USAAF philopshy of the heavies being able to defend themselfs

[pbfoot]

As you know a multi Task Force effort of say 750 B-17s and B-24s in April 1944 might be tasked to strike 15 separate targets in 7-10 general areas.

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As stated earlier they were as a rule less accurate then BC so alls this did is spread the inaccurate bombing over more area. I applaud the USAAF for at least attempting targeted bombing over area bombing but it was the same thing +/- 1000's of feet

 

[drgondog]

As stated earlier they were as a rule less accurate then BC so alls this did is spread the inaccurate bombing over more area. I applaud the USAAF for at least attempting targeted bombing over area bombing but it was the same thing +/- 1000's of feet

As a rule, RAF radar and OBOE bombing probably better than correspondingUSAAF PFF led missions over 10/10 cover. Not so when the target could be acquired optically. Period.

 

[Siegfried]

Only to someone trying desperately to "prove" how poor British technology was. I, too, have the book, and am intrigued by your "sloppy" jibe, since everyone else that I know, who has also read it, has said how understandable and non-technical the book is.

Im quite aware of how Oboe worked, clearly moreso than you, a charitable reading of my post wouldn't have latched on to my obviously accidental use of 'beam' instead of flight path which I had used several times correctly.

As far as Oboe's bombing accuracy is concerned: in combat practice at typical ranges and altitudes it yielded accuracies of CEP 350m. My Source is Louis Browns "A Radar History of WW2: technical and military imperatives page 312 Location 4898 on Kindle; Google books makes this readable on occaision. This is a factor of 10 greater than usual, sloppy claim of an accuracy of 34 yards. During demonstartions before TRE officers it was able to show accuracies of 65m at the relatively short range of 130km from Cat. In effect Oboe matched visual bombing from about the same altitude. Accuracies of 34 meters might be possible at extremely short ranges of around 50km.

Ground speed measurements would be obtainable from the 'mouse' transmitter and the bomb release could be advanced or retarded to compensate for headwinds.

Proper compensation of cross winds would firstly require the cross wind to be calculated and the bomb runs path to be displaced by some means. Just crabbing sideways into the cross wind is not enough. Visual bombsights like the Norden and Lotfe 7 did the same.

There would be many ways of achieving stable timming circuits; ranging from tapped delay lines, crystals and RC circuits. I'm not aware of what Oboe used. One thing is for sure, such circuits will have some errors.

Oboe most certainly was very accurate but a lot less accurate than boasted once it was used in combat at typical ranges and altitudes.

The Mk.XIV bombsight was not as accurate as the Norden. The Mk.XIV was unable to track a ground target to calculate and then automatically ofset wind drift, a fairly impossible task at night anyway. The Mk.XIV's trick was being able to manouver during the bomb run and to shallow dive bomb. Wind drift had to be entered manually from metereological data.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Im quite aware of how Oboe worked, clearly moreso than you, .

Really? Then how is it that you referred to "dot-dash" and "dash-dot" signals, when ignorant old me knew that the signals were all dots, or all dashes?

As far as Oboe's bombing accuracy is concerned: in combat practice at typical ranges and altitudes it yielded accuracies of CEP 350m.

Really? But, in item 80, you said that it was missing by a mile. Ignorant old me agaain, but what's CEP?

My Source is Louis Browns "A Radar History of WW2: technical and military imperatives page 312 This is a factor of 10 greater than usual, sloppy claim of an accuracy of 34 yards.

There's that word "sloppy" again, but the claim is for the accuracy of the line of flight, not the arrival of the ordnance, which is said to have been in the order of 110 yards, not 34.

During demonstartions before TRE officers it was able to show accuracies of 65m at the relatively short range of 130km from Cat. In effect Oboe matched visual bombing from about the same altitude. Accuracies of 34 meters might be possible at extremely short ranges of around 50km.

I realise that I keep repeating myself, but you said that Oboe had an error of a mile, then 350 metres, now it's 34 metres. A little consistency would go a long way.

Proper compensation of cross winds would firstly require the cross wind to be calculated and the bomb runs path to be displaced by some means. Just crabbing sideways into the cross wind is not enough. Visual bombsights like the Norden and Lotfe 7 did the same.

As I said before, the flight path was already adjusted inside the line of the target, to allow for the outward momentum imparted by the aircraft flying in a wide circle.

There would be many ways of achieving stable timming circuits; ranging from tapped delay lines, crystals and RC circuits. I'm not aware of what Oboe used. One thing is for sure, such circuits will have some errors.

They also have qualified electricians/technicians, with the training and expertise to discover, and rectify, any faults.

Oboe most certainly was very accurate but a lot less accurate than boasted once it was used in combat at typical ranges and altitudes.

So it didn't have errors of a mile, then? Perhaps you can give us examples of this in-service inaccuracy?

The Mk.XIV bombsight was not as accurate as the Norden. The Mk.XIV was unable to track a ground target to calculate and then automatically ofset wind drift, a fairly impossible task at night anyway. The Mk.XIV's trick was being able to manouver during the bomb run and to shallow dive bomb. Wind drift had to be entered manually from metereological data

I think you might find that the crews of the Tirpitz Lutzow (had they lived) might have had a view on the accuracy of the RAF's bombsight. How many German ships were sunk by the Norden sight?

 

[bobbysocks]

"How many German ships were sunk by the Norden sight? "

other than the occasional sub pen or straffing barges when did the USAAF really go after axis shipping especially with heavies?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Norden Bombsight Info...

NORDEN BOMBSIGHT

 

[Glider]

Just a couple of observations on the Norden Bomb Sight and that is a number of people like to have a pop at it and say it was overated, but no one has ever tried to claim that any other bomb sight in mass production was a better sight.

 

[pinsog]

1. B-17's and B-24's were bombing targets in small packets intermittedly, employing tactics designed to avoid or minimize interception. They did not simply fly in on the notion that they need not worry about fighters. It is still an Apples and Oranges comparison to the mass strategic bombing raids employed over Germany.

So small groups of bombers flying daylight raids into enemy territory with no fighter escort and holding off swarms of enemy fighters aren't considered self defending?
Just because you have self defending bombers doesnt mean you try to find the biggest group of enemy fighters you can and fly through the middle of them.

2. The self defending concept was not selective in it's application. It was a theory cultivated by the bomber cliche that defensive fighters were an obsolete concept. You are using specific attributes of that theory to promote the idea that the concept was in fact successful or as you put it "partially" successful dependant on Whom was being bombed. That is a selective and hindsight ridden argument. The SDB concept was universal and indepedant of target nationality. Use of higher altitudes did not eclipse the primary argument that the bombers would be able to ward off swarms of enemy fighters. Japan was more than capable of intercepting planes at 22-24K. The B-29's flew far above that to specifically avoid fighters but ran into problems with bombing accuracy. To say it would work against Japan or Italy under the same circumstances as it was introduced over Japan in late 1944 using B-29's is an argument that cannot be proven anymore than saying if Germany had only had 10 more armored divisions they'd have beaten the Russians. Events don't occur in a Vacuum. A dedicated effort from the get-go of WWII against Japan, or even Italy would have resulted in a response from those countries to the threat.

Yes Japanese fighters could fly up to 22-24k feet, but once they got there, the B17's and B24's were able to hold them off with a sustainable amount of bomber causualties. The Japanese were not very good at shooting down 4 engined bombers becuse the bombers were able to defend themselves. Before they could even deal with the B17 or B24, we introduced the B29 which was WAY beyond what they could handle.

3. I fail to see how Japan's airforce being worn down mainly by attrition in Theaters outside of Japan and involving a plethera of mission profiles equates to Japan 'sucking' at shooting down bombers over Japan.

They couldn't shoot down American 4 engine bombers with much success. We flew both atomic missions without fighter escort. 3 or 4 planes over another country without fighter escort and they couldnt even intercept them. They didnt even try. My point is, they sucked at shooting down self defending bombers.

4. LeMay didn't send in the bombers during daylight at low altitude because it would have been cost prohibitive. A B-29 loss was not applicable to a B-17 or B-24 loss due to the expense involved. A single B-29 cost $605,000 per plane. That is nearly 3x that of a B-17. General Hap Arnold noted this difference enough to be quoted as saying that B-29 losses could not be viewed in the same vein as earlier 4E types, but rather that each loss should be equated to the loss of a naval vessel...thus the loss of even a few bombers was something to be avoided at all costs. This included ultra high altitudes for day bombing and night missions at lower altitudes. LeMay....gambling on Japan's night defenses not being as well developed as Germany's ordered the removal of guns in order to maximize payloads per trip as the effort to put so many 29's in the air was a huge problem due to servicability issues, one of the main reasons why LeMay was put in charge. Many of his methods went against the grain of conventional wisdom but he got results.

B-29 missions over Japan in my view are not so much an example of Self Defending bombers but rather the progenitors to the threat avoidance mission profiles of later day bomber tactics due to their complexity and cost which makes even small losses cost prohibitive.

Again, just because your bombers are self defending doesnt mean you purposely expose them to enemy fighters, or for that matter, deny them fighter protection if it is availeable.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Having done a little checking, it appears that there was little to choose, up to 20,000', between the XIV the Norden; above that the Norden walked away with the honours. This probably explains why Bomber Command usually went in at around 18,000', while the USAAF could go so much higher. 617 probably used the SABS against Tirpitz, which put them in a different league from the users of the XIV. Sorry about that.

 

[wuzak]

Having done a little checking, it appears that there was little to choose, up to 20,000', between the XIV the Norden; above that the Norden walked away with the honours. This probably explains why Bomber Command usually went in at around 18,000', while the USAAF could go so much higher. 617 probably used the SABS against Tirpitz, which put them in a different league from the users of the XIV. Sorry about that.

The bombing height may have been because the RAF heavies didn't have ceilings much higher than that.

 

[Siegfried]

"How many German ships were sunk by the Norden sight? "

other than the occasional sub pen or straffing barges when did the USAAF really go after axis shipping especially with heavies?

The Norden was in fact designed to accuratly bomb a moving ship and was quite capable of computing a solution for doing so. It didn't just compensate for wind drift but target motion. It could track the target to either determin the targets motion or to determin its own wind drift (it was speed measuring not just position measuring, the term here is tachymetric). The whole idea was to sink ships using bombers such as the B-26 well before they got to US shores.

Unfortunatly ships tend to manouver and can thus dodge the bomb. Medium bomber however should have been more capable of the task since their smaller size made them less vulnerable than the huge B-17's that would need to bomb from higher altitudes.

The RAF's Mk.XIV was not tachymetric, it couldn't measure the speed of the target to determin wind drift or target motion. The motion had to be entered manually into the computer. However the Mk.XIV (which was computing but not tachymetric) could manouver right up to the last 10 seconds of the bomb run and it could also bomb in a dive thus making it safer to use. The RAF had the tchymetric SABS-II at some point but due expense, skill levels required and less flexibillity did not use the sight much. Windoffsets could in theory be provided by Pathfinders, Master bombers and Meterological aircraft.

The sinking of the Tirpitz around November 1944 sounds impressive but wasn't quite that impresive. The RAF's SAB bombsight, Luftwaffe's Lotfe and USAAF Norden could all do the job equally at the heights in question. What actually happened was that the RAF sank a ship that was at anchor (after upteen attempts) and whose length was larger than the CEP of their bombsight at the altitude used. Dozens of bombs were in fact dropped to get 2-3hits.

The Tirpitz was undefended by fighters, the smoke generators activated too late so that the smoke probably did more to spoil the aim of the defending gunners than that of the bomb aimers.

If the Tirptiz had of been suprise attacked by He 111 equiped with 2500kg bombs (or B-25's with 2000lbs) and Lotfe bombsights in 1942 they would have done almost as good a job as the Lancaster with its SABS and 5000kg tallboy bomb in late 1944. The key here is the screw up with the identification of the raid by German defenses which had detected the aircraft on radar in good time but failed to indentify them as hostile, the belated activation of smoke screens and the belated scrambling of FW 190 interceptors which if they had of intercepted the unescorted and armament stripped Lancasters would likely have shot down a high percentage of them and quite possibly spoiled the raid. The Reichs defenses were crumbling and in all probabillity teenagers were making the decisions.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

The sinking of the Tirpitz around November 1944 sounds impressive but wasn't quite that impresive. The RAF's SAB bombsight, Luftwaffe's Lotfe and USAAF Norden could all do the job equally at the heights in question. What actually happened was that the RAF sank a ship that was at anchor (after upteen attempts).

7 in fact (including the last) + 7 by the FAA

Dozens of bombs were in fact dropped to get 2-3hits.

19 actually, and it's a fair indication of how good the Tallboy was that two hits were able to sink her, and the near misses scoured away enough of the bottom to ensure that she turned completely over.

The Tirpitz was undefended by fighters, the smoke generators activated too late so that the smoke probably did more to spoil the aim of the defending gunners than that of the bomb aimers.

By the time 9 Squadron bombed, Tirpitz had almost disappeared in smoke, so that is manifestly untrue

If the Tirptiz had of been suprise attacked by He 111 equiped with 2500kg bombs (or B-25's with 2000lbs) and Lotfe bombsights in 1942 they would have done almost as good a job as the Lancaster with its SABS and 5000kg tallboy bomb in late 1944.

But it wasn't so that's more pointless speculation/guesswork. Like Bismarck, Tirpitz was alleged to be unsinkable, so it's doubtful that bombs half the size of Tallboy would have done much.

The key here is the screw up with the identification of the raid by German defenses which had detected the aircraft on radar in good time but failed to indentify them as hostile, the belated activation of smoke screens and the belated scrambling of FW 190 interceptors which if they had of intercepted the unescorted and armament stripped Lancasters would likely have shot down a high percentage of them and quite possibly spoiled the raid. The Reichs defenses were crumbling and in all probabillity teenagers were making the decisions

No, it wasn't; it was due to the usual lamentable lack of cooperation between German Commands; nobody had seen fit to tell the Luftwaffe that Tirpitz had been moved, so the fighters set off for her old mooring.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

The bombing height may have been because the RAF heavies didn't have ceilings much higher than that.

Pretty close; 22,000', but that was with a maximum bomb load of over 18,000lbs.

 

[wuzak]

FWIW, Tallboy and Grand Slam didn't always drop as accurately as required due to the bomb release mechanism - a chain slung around the bomb's body. Had they been able to use a normal type bomb carrier and release they may have been more accurate.

 

[pbfoot]

the bomb sight is an aid but all the little variables cause it to be just that an aid .except in perfect still air, no winds aloft at all, flown by a perfect pilot with a perfect bombardier with perfect instruments and most of all no distractions like flak or fighters ,

 

[FLYBOYJ]

the bomb sight is an aid but all the little variables cause it to be just that an aid .except in perfect still air, no winds aloft at all, flown by a perfect pilot with a perfect bombardier with perfect instruments and most of all no distractions like flak or fighters ,

Remember - during the bomb run, the bombardier had control of the plane (at least with the Norton bomb sight)

 

[pinsog]

We all agree that the SDB was a failure against Germany, but what about against Japan? American bombers were very successful defending themselves against Japanese fighters, without escort, all throughout the war.

 

[pbfoot]

Remember - during the bomb run, the bombardier had control of the plane (at least with the Norton bomb sight)

I'm aware , alls I'm saying with the technology of the day dropping dumb iron bombs with any accuracy in any weather outside perfect conditions would be a very hard task to accomplish. I'm thinking of all the variables winds aloft , altimeter setting, humidity, even if the aircraft was in the slightest bank or turn would all affect accuracy. Now toss in flak, nerves and fighters

 

[Nikademus]

Again, just because your bombers are self defending doesnt mean you purposely expose them to enemy fighters, or for that matter, deny them fighter protection if it is availeable.

that is contrary to the basic principle of the "Self Defending Bomber" concept. Fighters were seen as a wasteful expense by the purists. They were wrong. On the same vein, there is a big difference between exposure and avoidance. If the concept worked as advertised they wouldn't have to avoid by flying in at night, or during twilight/dawn conditions or attempting to go in when the CAP is figured to not be around or lastly at stratosphere heights. In other words the tactics the USAAF often used with their unescorted raids in the Pacific. It would appear they didn't buy the SDB concept and respected the enemy's defense potential. Eric Bergerud's study of the SoPac fighting showed that the Allied air efforts were hardly a cakewalk, and there were multiple incidents of even 4E's suffering signifigant losses. Not on the scale of a Schweinfurst of course, given the smaller sizes and vast terrain of the Theater, but enough for the USAAF to take notice and adjust it's tactics to minimize interception when no escort was available.

We all agree that the SDB was a failure against Germany, but what about against Japan? American bombers were very successful defending themselves against Japanese fighters, without escort, all throughout the war.

Like in Burma? The lowly Ki-43, probably the most maligned candidant for attacking a 4E (with good reason from a paper point of view) managed to shoot down more B-24's (and one B-29) than they lost. 24 for 18 in trade. Ki-43's also added another 7 Liberators in RAF service in exchange for 3 downed 43's. These were only the verified losses. There was also a good amount of damage and crew wounding to dish out. People tend to look only at losses. But damage and casualties are also part of the equation. The USAAF was always able to replace it's material losses during the war (though as mentioned, the debut of the B-29 heralded the dawn of the uber-expensive military air asset). The real concern was the life expectancy of the crews.

This from a Theater not known for it's integrated air defense network and having to rely primarily on plane forced into an ad-hoc role with a weak armament for tackling a heavy bomber. Germany, like Japan and Italy was not intially equipped to deal with a sustained strategic bombing campaign both in terms of defense network and based on the existing armaments of their primary fighter force. It evolved into one over time out of necessity. This is not to say that Japan and Italy could acomplish as much as the Germans given their specific limitations....especially Italy, but had they faced the same "what if" that Germany did they would have both reacted, esp with interceptors better armed and suited for knocking down the big bombers. The VVS, which i see your no longer throwing into the mix, was the world's largest airforce prior to Barbarossa. I would certainly not discount their ability to punish bomber formations either and they did have a decent high alt interceptor in the form of the MiG-3. The SDB concept as defined prior to WWII was proven to be no substitute for a conventional escorted attack. It was not conditional based on opponent....nor can one simply summarize that it would have been effective vs. any other opponent except for Germany, and now maybe Britian as you posted earlier. For every action, there is a reaction.

 

[pinsog]

that is contrary to the basic principle of the "Self Defending Bomber" concept. Fighters were seen as a wasteful expense by the purists. They were wrong. On the same vein, there is a big difference between exposure and avoidance. If the concept worked as advertised they wouldn't have to avoid by flying in at night, or during twilight/dawn conditions or attempting to go in when the CAP is figured to not be around or lastly at stratosphere heights. In other words the tactics the USAAF often used with their unescorted raids in the Pacific. It would appear they didn't buy the SDB concept and respected the enemy's defense potential. Eric Bergerud's study of the SoPac fighting showed that the Allied air efforts were hardly a cakewalk, and there were multiple incidents of even 4E's suffering signifigant losses. Not on the scale of a Schweinfurst of course, given the smaller sizes and vast terrain of the Theater, but enough for the USAAF to take notice and adjust it's tactics to minimize interception when no escort was available.



Like in Burma? The lowly Ki-43, probably the most maligned candidant for attacking a 4E (with good reason from a paper point of view) managed to shoot down more B-24's (and one B-29) than they lost. 24 for 18 in trade. Ki-43's also added another 7 Liberators in RAF service in exchange for 3 downed 43's. These were only the verified losses. There was also a good amount of damage and crew wounding to dish out. People tend to look only at losses. But damage and casualties are also part of the equation. The USAAF was always able to replace it's material losses during the war (though as mentioned, the debut of the B-29 heralded the dawn of the uber-expensive military air asset). The real concern was the life expectancy of the crews.

This from a Theater not known for it's integrated air defense network and having to rely primarily on plane forced into an ad-hoc role with a weak armament for tackling a heavy bomber. Germany, like Japan and Italy was not intially equipped to deal with a sustained strategic bombing campaign both in terms of defense network and based on the existing armaments of their primary fighter force. It evolved into one over time out of necessity. This is not to say that Japan and Italy could acomplish as much as the Germans given their specific limitations....especially Italy, but had they faced the same "what if" that Germany did they would have both reacted, esp with interceptors better armed and suited for knocking down the big bombers. The VVS, which i see your no longer throwing into the mix, was the world's largest airforce prior to Barbarossa. I would certainly not discount their ability to punish bomber formations either and they did have a decent high alt interceptor in the form of the MiG-3. The SDB concept as defined prior to WWII was proven to be no substitute for a conventional escorted attack. It was not conditional based on opponent....nor can one simply summarize that it would have been effective vs. any other opponent except for Germany, and now maybe Britian as you posted earlier. For every action, there is a reaction.

Just because you have a SDB you dont put it into places to get it shot at on purpose. If you can fly above them you do. If you can go around them you do. If you have to fly through them you have that option because it is self defending. Tell me, if you are in a tank in a battlezone, would you park it on a hill with a big sign on it that says "SHOOT ME"? Of course not. It you are in a battleship, would you cruise up right next to an enemy destroyer or cruiser and say "SHOOT ME, I'M A BATTLESHIP"? No. You engage them with your big guns out of range of their weapons. Same thing with SDB. Fly over, fly around fly through only if you must, but if you must fly through them, at least you have the option.

I didn't say it was impossible to shoot them down, but the Japanese were unable to halt the bomber offensive anywhere at anytime during the war.

"This is not to say that Japan and Italy could acomplish as much as the Germans given their specific limitations....especially Italy, but had they faced the same "what if" that Germany did they would have both reacted, esp with interceptors better armed and suited for knocking down the big bombers. "

The USAAF burned the entire country of Japan to the ground and then nuked it. At exactly what time does the threat get bad enough to try to shoot them down?