was the me 262 delay only hitler fault?

[Shortround6]

Things released from your aircraft at speed don't always act how you want them to - maybe there was some trouble there.

Iirc there was also a fuel reduction when bombs were fitted.

Both may very well be true but was either problem enough to stop or slow down production over?

can we name any other plane where either dropping stores or having to fly with reduced fuel slowed or stopped initial production while it was sorted out?

As far as I know (which could be very little) they made no attempt to take out a pair of the 30mm cannon in order to restore fuel capacity or balance?

Any change in bomb racks or deflector plates (change local airflow)?

And since the whole "hang a pair of bombs on it for the airshow"thing was to gain approval from Hitler they never really intended to use the thing as bomber in the first place.

 

[dedalos]

Blaming Hitler for everything is convenient. In my opinion Goering, Milch, Galland and RLM failed the needs of the front line units on every program. they failed to on every program, it was natural that they failed in Me 262 too. They failed to distribute properly the limited numbers of engineers and resources available for development work.
T hey failed to prioritize correctly the needs and equipment. They gave the db603 to the Do217(!) instead of FW190. They were developing transatlantic bombers when ,already in early 1943, did not have fuel for the Ju87s on the eastern front. They ignored 2 stage superchargers and when they finally realized their need ,they were demanding full pressure height of 12 km!
How the Me262 could be operational in early 1944 with that leadership?

 

[Shortround6]

They ignored 2 stage superchargers and when they finally realized their need ,they were demanding full pressure height of 12 km!

Which is pretty much standard. What I mean is that if you specify a full pressure of height of 7-8000 meters in 1943 to be delivered in late 1944/early 1945 you are setting yourself up to be in the same situation. If the British and Americans already have planes in service in 1943 (or whenever the 12km requirement was issued) then where are they going to be in 1-2 years?

The P-47M/N could hold full pressure (for 2100hp not 2000) to 38,750ft in late 1944. That is 11811 meters.
A P-38L could make 1138hp at 32,200ft (9814 meters)

With the Merlins we have the problem of deciding which pressure to use but a -9 Packard Merlin as used in the P-51H could make 1200hp at 35,000 with the engine "static" (not moving) it could make the same 1200hp act best climb speed and at high speed level flight it could make 1200hp at 40,000ft.

How the Me262 could be operational in early 1944 with that leadership?

There is only so much you can blame on poor leadership and only so much good leadership can take credit for when it comes to some technical aspects of engine development. Sometimes it just takes time or throwing some aspects out and starting over.

The Allison company helped turn the GE J-35 from a low powered, short lived engine to a higher powered one with a much longer life by redesigning the lubrication system.
The original engine used an oil/air mist while Allison went for a pressure system with scavenging. But it meant a total redesign of the bearing areas.

 

[dedalos]

Which is pretty much standard. What I mean is that if you specify a full pressure of height of 7-8000 meters in 1943 to be delivered in late 1944/early 1945 you are setting yourself up to be in the same situation. If the British and Americans already have planes in service in 1943 (or whenever the 12km requirement was issued) then where are they going to be in 1-2 years?
First of all bombers were coming at 6-7000 meters. That s the crucial height.
Besides that, the current service fighters with their single stage superchargers , were totally outclassed and slaughtered. The priority should be the fast introduction of an 2 stage supercharger even with more modest performance. A full pressure height of 9000m would be vast improvement and would close the performance gap a lot. For performance above that height , GM1 could be used
Instead the RLM rejected any interim solutions , wanting the perfect that never came.. When the british met the Fw190 did not wait the introduction of the Spitfire XIV. They created the IX version as an interim solution to help the immediate needs.


The P-47M/N could hold full pressure (for 2100hp not 2000) to 38,750ft in late 1944. That is 11811 meters.
Not reliably in 1944
A P-38L could make 1138hp at 32,200ft (9814 meters)
Obviously turbo superchargers are un matched at altitude

With the Merlins we have the problem of deciding which pressure to use but a -9 Packard Merlin as used in the P-51H could make 1200hp at 35,000 with the engine "static" (not moving) it could make the same 1200hp act best climb speed and at high speed level flight it could make 1200hp at 40,000ft.
Germany s problem was not the middle 1945 merlin but the 1943-4 merlin. It s true that in middle 1945 the TA152H probably would match the P51H performance at altitude , but what benefit was that to the Jagdwaffe?




There is only so much you can blame on poor leadership and only so much good leadership can take credit for when it comes to some technical aspects of engine development. Sometimes it just takes time or throwing some aspects out and starting over.
In my opinion most of the problems with the major development programs were not of technical nature but of management nature. Jumo 222, Db610 , He 177,high altitude performance of the Fw 190 , Me 262 ,Do 317B,Do335A6 could have offered valuable service. There was nothing technically unsolvable

The Allison company helped turn the GE J-35 from a low powered, short lived engine to a higher powered one with a much longer life by redesigning the lubrication system.
The original engine used an oil/air mist while Allison went for a pressure system with scavenging. But it meant a total redesign of the bearing areas.

 

[Shortround6]

The bombers in Europe never changed altitude, however the next generation of bombers (the B-29s) could have come in thousands of feet higher. We have the benefit of hindsight to know what did and did not happen, and place blame (or give credit) accordingly.

A little too much blame is being put on the superchargers here. The 109, given good pilots and decent engines should not have been slaughtered in 1943 or early 1944.
But if the DB 605 would not stand up to the use of 1.42 ATa from a single stage supercharger sticking a two stage supercharger on it and using more boost is just going to give more failed engines. It took too long just to get the DB605 to stand up to the pressure it's supercharger would make. The use of the supercharger from the DB603 on the 605 was a good work around for a temporary solution.
The germans had not figured out the fuel problem, using high ratios of compression in the supercharger means high intake temperatures. You need either intercoolers and or water injection to get the temperatures back down to what the fuel will tolerate. It is interconnected. two stage superchargers without good fuel (and the German fuel may have been good, they just weren't measuring what they needed to for this application) and charge cooling is not going to give you good high altitude performance.

 

[parsifal]

I actually agree with milch's assessment of lowering the priority for the 262. In 1943 when he made those decisions, the 262 was an albatross around the LWs neck offering no solution to the immediate problems confronting it and massively increasing its inability to combat the relentless offensive demolishing German cities at that time.

From an operational standpoint the main problem with the 262 was that it was brand new technology with a whole mass of problems not easily solved leading to abysmal operational readiness rates. These problems were solvable but it needed time and resources….things that Germany did not possess in 1943. They were short of such resources from the get go really.

The question being asked is the wrong one really. Its not that Hitler delayed the entry of the 262, its that he insisted on its service entry. Like the Tiger tank, it was a technological marvel that was TOTALLY unsuited to German capabilities and resources, and should never have had resources lavished on it in the first place.

Outright victory for Germany was unobtainable by 1942. What was possible was a negotiated settlement, but to create the conditions needed for that scenario, the germans needed to conserve their resources and inflict successive defensive successes on the Russians in particular. If the Russians could be forced to the peace table, the germans had a chance, but such opportunity needed to be achieved the hard way after the failure of the 1941 offensive. If the Russians could be knocked out of the war, resources could be freed up to waste on projects like the 262 and the v2. Otherwise, the germans were better served by lifting their production of existing types by something like 40% (yes 40%....40% of the RLM budget in 1943-4 was being frittered away on "special projects" like the 262 which yielded nothing in the short term….at the end of the day it was money and raw materials that limited German outputs, not factory space)

 

[ThomasP]

In response to Shortround6 post#25 and the other posts related to the GE, P&W, Wright, and German superchargers,

The Germans had figured out the supercharger problems by about late-1942, if by no other way than the reverse engineering of the Merlin XX and later engines. The US also had figured out the supercharger problems, if by no other way than through the UK providing the Merlin XX and 60 series supercharger designs.

However, both the Germans and the US (US in the early part of the war at least) had other fish to fry, so to speak.

The Germans had to plan on maybe not having high quality aviation fuel, and the Eastern Front was using up most of their focus and resources. In addition they used direct fuel injection on all(?) their high performance engines, which had some advantages over carburetor types, but did not allow for the fuel injection into the eye of the supercharger.

The US had institutional inertia to overcome, and not just relative to the turbo installations. The Allison V-1710 did not evolve to the level of the single-stage Merlin until the Rolls Royce Allison Merlin V-1710'G' series. The V-1710'G' could aptly be described as a 'Merlinized' and 'Hookerized' model with a slightly modified Merlin ⌀10.25" impeller, Merlin 6:1 cylinder compression ratio, and Hooker geometry for the airflow (I am not sure where the fuel was injected in the P-38L V-1710'G' series system). P&W did not come into their own until late-1944 with their R-2800 'C' series engines, and Wright not until their R-2600 'C' series? in 1945? (maybe not during the war?)

What I am saying by the above, any jokes aside, is why did the Germans and the US not simply put the Merlin supercharger on their engines? The answer is the very large amount of design, retooling, and trouble shooting that would be required. I can not say for sure how long the delay/disruption in production such a switch would have caused in 1942-43, but even today it would take a year, plus or minus a couple of months. For the US at least, while what they had for superchargers may not have been upto comparison with the Merlin, it was 'good enough' in an operational sense for the most part.

For the Germans, leaving out the fuel quality issue leaves engines that are pretty much equal to the US and UK engines in any operational sense, at least until it no longer really mattered.

 

[nuuumannn]

I think Michael has hit nail on the head; we are looking at a lot more than the immediate issues with jet development - engine and airframe in Germany. Third Reich style leadership was as much the biggest stumbling block to Germany winning the war as the Allies. We know that already, but there are also other strategic factors influencing the course of events. Action by the Allies in stymying these projects developments through bombing raids against production facilities etc. That Germany was developing jets was known about by the Allies since 1942/1943 - the latter over a year before the Me 262 entered service that the British had their first reconnaissance photos of it. We can even go back to 1940 when captured German intel gave British Intelligence the designation He 280 as a potential new jet, although little was revealed about what it actually was.

From 1943, The Third Reich was being pushed backwards on almost all fronts and although the war would rage for another nearly two years, for the first time, the Allies began to make serious in-roads into regaining footing previously lost; from then on, the 8th AF and RAF Bomber Command could launch a massive bombing campaign that would shock the Germans with its ferocity. The battle against the U-boats was turning the tide toward unsustainable U-boat losses as opposed to Merchant ship losses. The Afrika Corps were facing defeat and by the end of the year the Allies were firmly entrenched in Italy. The Russians had begun their inexorable drive toward Berlin. These factors forced the Germans into touting wunderwaffen as the silver bullet that would win the war, but they were a knee jerk reaction to what was going on and the dawning realisation, but not acceptance that Germany was losing. Again, Third Reich management were making ad-hoc decisions to attempt to turn the tide, and unfortunately for Germany these decisions were made in haste.

 

[GrauGeist]

However, Grant, the fact remains that the He280 and Me262 were in the pipeline before 1942.

There was nothing but a collective yawn from the RLM between 1939 and 1943 and as soon as the situation became dire, the RLM made the jets a priority.
Just like the German aircraft manufacturing didn't hit a true wartime footing until 1944, long after their ass was hanging in the breeze.

I should also point out, that *had* the RLM made the jet program a priority early on, then all the resources that were squandered later on trying to develop the various high-output piston engines would have not happened...

 

[nuuumannn]

Dave, I agree and disagree, but regardless of when the Germans began these projects, the crux of the matter is when the Allies find out about them and attempt to stop them. Had their development been accelerated due to urgency from the outset and the He 280 was further developed and entered service, you can guarantee the Allied effort to stop them would have been equally measured and timed. Again though, since the Germans rushed things with the 262, is it not arguable that their development from early on would have led to a similar time line? Hard to quantify, all things considered.

then all the resources that were squandered later on trying to develop the various high-output piston engines would have not happened...

Possibly, I would state perhaps might not have happened to the same degree rather than would not have happened; gotta have that back up plan...

 

[parsifal]

A case can be made for special projects 1939-41, because at this time Germany had the potential to exercise industrial superiority over its opponents (which paradoxically it failed to take advantage of). It could, in other words afford to pour money into long term projects like the 262. At that time it should have exerted itself more than it did to get its jet program to fruition, but failed to do so

Once the resource equation had swung so decisively against Germany, and Germany was so demonstrably bleeding and wounded by Allied actions, the situation was dramatically changed. It made no sense to remain or elevate priority to projects that offered no prospect of immediate or short term benefit. You do not triage a critically wounded patient by going off and inventing some new gismo that might increase efficiency years down the track

Allied R&D priorities, incidentally were always firmly in this camp. The allies harboured no romantic ideas of technological showing off in the same way as the Germans. The British and the Russians in particular displayed a ruthless pragmatism in downgrading or cancelling projects that had little hope of an immediate military return for the investment being put into those projects

 

[taly01]

Milch wasn't the only one..........And don't forget Schelp, who was the RLM's Engine Development director. He terminated the HeS8 and HeS30 engines in favor of the HeS011 (he preferred the axial design over the centrifugal design) and by doing this, robbed the He280 of it's much needed engine and left the Luftwaffe's jet program at the mercy of the sluggish 003 and 004 development............. and other types that were under development at that time.

Scientifically they should have run two parallel programs the more conventional He280 with centrifugal engine and swept wing Me262 with axial flow. Given the unknown nature of the new technology it would have been the faster and safer way to find the right option.

The fact the Luftwaffe continually made the wrong choice and wasted time and production resources Me210, He177, Me163, Mistel etc is more than bad luck.

 

[dedalos]

In response to Shortround6 post#25 and the other posts related to the GE, P&W, Wright, and German superchargers,

The Germans had figured out the supercharger problems by about late-1942, if by no other way than the reverse engineering of the Merlin XX and later engines. The US also had figured out the supercharger problems, if by no other way than through the UK providing the Merlin XX and 60 series supercharger designs.

However, both the Germans and the US (US in the early part of the war at least) had other fish to fry, so to speak.

The Germans had to plan on maybe not having high quality aviation fuel, and the Eastern Front was using up most of their focus and resources. In addition they used direct fuel injection on all(?) their high performance engines, which had some advantages over carburetor types, but did not allow for the fuel injection into the eye of the supercharger.

The US had institutional inertia to overcome, and not just relative to the turbo installations. The Allison V-1710 did not evolve to the level of the single-stage Merlin until the Rolls Royce Allison Merlin V-1710'G' series. The V-1710'G' could aptly be described as a 'Merlinized' and 'Hookerized' model with a slightly modified Merlin ⌀10.25" impeller, Merlin 6:1 cylinder compression ratio, and Hooker geometry for the airflow (I am not sure where the fuel was injected in the P-38L V-1710'G' series system). P&W did not come into their own until late-1944 with their R-2800 'C' series engines, and Wright not until their R-2600 'C' series? in 1945? (maybe not during the war?)

What I am saying by the above, any jokes aside, is why did the Germans and the US not simply put the Merlin supercharger on their engines? The answer is the very large amount of design, retooling, and trouble shooting that would be required. I can not say for sure how long the delay/disruption in production such a switch would have caused in 1942-43, but even today it would take a year, plus or minus a couple of months. For the US at least, while what they had for superchargers may not have been upto comparison with the Merlin, it was 'good enough' in an operational sense for the most part.

For the Germans, leaving out the fuel quality issue leaves engines that are pretty much equal to the US and UK engines in any operational sense, at least until it no longer really mattered.

i can not agree with you last sentence. The Db605A and even more the BMW801D were outperformed by a huge margin at altitude by the 2 stage merlins and the turbosupercharged R2800 . Even the excellent DB605D did not close the gap entirely.
The initial decision not to develop 2 stage engines proved disastrous for the west based fighter wings.
The policy of not introducing improvement in order not to disturb production, led at the end of the war, germany to posses thousands brand new inferior fighters (FW190A-D,Bf109G6-14s) , but without pilots. They had been killed flying these obsolete variants against much superior enemy, not just in number, but also in quality

 

[Shortround6]

It took the Germans until Sept-Oct of 1943 to clear the DB 605 to use 1.42 ATA with their existing supercharger. Using any sort of supercharger that heats the intake more is just going cause piston failure that much quicker. And compressing the air more at higher altitudes will heat the air more (raising the peak temperatures in the cylinder) even if you keep the same absolute manifold pressure (1.42 ata).
By the Fall of 1943 the Germans were getting way behind the curve on well trained replacement pilots. Blaming pilot losses in 1944 on lack of high performance superchargers is not facing the real problems.

 

[tomo pauk]

It took the Germans until Sept-Oct of 1943 to clear the DB 605 to use 1.42 ATA with their existing supercharger. Using any sort of supercharger that heats the intake more is just going cause piston failure that much quicker. And compressing the air more at higher altitudes will heat the air more (raising the peak temperatures in the cylinder) even if you keep the same absolute manifold pressure (1.42 ata).
By the Fall of 1943 the Germans were getting way behind the curve on well trained replacement pilots. Blaming pilot losses in 1944 on lack of high performance superchargers is not facing the real problems.

The DB 605 was not the only German engine in service in 1943. Neither BMW 801 nor Jumo 211 never got the 2-stage S/C.
Problems with DB 605 do not exclude having the 2-stage S/C for it in the pipeline, so, once reliability of the base engine is solved, it (2-stage unit) can be installed.

 

[Shortround6]

you are correct, the problems with the 605 do not exclude working on a 2 stage supercharger or developing such a supercharger for different engines.

But a lot of this stuff is interrelated, trying to develop a higher pressure supercharger while you are melting holes in the piston tops is a bit difficult. Trying to develop such superchargers and engines when the fuel situation is uncertain doesn't help either.

We also seem to have rather vague goals for the German 2 stage supercharger/s. What pressure at what altitude?

We also seem to be assuming that a two stage supercharger will give a significant advantage over the GM 1 systems some german aircraft used.
While GM 1 was a bit of a crutch the Germans were perhaps in a better situation to use it than many other air forces.

A two stage supercharger costs weight and bulk, so does the GM 1 system. AN intercooler costs some weight and volume, and it causes drag due to airflow.
The Germans, at least when trying to intercept daylight bombing raids, have their aircraft close to sources of supply. Imagine the US trying to supply Nitrous oxide to a number of Pacific Islands. Or use it in North Africa/Southern Italy.

Two stage superchargers also require (if engine driven) considerable horsepower to run. This raises the IMEP in the cylinders much faster than the output HP at the propshaft rises which increases the need for better fuel.

 

[tomo pauk]

...
We also seem to have rather vague goals for the German 2 stage supercharger/s. What pressure at what altitude?

German fighter engines (BMW 801D, fully rated DB 605A) were making around 1350-1450 PS at 5.7 km, boost of 1.42 ata or thereabout. Moving the rated altitude up by 2-2.5 km for the same boost does not seem like a bridge too far - it was done by big-supercharger versions of DB 605, and by BMW 801S (that featured improved S/C, among other things), albeit too late. The 2-stage S/C should be more efficient at those altitudes, thus leaving more HP to the prop?

We also seem to be assuming that a two stage supercharger will give a significant advantage over the GM 1 systems some german aircraft used.
While GM 1 was a bit of a crutch the Germans were perhaps in a better situation to use it than many other air forces.

A two stage supercharger costs weight and bulk, so does the GM 1 system. AN intercooler costs some weight and volume, and it causes drag due to airflow.
The Germans, at least when trying to intercept daylight bombing raids, have their aircraft close to sources of supply. Imagine the US trying to supply Nitrous oxide to a number of Pacific Islands. Or use it in North Africa/Southern Italy.

Two stage superchargers also require (if engine driven) considerable horsepower to run. This raises the IMEP in the cylinders much faster than the output HP at the propshaft rises which increases the need for better fuel.

GM-1 system is a consumable with, say, funky behavior. Since it is a consumable, each time wings after wings of LW fighters are to be scrambled, it needs to be produced, shipped and poured into tanks. Not too soon, since the tanks of the day can't hold it for plenty of hours. GM-1 will also mean MW 50 is tricky to install.
Intercooler has it's shortcomings, the benefits over-weight them. Once installed, it is always there.
As for the fuel - a Fw 190 that uses 2-stage S/Ced engine and C3 fuel is a better value than a Fw 190 that uses C3 fuel for the 1-stage S/Ced BMW 801D.
Problems with low-ish octane fuel can be circumvented by using ADI and/or intercooler and/or lower CR. Problems with using 1-stage S/C can be solved by installing either turbo or replacing 1-stage unit with a 2-stage one (or adding another gear-driven stage). Germans took their time with turbo and 2-stage engines, to what the families of ww2 Allied pilots are thankful.

 

[ThomasP]

In response to dedalos post#33 and possibly other's posts?,

I may not have been clear in what I was saying, sorry, possibly this is more clear?

The Germans understood the theory and possible advantages of the Merlin 1&2-stage superchargers by late-1942. If they had started design/development for their engines, say in early-1943, it would have taken them until early-1944 to get a Merlinized-Hookerized 1- or 2-stage supercharger in service in any numbers. The required logistics alone would have been a stumbling block for the introduction of the new designs, not overwhelming but significant.

What I mean by my statement "For the Germans, leaving out the fuel quality issue leaves engines that are pretty much equal to the US and UK engines in any operational sense, ..." is:

The DB 601/605 series filled the same niche as the Merlin for operational purposes when fitted to the 109 series airframe, and the BMW 801 and Jumo filled the same roll for the 190 series as the R-2800 or Allison. The engines may not have had the exact level of BMEP or boost that the Allied engines had but they still had enough performance to do the job.

"...at least until it no longer really mattered." means by the time the Germans could have gotten new engines and superchargers in service the war was already lost. In early-1944 it would not have made any significant difference if the Germans had the equivalent of a R-2800 in service (instead of the approximately R-2600 equivalent in the BMW 801).

By early-1944, the Russians in particular, but also the US and UK, had attritted the Germans to the point where they had 0% chance of winning the war. Starting in early-1944 the Germans could have had Me 38s, Bf 51s, FW 47s, and He Feuerspucken, (and the Russian equivalent best) and it would not have changed the outcome of the war. It might have caused the war to drag on a bit longer, and caused more Allied fighter and bomber losses, but that is about it. The German pilots would still have been killed and there would have been thousands of up-to-date fighter aircraft sitting on the ground, just a little later - maybe in late-1945?

On the other hand, switching to the new engines/superchargers/aircraft models would have severely disrupted the numbers of 109 and 190 available during the changeover period, that disrupted period being from about late-'43/early-'44 to late-'44/early-'45. The disruption would have caused far more harm to German operations than the new engines/superchargers/aircraft models could possibly have helped.

The US would have faced similar disruptions/delays (though probably not as severe) in production at a critical time for the Allied build-up/Lend-Lease. Would a Merlinized&Hookerized R-1820/R-1830/R-2600/R-2800/V-1710 in late-'43/early-'44 have made that much difference to the war effort? Would such engine/supercharger combinations have been worth the disruption in production?

 

[tomo pauk]

In response to dedalos post#33 and possibly other's posts?,

I may not have been clear in what I was saying, sorry, possibly this is more clear?

The Germans understood the theory and possible advantages of the Merlin 1&2-stage superchargers by late-1942. If they had started design/development for their engines, say in early-1943, it would have taken them until early-1944 to get a Merlinized-Hookerized 1- or 2-stage supercharger in service in any numbers. The required logistics alone would have been a stumbling block for the introduction of the new designs, not overwhelming but significant.

As before - time and resources spent into making 2-stage supercharged versions of BMW 801, DB 605 and Jumo 211 will be far less than making the DB 603 and Jumo 213 from ground up.
Merlin's 1-stage S/C does not add a lot, if anything to the DB 605, the 2-stage S/C however does, Germans pretty much copied the single-shaft design for DB 603L, 605L and Jumo 213E/F. Willy Mtt. stated himself that '...superiority of Merlin 61 is obvious' in his private correspondence in late 1942.

What I mean by my statement "For the Germans, leaving out the fuel quality issue leaves engines that are pretty much equal to the US and UK engines in any operational sense, ..." is:

The DB 601/605 series filled the same niche as the Merlin for operational purposes when fitted to the 109 series airframe, and the BMW 801 and Jumo filled the same roll for the 190 series as the R-2800 or Allison. The engines may not have had the exact level of BMEP or boost that the Allied engines had but they still had enough performance to do the job.

Above 20000 ft and after early/mid 1943, German engines didn't have had enough of performance to do the job. The Fw 190s pilots were reluctant to enter the combat with P-47s, as proven by captured radio transmissions that are available for download from this very site. Come P-51B and on, LW is in troubles.

"...at least until it no longer really mattered." means by the time the Germans could have gotten new engines and superchargers in service the war was already lost. In early-1944 it would not have made any significant difference if the Germans had the equivalent of a R-2800 in service (instead of the approximately R-2600 equivalent in the BMW 801).

By early-1944, the Russians in particular, but also the US and UK, had attritted the Germans to the point where they had 0% chance of winning the war. Starting in early-1944 the Germans could have had Me 38s, Bf 51s, FW 47s, and He Feuerspucken, (and the Russian equivalent best) and it would not changed the outcome of the war. It might have caused the war to drag on a bit longer, and caused more Allied fighter and bomber losses, but that is about it. The German pilots would still have been killed and there would have been thousands of up-to-date fighter aircraft sitting on the ground, just a little later - maybe in late-1945?

Indeed, Germany lost the war by the time they learned about Merlin 61.
BMW 801D in 1944 was a bit better than R-2600 or 1-stage S/Ced R-2800, but not as good as 2-stage R-2800, let alone turboed R-2800.

On the other hand, switching to the new engines/superchargers/aircraft models would have severely disrupted the numbers of 109 and 190 available during the changeover period, that disrupted period being from about late-'43/early-'44 to late-'44/early-'45. The disruption would have caused far more harm to German operations than the new engines/superchargers/aircraft models could possibly have helped.

Nobody said that new aircraft models are needed, the 'old' types will do if substantially improved versions of old engines are around - LW needed better fighters, not cannon fodder. New engines were also made, bad planning had them installed on bombers and night fighters instead of fighters.

The US would have face similar disruptions/delays (though probably not as severe) in production at a critical time for the Allied build-up/Lend-Lease. Would a Merlinized&Hookerized R-1820/R-1830/R-2600/R-2800/V-1710 in late-'43/early-'44 have made that much difference to the war effort? Would such engine/supercharger combinations have been worth the disruption in production?

No need to Merlinize/Hookerize R-1820 (it has a turbo on B-17s already, the FM-2 is not a frontline fighter), ditto for R-1830 and R-2800 (already have either 2-stage S/C or turbo, along with 1-stage S/C). Ditto for R-2600 - no fighter used it in service. V-1710 was produced in 2-stage version, but got installed in an irrelevant fighter (P-63) by Autumn of 1943.

How about Hokerizing/Merlinizing Hercules or Sabre?

 

[ThomasP]

Hey tomo pauk,

LOL! I was posting on the "Superchargers?" thread while you were posting here. Please see.

I know the Hercules supercharger was Hookerized some time during the war. I think the supercharger for the Sabre was too, but I do not know for sure.

As for ".../aircraft models" I meant new variants of the 109 and 190. I possibly could have left that qualifier out of the discussion but I do not know how much it would take to fit a 2-stage DB engine into a 109, and ditto for a 2-stage BMW in a 190, though given what was done with the 190/Jumo series it obviously could have been done in the 190.