USAAF philopshy of the heavies being able to defend themselfs

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I think if you look at pre-war U.S.A.A.C doctrine, they were grossly wrong on both the self-defending bomber, and the lack of need for a high altitude fighter

This was military politics. The "old guard" that kept antiquated doctrine when times where changing because the weapons being developed were improving.

Some of the forward thinkers, Mitchell, Chenault and the like were chastized for thinking outside of the normal procedure.

And as far as the U.S. testing thier bombers in mock attacks with thier own fighters, the problem I see is that the dominant pre war bomber, the B-17, flew far higher than what was the front line fighter then, the P-40.
 
By the war's end, the Japanese were increasingly interested in Kamikaze missions. They were also building a reserve, both from Kamikaze and conventional planes to the invasion of their island. I think they were waiting their new aircraft, specially the jets to make favourable cost-benefit attacks in the 29's.


I am aware of Japan's aircraft reserve for their last stand against their homeland invasion; but given Japan's deteriorating war industries, its stranded shipping lanes giving way to an acute shortage of raw materials and the final devastating fire raids against its most populated cities, I find difficult to believe how the Japanese could have been able to mount an efficient resistance during late 1945, into 1946.
 
I am aware of Japan's aircraft reserve for their last stand against their homeland invasion; but given Japan's deteriorating war industries, its stranded shipping lanes giving way to an acute shortage of raw materials and the final devastating fire raids against its most populated cities, I find difficult to believe how the Japanese could have been able to mount an efficient resistance during late 1945, into 1946.

Worth to considerate is the Japanese were trying to have an intermediated peace with the Allies by the Soviets. So, their hopes only really finished when the Soviets declared war to Japan.
 
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I think if you look at pre-war U.S.A.A.C doctrine, they were grossly wrong on both the self-defending bomber, and the lack of need for a high altitude fighter

This was military politics. The "old guard" that kept antiquated doctrine when times where changing because the weapons being developed were improving.

Some of the forward thinkers, Mitchell, Chenault and the like were chastized for thinking outside of the normal procedure.

And as far as the U.S. testing thier bombers in mock attacks with thier own fighters, the problem I see is that the dominant pre war bomber, the B-17, flew far higher than what was the front line fighter then, the P-40.


I think the often repeated idea that the US was NOT interested in high altitude fighters is one of the great myths of WW II. The USAAC probably spent more time, money and effort on high altitude fighters than any other two countries put together during the 30s. From the 1920s until the start of WW II the USAAC had built about 100 turbo-supercharged fighters, including fifty P-30As. In 1935 nobody else had a fighter of any type could perform at the altitudes the P-30 could. The USAAC knew what tehy wanted but the US industrial base, good as it was could not deliver what the USAAC wanted. The P-40 was never the latest and best, it was what could be delivered the quickest and not be too far behind the rest of the world. With 13 turboed YP-37s (same wings and tail as the P-36/P-40) already being built the USSAC had a pretty good idea was was needed to get a turbocharged aircraft into service and decided the world situation wouldn't wait for a properly sorted out turbo fighter plane (and the P&W two stage wasn't looking real good at the time either) so they went for the P-40 in order to have something/anything to equip the service squadrons with. Unless people think the USAAC should have ordered hundreds or thousands of P-36s and P-35s until the P-38 and P-47 were ready.
 
I think if you look at pre-war U.S.A.A.C doctrine, they were grossly wrong on both the self-defending bomber, and the lack of need for a high altitude fighter

This was military politics. The "old guard" that kept antiquated doctrine when times where changing because the weapons being developed were improving.

Some of the forward thinkers, Mitchell, Chenault and the like were chastized for thinking outside of the normal procedure.

And as far as the U.S. testing thier bombers in mock attacks with thier own fighters, the problem I see is that the dominant pre war bomber, the B-17, flew far higher than what was the front line fighter then, the P-40.

They weren't grossly wrong on the self defending bomber, it worked fine against Japanese fighters. In fact, I believe Germany was the only country in the world capable of properly intercepting large formations of B17s and B24s. Could the Japanese? No. Could the Italians without German help? No. Could the Russians? No. Could even the British? No. They would have been overwhelmed by sheer numbers alone.

In fact, Germany was the sole power in world in that time period that had any chance at all to do major damage to a self defending American bomber force.
 
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In fact, Germany was the sole power in world in that time period that had any chance at all to do major damage to a self defending American bomber force.
And the USA. It seems the US was concerned about bombers over the US, hence all the high altitude pursuit/fighter/interceptor projects.
 
I believe Germany was the only country in the world capable of properly intercepting large formations of B17s and B24s. Could even the British? No. They would have been overwhelmed by sheer numbers alone.

And where would these B-17s and B-24s have operated from against the British Isles? And Britain certainly could have intercepted the number of raids the USAAF could generate in prior to mid-1943.
 
And where would these B-17s and B-24s have operated from against the British Isles? And Britain certainly could have intercepted the number of raids the USAAF could generate in prior to mid-1943.

I'm just saying if the same sized formations of B17s and B24 magicly appeared over England, they could not have handled it. Germany was the sole country in the world at that time, capable of dealing with large formations of self defending American heavy bombers. And after mid 1943, they would have been overwhelmed.

Since we weren't at war with England, there is no use in dragging the debate off topic by wondering where we would bomb them from.
 
I'm just saying if the same sized formations of B17s and B24 magicly appeared over England, they could not have handled it. Germany was the sole country in the world at that time, capable of dealing with large formations of self defending American heavy bombers. And after mid 1943, they would have been overwhelmed.

Since we weren't at war with England, there is no use in dragging the debate off topic by wondering where we would bomb them from.
I do believe that just the opposite might the meeting , the Brits pioneered GCI and if anything the USAAF was light years behind and the LW was a tad behind the Brits particularly in Radar
 
They weren't grossly wrong on the self defending bomber, it worked fine against Japanese fighters. In fact, I believe Germany was the only country in the world capable of properly intercepting large formations of B17s and B24s. Could the Japanese? No. Could the Italians without German help? No. Could the Russians? No. Could even the British? No. They would have been overwhelmed by sheer numbers alone.

In fact, Germany was the sole power in world in that time period that had any chance at all to do major damage to a self defending American bomber force.

"Worked fine" is IMO far too broad a stroke of the paint brush. The 20th initially respected potential heavy fighter opposition enough to employ very high altitude attacks, These stratosphere heights made interception extremely difficult for the handfuls (with a few exceptions) of interceptors that were thrown up against them. Also by the time the bombardments began the Japanese airforces had been well worn down. It has also been mentioned that the Japanese were hoarding aircraft as a reserve for a massive pulse against the expected invasion of the Home Islands. This makes comparisons with European conditions largely an Apples and Oranges thing.

So while combat losses were minimized by these factors, it was balanced by less than stellar results from the bombing campaign. Hence LeMay's switch to low alt night attacks. Therein lies another point. If the Self Defending Bomber concept was even half right......why didn't LeMay send in the bombers at low alt during the day?

It is true that Germany's air defense net was light years ahead of Japan's, but not to the point where someone, even a LeMay was going to recklessly fly over enemy territory. They also worked hard to take bases allowing fighter escorts by long range fighters.
 
It wasn't so much that the USAAC bombers as envisoned well before WWII were supposed to be "self defending" - it was that they were not supposed to be intercepted at all.

The USAAC saw the famous Pikes Peak test of the first aircraft turbosupercharger as THE key to long range high altitude strategic bombing. When the Y1B-17 came out, equipped with turbosuperchargers, they had a long range bomber capable of carrying a large bombload at altitudes of 25,000 ft (and higher) and at speeds faster than any fighter could attain at that altitude.

The USAAF was the ONLY WWII air force to build ALL of its heavy bombers with two stage supercharging - the GE turbosupercharger combined with the engine's built in mechanical supercharger.

And neither the Luftwaffee nor the Italians nor the Japanese ever built anything but a few experimental fighters with two stage supercharging.

And at the time the Y1B-17 rolled out radar did not exist.

A high altitude bomber, as fast or faster than fighters at its operating altitude - and there is no radar to spot it. It would not have to fight its way to the target. The enemy would never see it coming until it was too late to intercept it. It was 1930's Stealth Technology.

And indeed, only one Air Force other than the USAAC recognized this threat and prepared to deal with it by standardizing on fighters with two stage superchargers in the 1930's: The United States Navy. The appearance of the B-17 and then the Y1B-17 was a nightmare for the USN, a realization of their worst fears since Billy Mitchell had sunk those battleships off the Virginia coast (you should see the Washington Times headlines after that event: "Billions Wasted On Battleships!" I have copies of them). First they managed to get USAAC aircraft confined near to shore by edict, then they worked on developing a high altitude fighter that could intercept the B-17's during wargames (the F4F).
 
In the 1930s governments around the world were basing their military aviation strategies on Guilio Douhet's writings about bomber formations swarming over their cities, men such as Trenchard and Mitchell were prophets of this philosophy. Even politicians seemed to jump on the band wagon (bomber formation?) Stanley Baldwin summed up what many thought at the time in his "...the bomber will always get through...' speech, and he was ably supported in the RAF by Chief of Air Staff Cyril Newall, so round the world, the building of bomber squadrons took precedence over fighter squadrons. If you examine the defensive armament of the first generation of monoplane bombers, it was all pretty inadequate; the first generation Fortresses' experience over Europe (my point earlier) proved their inadequacy. This weak defensive armament was considered all that was necessary since it was believed that "...the bomber..."

Oddly enough, although he was vilified for his "Peace in our time", one of the biggest advocates for a strong fighter opposition to bombers was Neville Chamberlain; during the Munich Crisis, on his insistence British factories accelerated fighter construction programmes. Nevertheless, long range escorts, heavy defensive armament, box formations came about by taking a more defensive approach contrary to the widely held pre-war belief about the superiority of swarms of bombers, and actual combat experience.

Even box formations in daylight bombing proved weak against determined interceptors; this is why the RAF went to night bombing (my point earlier about high losses suffered by the Eighth, regardless of what tactics or aircraft being used). As we all know, the US launched several programmes to build a successful long range fighter escort, but the Mustang, designed to supplement and replace the P-40 in service with the RAF (remember NAA were offered by Curtiss to the British Purchasing Commission to build P-40s under licence, but Dutch Kindleburger famously quoted "we can build you a better airplane than the P-40", so legend goes) proved more than adequate with the V-1650 engine.

Against Japan, as Nikademus states, apples and oranges.
 
Another point worth considering, but probably outside of the scope of this thread considering its about defensive armament, is finding the target. The RAF's poor results led them to 'area bombing' and again, the Britsh warned the USAAF about pinpoint attacks, but the Americans were convinced they had the answer in the Norden bombsight, but their navigation to the target was initially as poor as the RAF's, so while they might have had a brilliant bomb sight, if they couldn't find their way to the target, they were stuffed.

It was the Luftwaffe that led the way in this aspect of bombing with their X-Gerat, Y-Gerat and Knickebein equipment in 1940 and 1941 that proved their superiority in finding their targets. It wouldn't be for another two years or more before the RAF and the Americans would achieve the same degree of accuracy in reaching their targets.
 
I think the often repeated idea that the US was NOT interested in high altitude fighters is one of the great myths of WW II. The USAAC probably spent more time, money and effort on high altitude fighters than any other two countries put together during the 30s. From the 1920s until the start of WW II the USAAC had built about 100 turbo-supercharged fighters, including fifty P-30As. In 1935 nobody else had a fighter of any type could perform at the altitudes the P-30 could. The USAAC knew what tehy wanted but the US industrial base, good as it was could not deliver what the USAAC wanted. The P-40 was never the latest and best, it was what could be delivered the quickest and not be too far behind the rest of the world. With 13 turboed YP-37s (same wings and tail as the P-36/P-40) already being built the USSAC had a pretty good idea was was needed to get a turbocharged aircraft into service and decided the world situation wouldn't wait for a properly sorted out turbo fighter plane (and the P&W two stage wasn't looking real good at the time either) so they went for the P-40 in order to have something/anything to equip the service squadrons with. Unless people think the USAAC should have ordered hundreds or thousands of P-36s and P-35s until the P-38 and P-47 were ready.

You explained it far better than I. I guess I was being to short. But with all that info, explain then why they went with the P-40 when they knew what turbosupercharging would do for the fighter. The U.S.A.A.C went with the turbo P-38, but orginally a defensive short ranged bomber interceptor concept.
 
I do believe that just the opposite might the meeting , the Brits pioneered GCI and if anything the USAAF was light years behind and the LW was a tad behind the Brits particularly in Radar

Radar doesn't shoot down bombers. Just because you can find them doesn't mean you can shoot them down.
 
"Worked fine" is IMO far too broad a stroke of the paint brush. The 20th initially respected potential heavy fighter opposition enough to employ very high altitude attacks, These stratosphere heights made interception extremely difficult for the handfuls (with a few exceptions) of interceptors that were thrown up against them. Also by the time the bombardments began the Japanese airforces had been well worn down. It has also been mentioned that the Japanese were hoarding aircraft as a reserve for a massive pulse against the expected invasion of the Home Islands. This makes comparisons with European conditions largely an Apples and Oranges thing.

So while combat losses were minimized by these factors, it was balanced by less than stellar results from the bombing campaign. Hence LeMay's switch to low alt night attacks. Therein lies another point. If the Self Defending Bomber concept was even half right......why didn't LeMay send in the bombers at low alt during the day?

It is true that Germany's air defense net was light years ahead of Japan's, but not to the point where someone, even a LeMay was going to recklessly fly over enemy territory. They also worked hard to take bases allowing fighter escorts by long range fighters.

1.B17's and B24's were bombing Japanese targets long before the B29 began bombing mainland Japan.
2. High altitude bombers vs low altitude fighters is all part of the self defending concept. If fighters are struggling to even get to your altitude they will be easier targets for your defensive guns.
3. The Japanese airforce was well worn down by the time we started bombing mainland Japan. Correct: hence my statement that they sucked at intercepting self defending bombers. You actually made my point for me.
4. Lemay didn't send B29's in during the day because he removed all the defensive guns and gunners from them so they weren't self defending bombers any more. They were almost completely UNARMED bombers, except for the tail gunner, I think.
 
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But it was primarily GCI that enabled an effective defence against bombers, hence disproving the concept that "the bomber will always get through".

All England had to defend themselves against were rather poorly defended medium bombers. Big difference between an He111 and a B17 or B24. And there is a big difference between a B17 or B24 and a B29.

Finding them doesn't shoot them down. American tankers had no trouble finding German Tiger Tanks, it was killing them that proved troublesome.
 
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You explained it far better than I. I guess I was being to short. But with all that info, explain then why they went with the P-40 when they knew what turbosupercharging would do for the fighter. The U.S.A.A.C went with the turbo P-38, but orginally a defensive short ranged bomber interceptor concept.

They went with the P-40 because in the spring of 1939 when the first contract for the P-40 was signed, they figured they could have the P-40 in production in about one year. They figured a turbo-charged airplane was two years away from production. That is start of production, add number of months (8-12 for most fighters) to get to the 500th fighter produced. The P-40 was an exception because in many ways it was a re-engined P-36 and so the "production line" already existed.

The P-38 was a "long range interceptor" in concept. Long range being 2 hours at near full throttle in the original specification as opposed to 1 hour for the initial P-39 specification.
 

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