Was the B-29 Superfortress a Failure?

[GrauGeist]

A bit of B-29 trivia - I knew a man who had been a B-29 tail gunner during the Korean unpleasentness and was terrified of MiG-15 attacks because he could not track them at their speed.

This was the same for Allied bombers in 1944, when the Me262 showed up.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

B-36 entered service in 1948, meaning B-29 was the best for four years, not one year. Or if we're going by first flight-- the B-29 first flew in 1942, again giving us four years to chew on. I'd say that's a while.

At any rate, not being the best doesn't mean a plane is a failure, which is the original question here.

If we are going to quantify an aircraft being a failure because it was not the best, then all aircraft are failures in some form or fashion.

 

[Shortround6]

While I think the arguments that the B-29 was not successful at its intended design purpose (High Altitude, long range, unescorted bombing) are legitimate arguments, I would disagree that this made the aircraft a partial failure?

Why?

This was war. War is always full of unknowns. Anyone who has experienced it knows that war rarely goes as planned. You always have to adapt and overcome. No different here with the B-29. The USAAF had to adapt and change strategies to the environment, and it was successful in doing just that.

I would note that the Grumman Avenger was built to a spec that called for a ceiling of 30,000ft.
Never came close.
Was the Avenger a partial failure?

Specifications change, many times specifications change because they are trying to push the envelope of what is possible. Or forecast the future.

US costs are sometimes screwed up because some costs are not included. We can look at the cost of plane per contract price but often the "actual cost" is not included.
Sometimes the US government (either army or navy) payed for new factories and for the equipment. This was literally army OR navy. The Navy swapped a flying boat factory for these

a Boeing design to the Army to build B-29s (also Boeing) in return for the Navy to operate land planes for ASW duties (B-24s and B-25s and Vega's, etc).
The plants were the property of the different government agencies. At times after the war some factories were sold for less than scrap prices.
In 1969 -72 I worked in a P&W plant where rows and rows of machines had brass plates that said property of United States Navy. Sale had taken place between WW II and Korea.
What was the "cost" of an R-2800 if it was being built in factory buildings and using machines that were owned by the US government?

 

[GrauGeist]

If we are going to quantify an aircraft being a failure because it was not the best, then all aircraft are failures in some form or fashion.

Like the P-39?

Oops, I just went there - my bad.

 

[Alan Stevens]

*sigh*

So $2 billion divided by 3.

Average of $667 million per bomb.

 

[pbehn]

So $2 billion divided by 3.

Average of $667 million per bomb.

Far too expensive for 3 bombs, better to continue fighting hand to hand for another 2 to 3 years and let someone else develop nuclear weapons for their use. The cost isnt in the making of the bombs it is in figuring out how to make them.

 

[ThomasP]

re

Some people are probably going to argue and say "The B29 was designed to be unescorted or high altitude" It was for both. Its range was longer than any fighter of the time, if the purpose was to take advantage of that range, then no fighters could have escorted it the whole way. If you claim the purpose wasn't to be high altitude, then you're just wrong.

The initial B-29 concept and design studies were for a high altitude bomber that could do its job from high altitude - and from medium and low altitude.

The B-17, B-24, B-29, B-32 all had ranges far beyond the range of any fighter aircraft that saw service before the very end of the war. When their programs were started they were all intended to be able to do their job unescorted if necessary.

Remember the initial B-29 concept and design stages took place before any USAAF long-range heavy bomber missions had been flown.

At the start of its program in 1936(?), the B-17 design(with turbosuperchargers) was as fast or faster at 30,000 ft than any(?) fighter/intercepter in service.

At the start of its program in 1940(?), the B-29 design(with turbosuperchargers) was as fast or faster at 35,000 ft than any(?) fighter/intercepter in service.

The B-17 (and B-24 as the B-17's alternate by default) were advertised as 'flying fortresses', able to defend themselves against the enemy fighters and still get through to the target.

As it turned out, none of the above mentioned bombers were able to defend themselves against enemy fighters, and none of them could be escorted all the way to their maximum ranges by any fighters that saw service during the war. The P-82 maybe came the closest to the needed max escort range of any of the war-time escort fighter designs/programs.

Therefore, if the B-29 was a failure, all of the US heavy bombers were failures?

 

[pbehn]

If we are going to quantify an aircraft being a failure because it was not the best, then all aircraft are failures in some form or fashion.

Considering the B-29 first flew just after the USA did any strategic bombing of any kind anywhere it was quite a feat for it to be as close to what was needed in 1945 as it actually was. As a project when it was first conceived the world and especially the world of aviation was a completely different place.

 

[BEAR VMF257]

Don't know if this was covered but was thinking about the comment that plane was built to drop the a-bomb. Most writings read like the original & most of the B29 production were designed & built as conventional bombers not atomic bombers. Using them for the a-bomb was a function of their ability to carry the weight over the required distance at a safe height & speed.

The A-bombers were actually modified B29's not standard units under the Silverplate program. Silverplate production was 64 aircraft. These special bombers were in use for six years, serving as America's sole platform for atomic weapons following the war. They were flown by the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command.

The Silverplate final & third batch of 20 aircraft were brand new planes & the most modified. Project 98228-S had Martin Omaha use new engines. The Wright R-3350-41 incorporated better cooling, fuel injection, and improved fuel and manifold systems with reverse pitch props.

Additionally, the bomb bay doors used fast acting pneumatic actuators, except for the tail guns the turrets were removed. A special H frame held the bomb & the crew got an electronic tech to monitor the bomb & an assistant to help arm the bomb.

FWIW 1945 pictures of Enola Gay show a smooth fuselage with no turrets or sighting blisters.

 

[Alan Stevens]

Far too expensive for 3 bombs, better to continue fighting hand to hand for another 2 to 3 years and let someone else develop nuclear weapons for their use. The cost isnt in the making of the bombs it is in figuring out how to make them.

I am not arguing against the cost of the atomic bombs.
They were by far the best way to end the war.

I am just disputing the notion that the B-29 was more expensive than the Manhattan Project.

The fleet of over 3,900 B-29s and loads of spare parts and spare engines, could have comprised several air forces.

 

[Alan Stevens]

FWIW 1945 pictures of Enola Gay show a smooth fuselage with no turrets or sighting blisters.

Still does.

Boeing B-29 Superfortress "Enola Gay", ENOLA GAY

airandspace.si.edu

 

[GrauGeist]

Just a recap:
The B-29 program was not more expensive than the Manhattan Project.

This is a recent internet myth that seems to keep perpetuating.

The Manhattan Project cost over 20 Billion dollars between 1940 and 1945.

The cost of the B-29 production (Silver plate excluded) cost just a bit less than the B-17 production.

 

[PStickney]

Yes but it was build to just do that. Could a lesser developed airplane have done the same? Lets say Lancaster?

No. The Lancaster lacked the range, payload, speed performance and basic "stretch" to achieve the mission. I couldn't have flown from the Marianas, and would have required taking Okinawa in order to be able to attack the Japanese mainland.
It's worth noting that the Uprated Lancaster, the Lincoln, was supplanted in Bomber Command by (Wait for it...) B-29s (Washingtons, in RAF Speak)
It slso wasn't "built to just do that" - It was built to be able to do that - and it did - and many other things besides.

 

[PStickney]

Did it do what is was created for? Partly. The high altitude bit didnt worknout very well i believe. Wasn it leMay that changed to lower altitude and different pay load? Question is how much of the budget was spend on gear not used.

The high altitude bit didn't work out in a specific set of circumstances, at a particular time. For the rest of its career - (Well, other than the Air Rescue Service SB-29s) they performed most of their missions at high altitudes.

 

[GreenKnight121]

No. The Lancaster lacked the range, payload, speed performance and basic "stretch" to achieve the mission. I couldn't have flown from the Marianas, and would have required taking Okinawa in order to be able to attack the Japanese mainland.
It's worth noting that the Uprated Lancaster, the Lincoln, was supplanted in Bomber Command by (Wait for it...) B-29s (Washingtons, in RAF Speak)
It slso wasn't "built to just do that" - It was built to be able to do that - and it did - and many other things besides.

The 87 RAF B-29s were in England March 1950 - March 1954 because they were longer-ranged than the Lincolns, and could reach targets in the USSR from the UK - the Lincolns would require basing in France, the Netherlands, or Germany.

They were returned because of the eminent entry into service of the "V" bombers and the impending completion of the UK atomic/nuclear bombs.


Just a note: the US had its own B-29s in the UK - 2 groups moved in in 1948 in response to the Berlin Blockade, and in 1949 these began to be supplemented by nuclear-capable B-50s... in 1950 nuclear bombs for these arrived. In 1953 both types were replaced by B-47s, which remained until 1965, when continual presence missions were ceased. Periodic B-52 visits were normal however after this date.

 

[The Stannum Crusader]

From the start of the project through to the end of August 1945, the project cost 20 billion dollars.
This excludes the 76 million that the U.S. Army spent on the Silverplate project (B-29 modifications, personnel, training, logistics, support, etc., etc.)

Okay, this is I assume being taken from The Costs of the Manhattan Project | Brookings,

BUT the figures aren't in 1940s dollars. They are in 1996 dollars.

And since 1 dollar in 1940-1945 is equivalent to about 11.20 and 8.72 respectively. So 20 billion is ACTUALLY between 1.78 Billion and 2.29 Billion.

BOOM

 

[pbehn]

What is cost? If you spend $100,000 on a holiday you spent a lot of money and just have memories.. If you spend $100,000 on gold bullion you have gold which may or may not be worth what you paid for it. In terms of a nations spending on things like the B-29 and nuclear weapons, the USA spending left it with massive physical and intellectual assets. Boeing as a company today has a market capitalisation of $140 Billion.

 

[33k in the air]

What is cost? If you spend $100,000 on a holiday you spent a lot of money and just have memories.. If you spend $100,000 on gold bullion you have gold which may or may not be worth what you paid for it. In terms of a nations spending on things like the B-29 and nuclear weapons, the USA spending left it with massive physical and intellectual assets. Boeing as a company today has a market capitalisation of $140 Billion.

There are multiple ways of comparing monetary values across time, and each method has its advantages depending on the cost you are looking at. Using the standard CPI adjustment is likely not the best choice for comparing military project expenses from different time periods. For that, using the share of GDP is probably a better choice.

See this page from the Measuring Worth website which gives an overview of the different ways of comparing worth across time: Choosing the Best Indicator to Measure Relative Worth

 

[pbehn]

There are multiple ways of comparing monetary values across time, and each method has its advantages depending on the cost you are looking at. Using the standard CPI adjustment is likely not the best choice for comparing military project expenses from different time periods. For that, using the share of GDP is probably a better choice.

See this page from the Measuring Worth website which gives an overview of the different ways of comparing worth across time: Choosing the Best Indicator to Measure Relative Worth

I agree, as I see things the USA made the decision in around 1938 that if anyone was going to be bombing anyone at long range they were going to be market leader. You cannot put a cost on what not having something is when someone else does. The costs to a state are different to those of an individual or a corporation. There were thousands of contractors involved in the two projects and tens of thousands of people, many or perhaps even most learned new skills and technologies which remained within the US economy along with many factories and machines.

 

[Alan Stevens]

No. The Lancaster lacked the range, payload, speed performance and basic "stretch" to achieve the mission. I couldn't have flown from the Marianas, and would have required taking Okinawa in order to be able to attack the Japanese mainland.
It's worth noting that the Uprated Lancaster, the Lincoln, was supplanted in Bomber Command by (Wait for it...) B-29s (Washingtons, in RAF Speak)
It slso wasn't "built to just do that" - It was built to be able to do that - and it did - and many other things besides.

Some people have claimed that in-flight refueling could have provided the range needed from the Marianas.

Maybe, but in 1945 in-flight refueling for large aircraft was at the embryonic stage and unproven.