after college) for over a year. by the end of the war there were guys stationed in the us waiting a long time to get to europe. one of the guys i know had over 600 hours before he was deployed and was afraid the war would be over before he got there. so towards the end....they had a wealth of pilots even though the production lines were cranking out planes as well.
 
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i would like to see the numbers on that. not saying it isnt true....but at the beginning of the war it might have been more the case. when the war began the army ac wanted college grads as pilots. my father was in one of the first groups "fast tracked"....he quit high school after being given the chance and went to be a cadet ( fall 1943 ). they gave an assessment and took 300 recruits from the pittsburgh area. he was in advanced flight training with guys who had been in the military ( after college) for over a year. by the end of the war there were guys stationed in the us waiting a long time to get to europe. one of the guys i know had over 600 hours before he was deployed and was afraid the war would be over before he got there. so towards the end....they had a wealth of pilots even though the production lines were cranking out planes as well.

I don't know it to be true, this is the impression I am left with in some answers to my questions.
 
i've always wondered how many times did US ground crews get crates full of P51 parts when they needed P40 parts? or needed mechanics to work of P47's when all they could find were P38 mechanics.

Do you have evidence of that?

As far as a "P-38 mechanic" vs. a "P-47 mechanic," there really isn't much of a difference. Once a mechanic received general training he may have been assigned to work on a specific airframe but for the most part, with a little training, maintenance personnel were very interchangeable. "A plane is a plane is a plane." When doing line maintenance it's easy to go from one airframe to another.
 
A Toyota mechanic can work on a Ford but would not be familiar with the idiosyncrasies of the Ford.
 
During the Berlin Airlift necessary maintenance at Brandenburg and Tegel was done by former men in black. After a few initial misgivings they were seen as excellent mechanics.
 
It may have been that some men specialized, not in a particular aircraft but in a particular system?

Like an aircraft electrician or hydraulic repair? Engine mechanic vs airframe/sheet metal?

Armorers took care of the guns and gun mount/turrets.
 
How do you figure that?

During 1939 the Ju-88 program amounted to over 50% of the entire German airframe workforce. Me-109 was their only mass produced fighter aircraft. For all practical purposes Germany bet their air war on only two aircraft types.

What is your source for this?

From John Ellis' book "The WWII Data Book" is the following numbers for German production of aircraft in 1939......

605 - fighters
134 - ground attack
737 - bombers
163 - reconnaissance
145 - transport
588 - trainers

.....which leaves 2372 airframes. 50% of that number is 1186 which is not even close to the 737 bombers that were built - supposing, of course that ALL those 737 bombers were Ju-88s. What is really interesting is that many sources list only 83 models of the Ju 88 being built in all of 1939.

Junkers Production Lists

I'll stick to my original statement.
 
He didn't say a/c manufactured but those involved in the construction of those a/c.

German airframe workforce
 
While a twin engine bomber can certainly take many more man hours to build than a single engine fighter or trainer, and thus take a higher percentage of the "workforce" in 1939 the Germans were building Do 17s He 111s, Ju 52s, BF 110s and a number of other aircraft that would take a fair number of man hours to build unless the JU 88 took and extraordinary amount of labor per airframe. In which case it's adaptation may have been a mistake.

even in 1940 it is almost impossible to make the case that the JU 88 used up 50% of the "workforce" with 2208 Ju 88s built compared to about 2804 other large multi engine aircraft and another 2970 single and small twin NOT including trainer aircraft.

See: http://www.tarrif.net/wwii/guides/german_luft_production.htm

there seem to be some errors but unless they are gross errors the 50% number doesn't seem to stand up.

Neither does the statement that the Germans "standardized" on two types of aircraft. Not when the Ju 88 was being built in a 2:1 ratio compared to other bombers. The majority bombers is accurate but with other bombers accounting for roughly 1/3 of bomber production the JU 88 wasn't quite "standardized".
 
Do you have evidence of that?

As far as a "P-38 mechanic" vs. a "P-47 mechanic," there really isn't much of a difference. Once a mechanic received general training he may have been assigned to work on a specific airframe but for the most part, with a little training, maintenance personnel were very interchangeable. "A plane is a plane is a plane." When doing line maintenance it's easy to go from one airframe to another.


sorry is wasn't trying to point fingers at anyone. i've worked in the auto industry for 20 years and even with computer tracking and bar codes at many points along the way we would get the wrong parts on the line or even into the car only to have to stop the line or even recall the parts. it seems pretty sure that someone opened a crate to find the wrong parts. it may not have happened enough to cause problems but it may have. that's why i asked

i'm not very mechanical, i would have thought that working one a radial engine would be quit a bit different for an inline.
 
i'm not very mechanical, i would have thought that working one a radial engine would be quit a bit different for an inline.
Even in the auto industry, a mechanic can work on a Volkswagon Type 1 just as easily as he can work on a V-8 or L-6.
There'll be differences naturally, but any well trained mechanic knows to refer to a technical manual when in unfamiliar territory...
 
Do you have evidence of that?

As far as a "P-38 mechanic" vs. a "P-47 mechanic," there really isn't much of a difference. Once a mechanic received general training he may have been assigned to work on a specific airframe but for the most part, with a little training, maintenance personnel were very interchangeable. "A plane is a plane is a plane." When doing line maintenance it's easy to go from one airframe to another.

When you think about it no air force under wartime conditions could have mechanics who specialised in specific aircraft eg; "P-38" "P-47" mechanics because in wartime the types of aircraft equipping different units will change relatively quickly. For instance, how would the 8th AF have fared if all the mechanics in the P-38 groups were unable to work on the P-51s once those groups had been re-equipped with the latter? Or the RAF when Hurricane squadrons switched to Spitfires?

AFAIK every air force trained mechanics to be proficient in specific trades, such as electrical equipment, airframe maintenance, power plants etc, rather than being trained for specific aircraft types - as Flyboy says, once the basics are mastered, its easy enough to adapt to the systems and idosyncasies of specific aircraft; training one mechanic to be proficient in all trades is a lot harder and far more expensive.

Getting back to the Americans, their aircraft were, in the main, extremely well designed for mass production and for maintenance in the feild - in this both the Americans and Germans were streets ahead of the British in the use of modular units for things like, for example, radio installations, in which a faulty component or unit could be quickly taken out and swapped for a new one.
 
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