It is crystal clear Mr. Delcyros has quite a strong opinion on the capabilities of the VVS.
Keeping in mind no air force, at all, is a perfect organization is that we must assess the strong and weak points each one observes, as it has been pretty much done in this thread.
Now, Mr. Delcyros is completely confident when affirming the VVS made a very significant contribution for "halting" the Luftwaffe during the winter of 1941 around and over Moscow.
He states soviet radar stations made an excellent work vectoring VVS fighter formations to intercept German formations. This deserves further underlining and remarking for it is, to a very important extent, untrue.
I have several books on the evolution of radar and its usage during WWII amongst the many combatant stations.
You might be surprised to learn that when it comes to electronics, the soviets were located well behind the Brits and the Germans. As the war progressed and the Germans were getting pushed west, forward VVS airfields hardly had any of such equipment, even when they had Lend-Lease radar sets at their disposal in their stock.
Do you know, Mr. Delcyros, why the USAAF decided to cancell shuttle bombing missions? For the fundamental reason of the absolute lack of guaranties for their planes and crews in soviet airfields: no radar, weak ground control and weak air defense.
He russians had some stuff of their own when the war commenced, but most radar sets used by the soviet VVS and navy were Lend-Leased items of USA manufacture.
You refuse to acknowledge the VVS did not play any significant role in halting the Luftwaffe in the Moscow area during 1941.
Yep, there were soviet radar stations by the time, but from where is it that you get they could vector their formations to intercept the Germans?
Did you know that hardly one year before, Battle of Britain, the British radar system of the entire south and east parts of the island did not perform as the British history tells?
"We could see the German formations even when they were assemblying after taking off over France."
Well, further researches proved that AT LEAST 50% of the times Hurricane and Spitfire units vectored to intercept following radar guidance, simply and flatly found nothing.
December 7, 1941, while the Germans were around Moscow, a team of operators of a radar station in Hawaii completely failed to interpret what the screen was showing them: a formation of carrier air-borne bombers and fighters approaching Oahu.
What makes you think soviet radar operators were more skilled in the art of interpreting radar information than the guys of the RAF and USAAF were?
The RAF had a bunch of ancient Swordwfish equipped with small radar sets in the open cokcpit for tracking and attacking axis vessels supplying Rommel in North Africa.
Did the soviets ever came close to fit whatever of their planes with electronics?
The miserable weather of November, December and January of 1941 in the USSR hindered air raids and air support operations during the vast majority of days. Most Luftwaffe losses were caused by the cold, on the ground due to the open conditions of forward Luftwaffe bases, and not soviet fighters.
Now, you might bring forward the argument of number of sorties flown by the VVS during such period, still, soviet pilots -no matter how many missions might have flown- lacked skills to fly under such miserable conditions, just like the pilots of any other air force of the planet.
Noteworhty to mention is the fact that when said winter ended, the main axis of the German war effort in the USSR switched south: eastern ukraine/don river bend and the caucasus entrance. The Luftwaffe which had been active in bigger numbers in Mitte Gruppe, likewise, saw its main effort now in the south, and simply retook the role it had played before the winter of 1941: the slaughter of the VVS.