Was single seat Firefly possible?

[RCAFson]

Oh, there were differences in the armor and self-sealing schemes? I didn't know that. For most purposes, the only difference I knew about was the single-stage supercharger.

While somewhat off topic, did they factor in climb performance on single/twin-seaters?

According to the first memorandum (6/21/1940)

1. They wanted to retain the twin-seater for most purposes: Predominantly to act as both a fighter and scout
2. The Fulmar was ordered as a stop-gap, and was (at the time) entering quantity production, with an ultimate intended design being N.5/40 (Firefly), with a top speed of 360 (anticipated).
3. Both designs were to be centered out of Fairey's Stockport factory
4. Single-seat fighters would be considered useful for special purposes, because of superior performance
   • Plans were afoot to use mixes of twin-seaters (to provide the navigation function), while the single-seaters provide the performance side of the equation
5. Blackburn's design was to show a performance of 390-420 if a suitable engine was available
6. Deliveries of this design could begin in 18-24 months

While I can understand why, for scouting, a second person can add an extra set of eyes; it's possible to operate a single-seater with properly designed navigation gear (such as the USN). I sense a degree of bureaucratic inertia (common to all organizations, but some more than others), and a failure to calculate performance correctly (this seemed to be endemic in the UK, possibly owing to the knowledge base of contractors, as well as the government wind-tunnel facilities).

According to the second memorandum (2/7/1941), which outlined problems faced by the FAA

1. There's an over-reliance on trusting the tried and true, rather than entertaining new ideas
2. There's a need for a fighter of high performance to protect the fleet
3. The need for state of the art engines and aircraft design cannot be achieved if the RAF is still ultimately deciding what can/cannot get purchased
4. They need the Napier Sabre won't really take hold until 1942, so they just need them then. If they can place the order immediately, it would be possible to get the engines on time, so they don't have aircraft that will be under-performers.

I really should start chronicling these memos in a summarized format.

Oh, there were differences in the armor and self-sealing schemes? I didn't know that. For most purposes, the only difference I knew about was the single-stage supercharger.

While somewhat off topic, did they factor in climb performance on single/twin-seaters?

According to the first memorandum (6/21/1940)

1. They wanted to retain the twin-seater for most purposes: Predominantly to act as both a fighter and scout
2. The Fulmar was ordered as a stop-gap, and was (at the time) entering quantity production, with an ultimate intended design being N.5/40 (Firefly), with a top speed of 360 (anticipated).
3. Both designs were to be centered out of Fairey's Stockport factory
4. Single-seat fighters would be considered useful for special purposes, because of superior performance
   • Plans were afoot to use mixes of twin-seaters (to provide the navigation function), while the single-seaters provide the performance side of the equation
5. Blackburn's design was to show a performance of 390-420 if a suitable engine was available
6. Deliveries of this design could begin in 18-24 months

While I can understand why, for scouting, a second person can add an extra set of eyes; it's possible to operate a single-seater with properly designed navigation gear (such as the USN). I sense a degree of bureaucratic inertia (common to all organizations, but some more than others), and a failure to calculate performance correctly (this seemed to be endemic in the UK, possibly owing to the knowledge base of contractors, as well as the government wind-tunnel facilities).

According to the second memorandum (2/7/1941), which outlined problems faced by the FAA

1. There's an over-reliance on trusting the tried and true, rather than entertaining new ideas
2. There's a need for a fighter of high performance to protect the fleet
3. The need for state of the art engines and aircraft design cannot be achieved if the RAF is still ultimately deciding what can/cannot get purchased
4. They need the Napier Sabre won't really take hold until 1942, so they just need them then. If they can place the order immediately, it would be possible to get the engines on time, so they don't have aircraft that will be under-performers.

I really should start chronicling these memos in a summarized format.

Forecasting performance was universally problematic.

Martlets and Wildcats with full SS tanks had a maximum internal fuel capacity of 120IG. As per post 202, any Martlet showing more than 120IG capacity probably has little or no SS capability.

1) I don't understand what you mean here. Over water navigation and recon was a perilous task in 1940 and radio aids to navigation were being developed ASAP. Long range radio communication relied on Wireless Telegraphy rather than Radio Telephony (RT). The RN and the USN developed a secure homing device for carrier borne aircraft. The RN device was in service prior to Sept 1939 but it required a separate operator. The USN's device could be pilot operated but it was not ready for general service until after Dec 1941. By mid to late 1942 the development of long range naval radar, aircraft IFF and RT greatly reduced the need for accurate navigation by aircraft, to find their parent carrier.