Were airborne operations in WW2 worth it?

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Marcel

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So how successful were airborne operations during WW2?

My country (The Netherlands) has seen it's share of airborne operations during the war.
Let's start with 1940, probably the lesser known operations. In 1940 we saw one of the first major airborn assaults of the war. It was actually split in two parts. The first part was the strategic assault on the bridges at Dordrecht and Rotterdam. The second part was the, more politically motivated, assault on the airfields neat The Hague. The German army tried to win the war by capturing the Dutch leadership.

The first part was a success. The bridges were taken intact and the German forces were able to link up with the main forces that were advancing from thesouth. The second part however was a disaster. The airfields were not taken for long and the Dutch forces (and let's be real, these were virtually untrained recrutes) were able to counterattack and destroy most of the German forces that had landed. Many highly trained Germain airborne troops were either killed or captured and the operation resulted in a huge loss of Ju-52 transport a/c which some believe influenced the German decision making in operation See
Löwe (the planned invasion of Great Britain).

As a contrast, the attack on the Fortrerss of Eben Emael in Belgium was again quite successful.

So the deployment of airborne troops in 1940 was a mixed bag of success and failure.

We see this in most later operations as well. Crete in 1941, the Germans launched an airborne assault on the island of Crete. The operation was initially successful but the Germans suffered heavy casualties during the operation, making them virtually abandoning airborne operations after that.

Normandy, again a mixed bag. The airborne troops were able to secure key objectives but suffered heavy casualties.

Operation Market Garden, we all know. Some success, but ultimately a failure.

I probably forgot some operations.

All this while airborne troops were rather expensive to train and the logistic operation to support them was quite taxing.
So the question arises. Were airborne operations in WW2 ultimately worth it?
 

Varsity was successfull but a a high prize and certainly useless at this stage of the war.

Japanese airborne operations in 1942 very very successful.

Ditto generally for the US ones in the PTO.

In Burma the outcome is controversial.

For the Soviet their main operation at Kremenchug was a disaster, they were much more efficient against the Japanese.
 
I was looking at the 1940 invasion of the Netherlands just last week. German airborne troops in 1940 consisted of the:-

7th Flieger Division of about 5 battalions (it was increased in size to 4 brigade sized regiments by the time of Crete) consisting mostly of parachute troops and a few gliders (about 4,000 men deployed in the Netherlands) and

22nd Luftlande Division (about 9,500 men deployed in the Netherlands). This division was to be carried into battle in Ju52 which would land on airfields secured hopefully by the parachute troops. In fact in 1940 because the defenders proved so good at defending the airfields thay had to try and land on roads and fields in the vicinity of their objectives. Dutch fields were not conducive to that due to numerous ditches. Hence the high loss of Ju52 and heavy casualties. Each Ju52 carried only 12-14 paras or 14-16 airlanding troops.

Also of note is the difference between German and Allied parachute equipment. German parachute designs for their troops (not aircrew) were poor meaning that they could jump with only a pistol for protection when they reached the ground. Any other weapons had to be dropped in containers alongside them. So until they could untangle themselves from their parachutes, not easy apparemtly due to the design, and gather up their weapons, thay were pretty much defenceless.

The only glider they had in 1940 was the DFS 230 carrying just a pilot & 9 men or about 600lb of equipment. No vehicles or heavier equipment. AIUI the latter was supposed to arrive on more Ju52. Other glider designs didn't enter service until 1941 e.g. Go 240 and Me 321 Gigant. Compare that with later US and British designs.
 
This was also the case for the first organization of the US paratroopers (1942). They jumped with their personal weapon dismounted and everyone had a .45 for close defense in case of urgency, and had to hurriedly reassemble their shoulder weapon.

With the new organization (1943) the pistols were removed. As an illustration, a picture from the French US trained and organized 1er Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes (1er RCP) parading in Algeria : they all have a M1911A1 pistol. During WW2 they never had an occasion to perform a combat jump and fought as choc infantry. They made up for the time in Indochina.

The French para who performed combat jump during WW2 were the British trained 2e and 3e (Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes), for the British the 3rd and 4th SAS Regiments, that jumped in France and in Holland (Operation Amherst).


 
Marcel said:
So the question arises. Were airborne operations in WW2 ultimately worth it?
Click to expand...

At Normandy they were. Although the paratroopers were quite scattered, the scattering itself imposed a soft paralysis on the decision-making of some German leaders and formations, allowing the airborne to seize many if not most of their objectives. They very nearly failed in Sicily, between scattering that was even worse (especially for the Brits), the blue-on-blue shoot-downs, and the various counterattacks the Axis launched.

There were more airborne ops in the PTO than many people seem to think, but I don't know much about them, not enough to make an intelligent judgment.

ETA: I'm getting ready to watch Paul's recent video about Japanese paras on WW2TV, just started it but it seems a good presentation so far. Will link when done.
 
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IMHO, airborne operations in WWII were similar to very large (or very, very large) "commando" operations in terms of their potential effect. Each significant operation was a part of a larger ground operation. So the probable outcomes, in my opinion, break down like smaller, true commando operations would. (1) Some are successful and deliver substantial aid to the corresponding ground ops. (2) Some are not successful (as planned) but still wind up giving some aid to the ground operations in unplanned ways, e.g. the scattering over Normandy completely confusing the German command. (3) Some are utter failures and provide no aid to the ground operations, but at the same time cause little or no detriment to the ground ops. Assuming the outcome will be one of the above three, I think airborne ops were worth the effort, overall, since there is no "detrimenal" outcome other than large casualites and there is a chance for good payoff if even only partially successful. Remember, Eisenhower belived the paratroops in Normady would suffer 50-70% casualties but still thought the drops were worthwhile.

The OP has posed an interesting and pertinent question.
 
The paratrooper operations part of Overlord were described as brilliantly planned and horribly executed. I don't know how much good they did. I was struck by how the British airborne captured Pegasus Bridge on D-Day and a Spitfire flew over to read the signal that they were successful; talk about primitive communications!

Market Garden was described as horribly planned and brilliantly executed. It did not seem to be good idea in the first place and they ignored information that indicated German forces were much stronger than they had estimated. Frankly, I have never been too impressed with airborne operations' utility but the book "September Hope" about the US element of Market Garden did very much impress me on the fighting ability of the US airborne troops.

I think the airborne assaults as part of crossing the Rhine were worth it, since crossings involved not so much bridgeheads, which were vulnerable to concentrated assaults but instead involved thousands of DUKW amphib trucks crossing all over the place. Airborne units could get into position and cause big problems for German units trying to oppose the crossings, which in any case were not what the Germans expected. They virtually gave up, since there were no bridgeheads; the whole friggin' river was bridgehead. And the DUKW rushed in to resupply and reinforce the airborne. Many of the paratroops did not even know what a DUKW was and were shocked when these huge weird vehicles drove up and started unloading supplies. The airborne saw their first use of 57MM recoilless rifles in that operation, which were very successful and a real shock to the Germans. The Germans were aware of teh DUKW but estimated the US had only 150 of them. In reality they had more like 8000.
 
yosimitesam said:
IMHO, airborne operations in WWII were similar to very large (or very, very large) "commando" operations in terms of their potential effect. Each significant operation was a part of a larger ground operation.
Click to expand...

The real difference is that Commando ops were largely one-and-done raids, scouting missions with extraction planned, capture this radar -- whereas full-scale airborne ops were planned for, as Monty put it in a different context, "staking out claims". At that point the paras were generally tasked with securing the ground rather than pushing further advance.

This meant that ground forces had to advance to the succour of the paras. While there are many factors in the failure of Market-Garden -- which include the airborne's end of the planning -- the failure of ground forces to get to Arnhem underlines the difference between airborne and Commando ops. Rescuing the Commandos meant pulling them out safely after mission is accomplished. Rescuing full airborne formations (say, a battalion or more) meant getting ground forces to them and laying groundwork for resupply and reinforcement.

This is only my opinion, but both the American divisions stayed in place after the failure of M-G, and I don't doubt that the Red Devils would have as well had XXX Corps gotten to them in time -- a failure which may be ascribed to poor airborne planning.

So I don't see A/B ops as similar to the specops stuff Commandos or Marine Raiders did. In my opinion, and that's all it is, when the British or Americans dropped a battalion or more, that was your notice that they were planning to stay.
 
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Do you think that over estimation of airborne troops effectiveness played a part in the variance in success these troops had? If I look at Market Garden, the success the airport had seems to be reverse linear to the distance from the frontline they were dropped. Same seems to be true for the airborne operations in The Netherlands. The landings at The Hague were behind the main Dutch defence while the ones at Dordrecht were actually on it.

I also don't know much about airborne assaults in the far east, would be interesting to get some good info on that.
 
Hi
Reference the Japanese Airborne forces. The British OH 'Airborne Forces' by Lt.-Col. T B H Otway DSO, has this brief section on them:



A more contemporary (Int) view from 'The Organization of the Japanese Army & Navy Airforces, 1945.':


And 'Handbook on Japanese Military Forces' TM-E 30-480 (Oct 1944):

I hope that is of use.

Mike
 
I believe that airborne were used in retaking Corrigador. And I think they were used at Okinawa as well. Rod Serling was one and he got separated from the rest of his unit and dropped into a deserted village, a very spooky situation that was used in his TV series more than once.

There was quite a bit of use of glider-borne troops in Burma and they were indeed "commando like" which is why the Air Commandos were created, a special group for providing air support to such operations.
 
All Soviet paratrooper operations of any significance can be considered failures. The main reason for this was poor planning due to the low level of senior officers. The second reason was a lack of transport aircraft and the low level of pilot training.
 
I don't believe there were any airborne assault landings on Okinawa by US forces. The 11th Airborne Division was flown into Okinawa from Luzon in the Philippines on 12th Aug 1945 in anticipation of being the first occupation troops to land in Japan. The first elements from the division were landed from aircraft (not parachuted) at Atsugi airfield near Yokohama on 28th Aug with the rest of the division following over coming days.

The first elements of the Allied fleets dropped anchor in Sagami Wan, outside Tokyo Bay on 27th Aug, moving into the Bay itself starting the next day when the minesweepers had done their work.
 
I think that Crete was a bit anomalous, because Freyberg had Ultra telling him that the assault would be airborne, and the importance of the airfields. So he was able to deploy troops and brief his commanders accordingly, and the defenders were therefore able to inflict heavy casualties. Because they typically employ fewer personnel with generally light weapons, airborne operations rely on surprise more than land or seaborne assaults.

Even though the airborne assault was very bloody, it nevertheless did achieve the objective of securing a foothold on Crete.
 
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