Was the B-29 Superfortress a Failure?

[GrauGeist]

The B-36 entered service in 1948 - the Japanese *may have* held out until early 1947, but certainly not the Germans - so it missed the show entirely.

 

[The Stannum Liberator]

The B-36 entered service in 1948 - the Japanese *may have* held out until early 1947, but certainly not the Germans - so it missed the show entirely.

I'm sure they would have had them built quicker if the war had continued?

 

[GrauGeist]

I'm sure they would have had them built quicker if the war had continued?

Like the B-29 was?

 

[pbehn]

The B-36 entered service in 1948 - the Japanese *may have* held out until early 1947, but certainly not the Germans - so it missed the show entirely.

If Japan kept fighting and there was no B-29 (or other) the B-36 would have been pressed into service sooner if it was the only way to end things. Part of the reason the B-29 was so expensive as a project was because of the massive resources thrown at it to solve any issue. That single expense must be weighed against the cost of waging a war for another two or three years.

 

[special ed]

The B-36 design was proposed in 1942 as a possible intercontinental bomber for the eventual complete occupation of Europe by Germany. Flights from eastern USA to targets in Europe, and return, were envisioned. As the Brits held on, and Hitler sent his forces into the USSR, the B-36 was put on lower priority in favor of the B-29. I can no longer remember the sources.

 

[33k in the air]

Does B-29 include the B-29D a.k.a. the B-50?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I did not say the B29 was a failure, literally read the first sentence of my first post. Top of page 14.

I didn't say you said that. I said that was the question of this thread.

 

[MIflyer]

The idea that all Bomber Command did was area incendiary raids on German cities is a myth.

It is not a myth that Bomber Harris begrudged every Bomber Command raid that was diverted from Dehousing. And that included the very effective and mostly low loss rate attacks on transportation infrastructure designed to support Operation Overlord.

Only after the war did Harris admit the USAAF was right and they should have focused more on attacks on oil infrastructure.

You have to wonder if Dehousing was a real war strategy or merely the inertia of a prewar one that was an example of failed deterrence. Or was it simply revenge for the BoB attacks and the night Blitz? I am inclined to think it was the latter.

And even British historians have admitted that drawing the Luftwaffe to where it could be destroyed alone was justification for the 8th and 15th AF daylight raids.

 

[33k in the air]

It is not a myth that Bomber Harris begrudged every Bomber Command raid that was diverted from Dehousing. And that included the very effective and mostly low loss rate attacks on transportation infrastructure designed to support Operation Overlord.

Well, yes. Harris was an ideologue who was firmly wedded to prewar theories of air power. While he was indispensable in forging Bomber Command into a potent weapon, Harris probably should have been replaced in the autumn of 1944 by a more forward thinking commander. The political will to make such a change was not there, however.

That fire bombing decreased in importance from spring 1944 onward is an indisputable fact borne out by the squadron record books. Typical bomb loads changed considerably.

Let's not gloss over the fact that the USAAF did plenty of area bombing of its own, which is what using radar-guided bombing effectively was given the low accuracy of that attack method.

Only after the war did Harris admit the USAAF was right and they should have focused more on attacks on oil infrastructure.

You have to wonder if Dehousing was a real war strategy or merely the inertia of a prewar one that was an example of failed deterrence. Or was it simply revenge for the BoB attacks and the night Blitz? I am inclined to think it was the latter.

Certainly the economic effect of area raids (day and night) on the German war effort were more indirect, but there were effects. Quoting from The Crucible of War 1939-45 (p.867):

Of much greater significance . . . was the extent to which the bomber offensive against Germany constituted a 'Second Front' long before the Allied invasion of Northwest Europe, and even only when Bomber Command was heavily involved in it. In terms of manpower alone, the Germans used between 500,000 to 800,000 workers to repair bomb damage and organize the dispersal of vital industries, labourers who could otherwise have been involved in the direct production of war materiel, while the Flak arm required some 900,000 men in 1943 and was still 656,000 strong in April 1945 — many of who might otherwise have played a significant part in the ground war.

The enemy was also forced to allocate considerable equipment to air defence. In March 1942, as the Germany army was fighting crucial battles in Russia and Bomber Command had not yet launched its first 'thousand' or its initial battle of the Ruhr, there were already 3970 heavy Flak guns deployed around German cities.which could have been made into mobile artillery or bolstered anti-tank defences in the east. By September 1944 that number had grown to 10,225. Indeed, according to Albert Speer, of the 19,713 88-millimetre and 128-millimetre dual-purpose Flak/anti-tank artillery pieces produced between 1942 and 1944, only 3172 could be allocated to the army for use in the anti-armour role because of the pressure of air attack. Similarly, the threat posed by Bomber Command's night raids meant that the German night-fighter force accounted for a consistently increasing percentage of Luftwaffe front-line strength — more than 20 per cent of the total by December 1944. Several hundred of those on strength in late 1943 and 1944 were machines which could have been used to great advantage in other roles on other fronts.

 

[wuzak]

Only after the war did Harris admit the USAAF was right and they should have focused more on attacks on oil infrastructure.

Eaker and Spaatz probably would have agreed that they should have been targeting oil targets sooner as well.

Oil campaign of World War II - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Number of attacks by the RAF and USAAF against oil targets (May 1944 o April 1945):
Eighth AF: 233
Fifteenth AF: 221
RAF: 200

Short tons dropped on oil targets (May 1944 o April 1945):
Eighth AF: 66,497
Fifteenth AF: 48,378
RAF: 93,691

 

[Alan Stevens]

Trinity wasn't used in the war, it was the proof-of-concept. Only two were used in war.

Trinity bomb was produced by the Manhattan Project as part of the war effort.

So I count 3 atom bombs produced by the Manhattan Project as part of the war effort.

 

[Alan Stevens]

I was under the impression the B-32 was pressurized? Was it not?

The aircraft was designed to be pressurized, and have remote-controlled retractable gun turrets with fourteen .50 in (12.7 mm) machine guns.

However, due to problems they were omitted from the first prototype and all others.

Regarding turrets, manned glass turrets were utilized.

 

[Alan Stevens]

Richard B. Frank in his book Downfall - The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire says this, Appendix B, p. 363:

" The material price to the United States in the strategic bombing of Japan was remarkably modest. "
Cited:
414 B-29s for all operations lost
Air crew casualties 2,897 of which 2,148 dead
Air crew captured 334 of which 262 survived
. . . .
Britain's Bomber Command, 8,953 a/c lost and 55,500 air crew killed 1939-45
USAAF in Europe at least 25,000 air crew killed, heavy bomber losses 10,152
. . . .
Granted there were many carrier based sorties against Japan as well, and tactical bombers from Okinawa.

But given that the B-29 was the prime tool for winning the war without an invasion, how can it not be considered very successful given the modest cost?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

No, it did NOT fill the role of a high altitude bomber. It wasn't used at high altitude. And it was supposed to be practically invulnerable, that was the whole point of it being built as a high altitude bomber. But it wasn't used like that, so it did get losses.

What is the definition of high altitude and what loss rate qualifies for practically invulnerable? As noted in the early B-29 raids on Japan it was used at high altitude, losses were expected, the question being the definition of acceptable losses.

There was something better right away. And I was talking about world War 2 for reference. The B36 could fly higher and much farther, but it was SAC. And just because something is still used doesn't mean there isn't better.

This sort of reminds me of the quote WWII was fought with obsolete/obsolescent aircraft, there was always something better on the way.

He said there was nothing better for a while. I say that's wrong. The B36 first flew in August of 1946, 1945 to 1946 is not a while.

September 1941 the B-29 first flew
September 1942 the B-32 first flew.
July 1943 first YB-29 production
September 1943 first B-29 production
September 1944 first B-32 production (one, next in November)
December 1944 first TB-32 production.
March 1945 last TB-32 production.
End June 1945, planned production of 8,985 B-29 to completed by end 1946, with 172 B-32 by end 1945, 40 TB-32 by end July 1945, 13 YB-36 by end September 1946, and 87 B-36A by end December 1946 (but a note says 65 after December 1946)

August 1945 last B-32 production.
June 1946 final B-29A production. Bell started B-29B production in January 1945, apart from 1 B-29 accepted in February the factory produced B-29B until May, May to September it was a roughly 50/50 mix of B-29 and B-29B.

August 1946 The B-36 first flew.
August 1947 first production B-36A (one only)
October 1947 first B-50A production
December 1947 the B-47 first flew
May 1948 the second production B-36A
November 1948 first production B-36B
January 1949 first production B-50B, last production B-50A
February 1949 last production B-36A
April 1949 last production B-50B
June 1949 first production B-50D
August 1950 first B-36D production
September 1950 last B-36B production
December 1950 first B-47A production, last B-50D production

By end 1950 it was 22 B-36A, 62 B-36B and 14 B-36D built, along with 79 B-50A, 45 B-50B and 222 B-50D, the B-50 being the new medium bomber. As of 1 July 1950 the USAF had 1,787 B-29, 79 B-36, 96 B-45 and 258 B-50 classed as first line.

January 1949 there were 21 B-36A and 18 B-36B accepted to date, but there had been a landing gear failure in a production aircraft, all B-36 temporarily grounded while inspections done and whether restrictions are required. February SAC refuses to accept any more B-36 unless alternator constant speed drive fault fixed, compromise reached. April 1949 schedule delayed by one month to fix latent defects prior to delivery. In May winds of up to 90 mph damaged the tails of 29 B-36, repairs and strengthening underway, these changes to be incorporated in new production. The B-50D also had problems in 1949.

According to the 8th Air Force after removing diversions, unused spares and recalled missions there were 316,518 heavy bomber sorties airborne of which 264,618 were effective, 83.6%, the abort causes were 8.5% weather, 4.2% mechanical, 3.7% other reasons. According to the 15th Air Force there were 165,354 heavy bomber sorties airborne of which 128,598 were effective, 77.8%, the abort causes were 12.9% weather, 4.5% mechanical, 4.8% other reasons. According to the USAAF Statistical Digest the B-29 force had 31,387 sorties airborne, 29,153 effective, 92.88%, the abort causes were 0.06% weather, 5.21% mechanical, 1.85% other reasons.

"USAAF circular error by bomb weight, altitude not given, 100 pounds 2694 feet, 250 pounds 2078 feet, 500 pounds 1673 feet, 1000 pounds 1308 feet, 2000 pounds 571 feet."

According to the USSBS there were 87 oil targets in Greater Germany, 16 Hydrogenation, 9 Fischer-Tropsch, 40 refineries and 22 Benzol plants. The refineries had reserve capacity and so bombing them took a while to have an effect. Also at times it was not so much damage to the synthetic oil manufacturing part that caused the loss of production. Rather it was the cutting of water and gas supplies when their mains were ruptured.

Harris was enthusiastic about sea mining and usually attended SHAEF conferences, Spaatz tended to send a representative. Harris was not enthusiastic about specific economic targets but followed orders. If you look at the Bomber Command area attacks and the 8th Air Force attacks through 8/10 to 10/10 cloud in late 1944 and into 1945 they are similar as percentages of bombs dropped. Throughout the war the air forces expanded the definition of flying weather and bombing weather, but the flying always advanced ahead of the bombing, poor weather meant city strikes. Arthur Harris, as reported by Max Hastings, these two quotes are from different letters,

"It has always been my custom to leave no stone unturned to get my views across but when that decision is made I carry it out to the utmost and the best of my ability. I am sorry that you should doubt this and surprised indeed if you can point to a precedent in support of your statements. I am certainly able to quote precedents in the opposite sense"

"I will not willingly lay myself open again to the charge that the lack of success of a policy [Oil] which I have declared at the outset...not to contain the seeds of success is, after the event, due to my not having tried. That situation is simply one of heads I lose, tails you win and it is an intolerable situation ... "

US Official History, Volume 3 Chapter 18, p645. "By the last of November attacks on all the RAF's synthetic oil targets were suspended because they were no longer operating. Whereupon ACM Portal demanded the British share the losses the 8th had been taking by assuming responsibility for the two largest and most distant targets, Politz and Merseburg Leuna. The crippling of Germany's warning system in the west as the result of the allied victory in France and the increased efficiency of blind bombing techniques made such RAF missions possible, and they proved generally successful. Indeed, Speer, subsequently reported to Hitler that the night attacks were more effective than the daylight missions because heavier bombs were used and greater accuracy had been obtained."

When all of Bomber Command's oil targets were declared non operational in November 1944 Harris did not request more, that required Portal. Bomber Command kept attacking mostly Benzol plants throughout with small formations, but after the large raids on 21 November, over 650 bombers attacking, then a GH raid on 23 November with 162 attacking the next big raid was on Leuna on 6 December, then Ludwigshafen on 15 December.

Using Richard Davis' figures, short tons, the air force efforts are as follows, attacks on targets classified as Fuel Depot, Fuel Dump, O/Ben, O/R, O/St, O/Sy

15th Air Force, month, total bomb tonnage dropped / percentage dropped on oil,
May-44 27918.6 / 8.77
Jun-44 22871.7 / 37.38
Jul-44 27400.8 / 41.00
Aug-44 26174.3 / 31.13
Sep-44 19432.6 / 10.19
Oct-44 13271.1 / 23.71
Nov-44 14682.25 / 31.94
Dec-44 15580 / 45.37
Jan-45 5859.85 / 30.62
Feb-45 22593.3 / 18.72
Mar-45 28010 / 22.62
Apr-45 27347.2 / 0.64
Total 59,802.7 tons of bombs on oil targets out of 251,218.9 tons dropped in this period, all up 23.8% of the bombs dropped May 1944 to April 1945. Remove May 1944 and April 1945 and the percentage becomes 29.2% May 1944 to March 1945. Note the 15th Air Force as part of the transport plan was officially bombing the Ploesti Marshalling Yards in April and early May 1944 with terrible accuracy, thereby hitting the oil refineries surrounding the marshalling yards, counted as non oil raids above.

8th Air Force, month, total bomb tonnage dropped / percentage dropped on oil,
May-44 36006.6 / 7.98
Jun-44 58271 / 8.52
Jul-44 45212 / 15.22
Aug-44 47979.2 / 19.57
Sep-44 40348.1 / 18.93
Oct-44 43571.7 / 11.73
Nov-44 40455.8 / 39.61
Dec-44 41224.4 / 7.21
Jan-45 39004.7 / 7.31
Feb-45 51576.4 / 11.98
Mar-45 73715.7 / 12.93
Apr-45 46949 / 3.50
Total 76,060.5 tons of bombs on oil targets out of 564,314.6 tons dropped in this period. All up 13.5% of the bombs dropped May 1944 to April 1945.

Bomber Command, month, total bomb tonnage dropped / percentage dropped on oil,
Jun-44 64008.7 / 9.25
Jul-44 64226.3 / 7.66
Aug-44 74330.5 / 17.06
Sep-44 58498.8 / 7.68
Oct-44 68501.0 / 5.97
Nov-44 59240.4 / 24.04
Dec-44 54714.7 / 13.58
Jan-45 36643.6 / 27.59
Feb-45 51439.2 / 28.38
Mar-45 74969.8 / 28.28
Apr-45 38630.7 / 15.73
Total 105,770.2 tons of bombs on oil targets out of 654,404.8 tons dropped in this period. All up 16.4% of the bombs dropped June 1944 to April 1945.

Target allocations were not equal though. Bomber Command devoted a greater percentage of effort, along with the better weather needed for such raids, to invasion support until November 1944. The 8th Air Force was initially allocated more oil targets than Bomber Command, a situation that appears to have remained unchanged until November 1944. Note the following data ignores the attacks made on Czechoslovakian oil targets by the 8th Air Force in May, August and September 1944 and February 1945, 5 attacks 961.5 tons of bombs, and Bomber Command in January 1945, 1 attack of 959.6 tons of bombs. It is what happened when the bombers struck targets in Germany, when the Air Forces had the most discretion as to the choice of target during the SHAEF period of control.

Table is date, 8th Air Force bombs on Germany, tons / % of those bombs on oil targets // Bomber Command bombs on Germany, tons / % of those bombs on oil targets.
May-44 19880 / 12.89 // none on oil
Jun-44 13120.5 / 34.01 // 5443.5 / 83.82
Jul-44 29838.3 / 22.33 // 14670.1 / 26.14
Aug-44 23597.4 / 26.07 // 16119.3 / 11.49
Sep-44 34818.4 / 21.12 // 22955.3 / 19.56
Oct-44 43552.2 / 11.74 // 57679.1 / 7.09
Nov-44 37798.8 / 42.39 // 58870.2 / 24.20
Dec-44 41092.1 / 7.23 // 51132.1 / 14.54
Jan-45 38551.3 / 7.40 // 33218.9 / 27.55
Feb-45 51187.2 / 11.93 // 50891.2 / 28.69
Mar-45 72951.1 / 13.06 // 74969.8 / 28.28
Apr-45 35646.1 / 4.61 // 38103.1 / 14.80
For the 8th the percentage of effort devoted to oil targets is higher if you only consider targets in Germany compared with the total effort figures. For Bomber Command there is one clear exception to this rule, August 1944 when it put in a major effort against oil targets in France, mainly storage and depot targets, 9,156 short tons of bombs. For the 8th Air Force Oil, Chemical and Rubber targets were the number 1 target in November 1944, the number 2 target in July, August and October 1944, February and March 1945, the number 3 target in December 1944 and January 1945. If more bombs on oil targets were required the allied heavy bomber forces had the lift required.

Bomber Command from 1 January 1942. Raids 237, Attacking 23,296, Missing 361, Short tons 106,146.5
8th Air Force Raids 290, Attacking 30,407, Missing 586, Short tons 78,800.6
15th Air Force Raids 358, Attacking 25,961, Missing 716, Short tons 59,900.2

Another way of checking effort is to compare Bomber Commands percentage of effort against cities against the amount of non visual bombing done by the 8th Air Force. The USSBS European Theatre report 62, Weather factors in combat bombardment operations in the European Theater, target weather table on page 8 notes for around two thirds of non visual bombing the weather was in the "blind" category, 8/10 clouds or worse. The following table is 2/3 percentage of non visual bombing by the 8th // Bomber Command percentage of effort against cities in the Davis figures.

Jun-44 25.6 // 1.3
Jul-44 27.7 // 16.8
Aug-44 5.1 // 16.7
Sep-44 37.2 // 28.3
Oct-44 51.4 // 75.3
Nov-44 58.3 // 54.4
Dec-44 43.5 // 36.2
Jan-45 45.2 // 35.5
Feb-45 49.9 // 50.7
Mar-45 37.7 // 44.2
Apr-45 14.2 // 14.6

Note in December 1944 23.6% and in February 1945 69.6% of Bomber Command city strikes are listed as attacks on the "City and Railway Facilities" in the Davis figures, including the Dresden raid, they are included as "city" in the above table. Bomber Command strikes sent out after a specific target but encountering weather too bad to carry out that strike are usually recorded as doing city strikes, not a strike against the original target.

Any time the second figure in the above table is greater than the first is an indicator Bomber Command could be doing area strikes in more than just bad weather but there are the usual ambiguities, like what the actual weather was, and what the forecast was. In August 1944 Bomber Command did a series of strikes on German ports, including 2 on Konigsberg, some 950 miles from English bases, as part of an effort to help the Red Army by disrupting Baltic sea traffic. Although some of the raids had aiming points on the docks they are all listed as city strikes. In October 1944 there was operation Hurricane, and the GH trials. In February 1945 operation Thunderclap.

 

[Peter Gunn]

No, it did NOT fill the role of a high altitude bomber. It wasn't used at high altitude. And it was supposed to be practically invulnerable, that was the whole point of it being built as a high altitude bomber. But it wasn't used like that, so it did get losses.

I admire your zeal, however...

If it did not fill the role of high altitude bomber and "It wasn't used at high altitude" what was bombing Imperial Japan from 30,000 feet in 1944/45? Not to mention other targets in Southeast Asia like Singapore and Bangkok? Granted these were more of a "testing" phase to see how the plane worked but still.

Who said it was supposed to be "practically invulnerable"? That harks back to the apocryphal "the Titanic is unsinkable" trope. I'd wager no one in AAF command thought, especially after 1943 that ANY bomber was going to be untouchable. Invulnerable? No, tough to reach with the limited interceptors available to the IJAF? Yes, especially when escorted by Mustangs.

I'm also pretty sure Hiroshima and Nagasaki were decidedly NOT low altitude missions.

I mean, if we have differing opinions on this I'm good with that, that's why we all hang out here, the exchange of information and ideas.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Trinity bomb was produced by the Manhattan Project as part of the war effort.

So I count 3 atom bombs produced by the Manhattan Project as part of the war effort.

*sigh*

 

[The Stannum Liberator]

But I don't think a single person in this thread has stated that the bomber was a complete failure, but I do think we can acknowledge that it did have its failures. Nothing is perfect, but I think us arguing about whether or not there were 3 or 2 nukes, or whether or not we could have used the Lancaster doesn't really matter for the B29. The B29 filled the role they designed for it fine. Precision strategic bombing in itself was a failure during the war (especially the unescorted bombing the US was so fond of). The B29 was designed for a concept that Did not work however.
The B29 was designed to be an unescorted high altitude precision strategic bomber and it failed at that role because the technology for precision wasn't developed enough and the strategy of unescorted bombers was in itself flawed.
Some people are probably going to argue and say "The B29 was designed to be unescorted or high altitude" It was for both. Its range was longer than any fighter of the time, if the purpose was to take advantage of that range, then no fighters could have escorted it the whole way. If you claim the purpose wasn't to be high altitude, then you're just wrong.

-Stannum

This is just supposed to be a place to exchange ideas, so if you think I'm wrong, tell me.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I thought my argument was pretty good, I don't understand why the focus is being put on The Jet Stream, when the altitude was only part of my argument.

-Stannum

Because like in any discussion people can take apart arguments and discuss these individual pieces as they choose.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

While I think the arguments that the B-29 was not successful at its intended design purpose (High Altitude, long range, unescorted bombing) are legitimate arguments, I would disagree that this made the aircraft a partial failure?

Why?

This was war. War is always full of unknowns. Anyone who has experienced it knows that war rarely goes as planned. You always have to adapt and overcome. No different here with the B-29. The USAAF had to adapt and change strategies to the environment, and it was successful in doing just that.

 

[special ed]

A bit of B-29 trivia - I knew a man who had been a B-29 tail gunner during the Korean unpleasentness and was terrified of MiG-15 attacks because he could not track them at their speed.