Even in the Peenemunde raid, though damage was done and personnel killed, the actual miss distances from planned aim points were mostly pretty large, and in part because H2S sets didn't properly pick up the aim point at Rugen Island, though that raid was also flown at especially low altitude in moonlight to enhance accuracy, accepting the higher degree of vulnerability.
Joe
It is true that the failiure of the "Blind Markers" to identify Rugen island led to Target Indicators being dropped two miles to the South of the correct aiming point,the housing estate. Only one target indicator was correctly placed. Next came the six "Visual Markers" and at least three of these correctly marked the aiming point. When the "Backer Up" Pathfinder crews arrived they were able to ignore the incorrectly placed markers and correctly place their green Target Indicators over the housing estate.
Every aircraft that reached Germany dropped its bombs inside or very close to the Peenemunde establishment. The mis-identification of the aiming point caused some heavy bombing to develop well south of the target at Trassenheide but the prompt corrective orders of the Master Bomber,Group Captain Searby,did much to mitigate this and concentrate bombing in the correct areas. Searby deserves much credit for this,it was a new technique and he mastered it very effectively.
The plan called for the aiming point to be shifted for the the second phase of the attack in which 1 Group would attempt to destroy the production facilities, two buildings less than 900 feet long,a difficult target. The Pathfinders who would shift the marking would use red Target Indicators. Only one of five fell in the correct place,three overshot by 1000 yards and one fell short by about the same distance. Once again it was the Master Bomber who saved the day,telling the Main Force crews to ignore the misplaced indicators.
The third phase was another shift of target to the Experimental Works which the bombers of 5 and 6 Group would destroy. This time the marking went well awry,two overshot by 1000 yards,a third by more than a mile.Two fell on the first aiming point,two miles off target! This time Searby did not realise that the markers had overshot so badly and that the Backer Ups were also overshooting. He was busy trying to prevent the bombing effort drifting Eastwards and out to sea.
It is also interesting that some of the most accurate bombing in this wave was by 5 Group crews who ignored markers,misplaced by Pathfinders and bombed on time and distance from their correctly identified initial points.Air Vice-Marshall Cochrane believed (and was happy to tell anyone who would listen) that his 5 Group crews,using this technique,could have destroyed Peenemunde alone.
Without their effort this third target might have been missed altogether.
Also there was a lack of creep back from the markers that had overshot. Creep back was a normal feature of area bombing as crews released their loads a fraction of a second early in their desire to get away from the target. The importance of Peenemunde had been impressed on the men of Bomber Command and their determination to destroy it,and not have to go back,seems to have prevented it in a case where it might actually have been useful.
Searby spent most of his time at Peenemunde trying to make corrections that resulted from earlier errors. Many crews arriving in later waves assumed that the fires at the Trassenheide camp were the site of the first bombing area and consequently made errors in their calculation of their aiming points. Some later target indicators landed in the sea and drifted Eastwards and Searby had a hard time stopping these being bombed.
Without the interventions of Group Captain Searby and his two reserve Master Bombers,Wing Commander John White and the Canadian Wing Commander John Fauquier,the raid would have been a disaster. These men spent more than half an hour orbiting the target area,Searby made seven passes. It had a great effect on the crews of the Main Force.
"The fact that someone was there,telling us what to do,was a great morale booster..........
I don't know how he managed to stay so calm. It was just as though he was in the room talking to you - absolutely fantastic"
(Sgt. P S Crees 434 Squadron)
The plan was over complicated,but the fact that BC was prepared to attempt it shows how far the techniques and tactics of night bombing had advanced. The raid delivered:
232 x 4000lb
120 x 2000lb
1423 x 1000lb
1510 x 500lb
1912 x 40lb
High Explosive bombs,along with.
9606 x 30lb
77530 x 4lb
Incendiaries.
That's 1,795 tons of ordnance, dropped by 560 aircraft.
(The three subsequent USAAF raids in July and August dropped a further 3,000 tons of ordnance for roughly 12,000 B-17 sorties,a reflection of the much lighter loads carried by the B-17.)
Most estimates,both allied and German,reckon that development of the V-2 rocket was delayed by two months. Someone worked out how many less V weapons fell on London and Antwerp as a result and how many lives were saved. I can't find the numbers but it was a significant amount.
It also precipitated the dispersion of the project to various facilities,Peenemunde was not rebuilt. The death of propulsion specialist Dr Thiel was a bonus for the allies. There was also that notoriously difficult to quantify effect on morale.
Cheers
Steve