Was it possible for the IJN to replace aircraft and pilot losses?

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It's not possible to replace a pilot in the same way you replace a plane. Not even if you had twice or 3 times the number of people at your disposal. What becomes lost when a pilot dies is his invaluable combat experience. That's why the US way of doing 'tour of duty' was so effective. Individually, the US pilots might not have been as good as some Japanese or German aces that went through all 5 years of the war but, by returning home, they passed their experience to newer generations of pilots.
 
I have understood that the Japanese who are said here are all naval side of them anyway.
As pointed out, IJN's philosophy about not only training but aircraft was certainly terrible.
However, in the case of IJA, their philosophy was not necessarily so innovative as the US's or UK's but they understood the importance of hi-powered fighters like the Ki-44 and Ki-84 as well as the hit-and-run tactics far better than IJN. As I mentioned somewhere in this forum before, problem was there were few instructors who could understand and teach this. So, IJA let students fly with the Ki-44 to learn by themselves anyway.

IJN is said they were unable to understand the advantages of their high powered fighter J2M Raiden (Jack) well because there were many veterans who blamed Mitsubishi in the postwar. Some of them would have suffered as an instructor. This can be confirmed statistically in the production number difference of the 2,000hp fighters between IJN (1,900) and IJA (3,500) though this does not include the Ki-44's 1,200.
 
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As I have mentioned before a friend of mine's father flew Corsairs in late WW II.
One of his stories (and told at lunch and not over drinks) involved crashing a Corsair on take-off in a night take-off in training while stateside. A few other pilots coming back from liberty thought would it be funny to turn on bank of lights used for construction while he was in the middle of his take-off run and he lost is night vision and veered off the runway.
By the time the Corsair had hit a number of obstacles (including a bulldozer, telephone pole and stack of cement pipes) he wound up in an upside down cockpit with parts of both wings missing, the engine torn off the fuselage and a large part of the tail missing (or all of it?).
His point about telling the story was that his training was so ingrained in him that he turned off the tank switch and turned off the ignition switch/s before he loosened his harness, at which point he fell on his head in the upside down cockpit. And this was before anybody else reached him.
He didn't specifically say check lists but it sure sounds like there was some sort of check list he was trying to follow.

Very few of the Pilots that he started with survive the war however only a few of them were combat losses.
Low time pilots are going to have even higher accident rates than better trained pilots without factoring in combat.
 
Very few of the Pilots that he started with survive the war however only a few of them were combat losses.
Low time pilots are going to have even higher accident rates than better trained pilots without factoring in combat.
True - it's hard to ingrain the use (and necessity) of a checklist especially on those who come into aviation green with no technical background. Survivability comes with experience and time.

A famous accident because of the lack or inadequate use of a checklist:

The locked condition of the controls was due either to the possibility that no effort was made to unlock the controls prior to take-off, and as a result the controls were fully locked; the possibility that the pilot only partially depressed the locking handle and as a result the locking pin was only partially withdrawn from its hole in the face of the locking quadrant; or the possibility that the locking handle was fully depressed prior to take-off and, due to the malfunctioning of the system, did not fully disengage the locking pin. There is no evidence to show that the system had ever malfunctioned, but due to the inherent design it must be considered a possibility.

 
[...] (and told at lunch and not over drinks)

What kind of lunch is this?!

[...] His point about telling the story was that his training was so ingrained in him that he turned off the tank switch and turned off the ignition switch/s before he loosened his harness, at which point he fell on his head in the upside down cockpit. And this was before anybody else reached him.

He's a firefighter's pilot, fo sho. We always appreciated the keen ones.
 
LOL! I'd give my pinky finger to witness that!
Here's a more complete description. I can't locate my copy of Steinhoff's book, which had the original story.

Even funnier is Gunter Rall's description of the US method (1950s):
... Procedures and checks do for US pilot training what the rosary and litany do for the devout Catholic -- more in fact: if employed with sufficient ardor, both will get you into heaven, but only the former will return you to earth afterwards.
 

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Here's a more complete description. I can't locate my copy of Steinhoff's book, which had the original story.

Even funnier is Gunter Rall's description of the US method (1950s):
I knew an IP who worked with Luftwaffe pilots at Luke AFB during the 1960s. He mentioned many of the WW2 were pretty arrogant at times and it was challenging to teach them anything. He spoke very well of Rall and Steinhoff, said Hartmann was "very tough but one of the best pilots he's ever seen."
 
The other difference between IJN and USN pilot training was this: an experienced pilot pulling a tour as Instructor Pilot (IP) was considered normal in the USN, while it was inconceivable in the IJN.

The Japanese Navy held that once a pilot arrived at a combat unit that was where he stayed "for the duration". As a result of that philosophy and the "only graduate superior pilots" obsession, IPs were NOT experienced veterans, but rather the ones that had just barely graduated pilot training and were considered "not fit for a combat unit" or failed combat pilots sent home to "find a way to be useful", and who had no hope of returning to a combat unit.
This led to disinterested IPs and poorly-trained students who had no respect for their IPs.

In the USN IPs were experienced pilots who were on a "home rotation", and who knew that they would soon be back at the front leading the guys they had just trained. This created dedicated IPs who were invested in producing the best-trained new pilots possible, and student pilots who looked up to, and respected, their IPs.

Guess which one gave the new pilots their best chance of surviving their first weeks/months of combat and thus produced a higher % of quality combat pilots?
 
The IJN tended to use their small carriers as "bait" in fleet actions. It seems to me, it would be a better use of the Shoho and Ryūhō and the like as training carriers. The US had two paddlewheel ships converted to makeshift carriers that they sailed in Lake Michigan for carrier qualifications. They qualified thousands of carrier aviators.
 
Were any Buffalos used for training on those carriers? Maybe there's one at the bottom of Lake Michigan.
I saw an article that broke down the 100 or so lost aircraft by model, but I couldn't find it when I searched just now to try to answer your question. Maybe somebody else can. Quite a few of the aircraft lost in the lake have been recovered, and they make up a good number of the navy types that grace our museums.
 
The other difference between IJN and USN pilot training was this: an experienced pilot pulling a tour as Instructor Pilot (IP) was considered normal in the USN, while it was inconceivable in the IJN.

The Japanese Navy held that once a pilot arrived at a combat unit that was where he stayed "for the duration". As a result of that philosophy and the "only graduate superior pilots" obsession, IPs were NOT experienced veterans, but rather the ones that had just barely graduated pilot training and were considered "not fit for a combat unit" or failed combat pilots sent home to "find a way to be useful", and who had no hope of returning to a combat unit.
This led to disinterested IPs and poorly-trained students who had no respect for their IPs.

In the USN IPs were experienced pilots who were on a "home rotation", and who knew that they would soon be back at the front leading the guys they had just trained. This created dedicated IPs who were invested in producing the best-trained new pilots possible, and student pilots who looked up to, and respected, their IPs.

Guess which one gave the new pilots their best chance of surviving their first weeks/months of combat and thus produced a higher % of quality combat pilots?
How were the British FAA pilots trained? I suppose HMS Argus would have made for a good training carrier, until the losses/crippling of HMS Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal, Hermes, Eagle, Illustrious and Formidable forced her to re-enter the frontlines.
 
How were the British FAA pilots trained? I suppose HMS Argus would have made for a good training carrier, until the losses/crippling of HMS Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal, Hermes, Eagle, Illustrious and Formidable forced her to re-enter the frontlines.
I don't know in the pre war years but into the 1940s there were some FAA pilots being trained by the US Navy.
 
I don't know in the pre war years but into the 1940s there were some FAA pilots being trained by the US Navy.
The Canadian carrier pilots seem to have been trained in Canada. At least that's Robert Hampton Gray's experience. Robert Hampton Gray - Wikipedia

I would have thought RCAF Kingston as a FAA training facility would have mocked up a carrier, like USS Wolverine and Sable.
 
The Canadian carrier pilots seem to have been trained in Canada. At least that's Robert Hampton Gray's experience. Robert Hampton Gray - Wikipedia

I would have thought RCAF Kingston as a FAA training facility would have mocked up a carrier, like USS Wolverine and Sable.
Perhaps they all had a share. In the book "Jolly Rogers" Blackburn mentions FAA pilots being trained in Florida.


Were I used to live in SoCal there was a huge RAF training facility called War Eagle Field.

 
FAA basic and advanced pilot training was carried out by the RAF on behalf of the RN either in Britain or overseas under the Empire Air Traing Scheme / British Commonwealth Air Traning Plan under its usual training arrangements. In addition between June 1941 and Sept 1944 training took place in the USA under the Towers Scheme alongside USN pilots.

Observer training was either in the UK, or US (Towers Scheme again) or Piarco, Trinidad.

Then it was back to the UK for operational training in places like Crail (torpedo bomber), or Fearn (Barracuda OUT in 1944/45) or Yeovilton (fighters), East Haven (deck landing). Deck landingvtraining took place on Furious 1939/40, Argus, Activity or various US built escort carrier's starting with Ravager usually in the Firth of Clyde or later, in 1945, in the Fifth of Forth.

I've probably missed a few places.
 
FAA basic and advanced pilot training was carried out by the RAF on behalf of the RN either in Britain or overseas under the Empire Air Traing Scheme / British Commonwealth Air Traning Plan under its usual training arrangements. In addition between June 1941 and Sept 1944 training took place in the USA under the Towers Scheme alongside USN pilots.

Observer training was either in the UK, or US (Towers Scheme again) or Piarco, Trinidad.

Then it was back to the UK for operational training in places like Crail (torpedo bomber), or Fearn (Barracuda OUT in 1944/45) or Yeovilton (fighters), East Haven (deck landing). Deck landingvtraining took place on Furious 1939/40, Argus, Activity or various US built escort carrier's starting with Ravager usually in the Firth of Clyde or later, in 1945, in the Fifth of Forth.

I've probably missed a few places.
I somehow doubt it. 😉
 
Good discussion.
Yes, and the Japanese culture went well beyond initial selection. Around 1940 the USAAF started a shift to a "mass production" view of pilots, but no other air force did the same. I researched this mainly for Luftwaffe and US, but Japan appears to have been similar to Germany. Pilots were warriors who learned through a long apprenticeship. This approach could not scale up fast (you need lots of teachers per trainee, but teachers have to have experience already), and until 1944 they stuck with that model. The US in contrast shifted from an apprenticeship model to what I call "Standard Procedure Flying" (Read the Friendly Manual, and follow the checklist) which allowed a much higher ratio of trainees per instructor per year. The US Navy was similar to USAAF although it did not push the new paradigm as hard.
I would argue that the British went to a 'mass production' style of pilot training. In 1935 they trained approx 300 pilots a year. It was recognised from the start that this needed significant attention and in August 1940 when the second revision was in place, capacity had increased to 7,000 pilots a year.
A lot of the basic approaches were familiar to us all. The maximum use of civilian flying schools for ab into and initial flying, the use of experienced pilots on 'rest' tours being used to train the new pilots. Particularly talented trainees being 'encouraged' to stay in training. The use of front line aircraft types to give newly qualified pilots experience in combat techniques before posting to front line units.
A good number of RAF pilots trained in USAAF schools, and a number of USAAF pilots trained in RAF schools and I am not aware of any difficulty apart from some cultural issues.
 

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