Was Operation Pedestal a greater Axis air attack than any faced by the USN in 1942?

[WARSPITER]

Oh yes, I'm 100% serious. And I haven't finished relevant posting data to this thread.

Best if we ignore the battle of the Atlantic then.......

 

[Greg Boeser]

Hiroshi Ichimura, in Ki-43 'Oscar' Aces of World War II, records that during the period March - June, 1942, the 64th Sentai in Burma lost 11 planes and 10 pilots, all but one to AVG P-40s, while claiming one P-40, six Hurricanes, two Hudsons, a Blenheim and a B-17E. The AVG enjoyed the same early warning system as the British in this theater. The other loss was to a Blenheim gunner.

 

[WAFU]

Pre war, the RAF was fiercely wedded to the ascendancy of the bomber - to be a bomber pilot was the highest achievement in the RAF. The whole organization was designed around it, fighters were a minor role for 'homeland Defence', but not taken too seriously. Note also the high standards if formation flying the RAF was very proud to demonstrate in its pre war days - 'he's a good chap, flys a tight formation' was high praise indeed.
natural fighter pilots? They tend to be 'rotters' and a bit ragged in the formation flying stakes.

 

[WARSPITER]

Pre war, the RAF was fiercely wedded to the ascendancy of the bomber

Wasn't everybody ?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The question is if any other fighter of the time, in similar conditions , have done any better? Or perhaps much better?

Oh I think they certainly did, we can maybe open another thread on that one because there is a wealth of data. I still need to post a couple of the 1942 USN battles in this thread to kind of tie this one up. I won't be able to get to this today but hopefully tomorrow. Then I'll open "Ki-43-vs-MC.200" and perhaps "Ki-43 vs. Allied Fighters".

Now in Europe the Hurricane in late 1941/early 42 was past it's 'best use by date' but then the Japanese aircraft had a number of deficiencies.

I think it was pretty much the same. By 1942 the Hurricane was retired as a front line fighter, the Kittyhawk took it's place. The Kittyhawk (and American 'Warhawk' version) were still being used as air superiority fighters in the Med / Italy well into 1944, and it was the same in the CBI and Pacific.

And consider the advantages the AVG had at about the same time. One of which was an organized and wide spread early warning system that took about 3 years to work up before the AVG even got there.

It didn't end with the AVG, nor was the AVG and it's successors the only Allied unit fighting Ki-43s

 

[Peter Gunn]

All very interesting.

Just an observation, May 1942, the IJN stumbles across SS Neosho and with no other targets around, puts her down in on raid.

August 1942, how many times did the Germans and Italians attack the SS Ohio (sometimes while sitting still) which still made port?

Granted both were tankers, very tough ships to sink and Ohio did have the benefit of escorts towing/holding up to get her to Malta. Neosho did float for four days before sinking as well. But the IJN put seven quick direct hits on her and one suicide hit in short order.

I'm still of the opinion that the IJN were far more effective ship killers than their allies were.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Axis formations came in close enough in time, in each wave, that it was impossible for the CAP to concentrate on any single formation and 12 Me109Fs, for example, would probably have outnumbered the CAP directed against any single formation.

Quite a few waves of Axis bombers at Pedestal didn't have any escort. There don't seem to have been any escorts at all with the attacks on the 11th, or did I miss something?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

All very interesting.

Just an observation, May 1942, the IJN stumbles across SS Neosho and with no other targets around, puts her down in on raid.

August 1942, how many times did the Germans and Italians attack the SS Ohio (sometimes while sitting still) which still made port?

Granted both were tankers, very tough ships to sink and Ohio did have the benefit of escorts towing/holding up to get her to Malta. Neosho did float for four days before sinking as well. But the IJN put seven quick direct hits on her and one suicide hit in short order.

I'm still of the opinion that the IJN were far more effective ship killers than their allies were.

The Ohio was some kind of super ship. The sailors and airmen of Pedestal were heroic almost beyond belief.

But I also do agree, the Japanese, for whatever combination of factors, (training, quality of torpedoes, quality of the aircraft, luck) were extremely lethal at killing ships.

 

[Shortround6]

I think it was pretty much the same. By 1942 the Hurricane was retired as a front line fighter, the Kittyhawk took it's place. The Kittyhawk (and American 'Warhawk' version) were still being used as air superiority fighters in the Med / Italy well into 1944, and it was the same in the CBI and Pacific.

Just be sure to compare like to like.
1942 a very long year, The P-40Es were being delivered from Jan (actually from summer of 1941) through May but Dec of 1942 saw work at the factory being done on the P-40L (Merlin) and M versions.
AS far as 1944 goes in Med/Italy, P-40s may have been used as air superiority fighters but they were sharing that role with P-38s, P-51s, P-47s and Spitfires. Nobody was depending on P-40s (with either engine) to establish air superiority over the front or theater. Used as an escort for attack missions which can fall under the air superiority classification.
This is distinct from the fall of 1942 when they were using P-40Fs in Egypt as an air superiority fighter in general terms.

 

[RCAFson]

All very interesting.

Just an observation, May 1942, the IJN stumbles across SS Neosho and with no other targets around, puts her down in on raid.

August 1942, how many times did the Germans and Italians attack the SS Ohio (sometimes while sitting still) which still made port?

Granted both were tankers, very tough ships to sink and Ohio did have the benefit of escorts towing/holding up to get her to Malta. Neosho did float for four days before sinking as well. But the IJN put seven quick direct hits on her and one suicide hit in short order.

I'm still of the opinion that the IJN were far more effective ship killers than their allies were.

Stukas were the greatest killers of RN destroyers

 

[buffnut453]

Pre war, the RAF was fiercely wedded to the ascendancy of the bomber - to be a bomber pilot was the highest achievement in the RAF. The whole organization was designed around it, fighters were a minor role for 'homeland Defence', but not taken too seriously. Note also the high standards if formation flying the RAF was very proud to demonstrate in its pre war days - 'he's a good chap, flys a tight formation' was high praise indeed.
natural fighter pilots? They tend to be 'rotters' and a bit ragged in the formation flying stakes.

Really? Care to back that up with any evidence.

Take a look at the careers of a number of notable Air-ranking officers from WW2 and see how many of them actually flew bombers....EVER. Here's a short list that I came up with in a few minutes of idle googling (WW1 experience first, then interwar experience):

Douglas – Fighter, training interwar

Dowding – Observation/Reconnaissance, air defence and training interwar

Ellington – Staff officer only, CinC Air Defence GB interwar

Harris – Fighter, fighter/reconnaissance, training, bomber and flying boat interwar

Leigh-Mallory – Observation/Reconnaissance, leading authority on army co-op interwar

Newell – Reconnaissance and bomber, training and staff appointments interwar

Park – Fighter-Reconnaissance, fighters and perhaps a few months on bombers

Portal – Observation/Reconnaissance, bomber interwar

Slessor – Observation, army co-op interwar

Tedder – Fighter, bomber (1919-1923 only) and training interwar


Around half had ANY experience on bombers, and all were pretty limited in time served actually flying them. Most of these leaders did the usual military thing of various staff tours, training appointments etc. None of them stayed in one field very long....which should come as no surprise as anyone who's served in the RAF knows that the tradition continues to this day. All officers above the rank of Wg Cdr, aircrew and groundcrew, are treated pretty much as general staff officers unless their posting has a requirement to authorize flying (e.g. squadron commander, station commander etc).

Yes, there was a general belief during the interwar years that the bomber would always get through. However, the RAF also developed an integrated air defence system so the role of the fighter wasn't as underplayed as you suggest. Given some of the names on the above list and the ranks they attained, bomber experience didn't seem to be a driving factor in promotion and it's a very bold statement to suggest the "whole organization was built around [the bomber]."

 

[buffnut453]

It didn't make it clear but a normal process would be scores and instructor assessments and that I am sure you already know.

It was the policy of the time and one that was formed in the furnace of war, where vast numbers of people were trained. I didn't write it just reported what I found. There is some logic to it for the reasons I mentioned earlier. Were there exceptions to this rule, almost certainly.
For instance a personal view for me is that the stand out pilots were the single seat PR pilots. On their own, without support, often without weapons, many hundreds of miles behind enemy lines, having to navigate precisely without the normal navigation aids in all weathers. That's special. How were they chosen, I don't know, but the general policy was as outlined.

Yes, that makes sense....but I have a number of concerns:

1. Timing of Selection. The general profile for pilot training involved Elementary Flying Training on something like a Tiger Moth followed by Advanced Flying Training on a Harvard or Master for single-engine pilots and the Anson or Oxford for multi-engine pilots. In both cases, pilots would then proceed to the OTU. Selection of "the best" must therefore have taken place at the end of Elementary Flying Training which is a very early stage at which to make such an assessment. Experience shows that many who excel at the elementary stage struggle during the later stages of training, while some who struggle with their early attempts to commit aviation mature later in their training to become highly competent pilots. Thus saying that "the best" were selected at this early stage seems, at best, an over-optimistic statement of reality.

2. Timing of Training. One of the arguments you made for bomber pilots being the best was because they usually had to fly at night. However, this was not the case during the interwar period, indeed the RAF still sought to conduct daylight bombing raids through at least May 1940. Also, the types of aircraft operated by bomber command changed considerably from 1938-1945, growing in size and complexity throughout the period. One could easily argue that, in 1938-1939, the most challenging RAF aircraft to pilot would be the Short Sunderland rather than any of the twin-engined bomber types. Thus, the best pilots pre-war may be needed in non-bomber roles.

3. Supply and Demand. In 1943 onwards, I can easily see how "the best" pilots would get into bombers. I struggle to see the same statement holding water in the summer of 1940 when Bomber Command's Fairey Battle squadrons were being heavily milked to provide pilots for Fighter Command. The operational imperative of defending the British Isles after the fall of France MUST have impacted the decisions on relative priorities of pilot allocations. Since it wasn't clear that Germany wouldn't re-start the blitz, I can imagine priority for Fighter Command continuing until at least the start of Operation Barbarossa.


BTW, I agree entirely with your comments about PR pilots. They were certainly a special breed. I seem to recall reading that becoming a PR pilot was a voluntary thing. Regular requests were put into Station Routine Orders requesting for volunteers for PR work. It took a certain type of person to fly those missions and an all-volunteer force makes a lot of sense (to me, at least).

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Just be sure to compare like to like.
1942 a very long year, The P-40Es were being delivered from Jan (actually from summer of 1941) through May but Dec of 1942 saw work at the factory being done on the P-40L (Merlin) and M versions.
AS far as 1944 goes in Med/Italy, P-40s may have been used as air superiority fighters but they were sharing that role with P-38s, P-51s, P-47s and Spitfires. Nobody was depending on P-40s (with either engine) to establish air superiority over the front or theater. Used as an escort for attack missions which can fall under the air superiority classification.
This is distinct from the fall of 1942 when they were using P-40Fs in Egypt as an air superiority fighter in general terms.

I don't think there is such a distinction. In fall of 1942 there were both Spitfire Mk V and P-40F fighting as the main air superiority fighters. P-38s were there too by December. All three types of fighter were used for air superiority missions through 1943, and into the early months of 1944.

The Spitfire was constrained by range, the P-38 by a variety of problems, the Kittyhawks were slow climbing. So they were used for different missions - the P-38s to escort the Liberators mainly, which I'm learning was a much more important mission than I had originally realized; the Spitfire Vs for defending airfields and fighting right over the front line; the P-40Fs and Ks to escort light and medium bombers and fighter bombers, to perform fighter sweeps and do their own fighter bomber missions.

This breakdown remained fairly consistent into Anzio. It was the P-47 which actually came to replace the Kittyhawks, having many of the same strengths and weakness but ultimately more potential especially in higher altitude bands. The five P-40 fighter groups in the MTO in 1943 started switching over to P-47s mostly in 1944, though this took a little while. Later some of them switched to P-51s.

After that P-40s were done in the air superiority role, though the British kept using them (mainly Kittyhawk IV / P-40N) as fighter bombers right to the end of the war in Italy and the Balkans.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Ok so anyway,

Battle of the Eastern Solomons
24-25 August 1942
This is an interesting battle for several reasons. First, it is a relatively even battle - 2 fleet carriers for the US vs. 2 fleet carriers and one light carrier and a Seaplane tender for the Japanese, with both sides having about the same number of land based planes. The Japanese also have some transports and a heavy surface fleet, which was lurking in hopes of either bombarding Guadalcanal and / or engaging the US in a night surface action. Second, this is also interesting because it took place almost at the same time as Pedestal, so the aircraft are more comparable at this point. Worth noting that the Japanese carrier fighters at least are A6M3, which had some problems in terms of range but in combat are probably better than an A6M2. They are faster (more power and shorter wingspan) and carry twice the ammunition. The US are using F4F-4 which are inferior in combat (arguably) to the F4F-3 used at Coral Sea, but they have more of them. Finally, this was another case of both land and carrier aircraft attacking on both sides, contrary to what was stated earlier in this thread.

The Order of Battle for the carrier planes is here.

IJN carrier aircraft:
27 x A6M3, 27 x D3A, and 18 X B5N on the Shokaku
27 x A6M3, 27 x D3A, and 18 x B5N on the Zuikaku
24 x A6M3 and 9 x B5N on the Ryujo (as part of the 'Diversionary Group')

They also had at least 3 submarines and a 'Vanguard Group' consisting of 2 fast battleships (Hei and Kirishima), 3 heavy cruisers, and 7 destroyers.

USN Carrier Aircraft:
27 x F4F-4, 32 x SBD (15 Scout and 17 Dive bomber), 13 x TBF Avenger on the Saratoga /Task Force 11
29 x F4F-4, 35 x SBD (18 Scout and 17 Dive bomber), 15 x TBF Avenger on the Enterprise / Task Force 16
Worth noting that the fast battleship North Carolina and the Atlanta, an enhanced AAA cruiser, were sailing with Task Force 16

The Wasp was also in the general area with another 79 aircraft but was not involved in the battle.

In addition to this, Cactus Air Force consisted of 18 x F4F (USMC), 5 x P-400 (USAAF P-39s), and later 11 x SBD from Enterprise.
Espirtu Santo also has at least 12 x B-17s
PBY Catalinas are operating out of the Santa Cruz islands.
At Rabaul the Japanese had at least 24 x G4M, and the Tainan Air Group which at this time consisted of 14 x A6M

Strikes 24 August
Japanese and Americans had a hard time finding each other due to weather and random war factors. US spots Ryujo but not the others. Japanese don't find US CVs yet.

IJN Attacks

Attack (from Ryujo) vs. Henderson Field
14 x A6M, 6 x B5N are sent to Henderson field, joined by 24 x G4M and another 14 x A6M from Rabaul. But the Rabaul planes hit weather and turn back.
Ryujo strike tangles with Cactus Air Force. 3 x B5N, 3 x A6M3, and 3 x "US Fighters" are shot down.

Then IJN floatplane scout spot US CVs at 14:25, radios position prior to getting shot down. IJN strike launches at 14:50.

Simultaneously, 2 x SBD Scout planes spot the main force, radio USN but the report gets lost, then they attack causing light damage to Shokaku, but causing 5 of the A6Ms with the strike force to peel off to chase them. Escort is reduced from 15 to 10 A6Ms.

Nagumo launches a second wave at 16:00

First wave vs. Enterprise
10 (originally 15) x A6M, 27 x D3A
Cap of 53 (!!) F4F but badly managed, only a few engage with the IJN bombers.
20 IJN bombers attack Enterprise. At least six F4F follow the D3As into their attack dives, and four are shot down by US AAA.

First wave of 9 D3A misses.
Second wave hits Enterprise with 3 bombs.

7 x D3A attack the BB North Carolina but all are shot down by AAA.

IJN loses 25 aircraft in total. The US lost 6, with 5 pilots (four of these were F4Fs shot down by friendly fire).

Enterprise seems to be badly damaged, but damage / fire control teams put the fires out and were able to resume flight ops at 17:46 (1 hour after being hit)

Second wave (couldn't find a target)
9 x A6M, 27 x D3A
(lost 5 aircraft anyway)

USN Attacks
USN Carrier Strike vs Ryujo

US strike consisting of 38 aircraft (mix of F4F, SBD, and TBF)
SBD bombers hit Ryujo between 3 and 5 times, and a TBF apparently (they aren't certain) also hit with 1 torpedo.
US B-17s also attacked Ryujo but apparently got no hits.
Ryujo sank at nightfall and her surviving aircrew ditched their planes, having nowhere to land.

Scout Attacks
In addition to the two SBD scout bombers that attacked Ryujo at ~14:30,
two more SBDs spot the seaplane tender Chitose in the early evening, scoring two near misses which badly damaged the ship, putting it out of action.

Strikes 25 August

Cactus Attack + Big Bombers
18 aircraft from Henderson Field attack the transport convoy, heavily damaging Jintsu and sinking the transport Kinryu Maru.
Then four B-17s from Espiritu Santo bombed the destroyer Mutsuki which was rescuing crew and survivors from the Kinryu Maru and they sunk it.

During the battle the Japanese lost 25 aircraft and 61 Aircrew, the US lost 6 x F4F 2 x SBD, for 7 aircrew. The B-17s sunk a ship!

Enterprise sailed back to Hawaii and was back on patrol by 16October, and would participate in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October. That's next.

 

[RCAFson]

Quite a few waves of Axis bombers at Pedestal didn't have any escort. There don't seem to have been any escorts at all with the attacks on the 11th, or did I miss something?

The attack on the 11th was at dusk into near full dark, and it proved very difficult for the CAP to intercept, which was undoubtedly the Luftwaffe plan.

 

[RCAFson]

Ok so anyway,

Battle of the Eastern Solomons
24-25 August 1942
This is an interesting battle for several reasons. First, it is a relatively even battle - 2 fleet carriers for the US vs. 2 fleet carriers and one light carrier and a Seaplane tender for the Japanese, with both sides having about the same number of land based planes. The Japanese also have some transports and a heavy surface fleet, which was lurking in hopes of either bombarding Guadalcanal and / or engaging the US in a night surface action. Second, this is also interesting because it took place almost at the same time as Pedestal, so the aircraft are more comparable at this point. Worth noting that the Japanese carrier fighters at least are A6M3, which had some problems in terms of range but in combat are probably better than an A6M2. They are faster (more power and shorter wingspan) and carry twice the ammunition. The US are using F4F-4 which are inferior in combat (arguably) to the F4F-3 used at Coral Sea, but they have more of them. Finally, this was another case of both land and carrier aircraft attacking on both sides, contrary to what was stated earlier in this thread.

The Order of Battle for the carrier planes is here.

IJN carrier aircraft:
27 x A6M3, 27 x D3A, and 18 X B5N on the Shokaku
27 x A6M3, 27 x D3A, and 18 x B5N on the Zuikaku
24 x A6M3 and 9 x B5N on the Ryujo (as part of the 'Diversionary Group')

They also had at least 3 submarines and a 'Vanguard Group' consisting of 2 fast battleships (Hei and Kirishima), 3 heavy cruisers, and 7 destroyers.

USN Carrier Aircraft:
27 x F4F-4, 32 x SBD (15 Scout and 17 Dive bomber), 13 x TBF Avenger on the Saratoga /Task Force 11
29 x F4F-4, 35 x SBD (18 Scout and 17 Dive bomber), 15 x TBF Avenger on the Enterprise / Task Force 16
Worth noting that the fast battleship North Carolina and the Atlanta, an enhanced AAA cruiser, were sailing with Task Force 16

The Wasp was also in the general area with another 79 aircraft but was not involved in the battle.

In addition to this, Cactus Air Force consisted of 18 x F4F (USMC), 5 x P-400 (USAAF P-39s), and later 11 x SBD from Enterprise.
Espirtu Santo also has at least 12 x B-17s
PBY Catalinas are operating out of the Santa Cruz islands.
At Rabaul the Japanese had at least 24 x G4M, and the Tainan Air Group which at this time consisted of 14 x A6M

Strikes 24 August
Japanese and Americans had a hard time finding each other due to weather and random war factors. US spots Ryujo but not the others. Japanese don't find US CVs yet.

IJN Attacks

Attack (from Ryujo) vs. Henderson Field
14 x A6M, 6 x B5N are sent to Henderson field, joined by 24 x G4M and another 14 x A6M from Rabaul. But the Rabaul planes hit weather and turn back.
Ryujo strike tangles with Cactus Air Force. 3 x B5N, 3 x A6M3, and 3 x "US Fighters" are shot down.

Then IJN floatplane scout spot US CVs at 14:25, radios position prior to getting shot down. IJN strike launches at 14:50.

Simultaneously, 2 x SBD Scout planes spot the main force, radio USN but the report gets lost, then they attack causing light damage to Shokaku, but causing 5 of the A6Ms with the strike force to peel off to chase them. Escort is reduced from 15 to 10 A6Ms.

Nagumo launches a second wave at 16:00

First wave vs. Enterprise
10 (originally 15) x A6M, 27 x D3A
Cap of 53 (!!) F4F but badly managed, only a few engage with the IJN bombers.
20 IJN bombers attack Enterprise. At least six F4F follow the D3As into their attack dives, and four are shot down by US AAA.

First wave of 9 D3A misses.
Second wave hits Enterprise with 3 bombs.

7 x D3A attack the BB North Carolina but all are shot down by AAA.

IJN loses 25 aircraft in total. The US lost 6, with 5 pilots (four of these were F4Fs shot down by friendly fire).

Enterprise seems to be badly damaged, but damage / fire control teams put the fires out and were able to resume flight ops at 17:46 (1 hour after being hit)

Second wave (couldn't find a target)
9 x A6M, 27 x D3A
(lost 5 aircraft anyway)

USN Attacks
USN Carrier Strike vs Ryujo

US strike consisting of 38 aircraft (mix of F4F, SBD, and TBF)
SBD bombers hit Ryujo between 3 and 5 times, and a TBF apparently (they aren't certain) also hit with 1 torpedo.
US B-17s also attacked Ryujo but apparently got no hits.
Ryujo sank at nightfall and her surviving aircrew ditched their planes, having nowhere to land.

Scout Attacks
In addition to the two SBD scout bombers that attacked Ryujo at ~14:30,
two more SBDs spot the seaplane tender Chitose in the early evening, scoring two near misses which badly damaged the ship, putting it out of action.

Strikes 25 August

Cactus Attack + Big Bombers
18 aircraft from Henderson Field attack the transport convoy, heavily damaging Jintsu and sinking the transport Kinryu Maru.
Then four B-17s from Espiritu Santo bombed the destroyer Mutsuki which was rescuing crew and survivors from the Kinryu Maru and they sunk it.

During the battle the Japanese lost 25 aircraft and 61 Aircrew, the US lost 6 x F4F 2 x SBD, for 7 aircrew. The B-17s sunk a ship!

Enterprise sailed back to Hawaii and was back on patrol by 16October, and would participate in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October. That's next.

Lundstrom assessed 4 USN TF AA kills, with the rest of the IJN aircraft brought down by CAP or ditching near their carriers. Total USN TF AA and aerial kill claims far exceeded the number of IJNAF aircraft encountered.

 

[Shortround6]

Total USN TF AA and aerial kill claims far exceeded the number of IJNAF aircraft encountered.

You can't shoot down a plane more than once?????????

 

[RCAFson]

You can't shoot down a plane more than once?????????

Well, there can be situations where CAP and AA will claim the same aircraft, but here's a breakdown of USN Kill claims:

AA = 30 (all accepted by the USN Bureau of Ordnance's and included in their 1942 AA Summary!)
F4F claims = 16
SBD claims = 34 (!)
TBF claims = 2

Some of these kill claims were shared amongst aircraft types, but a large of number of claims arose from a supposed encounter with IJNAF Kates, which were never anywhere near the USN carrier TFs...

Lundstrom:

For the whole action against TF-16, U.S. claims for strike aircraft destroyed in aerial combat totaled fifty-two (fifteen more than the Japanese had) (see table 7.2). At the same time the Japanese claimed twelve Grummans (one unconfirmed) (see tables 7.3 and 7.4).

Lundstrom made his kill assessments by a careful comparison of IJNAF and USNAF individual aircraft combat reports and USN ship action reports.

The poor climb rate of the F4F-4 was once again an issue however, the F4F-4's 6 gun armament was not really an issue as most F4F-4 pilots who made firing passes didn't exhaust their ammo supply.:

The carrier commanders appeared satisfied with the Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat, although the Japanese Zero still excelled in performance. Several officers commented on the visible deterioration of enemy pilot skills. Some old and bitter controversies never came up. For example, the reduced ammunition supply of the six-gun F4F-4s appeared not to be a problem. Only a few VF pilots ran dry of bullets. However, the F4F-4's limited range still caused worry, despite the belly tanks. The fleet anxiously awaited the arrival of the gull-wing Vought F4U-1 Corsairs, and some fighter leaders also desired a special carrier-based interceptor (foreshadowing the Grumman F8F Bearcat).

The inaccuracy of the kill claims had consequences for Fletcher, who had decided to withdraw the carriers from close support of the Guadalcanal invasion forces, because it seemed to the higher command that the USN had crippled IJNAF carrier airpower, when this was far from the case, and was also Fletcher's concern. Fletcher was relieved of command for his caution.

 

[SaparotRob]

I can't remember when or where I read this (50+ years or so ago) that there was an F4F pilot would leave two guns switched off as his "going home" guns due to the limited ammo supply.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

In First Team (currently reading it now) Lundstrom makes several mentions of the VF pilots' dislike of the gun and ammo setup on the -4; many and perhaps most of them preferred four guns with longer trigger time -- not to mention the lighter -3 being more maneuverable with a marginally better rate of climb.