Was Operation Pedestal a greater Axis air attack than any faced by the USN in 1942? (1 Viewer)

[Shortround6]

The FM-2 is a can of worms. The engine was substantially lighter but the prop was 70-80lbs heavier (?) and the fuel tanks were smaller while there was more armor/BP glass.
May have had more radio/electronics.

the gun/ammo weights were as the F4F-3 and we know what those were, and about 80lbs on an 7500lb airplane is not that big a deal.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Anyway, here's the next one for the USN in 1942

The Battle of Santa Cruz Islands
25-27 October 1942

This is another interesting one. People tend to think Midway fairly well decided the Pacific War but it was only the tipping point. This was a major battle in which the Japanese badly outnumbered the Americans and came out on top, although not unscathed, and their air contingent seems to have already been diminished somewhat. The Japanese fleet still looks pretty hard core at this point. The scale of the IJN attacks are quite large in this, with a total of

Order of Battle
The Order of Battle is here but this only includes carrier aircraft.

IJN Fleet 4 x Fleet Carriers (Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hyio, Jun'yo) and 1 Light Carrier (Zuiho)
They also had large screening and bombardment forces, including 4 Battleships (Hiei, Kirishima, Kongo, and Haruna), 5 or 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 15 DDs
There were multiple IJN Submarines iperating int he area including I-26 which torpedoed Saratoga and sent her to drydock for 3 months, and I-19 which torpedoed and sunk Wasp on 15 September.

IJN Carrier planes:
101 x A6M3, 79 x D3A, 65 x B5N

Rabaul
(117 aircraft in total as of Sept 20) including at least 25 x G4M, 15 x A6M

USN Fleet 2 x Fleet Carriers (Enterprise and Hornet)
They also had the BB South Dakota, the Atlanta class CLAAs San Juan, San Diego, and Juneau, a couple of heavy cruisers and about 12 DDs

USN Carrier planes:
72 x F4F-4, 65 x SBD, 24 x TBF

Cactus Air Force:
(71 aircraft as of Sept 20) VMF-212 (F4F), VMF-223 (F4F), VMF-224 (F4F), VF-5 (F4F), VMSB-231 (SBD), VS-3 (SBD), VT-8 (TBF) some P-39 or P-400
Many of these were destroyed by bombarding IJN Battleships on 13 October.

Espiritu Santo:
B-17s, PBYs

Prelude
IJN BBs Kongo and Haruna bombarded Henderson Field on 13 Oct, destroying most of the planes and killing 9 pilots and 36 other US military.
Radar equipped Catalina detects Japanese fleet at 03:10, but report doesn't reach US Amdiral Kinkaid until 05:12. He decides not to strike yet.
06:45 US scout sights main IJN fleet. 06:58 IJN scout spots Hornet. Both sides launch strikes.

Air Strikes 26 October

First IJN strike
07:40 launch 64 aircraft: 21 x A6M3, 22 B5N2, 21 D3A2

US Scout Attack
07:40 2 x SBD Scouts spot IJN fleet and attack Zuiho, scoring two hits causing heavy damage to flight deck.

176 sorties by IJN carrier aircraft (including 61 fighter and 115 bomber sorties)

IJN rushes their massive surface fleet toward US task forces hoping for surface engagement

Second IJN Strike
08:10 launch 9 x A6M 19 x D3A and 16 x B5N

USN Strikes
08:00 launch 29 aircraft (9 x F4F-4, 15 x SBD, 6 x TBF)
08:10 launch 20 aircraft (8 x F4F-4, 3 x SBD, 9 x TBF)
08:20 launch 27 aircraft (7 x F4F-4, 9 x SBD, 10 x TBF)

Clashing Air Strikes!
At 08:40 USN and IJN strike aircraft flew past each other. A6Ms attacked from the sun.
4 x A6M, 3 x F4F and 2 x TBF shot down, 1 F4F and 2 TBFs limp back home crippled.

US air strike attacks
3 x A6M CAP distract F4F fighters and 12 x A6M attack SBDs.
2 x SBD are shot down, 2 more abort.
11 SBDs attack Shokaku, hitting with 3-6 bombs, wrecking flight deck. IJN Destroyer Teruzuki hit minor damage.
TBFs unable to locate IJN carriers but attack IJN cruisers Tone and Suzuya but miss.'
9 x SBDs attack IJN cruiser Chikuma scoring 3 hits with 1,000 bombs causing heavy damage. Chikuma withdraws to Truk.

Shokaku after being hit in this battle

IJN air strikes attack
First strike detected at 35 nm
37 x F4F CAP. Problems with communication and fighter control. Relatively few intercept IJN strike.
20 x B5N and 16 x D3A attack Hornet.
3 bombs hit Hornet, plus one damaged B5N crashes into it.

Hornet being hit by a damaged D3A

Hornet is also hit by 2 torpedoes. Then a second D3A crashed into Hornet.

25 x IJN aircraft (including 12 x D3A, 10 x B5N and 1 x A6M) and 6 US aircraft are lost in this engagement.

Fires on Hornet are put out and the crippled CV is put under tow.

Later Morning Strikes
Enterprise lands most of the Hornet aircraft, but another IJN strike is detected at 09:30, ceasing landing ops at 10:00. Some aircraft have to ditch.

Third IJN Strike
10:08 US CAP has trouble intercepting strike again, shooting down 2 of 19 D3A attacking Enterprise
First wave of 9 x D3A got no hits.
Second wave of 10 x D3A hit with 2 x 250 kg AP bombs on Enterprise, plus one near miss .

10 x D3A were lost in total, plus 2 more ditching.

Third Wave
16 x B5N attack Enterprise, South Dakota, and Portland
CAP is more effective, shooting down 3. One suicide attacks DD Smith, killing 57 crew, causing major damage and setting it on fire.
Captain of the Smith purposefully drives his ship through the spraying wake of the rapidly maneuvering BB South Dakota, putting out the fire, then goes back into action!
All torpedoes miss. 9 x B5N shot down.
Enterprise back in action by 11:15, and starts landing planes, but then another Japanese strike arrives. Some planes have to ditch due to being out of fuel.

Fourth IJN Strike
17 x D3A escorted by 12 x A6M all from Jun'yo
1 near miss on Enterprise, 1 hit on South Dakota and 1 hit on San Juan (moderate damage)

8 x D3A destroyed plus another 3 ditching on the way back.

Enterprise and most USN ships withdraw. Hornet is struggling to restore power with smaller escort helping.

Fifth IJN Strike
First wave
7 x B5N, 8 x A6M all from Jun'yo attack crippled Hornet.
1 hit on Hornet

Second wave
7 x B5N, 2 x D3A, 5 x A6M from Zuikaku attack Hornet
1 torpedo hit on Hornet

Third wave
4 x D3A, 6 x A6M
1 bomb hit on Hornet

Hornet abandons ship. IJN Destroyers Makguomo and Akigumo sink Hornet with torpedoes.

Enterprise recovers 57 aircraft, 16 have to ditch and crews are picked up by USN warships.

Night Attacks
Jun'yo and Teruzuki attacked by radar equipped PBY 'Black Cats', prompting IJN withdrawal

IJN lost many crew and aircraft, including all but one of their bomber commanders.

Sorties
I count 176 sorties by IJN aircraft.
75 sorties by USN aircraft.

Losses
Total USN losses were 81 out of 175 aircraft, and 26 aircrew. (33 F4F, 28 SBD, 20 TBF). Many of these had to ditch.
Total IJN losses were 99 out of 203 aircraft, and 148 aircrew.
This included 49% of B5N crews killed, 39% of D3A crews killed, and 20% of A6M killed.

Commander of the Jun'yo noted:

"We searched the sky with apprehension. There were only a few planes in the air in comparison with the numbers launched several hours before... The planes lurched and staggered onto the deck, every single fighter and bomber bullet holed ... As the pilots climbed wearily from their cramped cockpits, they told of unbelievable opposition, of skies choked with antiaircraft shell bursts and tracers."

Both sides overclaimed on ships sunk -IJN claiming 3 US carriers sunk, USN claiming hits to 2 carriers and a cruiser. In reality 1 USN carrier was sunk

USN had problems with fighter control and their CAP didn't work that well, they had the same problem during the previous battle (Eastern Solomons) but not as much apparently at Coral Sea and Midway where they had fewer fighters.

USN AAA on the other hand seems to have been quite telling.

Enterprise under attack

Enterprise under attack, South Dakota near center

 

[RCAFson]

And this matters because....?

Overclaiming was widespread throughout the war, it was hardly unique to the USN - I know for sure the RAF did it constantly as well. I can site hundreds of examples if needed.

I explained one of the consequences in my post. Another consequence is that USN AA capability was greatly overrated. The number of SBD kill claims is also of note and there's a thread here currently discussing SBD kill claims.

If the RN ship's AA and FAA aircraft were overclaiming at the same rate as the USN, then the Allies might have concluded that the Luftwaffe had been blown from the sky over PEDESTAL.

 

[Shortround6]

then the Allies might have concluded that the Luftwaffe had been blown from the sky over PEDESTAL.

It made me chuckle, not that I think your post is wrong.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

View attachment 708498
Gun bay of the Hurricane.
View attachment 708499
It doesn't look like you enlarge the magazines easily. You can't go up or down and there isn't much space before you hit the solid ribs at the end of the magazine boxes.
View attachment 708500
Perhaps if they were doing a substantial rework of the wing (making it fold?) they could have put holes in the solid ribs to take bigger ammo boxes but they may have decided to leave the EX RAF planes alone.
The Hurricane was supposed to be able to be rearmed fairly quickly if pre-loaded magazine boxes were available instead of doing this.
View attachment 708501

I would say if they were doing a substantial reworking of the wing on the Hurricane or Sea Hurricane, by all means do so, and make it thinner. If you made a thinner wing for the Hurricane I bet it would have been viable another couple of years as a fighter and not just close air support.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

We've already discussed the fact that 4 x 20mm cannon SH1C/2C carried ~100rpg. The purpose built SH2C was fitted with drop tank capability from the start.

Really? What kind of external tanks precisely. Slipper tanks? Jettisonable?

Only Martlets that came with fixed wings, no self sealing tanks and no armour had a theoretical range that approached 950 miles (Martlet 1 data card = 870 miles with 136IG at 15K ft).

I think you have your thumb on the scale, but 870 miles is still a lot more than 500.

The data from Eastern Solomons shows that most F4F-4 pilots didn't expend their allotted 6 x .5in BMG/240RPG (and to get their F4F-4s to climb they were flying with throttles wide open and burning fuel at staggering rate). But yes the whole ammo/firing time issue is an interesting conundrum.

The CO of Ark Royal was comparing the SH1B to a Fulmar.

The dismal assessment of the Sea Hurricane's faults along these precise lines remained consistent throughout it's career.

Again, Lundstrom shows that there were repeated calls within the USN for 'interceptor' carrier carrier fighters that emphasized climb rate.

I think there was interest in an 'interceptor' especially around the time when the Kamikazes started up, that's when they started putting F4Us on the carriers and I think Seafires were considered good for this too.

 

[Shortround6]

I would say if they were doing a substantial reworking of the wing on the Hurricane or Sea Hurricane, by all means do so, and make it thinner. If you made a thinner wing for the Hurricane I bet it would have been viable another couple of years as a fighter and not just close air support.

Well, without addressing the wing fold bit, mucking around with increased ammo capacity involves making holes (reinforced) in the solid ribs and extending the ammo hatches/doors and installing new brackets to hold the outer ends of the ammo magazines (and perhaps a few other things)
Once you start to make the wing "thinner" and leaving aside the whole it will fly different thing, you need to reengineer the whole wing, from end to end. And you all new tooling, not one part of the wing will be the same, except maybe the navigation lights in the wing tips. If you are going to do that just figure out how to get rid of the wood and fabric on the rear of the fuselage. Then add fuel and ammo, stick in a Sabre engine and.................................................................wait a minute, we have a Tempest.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Well, without addressing the wing fold bit, mucking around with increased ammo capacity involves making holes (reinforced) in the solid ribs and extending the ammo hatches/doors and installing new brackets to hold the outer ends of the ammo magazines (and perhaps a few other things)
Once you start to make the wing "thinner" and leaving aside the whole it will fly different thing, you need to reengineer the whole wing, from end to end. And you all new tooling, not one part of the wing will be the same, except maybe the navigation lights in the wing tips. If you are going to do that just figure out how to get rid of the wood and fabric on the rear of the fuselage. Then add fuel and ammo, stick in a Sabre engine and.................................................................wait a minute, we have a Tempest.

Yeah sure, but a Merlin XX Hurricane with a 'Tempest type' wing could have been quite useful if they could do it quickly. How long did it take to make the thin Tempest wing once they finally decided to do it? My understanding was that Camm was holding out for a long time because he liked the thick wings.

Thin wing Hurricane is probably 30 mph faster

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I explained one of the consequences in my post. Another consequence is that USN AA capability was greatly overrated. The number of SBD kill claims is also of note and there's a thread here currently discussing SBD kill claims.

If the RN ship's AA and FAA aircraft were overclaiming at the same rate as the USN, then the Allies might have concluded that the Luftwaffe had been blown from the sky over PEDESTAL.

Fletcher definitely wasn't withdrawn due to perception of overclaiming by pilots. That is utterly and totally false to the point of being absurd. Fletcher was withdrawn as part of a general change of command because he and Ghormley and some others weren't perceived as sufficiently willing to risk destruction of the USN fleet especially in surface actions and had left the marines in a lurch at Guadalcanal. Hallsey was much more aggressive and didn't give a F****. He forced the issue. The result being what we now call Iron Bottom Sound, several USN defeats in surface battles, some victories, and ultimately the breaking of the Japanese fleet albeit at great cost to the USN. Recommend Neptune's Inferno about all this if you are interested.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

It made me chuckle, not that I think your post is wrong.

It's a bad joke. RAF overclaimed at a higher rate than that on occasions too numerous to count....

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The FM-2 is a can of worms. The engine was substantially lighter but the prop was 70-80lbs heavier (?) and the fuel tanks were smaller while there was more armor/BP glass.
May have had more radio/electronics.

the gun/ammo weights were as the F4F-3 and we know what those were, and about 80lbs on an 7500lb airplane is not that big a deal.

The FM-2 was superior to a Sea Hurricane across the baord - just as fast as any Hurricane at 330 mph, had a vastly superior rate of climb (max 3,670 fpm) was more agile with a better roll rate and had better range and much more ammunition (1600 rounds for 4 guns).

 

[Shortround6]

Yeah sure, but a Merlin XX Hurricane with a 'Tempest type' wing could have been quite useful if they could do it quickly. How long did it take to make the thin Tempest wing once they finally decided to do it? My understanding was that Camm was holding out for a long time because he liked the thick wings.

Thin wing Hurricane is probably 30 mph faster

Hawker got a contract for two prototypes Nov 18th 1941. First flight was Sept 2 1942. However it was a later airframe as problems with the engine installations in the first prototype/s delayed construction/testing. Hawker's engineers had been working an a laminar flow wing since March of 1940. So much for Camm delaying things for a long period of time.

Now you could have a thin wing that was not laminar flow but then your internal volume was even less. Laminar generally worked out to have a max thickness at around 35-40% of cord instead of 30% (less really thin parts of the wing in the back half)

Just because a Tempest was about 30mph faster than a Typhoon does not mean the Hurricane will be 30mph faster, the improvements work on a percentage basis. If you get 30mph improvement on a 400mph airplane what do you get on a 333mph airplane (just to make the math easier).

Now maybe you could get your thin wing Hurricane to equal a P-40F, but what else do you have to give up?

 

[RCAFson]

Anyway, here's the next one for the USN in 1942

The Battle of Santa Cruz Islands
25-27 October 1942

Lundstrom's summation:

Interestingly, the potency of AA at the battle became a bone of contention between veterans of the Enterprise and the South Dakota. Some sources (but significantly not the South Dakota's action report) ascribed twenty-six kills to the battlewagon alone.45 Without going into detail it is possible, based on all available sources, including Japanese, to offer a reasoned estimate of relative effectiveness of AA versus the CAP in destroying Japanese planes. Counting only aircraft believed destroyed in the vicinity of the two U.S. task forces, the ratio between CAP and AA kills counting all the raids was twenty-nine by aircraft to twenty-five by AA (see table 22.1).That the fierce AA did not actually finish nearly as many Japanese aircraft as estimated in no way diminished its role in ruining the attacker's accuracy.

The USN's Bureau of Ordnance accepted 127 AA kill claims as verified and included them in their 1942 AA summary. Lundstrom assessed that most AA kills were via 40mm, 1.1in and 20mm close range fire. Again, AA kill claims and aerial kill claims exceeded the number of observed and actual targets.

Lundstrom also summarized IJNAF losses in this table:

The ditched/crashed refers to aircraft that ditched and/or crash landed near or on IJN carriers, that might have survived if they could have found an intact flight deck to land on.

This might be a good summary of F4F-4 performance:

The second area of complaint concerned the height at which the CAP was deployed prior to action. Counting on the long-range warning hitherto afforded by carrier radars, Griffin deliberately kept the fighters at 10,000 feet in order to save fuel and oxygen. As he and many others stressed, that decision was especially unfortunate, primarily due to the performance of the Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat, which desperately needed replacement by the F4U-1 Corsair. Describing the Wildcat as a "very clumsy interceptor," Dave Pollock of VF-10 commented, "The F4F4 is a heavily loaded airplane and cannot climb and zip around from place to place and up and down."53 Most of the time Griffin had no positive indication of the enemy's altitude because the radar only detected bogeys relatively close to the ships. Consequently the CAP rarely enjoyed the altitude superiority vital for successful attacks. Almost all the commentators, including Griffin, recommended that at least a substantial portion of the CAP climb to 20,000 feet when raids were expected.

 

[RCAFson]

The FM-2 was superior to a Sea Hurricane across the baord - just as fast as any Hurricane at 330 mph, had a vastly superior rate of climb (max 3,670 fpm) was more agile with a better roll rate and had better range and much more ammunition (1600 rounds for 4 guns).

Not really. The water injection variants appeared fairly late in the war, or about 2 years after the combat debut of the SH2. FM2 climb rate is at the combat rating of it's engine and you're comparing it to the normal rating of the SH.

Most sources, including Eric Brown give the SH the advantage in roll rate.

 

[Shortround6]

The FM-2 was superior to a Sea Hurricane across the baord - just as fast as any Hurricane at 330 mph, had a vastly superior rate of climb (max 3,670 fpm) was more agile with a better roll rate and had better range and much more ammunition (1600 rounds for 4 guns).

It also didn't show up in combat until the Spring/Summer of 1944. While deliveries started in Sept 1943 not a one was involved in USN operations in Marshal Islands in Jan 1944, First use of the Wildcat VI with the British was with #881 Squadron aboard the HMS Pursuer in July 1944.

BTW with full ammo the FM-2 held 1720 rounds.

What source do you have for the FM-2 climbing at 3670fpm and what condition was it in.

 

[RCAFson]

Fletcher definitely wasn't withdrawn due to perception of overclaiming by pilots. That is utterly and totally false to the point of being absurd. Fletcher was withdrawn as part of a general change of command because he and Ghormley and some others weren't perceived as sufficiently willing to risk destruction of the USN fleet especially in surface actions and had left the marines in a lurch at Guadalcanal. Hallsey was much more aggressive and didn't give a F****. He forced the issue. The result being what we now call Iron Bottom Sound, several USN defeats in surface battles, some victories, and ultimately the breaking of the Japanese fleet albeit at great cost to the USN. Recommend Neptune's Inferno about all this if you are interested.

Where did I infer that it was the 'perception of overclaiming' that caused Fletcher to be relieved? USN high command looked at all the accepted AA and air to air kill claims and drew from that that the IJN was much more severely hurt than was the case. OTOH, Fletcher witnessed the battle and could see with his own eyes that all those claims, especially AA kill claims, couldn't be true. Hence his caution.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Lundstrom's summation:



The USN's Bureau of Ordnance accepted 127 AA kill claims as verified and included them in their 1942 AA summary. Lundstrom assessed that most AA kills were via 40mm, 1.1in and 20mm close range fire. Again, AA kill claims and aerial kill claims exceeded the number of observed and actual targets.

Lundstrom also summarized IJNAF losses in this table:

View attachment 708509


The ditched/crashed refers to aircraft that ditched and/or crash landed near or on IJN carriers, that might have survived if they could have found an intact flight deck to land on.

This might be a good summary of F4F-4 performance:

Again, here is my comment

Overclaiming at this stage of the war was standard, very common, in fact almost universal. That isn't even that high of a rate.
The Japanese losses were still quite high. 99 aircraft isn't trivial.
As I've pointed out their losses in aircrew were even more crippling.
Many of the IJN planes that ditched actually didn't make it to anywhere near their carriers.
I certainly don't think F4F was ideal, but they had much better result from their CAP in other battles, and we have several examples already posted in this thread which show that properly positioned, the F4F seem to have been quite efficient killers of Japanese strike aircraft, and fairly good against A6Ms too (alot better than Sea Hurricanes ever did!)

I certainly wouldn't argue with Lundstrom's suggestion that an F4U would be a huge improvement over any kind of F4F, as would the F6F but we know that was still a while out. F4Us would be available for the Marines at Guadalcanal already by February, where they had an immediate impact.

I don't think anyone was calling for Hurricanes or Sea Hurricanes anywhere in the Pacific

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I think Lundstrom focused on the specifics of overclaiming here because he was one of the first to really do the verified losses vs. claims type analysis, which is now common with many WW2 aviation histories as we know.

 

[RCAFson]

Again, here is my comment

Overclaiming at this stage of the war was standard, very common, in fact almost universal. That isn't even that high of a rate.
The Japanese losses were still quite high. 99 aircraft isn't trivial.
As I've pointed out their losses in aircrew were even more crippling.
Many of the IJN planes that ditched actually didn't make it to anywhere near their carriers.
I certainly don't think F4F was ideal, but they had much better result from their CAP in other battles, and we have several examples already posted in this thread which show that properly positioned, the F4F seem to have been quite efficient killers of Japanese strike aircraft, and fairly good against A6Ms too (alot better than Sea Hurricanes ever did!)

I certainly wouldn't argue with Lundstrom's suggestion that an F4U would be a huge improvement over any kind of F4F, as would the F6F but we know that was still a while out. F4Us would be available for the Marines at Guadalcanal already by February, where they had an immediate impact.

I don't think anyone was calling for Hurricanes or Sea Hurricanes anywhere in the Pacific

Perhaps you can give an example where accepted AA kill claims were running at 6 or 7 to 1 vs actual AA kills? The F4F-4 air to air kill claims are not really out of line with other AF or actual kills, but the SBD kill claims should be raising some eyebrows. However it's the combined totals of the AA kill claims and aerial kill claims that is really out of whack.

This is Lundstrom's summation of just the first IJN strike:

Therefore Japanese losses in the target area numbered twenty-four: three fighters, eleven carrier bombers, and ten carrier attack planes. Two more Zeros, six carrier bombers, and six carrier attack planes later ditched from battle damage or lack of fuel while waiting to come on board the Zuikaku and the Junyō. Thus only fifteen of the fifty-three first-wave attack aircraft (seven Zeros, four carrier bombers, and four carrier attack planes) touched down on friendly flight decks.

and the 2nd strike:

With flight decks clear the two Japanese flattops recovered more aircraft that limped back from earlier attack waves. From 1320 to 1400 the Zuikaku landed five Zeros (one from her second wave and four Junyō, including Lieutenant Shigematsu), Lieutenant Arima's seven Shōkaku carrier bombers, Lieutenant Yusuhara's six Zuikaku carrier attack planes, and one Shōkaku carrier attack plane from the morning search. At the same time the Junyō brought on board Lieutenant Shiga with eight Zeros, Lieutenant (jg) Katō's six Type 99 carrier bombers, and one stray Zuikaku Zero (Sea1c Nisugi Toshitsugu) from the first wave. Two Zuikaku Zeros, two Shōkaku and two Junyō carrier bombers, and one Zuikaku carrier attack plane set down in the sea.

so that's 21 of the 29 aircraft stated in the table.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't think anyone was calling for Hurricanes or Sea Hurricanes anywhere in the Pacific

Heck, they couldn't even get P-40Fs (mostly) Although The navy wanted to try some.

P-40F 41-13701 was transferred to Anacostia Naval AIr station on June 6th 1942 for comparative trials with the F4F-4.
CinCPAC on June 21st 1942 wanted P-40s for all high importance outlying bases for Marine squadrons if the P-40 could be modified for with carrier operations.