Was the self defending bomber really a failure?

Colin1 said:

The USAF bombed extensive areas of jungle during Vietnam
Do you think the Canberra, even triple the number, could have handled a carpet-bombing job better than the king of the carpet-bombers?

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No I don't but then again I could never see the point of the activity you describe. What exactly did all that carpet bombing of jungle achieve in terms of progressing the military objectives of the campaign? Did it stop the NVA or Viet Cong operating? Did it stop the resupply route along the Ho Chi Minh Trails (and, yes, I used the plural deliberately)? Did it in any way reduce the warmaking capacity of the adversary? I believe the answer to all 3 questions is a resounding "NO". However, it did achieve some things. It annoyed the hell out of thousands of locals and probably greatly assisted NVA and VC recruitment. It expended thousands of bombs blowing up highly aggressive trees and paddy fields, and it explosed expensive large strategic aircraft and their crews to unnecessary threat (although, to be fair, the Buffs did not penetrate as far north as the tactical fighters - how's that for a contradiction of WWII strategic bombing theory...the small guys operating at longer range than the big multi-engine (and self-protected!) strategic bomber).

Sorry of this comes across as overly harsh but I really do fail to see what the carpet bombing of jungle achieved. The most effective bombing during the conflict was the increased employment of LGBs during LINEBACKER which achieved more success against North Vietnamese lines of communication with 155K tons of bombs than was achieved in all of ROLLING THUNDER and four-times the expenditure of munitions.

JoeB said:

IMO the unescorted defended bomber concept mainly failed, undefended day light unescorted bomber concept would have failed also, escorted bomber that could take care of itself against limited intensity and duration of fighter attacks (ie B-17/24 types, they generally could) was the right concept.

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Ah, but what about escorted, undefended "Schnellbomber"?
I.E., send in the Mossies (or whatever plane) w/escorts.

buffnut453 said:

No I don't but then again I could never see the point of the activity you describe. What exactly did all that carpet bombing of jungle achieve in terms of progressing the military objectives of the campaign? Did it stop the NVA or Viet Cong operating? Did it stop the resupply route along the Ho Chi Minh Trails (and, yes, I used the plural deliberately)? Did it in any way reduce the warmaking capacity of the adversary? I believe the answer to all 3 questions is a resounding "NO". However, it did achieve some things. It annoyed the hell out of thousands of locals and probably greatly assisted NVA and VC recruitment. It expended thousands of bombs blowing up highly aggressive trees and paddy fields, and it explosed expensive large strategic aircraft and their crews to unnecessary threat (although, to be fair, the Buffs did not penetrate as far north as the tactical fighters - how's that for a contradiction of WWII strategic bombing theory...the small guys operating at longer range than the big multi-engine (and self-protected!) strategic bomber).

Sorry of this comes across as overly harsh but I really do fail to see what the carpet bombing of jungle achieved. The most effective bombing during the conflict was the increased employment of LGBs during LINEBACKER which achieved more success against North Vietnamese lines of communication with 155K tons of bombs than was achieved in all of ROLLING THUNDER and four-times the expenditure of munitions.

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All true BUT in some of the Buff strikes on open jungle did alleviate pressure on US forces operating close to the strike (my brother witnessed this first hand)

The carpet bombings of the Vietnamese jungle did not do much to the over all war effort, but that wasn't because of the aircraft. The political meddling in the war hampered any chance of really establishing a victory from the south. As mentioned, once Nixon unleashed the B-52 in full force, the North Vietnamese was very quick to return to the peace table.

Entirely agree with your comments, Flyboy. My point was that bombing jungle was largely irrelevant to the overall war effort irrespective of the aircraft type used to drop the munitions. There were all sorts of political issues associated with the employment of the BUF, I suspect due to fears of a COMINTERN (probably an inappropriate term but you get the drift - international communist comunity) backlash to a nuclear-capable strategic bomber being employed against the NVA/VC. The 5000-mile political screwdriver was thoroughly utilised by DC throughout the conflict.

Agree, too, about the success of LINEBACKER, although I thought it was the more widespread use of LGBs that caused the real damage - the BUF was predominantly the big stick to show what would happen if the NVA/VC didn't come to the negotiating table.

Again, nothing against the BUF - I always used to marvel walking around the example at Duxford - it wasn't the aircraft that was at fault, just the dumb tasking to blow up flora and fauna.

buffnut453 said:

Maybe so, but a cannon-armed fighter could stand off outside the range of small-calibre defensive weapons on the bombers and still inflict casualties on the bomber formation with impunity.

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I'm sorry, but I have to disagree with this heartily.

Against a plane mounting sufficient defensive armament (that is to say, multiple .50 caliber guns, and twin mounts in key locations,) if you and some of your friends try to sit on a bomber's tail at 400 or 500 yards, (which is pushing it, even for a high-velocity cannon,) you're still well in effective range of their tail guns, and they have a much more stable firing platform as well as more ammo. They'll happily hose you down until you cop one in the radiator. Multiply twin tail guns vs. 20 bombers and then things start to get fun.

So this, naturally, leads to the employment of the high-sides attack, or head-on attacks, to minimize your exposure to defensive fire. Given the closing rates involved, long-range benefits of cannons become nil.

Not to mention, ammo loads on most cannon-armed fighters were very limited, so you couldn't afford to hose rounds at long range and hope for hits, and many cannons of the war had very poor ballistics compared to .50 cal (the Japanese early 20mm and the German 30mm cannons, for example,) and a shorter effective range.

As for the effectiveness of self-defending bombers, those citing high casualties of the unescorted groups need to remember what they were attempting- to fly over 2,000 miles of enemy-held territory and bomb their rear-most areas, and then fly back out. To expect unescorted bombers to do this with low casualties is tantamount to expecting them to steamroll over the enemy, and Germany was not a weak or technologically deficient enemy whatsoever. The brutal attrition of the early bombing campaign is what you'd expect from a military fighting a foe of similar capabilities.

In any case, raw loss rates don't help us much because they don't tell us how many bombers were knocked down by flack, which to my memory was more dangerous by far then interceptor fighters.

Hi Guys


I thought it might be useful to know that the DH 98 was designed as a High Altitude Recon Bomber, but as the war progressed the emphasis on bombing started to overtake the PR roles. It had no problems bombing from High altitude, or low altitude, day or night, and this included attacks against what many consider to be the most heavily defended target for AA - Berlin.

As the war progressed ther were two specific subtypes further developed and refined for the High level bombing role, details as follows:

B.Mk IX For high altitude with one bomb of 1814 kg.

B.Mk XVI With pressurized cabin newer version of the B.Mk IX

As far as bombing aids were concerned, I have not yet uncovered the type of bombsight installed, but for night the Mosquito was fitted with the full range of night time blind bombing aids, including H2S and the far more accurate OBOE.

FLYBOYJ said:

All true BUT in some of the Buff strikes on open jungle did alleviate pressure on US forces operating close to the strike (my brother witnessed this first hand)

The carpet bombings of the Vietnamese jungle did not do much to the over all war effort, but that wasn't because of the aircraft. The political meddling in the war hampered any chance of really establishing a victory from the south. As mentioned, once Nixon unleashed the B-52 in full force, the North Vietnamese was very quick to return to the peace table.

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I remember reading a review by a NV officer who said that for all the air attacks in Vietnam, only two worried them.
One was the B52 because if they were on target there was nowhere to hide. The second were the attack helicopters as they seemed personal, able to winkle out the target. The vast majority of other attacks achieved little.
This was no doubt some propaganda but it had the ring of truth.

JoeB said:

The USAF used 'Canberras' ie, B-57's in Vietnam. The most notable were 'Tropic Moon' program conversions to, for then, highly advanced night vision and laser guided bomb capability (LGB use in SEA was first highly publicized in 1972 from F-4's, but it started eariler during the 'bombing halt').



Joe

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TI's Paveway I actually started combat ops in 1968. I was not involved in that design but I was 'loaned' to TI in 1971 during the II development which added the bigger aero surfaces to extend slant range but brought higher failure rates due to the lowered bomb impact angle.

The FMU -81 fuse/wlock ring assy connecting the bang bang control module to the Mk 83/Mk84 was being sheared before detonation. I did a full blown NASTRAN model which was pretty simple per se comared to AH-1 or SR-71 but still useful in gaining insight to the failure mode.

buffnut453 said:

No I don't but then again I could never see the point of the activity you describe. What exactly did all that carpet bombing of jungle achieve in terms of progressing the military objectives of the campaign?

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I think Joe covered it
that wasn't really my point because that isn't the point of the thread.
Regardless of the success of the campaign, someone decided that it was a good idea at the time, the bombing footprint of even one B-52 ensured that, if there was something under it, chances of survival were nil.

The effectiveness of the bombing of Vietnamese jungle is the subject for another topic