USAAF - Around the clock bombing

[stona]

One possible advantage to more night bombing would be the limited, even dismantled, night fighter LW capacity. Kammhuber's plan was rejected early on and even limited support was diminished in favor of offensive bombing by Hitler.

The Luftwaffe night fighters were still operating into 1945. They had real operational problems,lack of trained crews and fuel,from about September 1944. Around June/July 1944 they were still regularly claiming 20+ bombers on a good night (for them). They were certainly not ineffective or a spent force.

As late as March 1945 they were still capable of launching significant intruder missions. Operation "Gisela" of 3rd March '45 saw no less than 140 aircraft (mostly Ju88s) flying a mass intruder mission which accounted for 23 British bombers and 1 Mosquito as well as another 20 bombers damaged.

Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

Parramatta

British had developed sky marking systems.
Juha

The "Wanganui" sky marker flares were a last resort. They drifted on the wind and were only relatively briefly visible before they would disappeared through the cloud.

They should not be confused with the "Newhaven" system. This was a mixed method in which flares were dropped to illuminate a target in order to help the Pathfinders drop marker bombs.

The third marking system "Parramatta" was the blind dropping of marker bombs,by H2S.

When "Oboe" rather than H2S was used,the marking technique was prefaced with the word "Musical".("Musical Wanganui" etc.)

The marker bombs were 250lb devices which had a barometric fuse. They would burst releasing 60 coloured candles before hitting the ground.

An ex Bomber Command navigator told me that they always referred to "Wanganui" markers as Christmas trees which,oddly,is exactly what the Germans below called them.

Cheers
Steve

 

[Juha]

Parramatta

The "Wanganui" sky marker flares were a last resort. They drifted on the wind and were only relatively briefly visible before they would disappeared through the cloud...

Of course, but BC at least have a system for target marking in case of clouds hide the target, to my understanding USAAF in ETO didn't have. And on average British were better in radar bombing simply because they had more practice. IIRC historical data shows that BC was more accurate than 8th AF when bombing happened through clouds.

Juha

 

[stona]

Of course, but BC at least have a system for target marking in case of clouds hide the target, to my understanding USAAF in ETO didn't have. And on average British were better in radar bombing simply because they had more practice. IIRC historical data shows that BC was more accurate than 8th AF when bombing happened through clouds.
Juha

True,but one would hope that had the Americans adopted night time bombing(for some bizarre reason) they might have had a look at the tactics and systems used by the RAF and adopted at least a version of those considered appropriate.
Cheers
Steve

 

[JoeB]

IMHO H2S was adequate if there weres high radar contrast areas near the target, for ex coastline, lake, river etc, so BC could bomb fairly accurately certain targets well outside the Oboe range, as was shown for ex in Peenemünde raid in Aug 43. I recall from BC War Diaries that BC made a number of effective attacks on oil targets during the Allied oil campaign in 44, some raids however were complete failures. I cannot remember exact targets, so I cannot say, how many of the oil targets were outside Oboe-range.

And as wuzak noted, not surprisingly, knowing weather in UK, British had developed sky marking systems.

USAAF statistics a/o late 1944 showed that bombing with H2X (similar to H2S) in heavy cloud conditions had average CEP of a few kilometers. I don't think RAF experience was vastly different. Even in the Peenemunde raid, though damage was done and personnel killed, the actual miss distances from planned aim points were mostly pretty large, and in part because H2S sets didn't properly pick up the aim point at Rugen Island, though that raid was also flown at especially low altitude in moonlight to enhance accuracy, accepting the higher degree of vulnerability.

Though it's somewhat apples and oranges statistical comparison, skewed in favor of Oboe, test results for that system achieved on the on the order of 1/3 of a km; also that's for the target markers or bombs dropped directly by the few Oboe a/c, not the accuracy of the bombs dropped on the markers whose CEP would be greater, especially using sky markers (that might be more or less a complete solution again for hitting cities in cloud, not a complete solution for hitting factories in cloud with Oboe). Still, Oboe pathfinding was on another level of accuracy from other night bombing techniques available in mid 1944, matched later in 1944 by SHORAN and in 1945 by APQ-7 radar bombing.

This link gives the example of the BC raids in June 1944; the synthetic oil targets attacked were in western Germany w/i Oboe range. Note that weather and target smoke definitely affected results on Oboe raids (over Germany and France both), but it was nonetheless a viable way to attack point targets at night; microwave radar and other radio navigation techniques at that time still really weren't precision alternatives.
RAF History - Bomber Command 60th Anniversary

Joe

 

[Juha]

Hello JoeB
I agree that sky markers were a lasr resort way, but better than nothing. And as I wrote, to have reasonable changes of hitting an industrial target while relaying on H2S there should have been good radar contrast areas nearby, without them changes of successful attack plummeted. I checked a few well known synthetic fuel plant targets. On 6/7 Dec 44 BC hit Leuna, there were considerable cloud in target area but post-raid photos showed considerable damage to the synthetic-oil plant, On 14/15 Jan 45 attack caused severe dam throughout the plant. On 4/5 Apr 45, the target was cloud covered, bombing scattered, only light dam. So of the 3 raids on Leuna 2 were successful and one marginally effective. I don't have info if there were any Oboe stations in continent at that time.

Brüx in Czechoslovakia, only one raid on 16/17 Jan 45, but it was a complete success. Speer also mentioned this raid as causing a particularly severe setback to oil production. One other Speer mentioned as particularly damaging was the 14/15 Jan 45 raid on Leuna.

Juha

 

[stona]

Even in the Peenemunde raid, though damage was done and personnel killed, the actual miss distances from planned aim points were mostly pretty large, and in part because H2S sets didn't properly pick up the aim point at Rugen Island, though that raid was also flown at especially low altitude in moonlight to enhance accuracy, accepting the higher degree of vulnerability.
Joe

It is true that the failiure of the "Blind Markers" to identify Rugen island led to Target Indicators being dropped two miles to the South of the correct aiming point,the housing estate. Only one target indicator was correctly placed. Next came the six "Visual Markers" and at least three of these correctly marked the aiming point. When the "Backer Up" Pathfinder crews arrived they were able to ignore the incorrectly placed markers and correctly place their green Target Indicators over the housing estate.

Every aircraft that reached Germany dropped its bombs inside or very close to the Peenemunde establishment. The mis-identification of the aiming point caused some heavy bombing to develop well south of the target at Trassenheide but the prompt corrective orders of the Master Bomber,Group Captain Searby,did much to mitigate this and concentrate bombing in the correct areas. Searby deserves much credit for this,it was a new technique and he mastered it very effectively.

The plan called for the aiming point to be shifted for the the second phase of the attack in which 1 Group would attempt to destroy the production facilities, two buildings less than 900 feet long,a difficult target. The Pathfinders who would shift the marking would use red Target Indicators. Only one of five fell in the correct place,three overshot by 1000 yards and one fell short by about the same distance. Once again it was the Master Bomber who saved the day,telling the Main Force crews to ignore the misplaced indicators.

The third phase was another shift of target to the Experimental Works which the bombers of 5 and 6 Group would destroy. This time the marking went well awry,two overshot by 1000 yards,a third by more than a mile.Two fell on the first aiming point,two miles off target! This time Searby did not realise that the markers had overshot so badly and that the Backer Ups were also overshooting. He was busy trying to prevent the bombing effort drifting Eastwards and out to sea.
It is also interesting that some of the most accurate bombing in this wave was by 5 Group crews who ignored markers,misplaced by Pathfinders and bombed on time and distance from their correctly identified initial points.Air Vice-Marshall Cochrane believed (and was happy to tell anyone who would listen) that his 5 Group crews,using this technique,could have destroyed Peenemunde alone.
Without their effort this third target might have been missed altogether.
Also there was a lack of creep back from the markers that had overshot. Creep back was a normal feature of area bombing as crews released their loads a fraction of a second early in their desire to get away from the target. The importance of Peenemunde had been impressed on the men of Bomber Command and their determination to destroy it,and not have to go back,seems to have prevented it in a case where it might actually have been useful.

Searby spent most of his time at Peenemunde trying to make corrections that resulted from earlier errors. Many crews arriving in later waves assumed that the fires at the Trassenheide camp were the site of the first bombing area and consequently made errors in their calculation of their aiming points. Some later target indicators landed in the sea and drifted Eastwards and Searby had a hard time stopping these being bombed.
Without the interventions of Group Captain Searby and his two reserve Master Bombers,Wing Commander John White and the Canadian Wing Commander John Fauquier,the raid would have been a disaster. These men spent more than half an hour orbiting the target area,Searby made seven passes. It had a great effect on the crews of the Main Force.

"The fact that someone was there,telling us what to do,was a great morale booster..........
I don't know how he managed to stay so calm. It was just as though he was in the room talking to you - absolutely fantastic"
(Sgt. P S Crees 434 Squadron)

The plan was over complicated,but the fact that BC was prepared to attempt it shows how far the techniques and tactics of night bombing had advanced. The raid delivered:
232 x 4000lb
120 x 2000lb
1423 x 1000lb
1510 x 500lb
1912 x 40lb

High Explosive bombs,along with.

9606 x 30lb
77530 x 4lb

Incendiaries.

That's 1,795 tons of ordnance, dropped by 560 aircraft.

(The three subsequent USAAF raids in July and August dropped a further 3,000 tons of ordnance for roughly 12,000 B-17 sorties,a reflection of the much lighter loads carried by the B-17.)

Most estimates,both allied and German,reckon that development of the V-2 rocket was delayed by two months. Someone worked out how many less V weapons fell on London and Antwerp as a result and how many lives were saved. I can't find the numbers but it was a significant amount.
It also precipitated the dispersion of the project to various facilities,Peenemunde was not rebuilt. The death of propulsion specialist Dr Thiel was a bonus for the allies. There was also that notoriously difficult to quantify effect on morale.

Cheers
Steve