The British import reports ignore aircraft issued to RN units in North America, as a result what follows is an underestimate of numbers sent to the RN starting with, 3 Helldiver in March, 1 in May, 4 in August and 1 in September 1944 plus 1 in January 1945. Early F4F Aug-40 6, Sep-40 38, Oct-40 6, Nov-40 15, Dec-40 6, May-41 9, Jul-41 27, Oct-41 3, Jan-42 32, May-42 13, Jun-42 7, Jul-42 1, Aug-42 23, Sep-42 40, Oct-42 63, Nov-42 44, Dec-42 3, Feb-43 7
Month | F4F | Avenger | Corsair | Hellcat |
Apr-43 | 0 | 6 | | |
May-43 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 10 |
Jun-43 | | | | |
Jul-43 | 28 | 14 | 8 | 37 |
Aug-43 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
Sep-43 | 5 | 29 | 2 | 17 |
Oct-43 | 10 | 8 | 1 | 9 |
Nov-43 | 64 | 72 | 20 | 24 |
Dec-43 | 53 | 64 | 0 | 23 |
Jan-44 | 58 | 133 | 32 | 39 |
Feb-44 | 9 | 36 | 25 | 33 |
Mar-44 | 40 | 36 | 64 | 20 |
Apr-44 | 21 | 10 | 40 | 4 |
May-44 | 33 | 24 | 154 | 26 |
Jun-44 | 29 | 19 | 155 | 6 |
Jul-44 | 21 | 5 | 119 | 59 |
Aug-44 | 2 | 21 | 30 | 45 |
Sep-44 | 10 | 4 | 56 | 160 |
Oct-44 | 15 | 2 | 193 | 57 |
Nov-44 | 30 | 18 | 86 | 96 |
Dec-44 | 17 | 4 | 60 | 59 |
Jan-45 | 37 | 0 | 22 | 0 |
Feb-45 | 2 | 12 | 103 | 33 |
Mar-45 | 7 | 11 | 57 | 51 |
Apr-45 | 27 | 7 | 36 | 49 |
May-45 | 40 | 14 | 48 | 117 |
Jun-45 | 25 | 5 | 22 | 49 |
Jul-45 | 0 | 26 | 63 | 60 |
Aug-45 | 10 | 78 | 3 | 65 |
Sep-45 | 0 | 24 | 22 | 22 |
Total | 943 | 686 | 1421 | 1172 |
Note F4F total includes pre April 1943 aircraft.
USN reported acceptances on behalf of RN,
1943: Avenger 575, Hellcat 200, Corsair 325
1944: Avenger 186, Hellcat 666, Corsair 1,346
1945: Avenger 160, Hellcat 316, Corsair 231
All the above should exclude the aircraft for New Zealand. The Admiralty strength return for 29 January 1944 lists 651 Barracuda, 1,016 Swordfish, 575 Avenger, 63 Firefly, 60 Hurricane IIc, 429 Wildcat V/VI, 512 Seafire, 212 Hellcat, 220 Corsair, 328 Walrus, 33 Sea Otter, 44 Kingfisher and 3 Helicopters, total 4,146 as operational types which translated to a front line strength of 554 aircraft at home, 183 overseas. The totals include trainers, under repair, in transit and on loan to other organisations. There were another 2,579 non operational aircraft types, like Blenheim, Defiant, older Hurricanes etc. The USN/USMC had 16,691 aircraft on hand June 1943 and 34,071 in June 1944.
Shermans, more from the US Army Supply histories. The US Army had some strong reasons about adjusting Sherman allocations in the final year of the war in Europe as the loss rates used in the original planning were underestimates.
The theatre chose not to use the Washington approved supply requisitioning procedure. This caused problems when it came to debates about what supplies the theatre had, with each side distrusting the other's figures. This would also intrude on the debates about maintenance (loss) rates, since Washington wanted proof to, in effect, lay before congress if needed, before authorising the increases in maintenance rates and production to support the new rates. The rates really mattered, with an authorised strength of 4,000 tanks and taking 135 days from request to delivery nearly 2,000 tanks would be in transit to cover an 11% replacement rate. Doubling the replacement rate would double the tanks in transit as well as increasing the shipping needed to move them. In the various discussions on what the ETO had Washington often counted items in the US allocated to the theatre, the ETO preferred to count what it had in theatre.
A pre invasion attempt to raise the replacement rate for tanks was knocked back until evidence could be found to support the new rate. Told of the 105mm gun Sherman and the new 90mm gun Pershing the theatre requested 4 105mm to 1 90mm gun tanks.
On 15th of August 1944 there are no reserves of Shermans, tanks earmarked as replacements for units arriving later are issued.
At the end of August Eisenhower noted 70 days of operations had cost 2,400 BARs, 1,750 jeeps, 1,500 mortars, 900 tanks and 2,000 aircraft.
On 15th September 12th Army group had 1,965 M4 Shermans classified as serviceable out of 2,147 on hand and 2,279 authorised. Note the serviceable figure is remarkable unless it is actually on strength with units including those under repair by the units. In September 3rd Armoured division reported only 1/3 of its medium tanks were fit for action. The vehicles of 5th Armoured Division were spread out over 100 miles between Valenciennes and Luxembourg, as vehicles fell out of the march through break down or lack of fuel.
End September First army was down to 85% of authorised tanks and so reorganised its tank units, 2nd and 3rd armoured gave up 32 Shermans, the other armoured divisions 18, tank battalions gave up 4 Shermans
On 11th October the theatre alters its request for 4 105mm Shermans for every 1 90mm Pershing to a 2 to 1 ratio in favour of the Sherman.
On 5th November the loss equipment rates are calculated at 1,200 Small arms weapons, 1,300 bayonets and 5,000 tyres a day. Also 700 mortars, 900 2.5 ton trucks, 1,500 jeeps, 100 cannon, 150 cannon tubes, 375 medium and 125 light tanks per month, all as total losses.
By the end of November there are 3,344 tanks in theatre versus the authorised strength of 3,409 plus 937 in reserve. By now there are German PoWs in French coal mines and logging camps.
During December US forces in Italy will release 150 tanks for the forces in France and 21st Army group will transfer 351 Shermans to US forces. The British had calculated a higher tank loss rate it seems, plus their reserves were much closer, the US logistics history claims there were 1,990 Shermans in reserve in Britain, this may include training units and reserves for Italy though. The US cancels further shipments of Shermans to the British until the US tank situation in Europe is corrected, probably around April 1945, rather than attempt to transfer more of the British reserves, the Shermans from 21st Army Group are considered transferred, not loaned. An attempt is made to improve the 76mm gun by providing HVAP ammunition, but shipments work out at 2 rounds per gun per month until March 1945. Changes in the design of the Sherman suspension and the change over to the Pershing meant there were not enough 76mm Shermans to fulfill requests, so 75mm versions were shipped. Attempts to convert some to use the 17 pounder had to be continually postponed because of the tank shortage. The 105mm gun Sherman was a useful addition but did not have powered turret traverse.
On 17th December one of the V-1s targeted on Liege for the first and only time hits the US fuel dump, causing minor damage but burning 650,000 gallons of fuel. A trans Atlantic telephone conference tries to work out the tank replacement situation, figures are as usual in disagreement, partly because Washington is counting tanks released to the theatre, so some are still in the US.
In January 1945 Third Army places a local contract to reinforce the Sherman armour by welding on plates taken from destroyed tanks in the Ardennes area. The theatre alters its request for 2 105mm Shermans for every 1 90mm Pershing to a 4 to 1 ratio in favour of the Pershing.
During February 1945 the armies were back to full Sherman tank strength 5,255, plus 179 in reserve, there were another 940 in the "theatre pipelines", this was still 721 tanks short of authorised strength.
During March the Sherman situation is good enough to finally release 160 for conversion to 17 pounder guns, the first will be delivered in March but the program is cut to 80 vehicles in mid April, few will see any action. On 20th March the theatre has 7,620 Sherman tanks, only 159 short of authorised strength. The armies have 6,606 against a requirement for over 1,000 less of 5,477, but the vehicles on hand includes around 600 that are unserviceable.
End extracts from US Supply histories. Next, mostly for my benefit, version and engine, M4 r-975, M4A1 r-975, M4A2 diesel, M4A3 gaa, M4A4 chrysler, M4A6 diesel. 8,389 M4 built July 1942 to March 1945, 9,895 M4A1 built February 1942 to July 1945, 10,986 M4A2 built April 1942 to May 1945, 1,690 M4A3 built June 1942 to September 1943 plus 10,906 built February 1944 to June 1945, 7,499 M4A4 built July 1942 to September 1943, 75 M4A6 built October 1943 to February 1944. As Ewen has pointed out after Fisher finished 75mm M4A2 production in May 1944 only M4A3 were built with 75mm, while 76mm came as M4A1 (January 1944 to July 1945), M4A2 (May 1944 to May 1945) and M4A3 (March 1944 to April 1945), the 105mm were M4 (February 1944 to March 1945) and M4A3 (May 1944 to June 1945)
The Sherman monthly production figures are quite varied
1942 numbers: 0, 1, 11, 64, 134, 98, 488, 923, 1259, 997, 1609, 2433, total 8,017
1943 numbers: 1613, 2043, 2052, 2318, 2097, 1790, 2401, 1861, 1569, 1320, 1261, 1108, total 21,433
1944 numbers: 671, 508, 715, 975, 1101, 1280, 1158, 1367, 1129, 1347, 1440, 1488, total 13,179
1945 numbers: 1198, 1346, 1532, 1218, 973, 496, 30 total 6,793
The half way point for production was in September 1943. All 75mm gun armed to end 1943.
1944 numbers: 3,758 75mm, 7,135 76mm, 2,286 105mm
1945 numbers: 651 75mm, 3,748 76mm, 2,394 105mm
Production started in February 1942 and by the end of June there were 6 production lines, by the end of the year there were 10. The peak was in August and September 1943, 11 lines, production was rationalised so by February 1944 it was down to 3 lines.
Sherman protection and combat power related improvements from early 1944:
The 47 degree sloped front plate, there was an increase in thickness (2 to 2.5 inches) plus the elimination of shot traps and the extra slope to improve protection. Thicker glacis. Wet Stowage (all 76 mm, in the 75 mm M4A3 from February, there was no other 75mm version in production after May). The 76mm gun. The 75mm versions with the protection improvements comprised around 40% of production January to May 1944, and 100% thereafter. All 76mm versions had the improvements.
All early 1944 76mm Shermans came with superior optics, compared to the 75mm versions, such optics had already been fitted to the M10 and M18. Then, probably during 1944, M18 production was fitted with an even better optics system. The 76mm Sherman production caught up with Tank Destroyer optics again in the second half of 1944 and the 75mm Sherman version, M4A3, still in production was also fitted with similar superior sights at the same time. The first of these 75 and 76mm Shermans arrived in Europe in the autumn of 1944. These improvements was rated as "nearly as good as the Germans", with the US system having a wider field of view, helping situational awareness.
Optics by type of AFV and armament from lowest to highest quality fit, the primary gunnery sighting systems were all direct telescope systems except in the earliest production M4 75mm:
M4 75mm - M38 Telescope with M4 Periscope, then went to the M55 Direct Telescope and the M38/M4, and finally the M70F Direct Telescope and the M38A2/M4A1 Periscope
M4 76mm -Direct Telescope M71D or M70H, later the M71D was replaced by the M71F
M26 - Direct Telescope M77F
M10 - Direct Telescope M51, later the M71G
M18 - Direct Telescope M71D, M76C or M70H
M36 - Direct Telescope M71C, M76D, or M76F
The M38, M55 and M51 were all fixed-magnification optics, with poor clarity, non-illuminated reticules and graticules, and primitive range estimation graticules. The M7X series were all similar adjustable magnification sights, with improved clarity, at least the M71C, M71D, M76C, M76D, M76F, and M77F had provisions for illuminated reticules and graticules, and improved range estimation graticules. The M38 roughly in 1942, the M55 roughly in 1943 and the M70F around the middle of 1944. The 70F being introduced about the same time as the 76mm versions changed over to the M71F. So until around the middle or third quarter of 1944 The 76mm tanks were built with better optics with the caveat that many of the improved systems were retrofitted to "old" tanks already in theatre.
The M10 initially deployed in Europe would have had the M51, since the assault units in NEPTUNE had drawn their equipment from stocks mostly shipped between September 43 and April 44. And given that in general there was a 75-90 day lag from roll-out from the factory to arrival in theatre, that means that the bulk of those in England had been produced between June 43 and January 44.
Given the distinct M36 production batches (4 to 8/44, 10 to 12/44, 5/45 onwards) it is probable the first batch used the 71C, the second the 76D and the third the 76F.