Was the Sea Hurricane a superior naval fighter than the F4F?

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I agree with most of that, none of it is confusing to me. There was also certainly a lag in delivering a lot of the US weapons, even once they had a few, they rarely seemed to arrive quickly enough or in enough numbers for the UK, and this is particularly true of all the naval aircraft including the Martlet / Wildcat. The first ones as you can see in detail from Geoffrey's post were small numbers that got diverted from French and Greek orders etc.

 

[EwenS]

Some data on service entry dates of various fighters with their operational squadrons might help inform the debate.

Fulmar I - June 1940
Fulmar II - Jan 1941

Martlet I - Sept 1940
Martlet III (10 fixed wing Mk.II & Greek order) - June 1941
Martlet II (folding wings) - Jan 1942
Martlet IV - Aug 1942
Wildcat V (FM-1) - Aug 1943
Wildcat VI (FM-2) - June 1944

Sea Hurricane Ib - April 1941
Sea Hurricane IIb - Sept 1942
Sea Hurricane IIc - Oct 1942

Seafire Ib - June 1942
Seafire IIc - June 1942
Seafire L.IIc - March 1943
Seafire F.III - Nov 1943
Seafire L.III - March 1944
Seafire XV - May 1945

Corsair - June 1943

Hellcat I - July 1943
Hellcat II - June 1944

Firefly F.I - Sept 1943

The Martlet I came from the French order for 81 taken over by Britain in June 1940 (10 lost en route to Britain). That contract contained an option clause for a further 100 that was exercised by Britain in summer 1940 and which became fixed wing Martlet III (10 delivered April 1941) and folding wing Martlet II (90). Britain opted to delay the delivery of the latter to get the Sto-wing promised by Grumman as it better suited FAA needs, but that took longer to develop than originally anticipated by Grumman. The 30 from the Greek order also became Martlet III. The Martlet IV were the first delivered under Lend Lease contracts, but to a British spec.

Martlet IV, Sea Hurricane IIb/IIc and Seafire Ib/IIc all saw their operational debuts during Operation Torch. The last front line Hurricane IIc were replaced by Wildcat VI in Sept 1944 on the escort carriers Vindex & Nairana.

Unfortunately, whether rightly or wrongly, Lend Lease didn't always deliver what Britain wanted when it needed it as the US had a habit of putting its own needs first, and cutting back on agreed British allocations particularly for the FAA. So by way of example, in Dec 1942 a schedule of aircraft deliveries was agreed to for the coming year, with a promise to review it in May 1943 with a view to increasing deliveries to the FAA. That included 420 F4U Corsairs, 100 Brewster built F3A Corsairs & 200 F6F Hellcats. Actual deliveries in 1943 were 325, 0 & about 150 respectively. Also included were 185 Canadian built SBW Helldivers only a handful of which were delivered by the end of the year.

Further meetings were held in June 1943 and agreements reached for deliveries in the first 6 months of 1944, which was supposed to be subject to revision at the end of 1943, in relation to US production shortfalls (so maybe covering the problems at Brewster) and changed strategic needs only. But

"When, however, another mission went out last December [1943], it met with an entirely different American attitude. The Americans declined to honour their June agreement, although it contained no clause for unilateral denunciation. They made no attempt to compare the needs and deficiencies of the two navies, and made an offer of a reduced number of aircraft, sufficient only to cover wastage on aircraft already delivered." A V Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty to Churchill in early 1944.

This was at a time that the USN had decided that it needed more aircraft for its advance across the Pacific leading to an increased tempo of operations, which was recognised as reasonable. But it also covered their decision to increase the number of manned replacement air groups they intended to maintain (to 100% for CV & 25% for CVL) as well as an increased USMC and shore based units. And they intended to do so very quickly. As usual Adm Ernie King was getting the blame.

To illustrate the effects of this here are the monthly figures from Admiralty documents as to what was agreed in June 1943 / scaled down for US shortfalls / Offered by the USN in Dec 1943:-

Wildcat - 60 / 50 / 20
Corsair - 60 / 53 / 118
Hellcat - 40 / 40 / 13
Avenger - 45 / 43 / 23
Helldiver - 30 / 21 / 1

One effect was that the FAA only got 26 SBW Helldivers and had to give up on the type as the USN would only provide attrition replacements. So only 1 squadron was formed. By the end of 1944 the RN gave up on trying to extract more from the USN and disbanded the squadron. Amazingly 1944 deliveries of Corsairs from the 3 factories did average out at 118 aircraft per month across Jan - Nov 1944 but with significant monthly fluctuations. From Dec 1944 to the end of the war Britain only received another 150, which just happens to coincide with the USN putting Corsairs onto the CVs to tackle the kamikazies! Hellcat production was expected by the FAA to end in Dec 1945, so plans were being made in 1944 to re-equip Indomitable with Seafires from mid-1946.

The FAA disbanded 3 Avenger squadrons between Oct & Dec 1944. In mid-1945 Britain was receiving refurbished TBF/TBM-1 Avengers in lieu of increased allocations of the TBM-3/3E model.

There were other effects of not being able to get enough aircraft either from British manufacturers (through the RAF having priority) or from the USA via Lend Lease. The FAA expansion programme of Oct 1942 (Programme A) had to be cut back in a new programme of Jan 1943 (Programme B). The planned Initial Establishment figures for the first line squadrons at the dates noted looked like this for the two programmes:-

1/1/43 - 875 / 570
1/1/44 - 1745 / 1150
1/1/45 - 2072 / 1750
1/1/46 - 2464 / 2350
1/7/46 - 2689 / 2689

The biggest shortfall was noted to be in the TBR category (700-650 aircraft in 1943 alone), with delays to Barracuda production and an inability to source any more Avengers from the US. The fighter shortfall was expected to largely resolve itself by Jan 1944, but that was before the US restricted the promised supplies. To assist the fighter issue more Seafires were to be requested.

It wasn't only with aircraft that this happened. A massive reorganisation and rationalisation of M4 Sherman production took place at the end of 1943. One effect was that after early 1944 the only 75mm version in production was the M4A3 which the US Army wanted to keep to themselves. Most of Britain's allocation in 1944 therfore came from remanufactured M4A2 and M4A4 tanks that had been used by training units in the US and which were then surplus to requirements. Britain also had to take 1,330 M4A1(76) with a gun it disn't want, as there was nothing else on offer.


So the generous concept of equipment being pooled and allocated to Lend Lease on the basis of the need of the individual countries, by mid-war was becoming fanciful. The US served its own needs first, rightly or wrongly, and everyone else got the leftovers. When viewed against that background it is just as well that Britain pursued development of the Seafire line and later aircraft and continued to develop its own tanks. With an partner that couldn't be relied upon to honour agreements they were right to be cautious.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Very interesting and helpful.

Were the British able to use the Brewster made F3Us? Were Corsairs and Hellcats actually in action in June and July 1943, or were they still going through work up?

 

[EwenS]

Very interesting and helpful.

Were the British able to use the Brewster made F3Us? Were Corsairs and Hellcats actually in action in June and July 1943, or were they still going through work up?

For the reasons explained on other threads in the past, the Brewster built were used by FAA units working up or by second line units. Any front line units with them had them replaced with Vought or Goodyear built aircraft of the latest specs as they reached the end of work up.

The Corsair sqns all formed for the first time in the USA from June 1943. The first arrived in Britain in Oct 1943 and went aboard Illustrious in Dec for passage to the IO where her first operation was a search for Japanese cruisers in March 1944. Back in Home waters, Victorious used her Corsairs for the first time against Tirpitz on 3 April during Operation Tungsten.

Early Hellcat squadrons formed in Northern Ireland and first went aboard the CVE Emperor in Dec to work up. First offensive op was Operation Tungsten.

In both cases the aircraft were awaiting their parent carriers completing refits. Shortage of Hellcats for Britain in 1943 saw only 4 Hellcat squadrons formed compared to 8 Corsair.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Every little detail slows their arrival to the front. It's a real shame they got into action so late, though they were a bit late for the USN and USMC in the Pacific as well. Early enough to be in the fight, but too late to save a lot of lives lost flying Wildcats etc.

When was the Tarpon / Avenger available to the fleet?

 

[EwenS]

832 Sqn converted to TBF-1 in Jan 1943 before deploying to the Pacific on Victorious.

The AS squadrons began forming in Jan 1943 but, as I've noted on other threads, only 4 arrived in Britain by the end of the year with 832 also returning. 846 became fully operational on Tracker in Jan 1944. 832 & 845 were rushed to Ceylon in Feb 1944 in case of a Japanese breakout from Singapore which was causing a flap at the time. The other pair joined Coastal Command in the run up to D-Day, joined by 2 more that arrived in early 1944.

Other squadrons arrived in 1944. 851 went direct from the US West Coast to India on the CVE Shah in Jan 1944. 832, 845 & 851 all became active from CVE in the IO from April 1944.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Sea Hurricane was a superior naval fighter for the Royal Navy because it existed when it was needed.

...your entire post is pretty much verbatim what I've said already.

Nevertheless, I do disagree with the premise that had the F4F with folding wings was available in larger numbers the Sea Hurricane would not have been ordered, that is debatable, simply because the admiralty explored as many options as they could. The Miles M.20 suggestion from Beaverbrook was acted on, which ultimately proved fruitless, but the fact it was explored into 1941 emphasises the point you make, that there was a war on and options needed to be considered. Perhaps emphasis on a better version of the Sea Hurricane could have been investigated, but we also have to remember that in 1940 the Firebrand was going to be the naval interceptor while the stop gap programmes were being implemented. This means that expediency would have seen Sea Hurricanes regardless of how many F4Fs the navy had. The numbers game.

At any rate, it is worth remembering that the admiralty ordered the F4F from Grumman and emphasised the hasty situation to the extent that Grumman decided to aid this in using the French airframes already on the production line. This got the Wildcats to Britain faster than what would have happened had France not capitulated, again, this needs to be taken into consideration when talking about Martlet Is and their unsuitability for carrier operations. It was expediency that got them to Britain so soon. The carrier capable Martlets were coming but couldn't come any faster, after all, Grumman was still fulfilling orders for the US Navy, so it could only do what it could do under the circumstances. America was not at war.

 

[Capt. Vick]

From:

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

An overview of the production models of the Grumman Martlet, its evolution and changing specifications.

www.armouredcarriers.com

After the war, test pilot Captain Eric Brown went through his copious testing notes and called upon his experience to write succinct summaries and comparisons of the capabilities of every aircraft he had encountered in his book "Duels in the Sky". Several of his verdicts can be found for the variants listed below. But here is his assessment of the F4F-4 versus the Sea Hurricane IIC:

Here were two fighters almost evenly matched in combat performance and firepower, with the British fighter holding the edge. The Hurricane could exploit its superior rate of roll, the Wildcat its steeper angle of climb. In a dogfight the Hurricane could outturn the Wildcat, and it could evade a stern attack by half rolling and using its superior acceleration in a dive.
Verdict: This is a combat I have fought a few times in mock trials. The Hurricane could usually get in more camera gunshots than the Wildcat, but for neither was this an easy job. The Hurricane would probably have been more vulnerable to gun strikes than the Wildcat.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

He says a bit more than that, as do other pilots quoted on that site.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The British import reports ignore aircraft issued to RN units in North America, as a result what follows is an underestimate of numbers sent to the RN starting with, 3 Helldiver in March, 1 in May, 4 in August and 1 in September 1944 plus 1 in January 1945. Early F4F Aug-40 6, Sep-40 38, Oct-40 6, Nov-40 15, Dec-40 6, May-41 9, Jul-41 27, Oct-41 3, Jan-42 32, May-42 13, Jun-42 7, Jul-42 1, Aug-42 23, Sep-42 40, Oct-42 63, Nov-42 44, Dec-42 3, Feb-43 7

Month	F4F	Avenger	Corsair	Hellcat
Apr-43​	0​	6​
May-43​	10​	4​	0​	10​
Jun-43​
Jul-43​	28​	14​	8​	37​
Aug-43​	3​	0​	0​	2​
Sep-43​	5​	29​	2​	17​
Oct-43​	10​	8​	1​	9​
Nov-43​	64​	72​	20​	24​
Dec-43​	53​	64​	0​	23​
Jan-44​	58​	133​	32​	39​
Feb-44​	9​	36​	25​	33​
Mar-44​	40​	36​	64​	20​
Apr-44​	21​	10​	40​	4​
May-44​	33​	24​	154​	26​
Jun-44​	29​	19​	155​	6​
Jul-44​	21​	5​	119​	59​
Aug-44​	2​	21​	30​	45​
Sep-44​	10​	4​	56​	160​
Oct-44​	15​	2​	193​	57​
Nov-44​	30​	18​	86​	96​
Dec-44​	17​	4​	60​	59​
Jan-45​	37​	0​	22​	0​
Feb-45​	2​	12​	103​	33​
Mar-45​	7​	11​	57​	51​
Apr-45​	27​	7​	36​	49​
May-45​	40​	14​	48​	117​
Jun-45​	25​	5​	22​	49​
Jul-45​	0​	26​	63​	60​
Aug-45​	10​	78​	3​	65​
Sep-45​	0​	24​	22​	22​
Total	943​	686​	1421​	1172​

Note F4F total includes pre April 1943 aircraft.

USN reported acceptances on behalf of RN,
1943: Avenger 575, Hellcat 200, Corsair 325
1944: Avenger 186, Hellcat 666, Corsair 1,346
1945: Avenger 160, Hellcat 316, Corsair 231

All the above should exclude the aircraft for New Zealand. The Admiralty strength return for 29 January 1944 lists 651 Barracuda, 1,016 Swordfish, 575 Avenger, 63 Firefly, 60 Hurricane IIc, 429 Wildcat V/VI, 512 Seafire, 212 Hellcat, 220 Corsair, 328 Walrus, 33 Sea Otter, 44 Kingfisher and 3 Helicopters, total 4,146 as operational types which translated to a front line strength of 554 aircraft at home, 183 overseas. The totals include trainers, under repair, in transit and on loan to other organisations. There were another 2,579 non operational aircraft types, like Blenheim, Defiant, older Hurricanes etc. The USN/USMC had 16,691 aircraft on hand June 1943 and 34,071 in June 1944.

Shermans, more from the US Army Supply histories. The US Army had some strong reasons about adjusting Sherman allocations in the final year of the war in Europe as the loss rates used in the original planning were underestimates.

The theatre chose not to use the Washington approved supply requisitioning procedure. This caused problems when it came to debates about what supplies the theatre had, with each side distrusting the other's figures. This would also intrude on the debates about maintenance (loss) rates, since Washington wanted proof to, in effect, lay before congress if needed, before authorising the increases in maintenance rates and production to support the new rates. The rates really mattered, with an authorised strength of 4,000 tanks and taking 135 days from request to delivery nearly 2,000 tanks would be in transit to cover an 11% replacement rate. Doubling the replacement rate would double the tanks in transit as well as increasing the shipping needed to move them. In the various discussions on what the ETO had Washington often counted items in the US allocated to the theatre, the ETO preferred to count what it had in theatre.

A pre invasion attempt to raise the replacement rate for tanks was knocked back until evidence could be found to support the new rate. Told of the 105mm gun Sherman and the new 90mm gun Pershing the theatre requested 4 105mm to 1 90mm gun tanks.

On 15th of August 1944 there are no reserves of Shermans, tanks earmarked as replacements for units arriving later are issued.

At the end of August Eisenhower noted 70 days of operations had cost 2,400 BARs, 1,750 jeeps, 1,500 mortars, 900 tanks and 2,000 aircraft.

On 15th September 12th Army group had 1,965 M4 Shermans classified as serviceable out of 2,147 on hand and 2,279 authorised. Note the serviceable figure is remarkable unless it is actually on strength with units including those under repair by the units. In September 3rd Armoured division reported only 1/3 of its medium tanks were fit for action. The vehicles of 5th Armoured Division were spread out over 100 miles between Valenciennes and Luxembourg, as vehicles fell out of the march through break down or lack of fuel.

End September First army was down to 85% of authorised tanks and so reorganised its tank units, 2nd and 3rd armoured gave up 32 Shermans, the other armoured divisions 18, tank battalions gave up 4 Shermans

On 11th October the theatre alters its request for 4 105mm Shermans for every 1 90mm Pershing to a 2 to 1 ratio in favour of the Sherman.

On 5th November the loss equipment rates are calculated at 1,200 Small arms weapons, 1,300 bayonets and 5,000 tyres a day. Also 700 mortars, 900 2.5 ton trucks, 1,500 jeeps, 100 cannon, 150 cannon tubes, 375 medium and 125 light tanks per month, all as total losses.

By the end of November there are 3,344 tanks in theatre versus the authorised strength of 3,409 plus 937 in reserve. By now there are German PoWs in French coal mines and logging camps.

During December US forces in Italy will release 150 tanks for the forces in France and 21st Army group will transfer 351 Shermans to US forces. The British had calculated a higher tank loss rate it seems, plus their reserves were much closer, the US logistics history claims there were 1,990 Shermans in reserve in Britain, this may include training units and reserves for Italy though. The US cancels further shipments of Shermans to the British until the US tank situation in Europe is corrected, probably around April 1945, rather than attempt to transfer more of the British reserves, the Shermans from 21st Army Group are considered transferred, not loaned. An attempt is made to improve the 76mm gun by providing HVAP ammunition, but shipments work out at 2 rounds per gun per month until March 1945. Changes in the design of the Sherman suspension and the change over to the Pershing meant there were not enough 76mm Shermans to fulfill requests, so 75mm versions were shipped. Attempts to convert some to use the 17 pounder had to be continually postponed because of the tank shortage. The 105mm gun Sherman was a useful addition but did not have powered turret traverse.

On 17th December one of the V-1s targeted on Liege for the first and only time hits the US fuel dump, causing minor damage but burning 650,000 gallons of fuel. A trans Atlantic telephone conference tries to work out the tank replacement situation, figures are as usual in disagreement, partly because Washington is counting tanks released to the theatre, so some are still in the US.

In January 1945 Third Army places a local contract to reinforce the Sherman armour by welding on plates taken from destroyed tanks in the Ardennes area. The theatre alters its request for 2 105mm Shermans for every 1 90mm Pershing to a 4 to 1 ratio in favour of the Pershing.

During February 1945 the armies were back to full Sherman tank strength 5,255, plus 179 in reserve, there were another 940 in the "theatre pipelines", this was still 721 tanks short of authorised strength.

During March the Sherman situation is good enough to finally release 160 for conversion to 17 pounder guns, the first will be delivered in March but the program is cut to 80 vehicles in mid April, few will see any action. On 20th March the theatre has 7,620 Sherman tanks, only 159 short of authorised strength. The armies have 6,606 against a requirement for over 1,000 less of 5,477, but the vehicles on hand includes around 600 that are unserviceable.

End extracts from US Supply histories. Next, mostly for my benefit, version and engine, M4 r-975, M4A1 r-975, M4A2 diesel, M4A3 gaa, M4A4 chrysler, M4A6 diesel. 8,389 M4 built July 1942 to March 1945, 9,895 M4A1 built February 1942 to July 1945, 10,986 M4A2 built April 1942 to May 1945, 1,690 M4A3 built June 1942 to September 1943 plus 10,906 built February 1944 to June 1945, 7,499 M4A4 built July 1942 to September 1943, 75 M4A6 built October 1943 to February 1944. As Ewen has pointed out after Fisher finished 75mm M4A2 production in May 1944 only M4A3 were built with 75mm, while 76mm came as M4A1 (January 1944 to July 1945), M4A2 (May 1944 to May 1945) and M4A3 (March 1944 to April 1945), the 105mm were M4 (February 1944 to March 1945) and M4A3 (May 1944 to June 1945)

The Sherman monthly production figures are quite varied
1942 numbers: 0, 1, 11, 64, 134, 98, 488, 923, 1259, 997, 1609, 2433, total 8,017
1943 numbers: 1613, 2043, 2052, 2318, 2097, 1790, 2401, 1861, 1569, 1320, 1261, 1108, total 21,433
1944 numbers: 671, 508, 715, 975, 1101, 1280, 1158, 1367, 1129, 1347, 1440, 1488, total 13,179
1945 numbers: 1198, 1346, 1532, 1218, 973, 496, 30 total 6,793
The half way point for production was in September 1943. All 75mm gun armed to end 1943.
1944 numbers: 3,758 75mm, 7,135 76mm, 2,286 105mm
1945 numbers: 651 75mm, 3,748 76mm, 2,394 105mm

Production started in February 1942 and by the end of June there were 6 production lines, by the end of the year there were 10. The peak was in August and September 1943, 11 lines, production was rationalised so by February 1944 it was down to 3 lines.

Sherman protection and combat power related improvements from early 1944:

The 47 degree sloped front plate, there was an increase in thickness (2 to 2.5 inches) plus the elimination of shot traps and the extra slope to improve protection. Thicker glacis. Wet Stowage (all 76 mm, in the 75 mm M4A3 from February, there was no other 75mm version in production after May). The 76mm gun. The 75mm versions with the protection improvements comprised around 40% of production January to May 1944, and 100% thereafter. All 76mm versions had the improvements.

All early 1944 76mm Shermans came with superior optics, compared to the 75mm versions, such optics had already been fitted to the M10 and M18. Then, probably during 1944, M18 production was fitted with an even better optics system. The 76mm Sherman production caught up with Tank Destroyer optics again in the second half of 1944 and the 75mm Sherman version, M4A3, still in production was also fitted with similar superior sights at the same time. The first of these 75 and 76mm Shermans arrived in Europe in the autumn of 1944. These improvements was rated as "nearly as good as the Germans", with the US system having a wider field of view, helping situational awareness.

Optics by type of AFV and armament from lowest to highest quality fit, the primary gunnery sighting systems were all direct telescope systems except in the earliest production M4 75mm:

M4 75mm - M38 Telescope with M4 Periscope, then went to the M55 Direct Telescope and the M38/M4, and finally the M70F Direct Telescope and the M38A2/M4A1 Periscope
M4 76mm -Direct Telescope M71D or M70H, later the M71D was replaced by the M71F
M26 - Direct Telescope M77F
M10 - Direct Telescope M51, later the M71G
M18 - Direct Telescope M71D, M76C or M70H
M36 - Direct Telescope M71C, M76D, or M76F

The M38, M55 and M51 were all fixed-magnification optics, with poor clarity, non-illuminated reticules and graticules, and primitive range estimation graticules. The M7X series were all similar adjustable magnification sights, with improved clarity, at least the M71C, M71D, M76C, M76D, M76F, and M77F had provisions for illuminated reticules and graticules, and improved range estimation graticules. The M38 roughly in 1942, the M55 roughly in 1943 and the M70F around the middle of 1944. The 70F being introduced about the same time as the 76mm versions changed over to the M71F. So until around the middle or third quarter of 1944 The 76mm tanks were built with better optics with the caveat that many of the improved systems were retrofitted to "old" tanks already in theatre.

The M10 initially deployed in Europe would have had the M51, since the assault units in NEPTUNE had drawn their equipment from stocks mostly shipped between September 43 and April 44. And given that in general there was a 75-90 day lag from roll-out from the factory to arrival in theatre, that means that the bulk of those in England had been produced between June 43 and January 44.

Given the distinct M36 production batches (4 to 8/44, 10 to 12/44, 5/45 onwards) it is probable the first batch used the 71C, the second the 76D and the third the 76F.