Was the luftwaffe really apolitical or not? Does a "clean luftwaffe" thing exist?

[Dimlee]

Absolutely not. DKM is often painted as being saintlier than thou, but in reality it was probably as ruthless as the two other major services. Possibly only the SS was worse but its debateable.

Agree to disagree.

Just please note that "illegal blood" you mentioned was spilled in the same manner by other Navies. (Except the oppression of Jewish sailors). Unrestricted submarine warfare, attacks on neutrals (Soviet Navy did that since November 1939), confiscations, interned crews, shore bombardments with "collateral damage" to civilians, mine laying in the waters of non-beligirents, etc... There is nothing specifically "German" in this sad list.

 

[The Basket]

Heinz Wilhelm Eck
Hellmuth von Ruckteschell

I remember reading a good book on German auxiliary raiders such as the Widder and Atlantis in ww2 and the Germans came across as decent guys such as Rogge and Detmers who actively did their best to find survivors. So not only Langsdorff was sainted.
Although, lets face it, if you target a tanker full of aviation gasoline then when it goes boom the chance of survivors are hardly going to be high. Or leaving shipwrecked crews in thier boats in the middle of the Atlantic in Winter, you can hardly expect them to survive.

The merchant ships attacked by the raiders usually had a 4 inch gun and was ordered to radio any contact which makes them less merchant and more military.

The grey areas of naval war.

 

[parsifal]

There is no proven case of a U-Boat machine-gunning survivors, unless you want to count the movie U-571 as a legitimate incident.

Here is a VERY well written article regarding the myth and offers a great many examples that run contrary to the claim. It even touches on the fact that the Kriegsmarine did not use the party salute until forced to do so after the assassination attempt on Hitler, in '44. Also be sure to examine the list of sources offered at the end.

uboat.net - Articles

The article is well written and does contain some elements of truth to it. Ive read it many times. Propaganda does that as well.....takes a few facts and then mixes it with the message you really want to convey. It gives the myth a few clothes to wear, and we lap it up because that's what we want to hear. It is also directly contradicting the article I posted, which is based on witness statements at the time and quotes specific incidents. there were a number of others. For the record, incidentally, I have never watched 'U-571" and never will.

There are very few postwar convictions of DKM captains. Donitz was sentenced to 10 years behind bars. There were maybe three or four others. Donitz escaped the gallows because of Nimitz coming to his defence. The reason Nimitz went to his defence was because the allies were as guilty as Donitz at waging unrestricted warfare on shipping. There were also some fairly well documented cases of allied submarine commanders engaging in massacres of shipwreck survivors, which in my opinion caused Nimitz to commit this betrayal. Consequently, despite the significant body of evidence from witnesses to the contrary, they were never pursued. Justice was sacrificed in the interests of political expediency. The ultimate betrayal in other words. However there are marked differences between the practices and culture of the allied forces and those within DKM. DKM is the only force where specific orders were (allegedly) given to commit murder. and extend this to neutral shipping operating outside the declared war zones of the time. Many DKM officers chose to ignore that. At least one U-Boat commander risked the safety of his boat so as to tow the survivors of one ship to the irish coast. He was disciplined for that. Another provided assistance to a British warship that Mountbatten was serving on. these are all praiseworthy acts and should be acknowledged. Most simply left the survivors alone which was enough. In the same way, there were instances of Allied commanders committing atrocities. That too needs to be acknowledged. but the difference is that within DKM and only in DKM (not even IJN did this) was it codified to commit those atrocities. We are not discussing the actions of individuals, we are discussing the criminality of the service itself, and in this case the criminality of DKM was unique and severe.

Someone mentioned that BC was the same. Not so. BC killed many more civilians than the uboats. They had written policy to attack the morale of civilian populations, dressed up by saying they wanted to 'dehouse" the cities of germany. Such a policy was bound to cause civilian deaths, in exactly the same way as targeting a merchant ship does. that happens. its called collateral damage. Today the law has changed and such deaths would be considered a war crime. Not during WWII however. In order for BC to be painted in the same light as DKM, it would have to knowingly bomb Switzerland and make sure of the job by passing at low level and strafe the survivors to death. I don't believe that ever happened.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... the LW formed its own divisions, the Luftwaffe Field divisions, which had enormous resources expended to form them, and proved to be very poor in the field, due to the lack of experience in land combat in their formations. The LW field divs proved utterly unreliable and useless."
What are your sources for this statement. Parsifal?

I do not claim LW formations enjoyed being used as anti-tank crews, nor, do I deny that that there was political friction over command and control of the LW resources, however, I have never encountered a description of the LW units lacking courage, skill or field craft.

Otto Carrius, in his memoirs, describes seconding a battery of 8.8 cm LW guns in Normandy to successfully arrest a British-Canadian armoured thrust. He did not find their performance lacking. LW units were widely employed as anti-tank artillery in the Ukraine with great effect.

 

[pbehn]

There were some weird critters in the RAF and also in UK factories. I don't think any organisation was "clean". I cant remember the book I read it in but explosives were found in a BoB fighter exhaust manifold.

 

[parsifal]

"... the LW formed its own divisions, the Luftwaffe Field divisions, which had enormous resources expended to form them, and proved to be very poor in the field, due to the lack of experience in land combat in their formations. The LW field divs proved utterly unreliable and useless."
What are your sources for this statement. Parsifal?

I do not claim LW formations enjoyed being used as anti-tank crews, nor, do I deny that that there was political friction over command and control of the LW resources, however, I have never encountered a description of the LW units lacking courage, skill or field craft.

Otto Carrius, in his memoirs, describes seconding a battery of 8.8 cm LW guns in Normandy to successfully arrest a British-Canadian armoured thrust. He did not find their performance lacking. LW units were widely employed as anti-tank artillery in the Ukraine with great effect.

Luftwaffe Field Divisions were not Luftwaffe flak formations. The HG PZ Div was not a LW Fld Division either. Neither were the Paras fighting as ground troops. For the most part, LW Fld divs were formed from personnel stripped out of the home defence flak formations. their home defence billets were filled by home guard style units....factory workers taught (badly) to work the guns defending their factories. Only after the personnel passed to direct army control and (generally) grafted as fillers into regular Infantry formations of the heer was much value derived from the ex-flak LW personnel fighting as regular ground troops. before that casualties were very heavy, and the formations judged to be unreliable.

A pretty good summary of their problems can be found in the following link , but there are numerous sources that provide this information:

Hobby

I don't have a copy of the following but Ive read it:

 

[parsifal]

Heinz Wilhelm Eck
Hellmuth von Ruckteschell

I remember reading a good book on German auxiliary raiders such as the Widder and Atlantis in ww2 and the Germans came across as decent guys such as Rogge and Detmers who actively did their best to find survivors. So not only Langsdorff was sainted.
Although, lets face it, if you target a tanker full of aviation gasoline then when it goes boom the chance of survivors are hardly going to be high. Or leaving shipwrecked crews in thier boats in the middle of the Atlantic in Winter, you can hardly expect them to survive.

The merchant ships attacked by the raiders usually had a 4 inch gun and was ordered to radio any contact which makes them less merchant and more military.

The grey areas of naval war.

Even in 1945 the rules of mercantile warfare were basically that a vessel flying a neutral flag, displaying a neutral flag (and nationality flag also painted on the side), remaining illuminated at night and outside a declared war zone retained freedom of navigation on the high seas. Pretty quickly after the outbreak of hostilities, both sides devised tricks to circumvent this. The British reflagged many ships from British colours to mostly US flags....so called flags of convenience. Almost immediately Germany declared unilaterally their right to stop and search any ship anywhere on the high seas. After the Graf Spee the US declared the Pan American neutrality zone, which in effect made the whole of the Americas within US territorial waters. This prevented the germans from entering those waters for the purposes of offensive operations. It gradually broke down over time.

Overt aggressive acts were judged to have occurred if the merchant ship was blacked out, was armed in any way or was in the employ or travelling under the protection of a foreign power at war with one own nation. A vessel that ignored directions to stop and submit to a lawful search could be fired upon. A vessel that transmitted its position could also be fired upon. this still was not enough concession for DKM. The germans frequently broke this convention, in a number of ways. they frequently attacked ships, of any nation, in any location with no warning. The problem is that genuine neutral shipping, even shipping acting for germany or her allies, were attacked and often sunk. All of this is illegal, and deserving of some indictment, but still short of the ultimate crime at sea, being that having determined a vessel was genuinely neutral, attacks/massacres were carried out regardless, and almost certainly orders were issued by the DKM high command to fire on survivors no longer in a position to resist. . That is the action of a service morally bankrupt and not deserving of respect in my book. The personnel were brave, efficient, often principalled. the service they were attached to was not.

 

[GrauGeist]

Michael, please provide the dispatch from the DKM Admiralty to U-Boat Captains ordering them to massacre survivors, I'd like to read it.
Thanks

 

[parsifal]

[Part I}

Probably the best single piece account comes from a source hostile to the Nazi regime. make of this what you must.....it comes from the jewish virtual library. The statements made in the article can however be verified by other sources.

here is the link to the article to which I refer:

Nuremberg Trial Defendants: Karl Doenitz

Lets see how many anti-semites come crawling out from under the rocks that they live under.

Relevantly, with regard to the orders to target defenceless survivors, it states as follows:

(1) "The Orders Concerning Treatment of Survivors.

A series of orders led up to the issue of an order which enjoined U- Boat commanders not merely to abstain from rescuing crews and give them no assistance but deliberately to annihilate them. Among these preliminary standing orders of the U-Boat Command is Order Number 154, signed by Doenitz:

"Paragraph (e). Do not pick up survivors and take them with you (already a contravention of the laws of warfare on the high seas) . Do not worry about the merchant-ship's boats. Weather conditions and distance from land play no part. Have a care only for your own ship and strive only to attain your next success as soon as possible. We must be harsh in this war. The enemy began the war in order to destroy us, so nothing else matters." (D-642)

In 1942, when the United States entered the war with its enormous ship-building capacity, the change thus brought about necessitated a further adjustment in the methods adopted by the U-Boats. Doenitz accordingly issued an order, which intended not merely the sinking of merchant ships, not merely the abstention from rescue of the crews, but their deliberate extermination.

The course of events is shown by the record of a conversation between Hitler and the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, (D-423) in the presence of Ribbentrop, on 3 Jan 1942:

"The Fuehrer, using a map, explains to the Japanese Ambassador the present position of marine warfare in the Atlantic, emphasizing that he considers his most important task is to get the U-Boat warfare going in full swing. The U-Boats are being reorganized. Firstly, he had recalled all U-Boats operating in the Atlantic. As mentioned before, they would now be posted outside United States ports. Later, they would be off Freetown and the larger boats even as far down as Capetown."

"After having given further explanations on the map, the Fuehrer pointed out that, however many ships the United States built, one of their main problems would be the lack of personnel. For that reason, even merchant ships would be sunk without warning with the intention of killing as many of the crew as possible. Once it gets around that most of the seamen are lost in the sinkings, the Americans would soon have difficulties in enlisting new people. The training of sea-going personnel takes a very long time. We are fighting for our existence and our attitude cannot be ruled by any humane feelings. For this reason he must give the order that in case foreign seamen could not be taken prisoner, which is not always possible on the sea, U-boats were to surface after torpedoing and shoot up the lifeboats. Ambassador Oshima heartily agreed with the Fuehrer's comments, and said that the Japanese too are forced to follow these methods."​

An extract from the B.D.U. War Diary of 16 September 1942 is part of the story in the sense that it was on the following day that the "annihilation order" was issued. It records an attack on a U-boat, which was rescuing survivors, chiefly the Italian survivors of the Allied liner "Laconia," when it was attacked by an Allied aircraft (D-446).

In this connection, a telegram from the Commander of the U- boat "Schacht" to Doenitz's headquarters, and the reply, are significant. "Schacht" had been taking part in the rescue of survivors from the "Laconia." The telegram from "Schacht," dated 18 September 1942, reads:

"163 Italians handed over to 'Annamite Navigating Officer of 'Laconia' and another English Officer on board." (D-630). The telegram goes on to set out the positionof English and Polish survivors in boats. The reply from Doenitz's headquarters was sent on the 20th: "Action as in wireless telegram message of 17th of September was wrong. Boat was detailed to rescue Italian allies and not for the rescue of English and Poles." (D-630)

A Top Secret order, sent to all commanding officers of U- boats from Doenitz's headquarters, dated 17 September 1942, provided:

"1. No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk, and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews.

2. Orders for bringing in Captains and Chief Engineers still apply.

"3. Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be of importance for your boat.

"4. Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities." (D-630)

The intentions of this carefully worded order are made clear by an extract from Doenitz's War Diary which is personally signed by Doenitz. The War Diary entry for 17 September 1942 reads:

"The attention of all commanding officers is again drawn to the fact that all efforts to rescue members of the crews of ships which have been sunk contradict the most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating enemy ships and their crews. Orders concerning the bringing in of the Captains and Chief Engineers still stand." (D-630). [Page 828]

(2) The Orders Concerning Treatment of Survivors.

A series of orders led up to the issue of an order which enjoined U- Boat commanders not merely to abstain from rescuing crews and give them no assistance, but deliberately to annihilate them.

"Operation Order Atlantic No. 56," dated 7 October 1943, contains the sailing orders of a U-boat (D-663). Although the date of this order is 7 October 1943, in fact it is only a reproduction of an order issued earlier, in the autumn of 1942. The following is an extract from this order:

"Rescue ships: A so-called rescue ship is generally attached to every convoy, a special ship of up to 3000 gross registered tons, which is intended for the picking up of survivors after U-boat attacks. These ships are, for the most part, equipped with a shipborne aircraft and large motor-boats, are strongly armed with depth-charge throwers, and very maneuverable, so that they are often called U-Boat Traps by the commander. In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, their sinking is of great value." (D-663)

(From Nuremberg)The Prosecution does not complain against attacks on rescue ships. They are not entitled to protection. But the point of the foregoing order to U-boats was that priority in attack should be given to rescue ships. This order, therefore, is closely allied with order of 17 September 1942 (D-630): in view of the Allied shipbuilding program the German Navy had resolved to take all means to prevent Allied ships from being manned.

To summarize, it would appear from the War Diary entry of 17 September that orders on the lines discussed between Hitler and Oshima were, in fact, issued. They have not, however, been captured. It may be that they were issued orally, and that Doenitz awaited a suitable opportunity before confirming them. The incident of the bombing of the U-boats (assisting the Laconia) detailed to rescue the Italian survivors from the "Laconia" afforded the opportunity, and the order to all commanders was issued. However hitlers and Doenitz's intentions should be clear...…..especially when Its it is considered in the light of the War Diary entries. The wording is, of course extremely careful, but to any officer of experience its intention was obvious: he would know that deliberate action to annihilate survivors would be approved under that order. There is not a single instance of a German officer in DKM facing disciplinary action for shooting or sinking an allied lifeboat. There are quite a few instances of DKM officers facing disciplinary action for trying to save allied sailors.

It may be contended that this order, although perhaps unfortunately phrased, was merely intended to stop a commander from jeopardizing his ship by attempting a rescue, which had become increasingly dangerous as a result of the extended coverage of the ocean by Allied aircraft; and that the notorious action of U-Boat Commander Eck in sinking the Greek steamer "Peleus" and then machine-gunning the crew on their rafts in the water, was an exception; and that, although it may be true that a copy of the order was on board, this action was taken solely, as Eck himself swore, on his own initiative.

In reply it may be said that if the intention of this order was (merely) to stop rescue attempts, in the interests of the preservation of the U-boat, it would have been done by calling attention to Standing Order 154. Secondly, this very fact would have been prominently stated in the order. Drastic orders of this nature are not drafted by experienced staff officers without the greatest care and an eye to their possible capture by the enemy. Thirdly, if it was necessary to avoid the risks attendant on surfacing, not only would this have been stated but there would have been no question of taking any prisoners at all except possibly in circumstances where virtually no risk in surfacing was to be apprehended. Fourthly, the final sentence of the first paragraph would have read very differently. And fifthly, if in fact -- and the Prosecution does not accept it -- Doenitz did not mean to enjoin murder, his order was so worded that he cannot escape the responsibility which attaches to such a document.

The instructions given by Admiral Doenitz with regard to the murder of shipwrecked Allied seamen are described in an affidavit by Oberleutnant Zur See Peter Josef Heisig (D- 566). (Heisig was called as a prosecution witness in the case against Doenitz and testified on direct examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements in his affidavit.) In September 1942 Heisig was a Midshipman in a training course for U-boat officers of the watch. On the last day of the course Grand Admiral Doenitz, who was then Commander-in-Chief, U-boats, held an inspection tour and made a speech to the officers in training. Heisig describes the content of Doenitz's speech as follows:

"According to news received from America we were bound to reckon with the possibility that in the Allied countries more than 1,000,000 net registered tons of new merchant shipping space would be brought into service monthly. This was more shipping space than would be sunk even with good U-boat successes. The bottleneck of the Allies lay only in the problem of personnel for these newly built ships. The Atlantic route was too dangerous for seamen so that they even had to be brought aboard ship under compulsion. This was the point where we, the U-boat crews, had to take a hand. He therefore demanded that we should from now on carry on total warfare against ship and crew. That meant: so far as possible, no seaman from a sunk ship was to get home any more. Only thus could the supply line of the British Isles be seriously endangered and only thus in the long run could we strike a noticeable blow at Allied merchant shipping traffic. In this way it would be impossible for the opponent even to make use of his newly built ships, since no more crews would be available to him. After the sinking of a ship, every possibility of rescue must be denied to the crew, through the destruction of every means of saving life. "I later discussed these remarks of Admiral Doenitz's with the others, and all present unanimously and unambiguously took them to mean that after the sinking of a ship, all possibility of escape, whether in boats, on rafts, or by any other means, must be denied to the crew and the destruction of the crew was to be attempted by every means. This mode of warfare was for me as for most of my comrades completely new. Owing to Admiral Doenitz's authoritative position, it was nevertheless fully and completely accepted by many of them. He sought to invalidate in advance any doubts which might arise, by pointing to the air war and the bombing." (D-566)

Further light on the real meaning of the Top Secret radio message sent by the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to all U- boat and operational flotillas in September 1942 (D-630) is contained in the statement of Korvettenkapitaen Karl Heinz Moehle (382-PS). (Moehle was called as a Prosecution witness in the Nuremberg trial of Doenitz and testified on direct examination to the same effect, in substance, as the statements in his affidavit.) Concerning this order which was couched in terms of a prohibition against the rescue of survivors, Moehle stated as follows:

"This W/T message was without any doubt sent out at the instigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e. Grand Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in which the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider it quite impossible that an order of such importance could have been given without his knowledge.

So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and in particular for those who know the manner in which Commander in Chief U-Boats is wont to give his orders, that the High Command regard it as desirable that not only ships but also their crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that they should be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was continually stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood this order in that way.

Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words. It would then only have stated that for reasons of security rescue measures were to cease and this order would have passed as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps even the intention that this order could be interpreted in two ways and the reason may be that in the first place, it contravenes international aws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in commanding officers.

To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942 appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had however to carry out the command to pass on this order to commanding officers for their instruction.

"During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that he was therefore unable to carry it out." (382-PS)

Moehle graphically describes Doenitz's incitement of his men to the murder of survivors:

"A type VII boat (600-tonner) reported in her war log that when outward bound from a base in France she met far out in the Bay of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to take them on board owing to shortage of room (she had a complement of 54 and carried full provisions for 14 weeks). The boat therefore proceeded without taking any notice of the survivors.

This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the Commander in Chief U-boats' staff. It was stated that she would have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was highly probably that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a German U- boat.

This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief U-boats clear to me." (382-PS)

As senior officer of the Fifth U-boat Flotilla, it was Moehle's duty to transmit orders from the Commander in Chief, U-boats, to commanding officers of U-boats. In this connection, Doenitz' ambiguous order against the rescue of survivors caused difficulties.

I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with more or less the following words: `I have now to inform you of a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September 1942 gave the following order in an 'officers only' signal (unintelligible mumble) the exact words of the order were then read out).

Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any further discussion on this point.

Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer somewhat as follows:

I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave this order, by reference to the following event:' I then mentioned the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay together with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by commander in Chief U- boats' staff. I then went on to say, 'Gentlemen, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with your own consciences. The safety of your own boat must always remain your prime consideration.

I also remember that many commanding officers after the order of September 1942 had been read said, 'That is quite clear and unequivocal however hard it may be.' Had this order been given to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger my own boat by acting in this way, (i.e., by shooting at lift-boats)." (382-PS)

Finally, Moehle describes the orders to omit from U-boat logs the notation of any actions in violation of International Law:

"There was an order ….I do not remember whether it was in the form of a written or verbal instruction …..that no events during a war patrol which contravened established international agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war logs and were available to many authorities; there was always the danger therefore that events of this nature would become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of propaganda that this should be so.

"Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats." (382-PS)"

 

[parsifal]

{PartII (more to come}

Two cases may be noted in which the order of 17 September 1942 (D-60) was apparently put into effect. The first case is the sinking of a steam trawler, the "Noreen Mary," which was sunk by U-247 on 5 July 1944. The log of the U-Boat shows that at 1943 hours two torpedoes were fired, which missed (D- 645). At 2055 hours the log reads:

"Fishing Vessels: [Bearings (??? of 3 ships given]."Engaged the nearest. She stops after three minutes." (D-645) There follows an account of a shot fired as the trawler lay stopped, and then, the final entry:

"Sunk by flak, with shots into her side. Sank by the stern." (D-645)

The U-Boat Command made this comment on the action:

"Recognized success: Fishing vessel Noreen Mary' sunk by flak."

A more detailed account emerges from allied sources and contains material that if true, should have been recorded into the BDU war diary and the ships log. An affidavit by James MacAlister, who was a deck-hand on board the "Noreen Mary" at the time of the sinking, describes the torpedo tracks which missed the trawler, and continues as follows:

"At 2110 hours, while we were still trawling, the submarine surfaced on our starboard beam, about 50 yards to the northeast of us, and without any warning immediately opened fire on the ship with a machine gun. We were 18 miles west from Cape Wrath, on a north- westerly course, making 3 knots. The weather was fine and clear, sunny, with good visibility. The sea was smooth, with light airs. When the submarine surfaced I saw men climbing out of the conning tower. The skipper [of the trawler] thought at first the submarine was British, but when she opened fire he immediately slackened the brake to take the weight off gear, and increased to full speed, which was about 10 knots. The submarine chased us, firing her machine gun, and with the first rounds killed two or three men, including the skipper, who were on deck and had not had time to take cover. The submarine then started using a heavier gun from her conning tower, the first shot from which burst the boiler, enveloping everything in steam.

By now the crew had taken cover, but in spite of this all but four were killed. The submarine then commenced to circle round ahead of the vessel, and passed down her port side with both guns firing continuously. We were listing slowly to port all the time but did not catch fire.

The Mate and I attempted to release the lifeboat, which was aft, but the Mate was killed whilst doing so, so I abandoned the attempt. I then went below into the pantry, which was below the water line, for shelter. The ship was listing more and more to port, until finally at 2210 she rolled right over and sank, and the only four men left alive on board were thrown into the sea. I do not know where the other three men had taken cover during this time, as I did not hear or see them until they were in the water.

I swam around until I came across the broken bow of our lifeboat, which was upside down, and managed to scramble on top of it. Even now the submarine did not submerge, but deliberately steamed in my direction and when only 60 to 70 yards away fired directly at me with a short burst from the machine gun. As their intention was quite obvious, I fell into the water and remained there until the submarine ceased firing and submerged, after which I climbed back on to the bottom of the boat. The submarine had been firing her guns for a full hour." (D-645)

The affidavit goes on to describe the attempts of the Second Engineer and others to rescue themselves and to help each other; they were later picked up by another trawler. The affidavit continues:

"Whilst on board the 'Lady Madeleine' the Second Engineer and I had our wounds dressed. I learned later that the Second Engineer had 48 shrapnel wounds, also a piece of steel wire 21/2 inches long embedded in his body. *** I had 14 shrapnel wounds.

This is my fourth wartime experience, having served in the whalers 'Sylvester' (mined) and 'New Seville' (torpedoed), and the Trawler 'Ocean Tide', which ran ashore.

"As a result of this attack by U-boat, the casualties were six killed, two missing, two injured." (D-645).

The next case is that of the ship "Antonico" which was torpedoed, set afire, and sunk on 28 September 1942, off the coast of French Guiana. The date of the incident is some eleven days after the issue of the order (D-630). A statement given by the Second Officer describes the attack on the ship, which by then was on fire (D-647):

"That the witness saw the dead on the deck of the 'Antonico' as he and his crew tried to swing out their lifeboat; that the attack was fulminant, lasting almost 20 minutes; and that the witness already in the lifeboat tried to get away from the side of the 'Antonico' in order to avoid being dragged down by the same 'Antonico' and also because she was the aggressor's target; that the night was dark, and it was thus difficult to see the submarine, but that the fire aboard the 'Antonico' lit up the locality in which she was submerging, facilitating the enemy to see the two lifeboats trying to get away; that the enemy ruthlessly machined-gunned the sailors in No. 2 lifeboat, in which the witness found himself, and killed the Second Pilot Arnaldo de Andrade de Lima, and wounded three of the crew; that the witness gave orders to his company to throw themselves overboard to save themselves from the bullets; in so doing, they were protected and out of sight behind the lifeboat, which was already filled with water; even so the lifeboat continued to be attacked. At that time the witness and his companions were about 20 meters in distance from the submarine." (D-647)

The U-boat's log in that case is not available, but it may be surmised, in view of the order that nothing compromising should be included in entries in logs, that it would be no more helpful than in the case of the previous incident.

A broadcast by a German Naval War Reporter on the long wave propaganda service from Friesland, (D-646-A) in English, on 11 March 1943, stated:

"Santa Lucia, in the West Indies, was an ideal setting for romance, but nowadays it was dangerous to sail in these waters -- dangerous for the British and Americans and for all the colored people who were at their beck and-call. Recently a U-boat operating in these waters sighted an enemy windjammer. Streams of tracer bullets were poured into the sails and most of the Negro crew leaped overboard. Knowing that this might be a decoy ship, the submarine steamed cautiously to within 20 yards, when hand grenades were hurled into the rigging. The remainder of the Negroes then leaped into the sea. The windjammer sank. There remained only wreckage. Lifeboats packed with men, and sailors swimming. The sharks in the distance licked their teeth in expectation. Such was the fate of those who sailed from Britain and America." (D-646-A)

This statement shows that it was the policy of the enemy to seek to terrorize crews. It is a part with the order with regard to rescue ships and with the order on the destruction of steamers.

After Doenitz succeeded Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he also succeeded to the equivalent rank of a Minister of the Reich, which Raeder had held (2098-PS).

An official report certified by an official of the British Admiralty sets out the number of meetings, the dates of the meetings, and those present, on the occasion of meetings between Doenitz or his representative with Hitler from the time that he succeeded Raeder until the end (D-648). The certificate states:

"I have compiled from them [captured documents] the attached list of occasions on which Admiral Doenitz attended conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The list of other senior officials who- attended the same conferences is added when this information was contained in the captured documents concerned. I certify that the list is a true extract from the collective documents which I have examined, and which are in the possession of the British Admiralty, London."

Either Admiral Doenitz or his deputy, Konteradmiral Voss, was present at each of the numerous meetings listed. Among hose who were also constantly present were Speer, Keitel, Jodl, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler or his lieutenants, Fegelein or Kaltenbrunner. The inference is clear that from the time that he succeeded Raeder, Doenitz was one of the rulers of the Reich and as undoubtedly aware of all major decisions of policy.

(3) The Order to Kill Commandos. An internal memorandum of the Naval War Staff, written by the division dealing with International Law to another division, discusses the order of 18 October 1942, with regard to the shooting of Commandos (C-178).

Doubt appears to have arisen in some quarters with regard to the understanding of this order. Accordingly, in the last sentence of the memorandum it is suggested:

"As far as the Navy is concerned, it remains to be seen whether or not this case should be used to make sure, after a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, that all departments

 

[The Basket]

Are you saying any defence of the Kriegsmarine is anti-Semitic?

 

[Timppa]

Someone mentioned that BC was the same. Not so. BC killed many more civilians than the uboats. They had written policy to attack the morale of civilian populations, dressed up by saying they wanted to 'dehouse" the cities of germany. Such a policy was bound to cause civilian deaths, in exactly the same way as targeting a merchant ship does. that happens. its called collateral damage.

I have a feeling that "Butcher" Harris would not have been happy if all the "dehoused" Germans survived and moved to cozy tents nearby.

 

[parsifal]

{Part III of Doenitz's indictment}

concerned have an entirely clear conception regarding the treatment of members of commando units." (C-178)

Whether that conference took place or not is not known. The document is dated some 11 days after Doenitz had taken over command from Raeder. But in July 1943, the Navy handed over to the SD Norwegian and British Navy personnel, whom the Navy decided came under the terms of the order, for shooting. An affidavit by a British barrister-at-Law who served as judge advocate at the trial of the members of the SD who executed the order states (D-649):

"The accused were charged with committing a war crime, in that they at Ulven, Norway, in or about the month of July 1943, in violation of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing of ***" [there follow the names of six personnel of the Norwegian Navy, including one officer, and one telegraphist of the British Navy, prisoners of war.]

There was evidence before the Court; which was not challenged by the Defense, that Motor Torpedo Boat No. 345 set out from Lerwick in the Shetlands on a naval operation for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on German shipping off the Norwegian coast, and for the purpose of laying mines in the same area. The persons mentioned in the charge were all the crew of the Torpedo Boat.

The defense did not challenge that each member of the crew was wearing uniform at the time of capture, and there was abundant evidence from many persons, several of whom were German, that they were wearing uniform at all times after their capture. On 27 July 1943, the Torpedo Boat reached the island of Aspo off the Norwegian coast, north of Bergen. On the following day the whole of the crew were captured and were taken on board a German naval vessel which was under the command of Admiral von Schrader, the Admiral of the west coast. The crew were taken to the Bergenhus, where they had arrived by 11 p.m. on 28th July. The crew were there interrogated by Leut. H. P. W. W. Fanger, a Naval Leutnant of the Reserve, on the orders of Korvettenkapitaen Egon Drascher, both of the German Naval Intelligence Service. This interrogation was carried out upon the orders of the staff of the Admiral of the west coast. Leut. Fanger reported to the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Branch at Bergen that in his opinion all the members of the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, and that officer in turn reported both orally and in writing to the Sea Commander, Bergen, and in writing to the Admiral of the west coast.

The interrogation by the Naval Intelligence Branch was concluded in the early hours of 29th July, and almost immediately all the members of the crew were handed over on the immediate orders of the Sea Commander, Bergen, to Obersturmbannfuehrer of the SD, Hans Wilhelm Blomberg, who was at that time Kommandeur of the Sicherheitspolizei at Bergen. This followed a meeting between Blomberg and Admiral von Schrader, at which a copy of the Fuehrer order of 18 October 1942 was shown to Blomberg. This order dealt with the classes of persons who were to be excluded from the protection of the Geneva Convention and were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but when captured were to be handed over to the SD. Admiral von Schrader told Blomberg that the crew of this Torpedo Boat were to be handed over in accordance with the Fuehrer order, to the SD." (D-649)

The affidavit goes on to describe the interrogation by officials of the SD. These officials took the same view as the Naval Intelligence officers, that the crew were entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. Nevertheless, the crew were taken out and shot by an execution squad composed of members of the SD. The affidavit concludes as follows:

"It appeared from the evidence that in March or April, 1945, an order from the Fuehrer Headquarters, signed by Keitel, was transmitted to the German authorities in Norway. The substance of the order was that members of the crew of commando raids who fell into German captivity were from that date to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. This order referred specifically to the Fuehrer order referred to above." (D-649)

The date mentioned is important; it was time "in March or April, 1945," for these men to put their affairs in order.(or put more bluntly, to hide what they had done).

(4) Reasons for Not Renouncing the Geneva Convention.

The minutes of conferences on 19 February 1945 and 20 February 1945 between Doenitz and Hitler read as follows:

"The Fuehrer is considering whether or not Germany should renounce the Geneva Convention *** [the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention]. The Fuehrer orders the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to consider the pros and cons of their step and to state his s opinion as soon as possible." (C-158)

Doenitz then stated his opinion in the presence of Jodl and a representative of Ribbentrop:

"On the contrary, the disadvantages [of renouncing the convention] outweigh the advantages. It would be better to carry out the measures considered necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the outer world." (C-158)

An extract from the minutes of another meeting between Doenitz and Hitler, on 1 July 1944, -- the extract is signed by Doenitz -- states:

" *** Regarding the General Strike in Copenhagen, the Fuehrer says that the only weapon to deal with terror is terror. Court martial proceedings create martyrs. History shows that the names of such men are on everybody's lips, whereas there is silence with regard to the many thousands who have lost their lives in similar circumstances without court martial proceedings." (C-171)

(5) Use of Concentration Camp Labor in Shipyards.
In a memorandum signed by Doenitz sometime late in 1944, which was distributed to Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Speer, and the Supreme Command of the Air Force, Doenitz reviews German shipping losses, and concludes:

"Furthermore, I propose reinforcing the shipyard working parties by prisoners from the concentration camps and as a special measure for relieving the present shortage of coppersmiths, especially in U-boat construction, I propose to divert coppersmiths from the construction of locomotives to shipbuilding." (C-195)

In dealing with sabotage, Doenitz has this to say:

"Since, elsewhere, measures for exacting atonement taken against whole working parties amongst whom sabotage occurred, have proved successful, and,-for example, the shipyard sabotage in France was completely suppressed, possibly similar measures for the Scandinavian countries will come under consideration." (C-195)

Item 2 of the summing-up reads:

"12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor (security service [SD] agrees to this) " (C-195)

It was not for nothing that at these meetings Himmler and his Lieutenants, Fegelein and Kaltenbrunner, were present. They were not there to discuss U-boats or the use of battleships. It is clear from this document that Doenitz knew all about concentration camps and concentration camp labor, and as one of the rulers of Germany he must bear his full share of that responsibility.

(6) Doenitz's Incitement of Ruthless Conduct By His Men.
The orders issued by Doenitz in April 1945 (D-650) show his fanatical adherence to the Nazi manifesto, and his preparedness even at that stage to continue a hopeless war at the expense of human life, and with the certainty of increased destruction and misery to his country:

"I therefore demand of the commanding officers of the Navy: That they clearly and unambiguously follow the path of military duty, whatever may happen. I demand of them that they stamp out ruthlessly all signs and tendencies among the men which endanger the following of this

"I demand from Senior Commanders that they should take just as ruthless action against any commander who does not do his military duty. If a commander does not think he has the moral strength to occupy his position as a leader in this sense, he must report this immediately. He will then be used as a soldier in this fateful struggle in some position in which he is not burdened with any tasks as a leader." (D-650)

In the secret Battle order of the day of 19 April 1945, Doenitz gives an example of the type of under-officer who should be promoted:

"An example: In a prison camp of the auxiliary cruiser 'Cormorau', in Australia, a petty officer acting as camp senior officer, had all communists who made themselves noticeable among the inmates of the camp systematically done away with in such a way that the guards did not notice. This petty officer is sure of my full recognition for his decision and his execution. After his return, I shall promote him with all means, as he has shown that he is fitted to be a leader."

E. CONCLUSION
Doenitz was no plain sailor, playing the part of a service officer; loyally obedient to the orders of the government of the day. He an extreme Nazi who did his utmost to indoctrinate the Navy and the German people with the Nazi creed. It is no coincidence that it was he -- not Goering, not Ribbentrop, not Goebbels, not Himmler -- who was chosen to succeed Hitler. He played a large part in fashioning the U-boat fleet, one of the most deadly weapons of war. He helped to plan and execute aggressive wars, which he knew well were in deliberate violation of treaties. He was ready to stoop to any ruse where he thought he would not be found out: breaches of the Geneva Convention or of neutrality, where it might be asserted that sinking was due to a mine. He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally.



He was a man with blood allover him and in the terms of reference of this thread, a thoroughly political creature

 

[parsifal]

I have a feeling that "Butcher" Harris would not have been happy if all the "dehoused" Germans survived and moved to cozy tents nearby.

Its irrelevant how harris, or anyone else felt. its a question of criminality here. And conclusively, despite the heavy civilian losses inflicted by BC, they did not engage in criminal behaviour to carry that out. Provided the city had not surrendered it was not a crime to bomb a city in WWII.

In terms of the original thread topic, BC was definitely a political beast. it had to be. The same as Doenitz was, and the same as goring was.

 

[parsifal]

Are you saying any defence of the Kriegsmarine is anti-Semitic?

Nope. Im saying the source of the material I posted is jewish. im waiting for someone to open up and say because of that the material cant be relied upon

I am saying that too often it is claimed that DKM at the end of day were a "decent bunch of boffins who fought an honourable war". They did not, because they served a morally bankrupt and yet malevolently evil genius of a commander and an even crazier Commander In Chief. Donitz should have been hanged at the end of the war, but escaped the noose mostly because of nimitz

 

[Elmas]

Allied Commanders were not immune from controversial episodes...

Dudley W. Morton - Wikipedia

 

[stona]

I have a feeling that "Butcher" Harris would not have been happy if all the "dehoused" Germans survived and moved to cozy tents nearby.

Harris would have been happy to raze every single German city to the ground. He believed it would win the war. So did many others. Harris did not make the UK government's bombing policy, he implemented it.

'The essence of war is violence; moderation in war is imbecility'. Macauley, 1831.

Robin Niellands has written (rather more recently) that

'[Wars] are fought by ordinary people … once they are in it they find moral questions largely academic; their main aim is to stay alive, and to win.'

Now, the idea that war is something to be won at any cost, preferably to be paid by the enemy, is a point that can be endlessly debated by moral philosophers, who tend to find so blunt a point unacceptable. Wars are not usually fought by moral philosophers. They are, however, re-fought by armchair generals and moral philosophers, with the benefit of hindsight. They are almost invariably guilty of the most inane presentism in their half baked revisionism.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Dimlee]

He was ready to order, and did order, the murder of helpless survivors of sunken ships, an action only paralleled by that of his Japanese ally.

Thank you for posting extensive materials about DKM. I'm sure they are very useful for those who were not aware of all that before. And for those who considered Donitz to be a "plain sailor" and apolitical warrior.

One small problem. Probably my eyes let me down but I found nothing which confirmed your following statement:
He...did order, the murder of helpless survivors

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The comment about anti semites coming out from under the rocks is unessessary, ignorant and bullshit. And downright insulting to the forum membership. You know damn well there are no anti semites on this forum.

So why even go there, unless the purpose was simply to insult and antagonize from the position of a high horse.

And that is all I will say on that matter.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

And my apologies if that comes across as rude. It was a bit harsh, and I will tone it down. Any member on this forum who woukd have done that, is no longer here. It really was an uncalled for comment.