Nodeo-Franvier
Airman 1st Class
- 124
- Jul 13, 2020
Just recently watch this Video.
Was the fighter Mafias a bunch of fraud?
Was the fighter Mafias a bunch of fraud?
Was the fighter Mafia just a bunch of charlatans?
- Thread starter Nodeo-Franvier
- Start date
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I saw that video. I enjoyed it. He's very entertaining. I enjoy drunken rants.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Some points here -
The Fifth Estate interview and it's acceptance by Canadian politicians was a huge disservice to the Canadian Armed Forces. Canada could have been one of the first foreign operators of the aircraft, now they won't see their first unit until 2025 if they are lucky. I've never seen Spey correct any interviewer about his role as an aircraft designer or engineer - he was none of the above!!! He helped design "concepts." When I first heard of him I had a lot of respect for him, but when I learned about his background and to find out he never physically designed, built or flew any type of combat aircraft, well his credibility to me just became nothing more than a huge turd! In reality Spey was nothing more than a bean counter who happened to work along side two old school fighter pilots who IMO did have some great ideas in their day, but in the end some of their ideas and beliefs were eclipsed by technology.
John Boyd and Everest Riccioni were the real deal - they served in the USAF, Boyd served a short tour in Korea and both wrote many papers and manuals about air combat and energy management during combat. They made valid points and their influence eventually saw the F-16 and F/A-18 develop, credit is due there. Their heyday however was in the 70s and 80s with regards to consulting and lending their combat experience and knowledge to aircraft manufactures. Spey was nothing more than their mouthpiece and in hindsight I can say "talked a good talk."
It's funny - we can discuss his comments about the F-35, he also badmouthed the F-15, one of the most successful (if not the most successful) fighters of all time! I would have considered this if I was going to interview him!
New technology and black world projects eventually eclipsed what all 3 had to offer. This is where Spey kept running his mouth - he kept badmouthing the F-35 without understanding or having access to some of the systems and technologies developed long after his heyday. In the Fifth Estate interview he keeps bringing up dogfighting as if he was watching the original Top Gun movie. He talked about the Serbs shooting down a F-117A but doesn't discuss how it was done (or the mistakes made by the USAF that contributed to it's downing) and then criticizes the technology. During the years of his interviews regarding his opinions about the F-35, it should have been recognized the man was a bean counting dinosaur and should have received more recognition for his music than his analysis of the F-35 - or F-15!!!
The Fifth Estate interview and it's acceptance by Canadian politicians was a huge disservice to the Canadian Armed Forces. Canada could have been one of the first foreign operators of the aircraft, now they won't see their first unit until 2025 if they are lucky. I've never seen Spey correct any interviewer about his role as an aircraft designer or engineer - he was none of the above!!! He helped design "concepts." When I first heard of him I had a lot of respect for him, but when I learned about his background and to find out he never physically designed, built or flew any type of combat aircraft, well his credibility to me just became nothing more than a huge turd! In reality Spey was nothing more than a bean counter who happened to work along side two old school fighter pilots who IMO did have some great ideas in their day, but in the end some of their ideas and beliefs were eclipsed by technology.
John Boyd and Everest Riccioni were the real deal - they served in the USAF, Boyd served a short tour in Korea and both wrote many papers and manuals about air combat and energy management during combat. They made valid points and their influence eventually saw the F-16 and F/A-18 develop, credit is due there. Their heyday however was in the 70s and 80s with regards to consulting and lending their combat experience and knowledge to aircraft manufactures. Spey was nothing more than their mouthpiece and in hindsight I can say "talked a good talk."
It's funny - we can discuss his comments about the F-35, he also badmouthed the F-15, one of the most successful (if not the most successful) fighters of all time! I would have considered this if I was going to interview him!
New technology and black world projects eventually eclipsed what all 3 had to offer. This is where Spey kept running his mouth - he kept badmouthing the F-35 without understanding or having access to some of the systems and technologies developed long after his heyday. In the Fifth Estate interview he keeps bringing up dogfighting as if he was watching the original Top Gun movie. He talked about the Serbs shooting down a F-117A but doesn't discuss how it was done (or the mistakes made by the USAF that contributed to it's downing) and then criticizes the technology. During the years of his interviews regarding his opinions about the F-35, it should have been recognized the man was a bean counting dinosaur and should have received more recognition for his music than his analysis of the F-35 - or F-15!!!
Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
OK, "all while making a sound like a hippo with diarrhea" got me laughing out loud. Not to mention "the Fairchild-Republic A-10 Shitting Hippo"... 
Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
A bunch of charlatans? Not wholly. Not even mostly. But certainly there were some self-promoting asshats in the bunch, with lots of opinions that weren't really backed up by their expertise (or reality).
Some of their ideas were good. Some of their ideas were a bunch of hooey. Some were fundamentally sound, but only worked in retrospective and had been bypassed by technology. (what one critic has called "weaponized nostalgia"). Others seem to willfully ignore reality, in exchange for doctrine (something they claimed everyone else was doing).
As FLYBOYJ alludes to above, Spey was mostly full of it. And, the further he ranged out of his areas of expertise, the worse his opinions got. Look at his opinion/analysis of the M-14 vs M-16, for instance, or on the M1 vs M60. The old Tank Net and F-16.net forums were full of actual professionals (both front line and strategy/doctrine types) patiently explaining to various dilettantes - and this was ~25 years ago.
Spey also never read an outlandish/self aggrandizing/wildly inaccurate personal WWII memoir that he couldn't then use to draw totally the wrong conclusions from. His "defense reform" writing is full of references to books like 'Samurai', 'The Rommel Papers', 'War As I Knew It', and 'Death Traps' without any understanding of their bias or consideration to their accuracy.
Some of their ideas were good. Some of their ideas were a bunch of hooey. Some were fundamentally sound, but only worked in retrospective and had been bypassed by technology. (what one critic has called "weaponized nostalgia"). Others seem to willfully ignore reality, in exchange for doctrine (something they claimed everyone else was doing).
As FLYBOYJ alludes to above, Spey was mostly full of it. And, the further he ranged out of his areas of expertise, the worse his opinions got. Look at his opinion/analysis of the M-14 vs M-16, for instance, or on the M1 vs M60. The old Tank Net and F-16.net forums were full of actual professionals (both front line and strategy/doctrine types) patiently explaining to various dilettantes - and this was ~25 years ago.
Spey also never read an outlandish/self aggrandizing/wildly inaccurate personal WWII memoir that he couldn't then use to draw totally the wrong conclusions from. His "defense reform" writing is full of references to books like 'Samurai', 'The Rommel Papers', 'War As I Knew It', and 'Death Traps' without any understanding of their bias or consideration to their accuracy.
At one time flying itself was a hooey idea as were long distance bomber escorts and even the possibility of intercepting a bomber, they will always get through, you know!
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Describes Spey perfectly
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Love the comment about wiki being a good source for historical inaccuracies
I didn't know that.
What mistakes were made, if it's not classified?
Honestly, as cynical as this sounds, you'd almost think guys like Sprey were out to somehow sabotage our country lol.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
An In-Depth Analysis of how Serbs Were Able to Shoot Down An F-117 Stealth Fighter during Operation Allied Force - The Aviation Geek Club
An In-Depth Analysis of how Serbs Were Able to Shoot Down An F-117 Stealth Fighter during Operation Allied Force
theaviationgeekclub.com
There was a time where his concepts had some validity but I don't think he ever grasped the fact that technology overcame what he considered impossible and because he wasn't invited to the party decided to "piss in the punchbowl."
So basically, they flew the same routes over and over which made it possible to put the tracking radar in exactly the right location; the USAF felt the F-117 would be able to get through without ECM & SEAD support; OPSEC was not properly maintained with a compromised agent feeding them data about our excess confidence; creativity in modifying the missile battery to be mobile, and using the lowest frequency range that could pick up the aircraft (that last part I knew) combined with the fact that, as the bay doors opened: The plane could be fairly easy to be detected (this sounds like a recurring theme from Linebacker II)?An In-Depth Analysis of how Serbs Were Able to Shoot Down An F-117 Stealth Fighter during Operation Allied Force - The Aviation Geek Club
An In-Depth Analysis of how Serbs Were Able to Shoot Down An F-117 Stealth Fighter during Operation Allied Force
I didn't know the F-117 would be blind during attack runs: I'd have always figured those antennas could be configured to broadcast through radomes like radar does, and could be aerodynamically clean. While I could understand the urge to turn any active radar system off, I figured the receivers would always be on.
It's a pretty fascinating read.
Well, if there was anything I'll give him and his minions credit for was helping improve the F-15 (early on it was to be a swing-wing fighter that was far larger) as well as the F-16.
There seemed a pervasive believe in the USAF that air-superiority wouldn't need to be established in a nuclear-strike mission (something that assumes the enemy doesn't see it coming), and a failure to see much use in conventional warfare (even though some scenarios for the Cold War going hot included a furious conventional war that rapidly escalates either to limited nuclear war, followed by total nuclear war, or just total nuclear war) even though it would have uses.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
lol, a ground-attack a/c gets shot down by ground-fire more often than air superiority fighters? I'm shocked -- shocked, I tell you!
As for "relegated to shooting up technicals":
For instance, the Warthog force was used only sparingly in the CAS role but proved more versatile and better able to survive over enemy territory than many expected. During the forty-day conflict, the A-10 force was credited with destroying 987 tanks, 926 artillery pieces, 1,355 combat vehicles, and a range of other targets-including ten fighters on the ground and two helicopters shot down in air-to-air engagements. The A-10 force, flying more than 8,000 combat sorties, suffered only five A-10s destroyed (a loss rate of .062 percent). Twenty of these aircraft returned with significant battle damage, and forty-five others returned with light damage that was repaired between sorties.
www.airforcemag.com
So yeah, that's a funny, uh, opinion.
As for "relegated to shooting up technicals":
For instance, the Warthog force was used only sparingly in the CAS role but proved more versatile and better able to survive over enemy territory than many expected. During the forty-day conflict, the A-10 force was credited with destroying 987 tanks, 926 artillery pieces, 1,355 combat vehicles, and a range of other targets-including ten fighters on the ground and two helicopters shot down in air-to-air engagements. The A-10 force, flying more than 8,000 combat sorties, suffered only five A-10s destroyed (a loss rate of .062 percent). Twenty of these aircraft returned with significant battle damage, and forty-five others returned with light damage that was repaired between sorties.
To War in a Warthog | Air & Space Forces Magazine
Forty missions over the Gulf with A-10 pilot Shanghai Sheehy.
www.airforcemag.com
So yeah, that's a funny, uh, opinion.
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FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Its this just your armchair opinion or have you ever worked in a capacity with the aircraft or spoke to anyone who actually flew the machine?
Snautzer01
Honourably banned
- 42,944
- Mar 26, 2007
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
During the first Gulf War (Desert Storm 1991), the U.S. lost the following:
17 January - F/A-18C (BuNo 163484) shot down by Iraqi MiG-25. Pilot KIA.
17 January - A-6E (BuNo 161668) shot down by SAM. Crew POW.
17 January - F-15E (s/n 88-1689) shot down by AA. Crew KIA.
18 January - A-6E (BuNo 152928) shot down by AA. Crew KIA.
18 January - OV-10 (BuNo 155435) shot down by SAM. Crew POW.
18 January - F4G (s/n 69-7571) shot down by AA. Crew bailed safely behind friendly lines.
19 January - F-15E (s/n 88-1692) shot down by SAM. Crew POW.
19 January - F-16C (s/n 87-0228) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
19 January - F-16C (s/n 87-0257) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
21 January - F-14A (BuNo 161430) shot down by SAM. Pilot rescued, R/O POW.
24 January - AV-8B (BuNo 163518) shot down by MANPAD. Pilot POW.
31 January - AC-130H (s/n 69-6567) shot down by SAM. Crew KIA.
2 February - A-6E (BuNo 155632) shot down by AA. Crew KIA.
2 February - A-10A (s/n 80-0248) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
5 February - F/A-18A (BuNo 163096) shot down by unknown. Pilot KIA-BNR.
9 February - AV-8B (BuNo 162081) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
13 February - EF-111A (s/n 66-0023) crashed while evading Iraqi Mirage. Crew KIA.
15 February - A-10A (s/n 78-0722) shot down by AA. Pilot POW.
15 February - A-10A (s/n 79-0130) shot down by AA while providing cover for downed wingman (see above). Pilot KIA.
19 February - A-10A (s/n 76-0543) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
23 February - AV-8B (BuNo 161573) shot down by AA/MANPAD. Pilot KIA.
25 February - AV-8B (BuNo 163190) shot down by MANPAD. Pilot ejected safely behind friendly lines.
25 February - OV-10A (BuNo 155424) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW, Observer KIA.
27 February - AV-8B (BuNo 162740) shot down by MANPAD. Pilot KIA.
27 February - A-10A (s/n 77-0197) severely damaged by SAM, crashed while attempting to land back at base. Pilot KIA.
27 February - F-16C (s/n 84-1390) shot down by MANPAD. Pilot POW.
* to be fair, I'll add add A-10A (s/n 79-0181) that suffered severe battle damage from a SAM on 22 February, returned to base and was written off.
So with these numbers, we see that there were:
6) A-10A lost
5) AV-8B lost
3) F-16C lost
3) A-6E lost
2) F/A-18C lost
2) F-15E lost
2) OV-10 lost
1) F-14A list
1) F4G lost
1) EF-111A lost
1) AC-130H lost
At first glance, it appears that the A-10 had a higher loss rate, until you compare all the types lost, to their respective roles.
The AV-8B had an identical loss rate to that of the A-10 because it too, was operating in a similar role. Remember, I added the one A-10 only because it was a write-off.
So then we see the next highest losses are the F-16C and A-6E, which were operating in multi-role. When they entered the environment where the A-10A and AV-8B normally operated at, they became exposed to more threats and accrued a higher loss number as a result.
There is no ground attack aircraft that has ever existed that is immune to defensive fire and to waive a high loss number as "proof" that a certain type is a failure, literally means nothing in the real world.
17 January - F/A-18C (BuNo 163484) shot down by Iraqi MiG-25. Pilot KIA.
17 January - A-6E (BuNo 161668) shot down by SAM. Crew POW.
17 January - F-15E (s/n 88-1689) shot down by AA. Crew KIA.
18 January - A-6E (BuNo 152928) shot down by AA. Crew KIA.
18 January - OV-10 (BuNo 155435) shot down by SAM. Crew POW.
18 January - F4G (s/n 69-7571) shot down by AA. Crew bailed safely behind friendly lines.
19 January - F-15E (s/n 88-1692) shot down by SAM. Crew POW.
19 January - F-16C (s/n 87-0228) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
19 January - F-16C (s/n 87-0257) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
21 January - F-14A (BuNo 161430) shot down by SAM. Pilot rescued, R/O POW.
24 January - AV-8B (BuNo 163518) shot down by MANPAD. Pilot POW.
31 January - AC-130H (s/n 69-6567) shot down by SAM. Crew KIA.
2 February - A-6E (BuNo 155632) shot down by AA. Crew KIA.
2 February - A-10A (s/n 80-0248) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
5 February - F/A-18A (BuNo 163096) shot down by unknown. Pilot KIA-BNR.
9 February - AV-8B (BuNo 162081) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
13 February - EF-111A (s/n 66-0023) crashed while evading Iraqi Mirage. Crew KIA.
15 February - A-10A (s/n 78-0722) shot down by AA. Pilot POW.
15 February - A-10A (s/n 79-0130) shot down by AA while providing cover for downed wingman (see above). Pilot KIA.
19 February - A-10A (s/n 76-0543) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW.
23 February - AV-8B (BuNo 161573) shot down by AA/MANPAD. Pilot KIA.
25 February - AV-8B (BuNo 163190) shot down by MANPAD. Pilot ejected safely behind friendly lines.
25 February - OV-10A (BuNo 155424) shot down by SAM. Pilot POW, Observer KIA.
27 February - AV-8B (BuNo 162740) shot down by MANPAD. Pilot KIA.
27 February - A-10A (s/n 77-0197) severely damaged by SAM, crashed while attempting to land back at base. Pilot KIA.
27 February - F-16C (s/n 84-1390) shot down by MANPAD. Pilot POW.
* to be fair, I'll add add A-10A (s/n 79-0181) that suffered severe battle damage from a SAM on 22 February, returned to base and was written off.
So with these numbers, we see that there were:
6) A-10A lost
5) AV-8B lost
3) F-16C lost
3) A-6E lost
2) F/A-18C lost
2) F-15E lost
2) OV-10 lost
1) F-14A list
1) F4G lost
1) EF-111A lost
1) AC-130H lost
At first glance, it appears that the A-10 had a higher loss rate, until you compare all the types lost, to their respective roles.
The AV-8B had an identical loss rate to that of the A-10 because it too, was operating in a similar role. Remember, I added the one A-10 only because it was a write-off.
So then we see the next highest losses are the F-16C and A-6E, which were operating in multi-role. When they entered the environment where the A-10A and AV-8B normally operated at, they became exposed to more threats and accrued a higher loss number as a result.
There is no ground attack aircraft that has ever existed that is immune to defensive fire and to waive a high loss number as "proof" that a certain type is a failure, literally means nothing in the real world.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
And let's not forget that during the Gulf War the A-10 was responsible for...
www.2951clss-gulfwar.com
- 987 tanks destroyed
- 2 Helicopters (air-to-air aircraft) kills with the GAU-8A 30mm Avenger cannon: 6 February 1991 by Capt. Bob Swain in 77-0205 of the 706th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 926th Tactical Fighter Group "Cajuns" from New Orleans Louisiana and the second by Capt Todd "Shanghai" Sheehy in 81-0964 with the 511th TFS "Vultures" out of RAF Alcombury United Kingdom.
- 501 Armor Personnel Carriers (APC) destroyed
- 249 Command Posts (CP) destroyed
- 11 Frog missile launchers destroyed
- 281 Military structures destroyed
- 96 Radar installations destroyed
- 72 Bunkers destroyed
- 9 SAM sites destroyed
- 8 Fuel tanks destroyed
- 2,000 other military vehicles
- 1,306 trucks
- 53 SCUD missiles and launchers
- 10 aircraft on the ground destroyed
- 157 A-10/OA-10 aircraft participated from 5 different units
- 144 A-10/OA-10 aircraft deployed into the AOR at a time - remaining aircraft were replacements at an off-site location
- 148 total aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia
- 8,077 sorties flown by the A-10
- 95/7% Mission Capable rate maintained - 5% higher than peacetime rates
- 16.6% Sortie Rate - highest sortie rate of any USAF aircraft during the Gulf War
2951 CLSS A-10 ABDR Persian Gulf War 1991
2951st CLSS A-10 ABDR Aircraft Battle Damage Repair during the Persian Gulf War Operation Desert Storm 1991
www.2951clss-gulfwar.com
Well thats the facts taken care of but what about feelings and hunches?And let's not forget that during the Gulf War the A-10 was responsible for...
And also consider...
- 987 tanks destroyed
- 2 Helicopters (air-to-air aircraft) kills with the GAU-8A 30mm Avenger cannon: 6 February 1991 by Capt. Bob Swain in 77-0205 of the 706th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 926th Tactical Fighter Group "Cajuns" from New Orleans Louisiana and the second by Capt Todd "Shanghai" Sheehy in 81-0964 with the 511th TFS "Vultures" out of RAF Alcombury United Kingdom.
- 501 Armor Personnel Carriers (APC) destroyed
- 249 Command Posts (CP) destroyed
- 11 Frog missile launchers destroyed
- 281 Military structures destroyed
- 96 Radar installations destroyed
- 72 Bunkers destroyed
- 9 SAM sites destroyed
- 8 Fuel tanks destroyed
- 2,000 other military vehicles
- 1,306 trucks
- 53 SCUD missiles and launchers
- 10 aircraft on the ground destroyed
- 157 A-10/OA-10 aircraft participated from 5 different units
- 144 A-10/OA-10 aircraft deployed into the AOR at a time - remaining aircraft were replacements at an off-site location
- 148 total aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia
- 8,077 sorties flown by the A-10
- 95/7% Mission Capable rate maintained - 5% higher than peacetime rates
- 16.6% Sortie Rate - highest sortie rate of any USAF aircraft during the Gulf War
2951 CLSS A-10 ABDR Persian Gulf War 1991
2951st CLSS A-10 ABDR Aircraft Battle Damage Repair during the Persian Gulf War Operation Desert Storm 1991
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Can't control that - for some "feelings and hunches" takes precedence over "facts and truth!"
Thumpalumpacus
Major
And let's not forget that during the Gulf War the A-10 was responsible for...
And also consider...
- 987 tanks destroyed
- 2 Helicopters (air-to-air aircraft) kills with the GAU-8A 30mm Avenger cannon: 6 February 1991 by Capt. Bob Swain in 77-0205 of the 706th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 926th Tactical Fighter Group "Cajuns" from New Orleans Louisiana and the second by Capt Todd "Shanghai" Sheehy in 81-0964 with the 511th TFS "Vultures" out of RAF Alcombury United Kingdom.
- 501 Armor Personnel Carriers (APC) destroyed
- 249 Command Posts (CP) destroyed
- 11 Frog missile launchers destroyed
- 281 Military structures destroyed
- 96 Radar installations destroyed
- 72 Bunkers destroyed
- 9 SAM sites destroyed
- 8 Fuel tanks destroyed
- 2,000 other military vehicles
- 1,306 trucks
- 53 SCUD missiles and launchers
- 10 aircraft on the ground destroyed
- 157 A-10/OA-10 aircraft participated from 5 different units
- 144 A-10/OA-10 aircraft deployed into the AOR at a time - remaining aircraft were replacements at an off-site location
- 148 total aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia
- 8,077 sorties flown by the A-10
- 95/7% Mission Capable rate maintained - 5% higher than peacetime rates
- 16.6% Sortie Rate - highest sortie rate of any USAF aircraft during the Gulf War
2951 CLSS A-10 ABDR Persian Gulf War 1991
2951st CLSS A-10 ABDR Aircraft Battle Damage Repair during the Persian Gulf War Operation Desert Storm 1991
Yabut where are the technicals listed here?! Pretty sure our brotha said they shot up a lot of technicals.
As an aside, 48 of those A-10s were transient on our ramp at Moron AB during the buildup, that's when I got my first close-up look at one. You could see their agility by the way broke into the landing pattern.
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