Use of Lee Enfield after 1945 (1 Viewer)

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The US also favoured firepower, but they were not as well served as the germans in the squad based MG and saw the rifle component of the squad as a means of boosting their squad firepower. Hence the thinking that led to the garand. in practice the US squads always missed the benefits of a proper squad MG, and the US whilst advocating a firepower solution to their squad battle solutions, then prompltly nobbled it by failing to make the Mg the main focus of their squad tactics.

I'm assuming that recognition of this led to the fielding of the M1919A6
From M1919 Browning machine gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The M1919A6 was an attempt to provide US forces with a more portable light machine gun, similar to the German MG 34 and MG 42 machine guns that they were facing. The M1919A6 had a metal buttstock assembly that clamped to the backplate of the gun, and a front barrel bearing that incorporated both a muzzle booster and a bipod similar to that used on the M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR). A lighter barrel than that of the M1919A4 was fitted. The M1919A6 was a heavy (32 pounds (15 kg)) and awkward weapon in comparison with the MG34 and MG42 and was eventually replaced in US service by the M60 machine gun in the 1960s.

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A friend of mine, much older than me, in 1943, when aged 17, went with Repubblica Sociale Italiana and was involved in several combats.

He told me that, while before September the 8th 1943, submachine guns in the Regio Esercito were as scarce as hens theet, probably for the sparing mentality of the Italian Generals, afterwards a tremendous amount of Beretta Mod.38 and other kind of submachine guns appeared, so all the soldiers wanted to have one. But, as he told me " a rifle, under certain circumstances was by far more efficient than a dozen of machine guns..." the Tenente commanding the platoon had to order who had to carry a rifle and who had to carry a Beretta.

That was probably due to the fact that were mostly counterinsurgency operations.

Most of all the pics of R.S.I. show soldiers carring a submachine gun



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Pre WW I most armies had 2-4 Heavy tripod mounted (or equivalent) machine guns per battalion. There were no mortars or light infantry guns in most armies. If a Battalion was tasked with influencing a battlefield (keeping enemy troops pinned in position or preventing reinforcements/supplies from reaching certain positions it could only be done with long range rifle fire. Volley firing was a common tactic. Entire companies firing single shots on command.
A long ranges one heavy water cooled machine gun was worth 80-100 riflemen so giving a battalion a MG platoon of 4 guns was a considerable increase in firepower for a small increase in man power.
In defense a few well sited machine-guns could stop an entire infantry battalion and cause horrendous casualties in a matter of minutes. The answer was lighter more portable machine guns that could be carried during the attack for immediate fire support. by 1915/16 these guns were showing up but often only on a scale of one gun per platoon.
German version
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Much better than a standard Maxim gun but not what was really wanted.
By 1918 more armies had "portable" machine guns and the scale of issue was improving.

However the importance of individual rifle men was declining and in the 1920s and 30s when most armies adopted 80-82mm mortars as battalion support weapons the rifles lost any real need (or even imagined need) for firing at ranges over 1000yds.
British had collected the Vickers guns and kept them in separate units to be attached to battalions or regiments as needed.

Squads rarely operated alone and comparing squad weapons gives a rather distorted picture of tactical thinking. There is of course basic squad tactics but squads were expected to co-operate and work to an overall plan of a higher unit. A single squad might clear a building or small section of a street but other squad/platoons are clearing other buildings and parallel streets at the same time.
A Platoon commander of a 3 squad platoon could very well use his 3rd platoon as a base of fire (primarily the MG ) to support the advance of his other 2 squads which would further break down in advances of the rifle and mg sections of each squad.
In some armies the Platoon commander might have a small mortar available for further support or smoke throwing/target marking (no radios)

It is this proliferation and escalation of "support" weapons" that helped change the expectations of the rifle. Volley fire at 1200-1800 yds was no longer required and even fire at 600yds or beyond could better be handled by LMGs or MMGs/mortars.
In 2012-16 in is no longer acceptable to call down mortar fire on suspected sniper positions in inhabited areas so marksmanship is making something of a comeback.
 
I respectfully disagree that squads rarely were called upon to fight alone. Squads were the basic fighting unit in most armies and there were many situations where fighting centred around the squad. so-called battalion guns were useful if the fight got bigger than that, but frequently that was far too late and excessively restricted the ability to flexibly and quickly respond. the squad fought its battle with the resources at its disposal immediately. mortars too were basically a battalion or platoon based weapon though some armies did apply mortars somewhat more lavishly than others.

in battles that were fought at squad level, and that was, and is, often the norm, a lack of a proper squad based weapon or GPMG was a major shortcoming. The US 30 and 50 cals were excellent support MGs, but never really a squad based weapon. not in the same way as a Bren or an MG42. The US squads were uneccessarily burdened with a weapon that was more akin to a rifle than an MG, I speak of course about the BAR. not a bad gun....until compared to its contemporaries. Whats more tragic is that its problems could quite easily have been addressed .

If the battle descended to a more intense level of fighting, then the heavier firepower of the platoon company or battalion might become significant. The squads job in those situation whilst the extra firepower was moved forward was usually to delay or pin an opponent. Inevitably in these situations, supply was an issue, and here, measured use of ammunition, long range suppression fire aimed fire were of greater importance, and effectiveness than the traditional, essentially French and American models of using firepower to try and replace proper infantry training. The ability of the squad riflemen to maintain a steady, but accurate amount of aimed fire, whether on the advance, or covering a withdrawal should not be under-estimated. it has tended to be so under-estimated in the US army since at least 1917. The Australian ar,y in contrast, demonstrated in the big offensives of 1918 what could be achieved with better trained infantry relying heavily on aimed rifle fire. These advances did introduce a large amount of integration with other arms, using Monash's new tactical concepts, but the anchor on what all these new ideas rested was still firmly the well trained Infantry that he demanded

I think what we are hitting up against here are the difference between the philosophies of Commonwealth on one side and the continental (French/US) on the other. I have no direct experience with WWII, but I know a number of ex-Vietnam vets, all of whom were critical of US disregard for squad training in favour of this massed firepower concept. In Vietnam, the US army did not emerge with a great reputation. its reaction times were too slow, it did not seem able to undertake much in the way of counterinsurgency other than blow the f*** out of anything that moved. that's definitely not the way to fight when your enemy is using stealth, infiltration, ambush and similar such as the viet opponents were using.

I accept that support weaponary diminished the need or importance for high quality aimed rifle fire, but I know that it never was entirely eliminated from the inventory, or even so reduced as to be considered not essential in armies like the Australian and british armies.
 
There may be some confusion between the organisational and tactical role of the squad or section.

The section is the largest size controlled by a junior NCO. It includes an LMG and rifles. Its role is to allow the junior officer/platoon commander to employ his platoon by instructing the junior NCOs and not the entire platoon. It also devolves the administration of the platoon to junior NCOs via the platoon sergeant and gives the officer time to do his job which is to do the thinking for them.

So the section size is a function of the command and control that can be expected of an inexperienced junior NCO and to contain a miniature all arms mix e.g. LMG for suppression, rifles for accurate fire and grenades for indirect fire and pointy sticks all round when in touching distance.

How the section acts is a function of the kit it possesses which itself is a function of the doctrine and resources of the high command/government. If you have a Maxim and bolt action rifles it will function differently to having a modern LMG and L85A2s. In the case of the Wermacht the section machine gun was introduced to fit a given doctrine so was belt fed and high volume fire. The BREN was introduced to multiply rifle fire so was low volume fire from magazines. The US army seems to have made it's starting point the kit it had rather than the kit is needed to fit it's doctrine. The old Soviet army went from an armed peasant mob to a professional all arms model varying with the kit available (yes I know that this is a gross simplification) as it grew a stock of experienced junior and senior NCOs freeing the junior officers from direct soldier management.

Having wandered OT I return with the point that the Short Magazine Lee Enfield was a holding pattern design until the P13 and both were to provide very long range accurate individual fire. The SMLE proved to be a better choice for 20th century wars so was retained and the P13/14 proved unnecessary (except to the US who would have had to give some of their troops in WW1 pikes without P17 production). In the 21st century it returned to it's roots when the Taliban began to use it again to out range allied troops with NATO standard short range 5.56mm guns and remains viable for the task and inspired allied forces to reintroduce long range rifles. One might misquote that the battles of the Hindu Kush were won on the Veldt of South Africa.
 
When trying to compress what could be a book long subject (and a lengthy book at that) of infantry weapons and tactics covering a period of well over 100 years into a few paragraphs things get pushed in generalities.
There were many times when squads fought alone or without support but many may not mean the majority of times. Most of WW I was not fought on a squad level. On occasions squads fought in somewhat isolated pockets during a general battle but the total number of troops in even a small area (a few hundred yards by a few hundred yards) was large. During WW I on the western front troop strength per yard of front varied considerably, from well over 1 man per yard to 5-10 yds per man depending on attack or defense, year (or month) later war had many power shortages and how active a sector was. Many large units (British/commonwealth brigades) had two battalions in the line, one in support and one in reserve/resting.
Terrain can make a huge difference, jungles cut lines of sight and lines of fire so even a company battle devolves into a series of somewhat connected squad/platoon fire fights. However any squad swanning about the North African desert on it's own (night reconnaissance excepted) could very well be in full sight of an entire enemy battalion or larger.

Terms are also confusing, while accurate rifle fire is always a good thing you have accurate (or not so accurate) fire at 800-1600 yds, a range no squad should be firing at on it's own and accurate fire at 400 yds and under which more directly affects a squad's own survival. and yes you have the in-between.
From the 1880s to 1914 most battalions had few, if any machine guns and their ONLY long range weapon was the rifle. By the 1920s some sort of squad/platoon MG was accepted as being necessary, type and number being subject to argument but a bipod mounted weapon firing short bursts had better target effect at that middle distance (400-800yds) than a 1/2 dozen or so rifles. It also helped considerably at much shorter distances.
Not all armies changed at the same time and not all armies followed the same doctrines but the need for long range (over 400-600yds) rifle fire certainly diminished considerably from the 1880s-1910 period.
 
Harsh on the P14/M1917 which by any standard were excellent weapons.
I remember reading in some poor journalistic garbage that the Taliban used a 303 rifle and killed a British soldier and how can such an old cartridge and such an old weapon kill in the 21st century?
The Indian subcontinent must be awash with old Lee Enfield so it's not surprising and maybe it's the Taliban who will have the last word on an iconic rifle.

The emergence of semi auto allows new tactics because of greater firepower. Fire and manoeuvre is a no go with a Martini Henry. So tactics evolve.

But my secret British rifle desire....is that the British in 1932 accept in mass production the Vickers Pedersen rifle! Yes! Toggle action for the UK! Sigh. If only....
 
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There was nothing really special about the P14/M1917 except for it's rear sight. And that was only special for it's time. During the 30s the French MAS, the No 4 Enfield, the Springfield 1903A3 and the Garand for mass produced rifles (or rifles preparing for mass production) all had rear sights of somewhat comparable capabilities, and in some cases superior. The P14/M1917 showed the way but that doesn't mean it was the best of all time.
While the British tried for improved long range performance with the .276 cartridge other countries improved long range ballistics by changing the bullet in the already in use cartridge.
WIthout good training (and the proper landscape and weather) long range rifle shooting is something of an illusion. At least in the idea that one soldier actually aims at an opposing soldier at ranges over 800-1200 yds. Just seeing an enemy soldier at that range calls for a high contrast back ground and/or the 'target' in question moving or drawing attention. Group fire is something else. Squad/platoon/company all aim at a common aiming mark (or area) and fire at once in volleys or fire as individuals at an area target. Dozens or hundreds of bullets arriving in a 'small' area (like a football field ) per minute and law of averages says something is going to get hit at some point.
The number of men who can actually hit man sized targets at 800yds and beyond using open sights and no sling in even a light wind are a very small percentage indeed of an army.
A rifle that is easy to hit with (better battle sights) at under 400yds and will still provide effective fire at 600yds and beyond is probably a better all round bet. And higher rates of fire at close ranges (say 300 yds) and under is a real plus. The longer the range the more time you need between shots to take the more careful aim needed. remember that twice the range means the bullets fall in 4 times the area. Slight sighting errors that would still produce a hit at 200yds means a miss of several feet at 600yds so the fast rates of fire are not really practical at long range with manually operated rifles and even semi autos need 2-3 seconds between shots for the shooter to recover from recoil and realign the sights for good shooting.
 
I thought u didn't like the MAS 36?
I do declare without fear that the P14 compared nicely to the MAS!during war time infantry is less marksman and more cannon fodder so the concept of accuracy goes out the window. In the Soviet army the SVT-40 was replaced by the Mosin which is kinds like binning the Garand for the M1917. That logic has nothing to do with any tactic other than giving a soldier a rifle.

One must remember going back in time...the Lee Enfield was replaced by the SLR but not the sub machine gun.
The Sterling wasn't replaced until the SA80. So the EM-2 would have carried out both roles.

The more I read about the EM-2 the more I like. It would have been fantastic
 
The French and the Spanish did take German design and engineers to make rifles. Plus of course the Russians which is why the AK is considered a German copy.
The most famous is the CETME rifle which was a German Sturmgewehr 45 which then became the G3. The French also designed a rifle but that didn't go anywhere.

Why would making a British copy of either a StG 44 or StG45 such a bad thing?
 
I thought u didn't like the MAS 36?
I do declare without fear that the P14 compared nicely to the MAS!

The main problem I have have with the MAS is that it came 23 years after the P-13. If the best the French could do was to try to equal a 23 year old rifle then something is wrong. It is one thing to continue to build old rifles using existing tooling. It is another to spend large sums of money on tooling for a rifle showing little advancement.


In the Soviet army the SVT-40 was replaced by the Mosin which is kinds like binning the Garand for the M1917. That logic has nothing to do with any tactic other than giving a soldier a rifle.

Not quite, The Russians faced some unique situations. One of which was that it wasn't really "Russia" but the United Soviet Socialist Republic which is more than semantics. The Soviet Army had over 20 different languages spoken in it not including dialects. Counting the troops from the asian areas and southern borders the Soviet army had about the lowest literacy rate so training was a huge problem, 12-20 manuals for the same rifle just in different languages? and since a good number of troops couldn't read anyway using the simplest possible weapons for the majority of the troops made sense.

The SVT-40 had more problems with maintenance and durability than the Garand and was commonly issued to NCOs as they were generally better trained (or at least trainable). The SVT-40 continued in use for quite some time, just in small numbers.
 
Why would making a British copy of either a StG 44 or StG45 such a bad thing?


because it didn't, and doesn't, fit in with British army tactical concepts. The british army is an incredibly conservative outfit, and still holds valuable accuracy of fire as opposed to volume of fire. This is especially true of its rifles component. The effects of mons still have an effect on the way the british army thinks intensive battles should be fought. the mk4 fits those concepts perfectly. Some concessions arise with the self loading rifle, still not a fully automatic piece of kit, and of cause modern rifles like the Austrian steyr which we now use. I think we have opted for a fully automatic weapon, finally, just to make a fashion statement more than anything. training in the Australian army is still emphasising accuracy of the fire over the volume of the fire in 90% of combat situations
 
Why would making a British copy of either a StG 44 or StG45 such a bad thing?

It complicates the ammo supply. The 7.9X33 round being a lousy machine gun cartridge. the Russian 7.62x39 was a bit better but the Russians dropped the belt-fed RPD machine gun in favor of heavy barreled AKs (RPK) with 40 round mags instead of 30s. In part due to training. The Russians used belt fed RP-46 machine guns at company level to reinforce the RPDs. Later they used the PKM. The company level guns using the 7.62X54R cartridge.

BTW some of the first Spanish CETME rifles, while nominally chambered for 7.62X51 NATO used a lower power loading. Production of rifles using full power 7.62X51 NATO didn't start until the late 50s.

British had also wisely given up on those lousy sights mounted on the barrel.
 
French guns kinda leave me thinking they is always a dollar short and a day late.
They just dont....do the biz. Don't wanna come across as anti French but they just do. Not saying I'm expert on French guns but there we go.
Conservative yes but the EM-2 is a very left field choice which is pretty much an assault rifle which has nothing to do with old school accuracy. One problem is eggs in one basket and then basket thrown away so by time Korea comes it's SMLE or bust. Whether uk could have any semi auto in numbers by Korea is probably zero as Korea was a surprise and couldn't be used in planning.

The SLR was numbered soon after the Americans went 5.56 so there was always a new rifle needed. The SA80 wasn't it though!

Good point about USSR. Although the problem having a huge conscript army still holds after the war. So the SKS and AK are also going to be problematic if there are language barriers.
 
There is a reason why the original CETME had a soft cartridge and not sure why.
My old brain is getting.....er....what was I talking about?
If I think I recall it was simply an error a misunderstanding the Spanish had. They had the dimensions of the round and built there own but then advised there is a standard NATO round so you have to use that instead. I am probably wrong on that as I am using a memory which may not have occured
 
The Russians faced some unique situations. One of which was that it wasn't really "Russia" but the United Soviet Socialist Republic which is more than semantics. The Soviet Army had over 20 different languages spoken in it not including dialects. Counting the troops from the asian areas and southern borders the Soviet army had about the lowest literacy rate so training was a huge problem, 12-20 manuals for the same rifle just in different languages? and since a good number of troops couldn't read anyway using the simplest possible weapons for the majority of the troops made sense.
In another life I had problems getting people to get their heads around the 1970/80s Soviet kit and organisation. It was becoming out of date as the Soviet population became more educated and urban but was built around the model of a peasant mass army and that the Soviet Union was too big to defend territory and needed to deal with threats by being an offensive army which could manoeuvre across large open spaces. Hence it chose simple kit in large numbers and command and control by a limited number of professional officers who needed to remove tactical initiative to ensure that they did what they were told. You could slot in a peasant with only enough training to know what to do with the simple weapon they were given and to totally rely on officers to tell them what to do.

By the 1970's the typical Soviet conscript was literate and urban and the old ways did not make best use of them as they found in Afghanistan. Hence the modern Russian army is a smaller more professional army that looks to it's troops to be able to use increasingly complex kit and devolving more command and control to the most junior levels and making use of their initiative.

It was not for nothing that the famous aphorism 'the most dangerous thing in any army is a Second Lieutenant with a map' is most popularly attributed to Marshal Zhukov.
 
There is a reason why the original CETME had a soft cartridge and not sure why.
My old brain is getting.....er....what was I talking about?
If I think I recall it was simply an error a misunderstanding the Spanish had. They had the dimensions of the round and built there own but then advised there is a standard NATO round so you have to use that instead. I am probably wrong on that as I am using a memory which may not have occured

It was an attempt to hold down the recoil forces so the gun could fire full automatic without spraying the sky with the majority of the rounds fired. The guns would chamber and fire standard NATO ammo without blowing up but may not have been at their most reliable, recoil operated guns tend to need a balance between recoil force and springs/delay mechanism. It also means there was a good chance the bullets would not hit where the sights were pointed. In the early to mid 50s there was a bit of confusion as to what the NATO standards really were.
 
Yeah.
I would say that the new SLR and G3 and M14 are late 50s weapons.
So not available for Korea.
But...the Germans were certainly ahead of the curve with the Sturmgewehr and FG-42. They would have been ready.
 
It was an attempt to hold down the recoil forces so the gun could fire full automatic without spraying the sky with the majority of the rounds fired. The guns would chamber and fire standard NATO ammo without blowing up but may not have been at their most reliable, recoil operated guns tend to need a balance between recoil force and springs/delay mechanism. It also means there was a good chance the bullets would not hit where the sights were pointed. In the early to mid 50s there was a bit of confusion as to what the NATO standards really were.
I've shot the M-14 on full auto, it had a full auto selector on the side that the squad leader was supposed to carry the key to turn it. I was trained on the M-60, IMO the M-14 on full auto would waste a lot of ammo. The NATO 7.62x51 was too powerful when on full auto for the weight of the
M-14.

From what I've read about the Korean war human wave charges was that when they did succeed it was usually because the UN troops ran low on ammo, not that whatever weapons they had couldn't put out enough firepower.
Would faster firing weapons have changed that ?

Maybe weapons firing reduced power rounds , that weighted less would mean each man could carry more ammo, and the supply system deliver more ammo for the same effort, and that's IF those reduced power rounds could have been as effective.
 
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