was the me 262 delay only hitler fault?

[aurelien wolff]

Hi,

I have some doubt about that because the schnellbomber variant where considered before the airrcaft was presented to hitler,and theyr is also this:

 

[MIflyer]

First the Me262 was sold as a multirole aircraft from the start. The Germans were all agog over the DH98 and Willy made that aspect a part of his marketing strategy.

Second, the real limitation on building the Me262 was the lack of high temperature materials for the engines, specifically nickle. The engines, when cleared for production, only had about 25 hours of life. Aside from the operational problems that caused, that short service life required many many engines be built.

And the Hitler "build it as a bomber" order only lasted about 6 months, from the spring of 1944 to September. The idea was to use the 262 as a bomber to interfere with the Allied invasion and when Patton's tanks penetrated deeply into France after Operation Cobra that became pointless.

David Baker's book is the best one on the development of the Me262.

 

[GrauGeist]

Both Hitler and Göering asked Messerschmitt if it could be a bomber (Göering during a visit at the Augsburg plant and Hitler during the demonstration at Insterburg) and each time, Willy said it was.
In a twist of irony, Hitler was adamant about the Me262 being a bomber and at a meeting in May 1944, lost his mind when he was informed the 262 was being built as a fighter, not a bomber BUT it appears that no one explained to Hitler that the Ar234, which had made it's first flight nearly a year before and was soon to be ready for service was perfectly suited for a bombing role.

So the insistance that the Me262 be a "Schnell Bomber" did cause some delays in production, but the real culprit (early on) was it's engines - both BMW and Junkers were having issues which delayed the Me262's production from the start. This is why the Me262 first flew under it's own power in 1941 with a Jumo210G mounted in it's nose and then a year later with actual jet engines.

The same problem with engines doomed the He280, which first flew under it's own power a year before the Me262, but with HeS8 jet engines. The HeS8, HeS30 and HeS011 engines never were completely debugged, so that and lack of interest from the RLM doomed the He280 to history's back seat.

In the end, problematic engine development, political medling and untimately fuel and pilot shortages kept Germany's jets from realizing their full potential.

 

[Thos9]

The HeS8, HeS30 and HeS011 engines never were completely debugged, so that and lack of interest from the RLM doomed the He280 to history's back seat.

As to the HeS30 never being completely debugged, please cite the source.

 

[GrauGeist]

The HeS8, HeS30 and HeS011 engines never were completely debugged, so that and lack of interest from the RLM doomed the He280 to history's back seat.

As to the HeS30 never being completely debugged, please cite the source.

Which source would you like?
Nearly all will tell you that while the HeS30 (006) held a great deal of promise and easy to manufacture, it was never allowed to fully be developed because of pressure from the RLM to stay focused on the Class I engines (003 and 004) and the Class II engines, like the HeS011.

Anthony Kay:
German Jet Engine and Gas Turbine Development 1930–1945
Turbojet History and Development 1930–1960

Bill Gunston:
World Encyclopedia of Aero Engines: From the Pioneers to the Present Day

There's several others, but this should be enough...

 

[Thos9]

Which source would you like?
Nearly all will tell you that while the HeS30 (006) held a great deal of promise and easy to manufacture, it was never allowed to fully be developed because of pressure from the RLM to stay focused on the Class I engines (003 and 004) and the Class II engines, like the HeS011.

Anthony Kay:
German Jet Engine and Gas Turbine Development 1930–1945
Turbojet History and Development 1930–1960

Bill Gunston:
World Encyclopedia of Aero Engines: From the Pioneers to the Present Day

There's several others, but this should be enough...

Neither Kay nor Gunston nor any other author says anything about HeS30 (006) never being completely debugged. Gunston says "As for the 006 turbojet, this made amazing progress but was dropped in early 1943 because of the (probably mistaken) RLM belief that an engine of 617mm diameter could not be sufficiently powerful for combat aircraft." Kay details Schelp's (RLM) objections but compliments "this remarkable engine"s exceptional quality." Similarly Robert Schlaifer in "The Development of Aircraft Engines". Edward Constant in "The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution" says "by the end of 1942, the 006's basic problems had been solved."

 

[GrauGeist]

Thos9, I appreciate where you're going with this, but let's allow history to bear this out.
Let's first look at how many HeS30 engine made it to operational status: none.

Now it's been said that the test engine was finally able to be bench-tested by late 1942, and ran up to full power with satisfactory results.
Fine, but was it installed in an airframe and given a load test? No.
Was the the engine produced in a quantity that would give it a performance curve over a specific period of time? No.
Were there multiple engines that were tested to give a performance profile needed for combat applications? No.
So what we're talking about, is an engine (which held a great deal of promise) never being able to be tested beyond the prototype stage, tested in a real world environment or even manufactured.

It was not debugged.

 

[ljadw]

Thos9, I appreciate where you're going with this, but let's allow history to bear this out.
Let's first look at how many HeS30 engine made it to operational status: none.

Now it's been said that the test engine was finally able to be bench-tested by late 1942, and ran up to full power with satisfactory results.
Fine, but was it installed in an airframe and given a load test? No.
Was the the engine produced in a quantity that would give it a performance curve over a specific period of time? No.
Were there multiple engines that were tested to give a performance profile needed for combat applications? No.
So what we're talking about, is an engine (which held a great deal of promise) never being able to be tested beyond the prototype stage, tested in a real world environment or even manufactured.

It was not debugged.

Hi,

I have some doubt about that because the schnellbomber variant where considered before the airrcaft was presented to hitler,and theyr is also this:

The OP is starting from the questionable POV that that the use /earlier use of the me 262 would have been a good thing .The question is : did Germany need less,but qualitatively ''better '' fighters/bombers, or more fighters/bombers who were qualitatively less ''good '' than the new ones ?
A subsidiary, but not less important question is :was it easier to train 100 pilots/crews of a existing fighter/bomber than the same number for a me262/schnellbomber ? Fighters/bombers without crews are useless .
What was better : quantity or quality ?

 

[GrauGeist]

The OP is starting from the questionable POV that that the use /earlier use of the me 262 would have been a good thing .The question is : did Germany need less,but qualitatively ''better '' fighters/bombers, or more fighters/bombers who were qualitatively less ''good '' than the new ones ?
A subsidiary, but not less important question is :was it easier to train 100 pilots/crews of a existing fighter/bomber than the same number for a me262/schnellbomber ? Fighters/bombers without crews are useless .
What was better : quantity or quality ?

That's the age-old question that leads to a great deal of speculation.
First of all, the quality of a machine will mean that it will be able to perform it's mission profile as anticipated.
However, quantity of a type without qulity doesn't always mean success: the Curtiss SO3C "Seamew" is a prime example.
In regards to pilot training and the Me262, the answer to that is that the Me262 (and Ar234) had a better chance of survival due to it's speed. In the later stages of the war, the Luftwaffe had zero air superiority and their piston-engined bombers mostly languished on the ground (the ones that remained) as any day flights had a high probability of being intercepted by Allied fighters and downed.

Now in regards to the "what-ifs"...
In order for the Me262 to appear two years earlier, means that the 003 and 004 would have to be ready for production, but they weren't.
In order for the engine development to be accelerated, the RLM needed to have placed a high priority both on the engine program and procuring the much needed materials the engines required.
In order for the RLM to have placed a priority on the engines, they needed to take the entire jet program seriously from the start, which they didn't.
When the He178 fist flew in August 1939, there was literally no interest from the RLM - even though it was achieving speeds over 375mph.
When Heinkel arranged for the high-command to have a demonstration of the He178 in November, Göering didn't even attand.

So had the RLM prioritized the jet program from the start, by: provided funding for accelerated development, provided the much needed exotic metals, supported the He280 and Me262 development (both by being objective in their design and not interfering with the design) than there would have been jets over Europe at a time when the Luftwaffe held air superiority and it would have changed the face of the airwar (but not the outcome).

 

[Shortround6]

A lot of this getting jets into service quicker depends on an awful lot of things going at least as well as they did historical and probably an awful lot better.

We are are also using terms without any precise definitions.

What does "completely debugged" really mean?
1 failure in 10 hours, 1 in 25 hours, 1 in hundred?

or "by the end of 1942, the 006's basic problems had been solved. "

Ok, what were the basic problems and what are the advanced or secondary problems?

I don't want to turn this into an American vs Germany argument but GE started the development of the J-35 Axial engine in 1943 using parts and knowledge gained in working on a turbo prop engine. 4 years late the engine was barely useable in test flying a number of prototypes. The XB-48 bomber went through 14 engines in 44 flights (it started with 6 engines so depending on how you count it went through one engine every 5.5 flights for 8 replacement engines) it took another year or two to get the J-35 straightened out and become a reliable engine by american standards. Over 14,000 would up being made and overhaul life of the late engines (1950s manufacture) went over 1000 hours if I remember correctly.

It isn't a question of who's engineers were smarter, it is a question of who had more engineers, more test facilities, more resources for materials, (not just the raw materials but materials processing) and so on.
Look at the development of some of the British engines. Getting them up to the standards of reliability or life of existing piston engines took several years beyond the end of the war.

JUst getting a Jet to run at all under it's own power was an achievement in 1941-42. let alone power a plane and getting one to last for more than few hours let alone operational problems like flame outs and restarting in flight took a bit of solving.

 

[Thos9]

Thos9, I appreciate where you're going with this, but let's allow history to bear this out.
Let's first look at how many HeS30 engine made it to operational status: none.

Now it's been said that the test engine was finally able to be bench-tested by late 1942, and ran up to full power with satisfactory results.
Fine, but was it installed in an airframe and given a load test? No.
Was the the engine produced in a quantity that would give it a performance curve over a specific period of time? No.
Were there multiple engines that were tested to give a performance profile needed for combat applications? No.
So what we're talking about, is an engine (which held a great deal of promise) never being able to be tested beyond the prototype stage, tested in a real world environment or even manufactured.

It was not debugged.

It wasn't lack of debugging the HeS30 that doomed the He280 to history's back seat. - it was just the RLM.

 

[GrauGeist]

...What does "completely debugged" really mean?
1 failure in 10 hours, 1 in 25 hours, 1 in hundred?

or "by the end of 1942, the 006's basic problems had been solved. "

By using that term, it cut down on a long dissertation in regards to not only the 006, but the other engines as well.
Yes, several design issues had been addressed on the 006 and it showed a great deal of promise BUT it was never put through trials on an airframe for load testing or active demand profile. So we're left to speculate on how it "would have" performed based on bench-tests.

The other jet engines never were able to be fully developed because of lack of maturation, lack of necessary materials needed (raw material for alloys), lack of support for development and lack of protected factories for production.

It wasn't lack of debugging the HeS30 that doomed the He280 to history's back seat. - it was just the RLM.

To a certain degree, you would be right.

The RLM didn't see the Jet program as a necessity until the wartime situation was dire. By then, they were crying for the Me262, the He162, the Ar234, the Ho229 and anything else they thought that could save their ass.
But as I have already mentioned, they had the opportunity to take the lead the month before the war started, by taking what the He178 proved seriously - and they did not.

Even when the He280, powered by HeS8 engines (which still had problems), completely outflew an Fw190 in various trials, the RLM did not pay much attention to it's merits.

 

[aurelien wolff]

go back to do subject please,my question was talking about those who only blame hitler for the me 262 delay .

 

[Zipper730]

I honestly thought the biggest delay was the change from tail-dragger to nose-gear...

 

[GrauGeist]

go back to do subject please,my question was talking about those who only blame hitler for the me 262 delay .

That has already been answered in detail.
The Me262 was already delayed two years before Hitler was interested in it being a "Schnell Bomber", because of engine problems.

I honestly thought the biggest delay was the change from tail-dragger to nose-gear...

The problem of conventional gear wasn't aparent until V3 was test-flown under pure jet power in July 1942, V5 (first flight June '43) and V6 (first flight October '43) had the nose gear installed - V5's nose gear was fixed-forward, V6's was fully retractable.

However, by summer of '43, they were still having teething problems with the 004A and the nose gear issue was accomplished while the engine problem was being worked on.

 

[taly01]

go back to do subject please,my question was talking about those who only blame hitler for the me 262 delay .

Hitler and the Me262 is a post-war blame Hitler for everything myth. Eduard Milch was in charge of Luftwaffe production and is probably the worst meddler in advanced Luftwaffe projects, he gleefully announced he got the Me262 and He219 projects put on lowest priority in 1943.

 

[Shortround6]

I would say that any engineering team that could not figure out a couple of bomb racks on a high powered fighter plane in 6 months should not try working on anything more complicated than a one speed bicycle.

Does anybody know of any other fighter plane that took 6 months to fit a couple of bomb racks on?

Good thing Hitler asked for the bomb racks, it gave them time to get get the engines up to bad from truly deplorable.

 

[GrauGeist]

Hitler and the Me262 is a post-war blame Hitler for everything myth. Eduard Milch was in charge of Luftwaffe production and is probably the worst meddler in advanced Luftwaffe projects, he gleefully announced he got the Me262 and He219 projects put on lowest priority in 1943.

Milch wasn't the only one.
When Udet was told the ground breaking news that the He178 had flown successfully under jet power, he went back to sleep and again, when he was shown the He280, he was less than impressed and Milch cancelled the He280 program in March of '43.
Then there was the fat clown, Goering, who could have made everything happen, but he allowed the entire program to fall to the back burner from the onset.
And don't forget Schelp, who was the RLM's Engine Development director. He terminated the HeS8 and HeS30 engines in favor of the HeS011 (he preferred the axial design over the centrifugal design) and by doing this, robbed the He280 of it's much needed engine and left the Luftwaffe's jet program at the mercy of the sluggish 003 and 004 development.
The irony is, that the HeS30 was comparable to the 003 and 004's output, but weighed almost 400 pounds less than the 003 and almost half the weight of the 004 - perfect for the Me262, Ar234 and other types that were under development at that time.

I would say that any engineering team that could not figure out a couple of bomb racks on a high powered fighter plane in 6 months should not try working on anything more complicated than a one speed bicycle.

Does anybody know of any other fighter plane that took 6 months to fit a couple of bomb racks on?

Good thing Hitler asked for the bomb racks, it gave them time to get get the engines up to bad from truly deplorable.

And the placement of the bomb racks on the A1-a leaves one scratching their head because they messed with the aircraft's CoG.
Even with the A2-a and deleting of two of the MK108s, it still created an issue with CoG.
I'm not sure why they didn't place the hardpoints just outboard of the engines, surely the wing was sturdy enough to handle 550 additional pounds each.

 

[Greyman]

Things released from your aircraft at speed don't always act how you want them to - maybe there was some trouble there.

 

[Milosh]

Iirc there was also a fuel reduction when bombs were fitted.