USAAF philopshy of the heavies being able to defend themselfs

[Jenisch]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruE8yhkHke8

Watching this video, I keep imaginating how would be the hypotetical missions from the US to Germany in the B-36. =D

 

[Siegfried]

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruE8yhkHke8

Watching this video, I keep imaginating how would be the hypotetical missions from the US to Germany in the B-36. =D

The B-36A was not a service ready aircraft, being unarmed and also not having a particularly high service or opperational ceiling. The B-36B was a little better in terms of performance, though not particularly the early engine rated versions, this being a 1948 aircraft. Hence the uarmed B-36A, if it had of been armed with say an improvised General Electric System borrowed from the B-29 was still within the upper interception envelope of even ordinary German fighters such as the Me 109K4 and He 162 while the far latter B-36B within the envelope of aircraft such as the Ta 152H-1

Of course if Britain had fallen and if the B-36 was the only means to attack the Reich then it would certainly have been somewhat accelerated, though its hard to see the R-4360 being accelerated.

I suspect the fate of the B-36 in 1946 would have been terrible: bisection by the EMW Wasserfall Surface to Air Missile which was designed to handle a 2G manouvering target at around 48,000ft. Most of the 'ducks were lined up' in terms of guidance for this missile: the Germans having selected beam riding over command guidance due to its resistance to jamming.

From my understanding the B-36's performance was exaggerated by SAC to bluff the soviets, much as the soviets tried to bluff the number of missiles and bombers they had.

 

[Glider]

Ok. I'll throw in the towel and say that Britain might have been able to stop B17 and B24 raids.(Personally I still think Britain didn't have the manpower or indutrial power to stand up to USAAF bombing but I will stop arguing) But Japan couldn't. B17's and B24's were able to defend themselves against Japanese fighters. Without German assistance Italy couldn't have stopped them and I don't think the Soviet Union could either.

On the manpower or industrial power point. I think I am right when I say that the UK and Germany produced a similar no of aircraft but the RAF didn't have anything close to the drain on resources caused by the losses on the Russian Front. On the manpower front training was probably similar between the two sides up to 1942/3 which is the period we are talking about, but losses were lower in the RAF so experience was higher within the squadrons.
Its also worth remembering that the 1942 second string RAF fighter, the Huricane was a deadly threat to the unescorted bombers, as they also carried 4 x 20mm cannon.

I can see no basis for your belief that the RAF wouldn't be as effective as the Luftwaffe

 

[Milosh]

Considering the USAAF had 368 1st line B-17s and B-24s on hand vs Germany in Dec 1942, I don't think they would have lasted long in the British skies as the British had ~60 squadrons of fighters. That is ~1200 a/c.

 

[pbfoot]

The B-36A was not a service ready aircraft, being unarmed and also not having a particularly high service or opperational ceiling. The B-36B was a little better in terms of performance, though not particularly the early engine rated versions, this being a 1948 aircraft. Hence the uarmed B-36A, if it had of been armed with say an improvised General Electric System borrowed from the B-29 was still within the upper interception envelope of even ordinary German fighters such as the Me 109K4 and He 162 while the far latter B-36B within the envelope of aircraft such as the Ta 152H-1

Of course if Britain had fallen and if the B-36 was the only means to attack the Reich then it would certainly have been somewhat accelerated, though its hard to see the R-4360 being accelerated.

I suspect the fate of the B-36 in 1946 would have been terrible: bisection by the EMW Wasserfall Surface to Air Missile which was designed to handle a 2G manouvering target at around 48,000ft. Most of the 'ducks were lined up' in terms of guidance for this missile: the Germans having selected beam riding over command guidance due to its resistance to jamming.

From my understanding the B-36's performance was exaggerated by SAC to bluff the soviets, much as the soviets tried to bluff the number of missiles and bombers they had.

before your Reich could play with its fanciful toys it would be a glass parking lots care of the nuclear weapons

 

[FLYBOYJ]

From my understanding the B-36's performance was exaggerated by SAC to bluff the soviets, much as the soviets tried to bluff the number of missiles and bombers they had.

Not true although it was a maintenance nightmare.

 

[drgondog]

"Worked fine" is IMO far too broad a stroke of the paint brush. The 20th initially respected potential heavy fighter opposition enough to employ very high altitude attacks, These stratosphere heights made interception extremely difficult for the handfuls (with a few exceptions) of interceptors that were thrown up against them. Also by the time the bombardments began the Japanese airforces had been well worn down. It has also been mentioned that the Japanese were hoarding aircraft as a reserve for a massive pulse against the expected invasion of the Home Islands. This makes comparisons with European conditions largely an Apples and Oranges thing.

So while combat losses were minimized by these factors, it was balanced by less than stellar results from the bombing campaign. Hence LeMay's switch to low alt night attacks. Therein lies another point. If the Self Defending Bomber concept was even half right......why didn't LeMay send in the bombers at low alt during the day?

It is true that Germany's air defense net was light years ahead of Japan's, but not to the point where someone, even a LeMay was going to recklessly fly over enemy territory. They also worked hard to take bases allowing fighter escorts by long range fighters.

LeMay thought out of the box. He had to fire a protege (Hansel) because the classic 8th/15th AF High altitude precision bombing wasn't working with variable shear jet streams and Japan was even more decentralized than Speer directed Germany.

He studied Japanese conditions versus Germany and noted the following. Japan had far fewer radar controlled AA, had cities with a far higher infrastructure of wooden houses, and had what he believed was not only an inadequate night fighter force, but wholly inadequate fire departments. The reason for bombibg the cities in RAF style carpet bombing with mostly incinderaries was simply the quantitiy of small manufacturing shops within the city and he could kill a LOT of Japanese in the process.

So, strip the 29's, load em up, fly low/medium altitudes to reduce stress on the engines and burn the cities to the ground... which he did.

 

[drgondog]

Another point worth considering, but probably outside of the scope of this thread considering its about defensive armament, is finding the target. The RAF's poor results led them to 'area bombing' and again, the Britsh warned the USAAF about pinpoint attacks, but the Americans were convinced they had the answer in the Norden bombsight, but their navigation to the target was initially as poor as the RAF's, so while they might have had a brilliant bomb sight, if they couldn't find their way to the target, they were stuffed.

This may be stretching several points. The RAF were led to area bombing not just because of finding the target area, bout also because there was no capability to find a specific target in darkness, nor an ability for the bombardier to locate/track and release optically. The lack of 8th AF ability 'to navigate' was largely due to inexperience and inadequate training. LeMay studied the problem and led the lead crew of best squadron navigator/bombadier and pilots to find and bomb the target - with the rest of the squadron dropping on them.

The RAF pioneered and adaopted radio aided navigation and radar bombing - which worked fine for large targets with distinctive radar features. The USAAF trailed, adopted OBOE and H2S with mixed success when cloud cover prevented optical acquisition by the bomb site. In this comparison the Brits had superior results. However when compared to results against targets that were acquired by the B-17/B-24 bombsite, the USAAF results were much superior to RAF night area bombing.

It was the Luftwaffe that led the way in this aspect of bombing with their X-Gerat, Y-Gerat and Knickebein equipment in 1940 and 1941 that proved their superiority in finding their targets. It wouldn't be for another two years or more before the RAF and the Americans would achieve the same degree of accuracy in reaching their targets.

Americans wer finding targets just fine after several months operations in ETO. Speer was far more concerned about daylight strategic bombing than RAF area night bombing.

Having said this, the RAF developed a better daylight sight than the Norden and achieved excellent results with it during daylight missions after D-Day.

 

[pbfoot]

Americans wer finding targets just fine after several months operations in ETO. Speer was far more concerned about daylight strategic bombing than RAF area night bombing.

Having said this, the RAF developed a better daylight sight than the Norden and achieved excellent results with it during daylight missions after D-Day.

Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the target

 

[drgondog]

To some of the general comments above:
Yes the USAAF bomber mafia believed that speed and altitude would overcome enemy fighter and AA opposition in the 30's.

Yes the Fortress I was anything but.. the RAF attempted to use the aircraft at 30K+ and had many issues. The lessons learned led to the B-17E which had two power turrets, replaced the 5x.30 cal with 10 x .50 cal and believed that the problem was solved - and convince Arnold that there was no need to waste precious procurement dollars on long range escort fighters.

No, they were not invulnerable to German fighters but it took about 4-6 months before the LW had developed the tactics to become lethally effective against B-17s and the 109 had to be significantly upgraded to remotely approach the Fw 190 as a B-17 killer. Having said this, the B-17 was the very last choice for a LW day fighter pilot to pick as his favorite victim.

Interestingly, the RAF went 'dark' because they couldn't survive daylight bombing for the same reasons the 8th AF nearly threw in the towel in October 1943 - but because the USAAF introduced the Mustang to ETO and stole all of them for the 8th AF daylight ops (sending 354 and 363 to 8th on TDY and took the 357th in return for 358FG P-47s), the 8th ultimately emerged with far fewer losses than the RAF night missions.

I have zero notion that the Spit V or IX would be less effective than a Fw 190 and would give it an edge over the 109 until gondola's with 20mm were kitted - Nobody in a B-17 would say "gee, we will only have Spits to worry about". The 4x20mm version of the Spit IX would be superior to all the Fw 190A series at B-17 altitudes in the context of a.) ability to kill near equally, and b.) have superior Mustang repellant ability at that altitude.

 

[drgondog]

Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the target

If you compare RAF night bombing results versus USAAF radar controlled PFF bombing in 10/10 cloud cover - yes. Clear visibility Norden versus H2S RAF unequivocally - No.

 

[fastmongrel]

If you compare RAF night bombing results versus USAAF radar controlled PFF bombing in 10/10 cloud cover - yes. Clear visibility Norden versus H2S RAF unequivocally - No.

Europe in winter you dont get many clear days. Plus 1940s industry ran on coal so even if the sky is clear you get industrial haze and smog. Its a wonder the USAAF and the RAF hit anything.

 

[drgondog]

The USAAF did not hit targets accurately whenever the clouds obscured the targets - which was mostly the case from November - through February. Bad enough in March and October.

 

[Siegfried]

Having said this, the RAF developed a better daylight sight than the Norden and achieved excellent results with it during daylight missions after D-Day.

I don't see that the "SABS" or "Stabalised Automatic Bombsight" had any capabilities or features that were better than the Norden. I worked the same way: gyrostablised the optics, tracked target to established wind drift and ground speed and calculated a bomb release solution. More or less the same thing naval directors had been doing since the 20's.

 

[Siegfried]

Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the target

The bulk of Bomber commands bombs were miles of target. Even late war with oboe being used to lay markers and a clear night for those markers to be aimed at the majority of bombs fell around 2 miles from target, as soon as there was any cloud accuracy would deteriorate by miles. The accuracy you speak of can only be justified in terms of a few special raids, which are over emphasised because they are so spectacular and also propaganda. Propaganda could could come engineers and companies just trumping their product or it could be organised. Daylight bombing was still the most accurate method by far, so long as the visibillity was very good. Some semblance of accuracy could be maintained at up to 50% cloud cover with simultaneous use of H2X ground mapping radar (a bombardier and radar opperator working together to ofset bomb). Once the cloud cover exceded 50% bombing accuracy deteriorated drastically out to several miles again.

For instance oboe sent a dot/dash sequence to tell the pilot that he was either +/-17 meters from the NOMINAL centerline of his bomb run. In other words the width of the path that was used to guide the pilot was 2 x 17m (ie 34m about 40 yards). This was latter misconstrued as meaning that Oboe's accuracy was +/-17m. In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.

 

[pbfoot]

The bulk of Bomber commands bombs were miles of target. Even late war with oboe being used to lay markers and a clear night for those markers to be aimed at the majority of bombs fell around 2 miles from target, as soon as there was any cloud accuracy would deteriorate by miles. The accuracy you speak of can only be justified in terms of a few special raids, which are over emphasised because they are so spectacular and also propaganda. Propaganda could could come engineers and companies just trumping their product or it could be organised. Daylight bombing was still the most accurate method by far, so long as the visibillity was very good. Some semblance of accuracy could be maintained at up to 50% cloud cover with simultaneous use of H2X ground mapping radar (a bombardier and radar opperator working together to ofset bomb). Once the cloud cover exceded 50% bombing accuracy deteriorated drastically out to several miles again.

For instance oboe sent a dot/dash sequence to tell the pilot that he was either +/-17 meters from the NOMINAL centerline of his bomb run. In other words the width of the path that was used to guide the pilot was 2 x 17m (ie 34m about 40 yards). This was latter misconstrued as meaning that Oboe's accuracy was +/-17m. In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.

How in gods name would wind affect radio beams , thats why they invented rudders

 

[FLYBOYJ]

In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.

How in gods name would wind affect radio beams , thats why they invented rudders

Pb is spot on. This system was very similar to the first non-precision instrument approach systems and in a cross wind you "crabbed" to compensate for this, just like you would when tracking this aural signal or when tracking an NDB.

 

[Siegfried]

Pb is spot on. This system was very similar to the first non-precision instrument approach systems and in a cross wind you "crabbed" to compensate for this, just like you would when tracking this aural signal or when tracking an NDB.

Systems such as Oboe and the earlier German x-geraet gave a measure of ground speed. This could be compared with TAS (true air speed) to estimate head or tail winds which would allow adjustment of bomb release points, in x-gerate this was the purpose of the 3 crossing beams and the 'clock'. The amount of 'crabbing' needed to maintain the flight path could in theory be used to calculate cross winds. If passed back to the base station the designated flight path could in theory be adjusted to compensate. I don't know of this was done very often as it would seem to me that the aircraft crew would need to calculate the deviation from their theoretical compass heading with actual compass heading and pass this back to the base station (cat and mouse in oboe) to make adjustments. I've never heard of a mechanism to do this so it would require a voice link.

Inaccuries would come from low altitude cross winds and errors in the timming circuits; in oboe these even attempted to compensate for the effect of air density or the speed of radio waves but nothing is perfect, especially over long distances.

 

[wuzak]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I was under the impression that the bulk of RAF Bomber Command bombed visually, with the pathfinders using Oboe to mark the target with flares. A bombing leader would direct the bombing and call in corrections for wind drift or poor marker placement.

The 8th AF inaccuracies were not only to do with target sighting. The fact is that after a few early raids they bombed from within the formation. So as the formation grew, so did the spread of bombs. The 8th AF record of "precision" bombing was less than 20% within a 1000ft radius of the aiming point.

 

[Siegfried]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I was under the impression that the bulk of RAF Bomber Command bombed visually, with the pathfinders using Oboe to mark the target with flares. A bombing leader would direct the bombing and call in corrections for wind drift or poor marker placement.
.

Oboe was limmited by the radio horizon, one reason a high flying Mosquito was often used. In addition early versions could only control a single aircraft at a time per base station pair. Of course if you need to bomb flares then if cloud cover is around the system can break down as well. In good weather accuracy was still over the 1 mile range!


Beyond the radio horizon only GEE and H2S could help. H2S both 9cm and 3cm was really a navigation aid, as a pure blind bombing device it would in general have to be described as ineffective for most targets. Coastal or very strong esturine features apparently helped.

There were other versions of the Oboe philosophy: GEE-H which reversed the transponder interrogator from aircraft to ground station, Oboe-III which could handle multiple aircraft. A US implementation was Micro-H which could control 50 aircraft at once. These systems became possible to use after d-day when ground stations on the continent could be built.